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Abstract 
 
 
 
The thesis examines the development of the civil air route between Britain and India 
from 1918 to 1932. Although an Indian route had been pioneered before the First World 
War, after it ended, fourteen years would pass before the route was established on a 
permanent basis. The research provides an explanation for the late start and subsequent 
slow development of the India route. The overall finding is that progress was held back 
by a combination of interconnected factors operating in both Britain and the Persian 
Gulf region. These included economic, political, administrative, diplomatic, 
technological, and cultural factors. The arguments are developed through a 
methodology that focuses upon two key theoretical concepts which relate, firstly, to 
interwar civil aviation as part of a dimension of empire, and secondly, to the history of 
aviation as a new technology. With regards to empire, the thesis investigates the 
imperial and economic value of imperial aviation, perceptions of Britain’s imperial 
potency, and the nature of Britain’s long-term policy and administrative arrangements in 
London, Delhi, Persia, and on the Trucial Coast. In relation to technology, the thesis 
examines the choices made by the British. In connection with both empire and 
technology, the thesis considers the character and effects of the ‘official mind’ 
responsible for civil aviation policy. 
The research shows that, in relation to aviation, British imperial policy-making 
was in general neither confident nor proactive. In terms of the India route, British 
imperial administrators displayed weakness, in that they were unable to impose their 
will sufficiently strongly to drive through the route either rapidly or effectively. The 
impetus for imperial aviation came from the empire’s core, and the causes of the route’s 
delay were therefore located within the core. The primary cause was Britain’s resistance 
to providing financial support for air transportation. As the First World War ended, the 
development of imperial aviation depended upon that of civil aviation. With private 
capital investment not forthcoming, the Government reluctantly took on responsibility 
but not until 1924, when, provoked by Germany’s air progress and lured by the promise 
of imperial prestige, was the Government forced to provide financial support to civil 
aviation. It subsidised Imperial Airways, but in pursuing the policy of wholly funding 
the R101 airship project it made the wrong technological choice. The Imperial Airship 
Scheme only diverted public money away from the aeroplane development on which 
future civil aviation would depend. 
In the second half of the 1920s, as the British attempted to develop the India 
route via Persia and then the Trucial Coast, their long-term policy in the region seemed 
to promise diplomatic advantage in negotiations. However, as aviation represented an 
unwelcome incursion into local sovereignty, it caused local opposition. Unable to resort 
to their traditional ‘gunboat diplomacy,’ the British found their influence greatly below 
what they had presumed. When they were forced to develop a collaborative relationship 
with local elites, it became apparent that a balance of power had emerged.  
While undoubtedly showing the limitations of British imperial policy-making, 
the protracted history of the establishment of the Indian air route demonstrates that to 
some extent the British ‘official mind’ was flexible, and capable of adapting to changed 
conditions.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
The thesis investigates an area of British imperial policy that tends to be neglected but is 
nevertheless important: the development of the civil air route from Britain to India 
between 1918 and 1932. In particular, the research considers the difficulties that the 
British experienced in formulating a far-sighted and forward-looking policy. The study 
is conducted within the context of the history of interwar civil aviation as it relates to 
Britain’s wider imperial policy. It discusses the forces and influences that affected 
imperial aviation in both Britain and the environs of India, and both within and outside 
Governmental spheres. In making an in-depth examination of a number of key aspects 
of the development of the India route, it explores factors that have hitherto received 
little, or only partial, attention. These include, for example, the role of airships in 
passenger transportation to India, and the difficulties involved in establishing a 
permanent air sector through the Persian Gulf region - the critical bridging sector for the 
onward route to Australia. In structure, the thesis is broadly chronological. In the first 
half it investigates matters that affected the early stages of civil and imperial aviation 
policy-making in Britain, with a focus on the years 1919 to 1930. The second half 
examines British attempts from the mid-1920s until 1932 to develop civil air services 
firstly via Persia and then via the Trucial Coast (areas corresponding to today’s Iran and 
the United Arab Emirates). Reflecting the eastward advance of the India route 
throughout the 1920s, the subject matter is also considered in terms of geographical 
progression. 
The broad nature of the topic has called for an eclectic approach. As Gordon 
Pirie has commented: ‘Customarily, transport has been treated as something that 
belongs only in the grand theatre of economics, law, politics and technology.’1 Within 
the sphere of transportation scholarship, aviation, as Janet R. Bednarek (in a recent 
examination of international coverage over the previous decade) comments, has inspired 
‘far less historical scholarship than other major forms of transportation technology.’ 
This, Bednarek suggests, is because aviation history is ‘informed by diverse 
perspectives and disciplines,’ and ‘the field has been and remains hard to pin down.’ 
Few prominent themes have emerged, and thus Bednarek’s review includes ‘sometimes 
isolated’ topics as diverse as strategic bombing, women in British imperial aviation, and 
                                            
1 Gordon Pirie, Air Empire, British Imperial Civil Aviation, 1919-39 (Manchester, Manchester University 
Press, 2009), p. 5. 
2 
the Boeing 787 Dreamliner aircraft.2 Pirie suggests that ‘British imperial, colonial and 
commonwealth histories are extraordinarily coy about civil aviation.’3 Certainly the 
thesis demonstrates that a wide range of factors played directly and indirectly upon 
imperial aviation policy-making. These factors were diverse, including, for example, 
Britain’s ideological opposition to the subsidisation of passenger air transport, British 
jealousy of Germany’s Zeppelin airships, a Persian official’s relationship with the 
Soviet Union, and an Arab sheikh’s fear of assassination. It may be argued that the 
approach adopted here detracts from in-depth examination of individual topics. 
However, it is nevertheless appropriate for an investigation of the India route, in that it 
allows for diversity in the conceptual ideas applied to the study of aviation policy. The 
difficulty of classifying the area of study – imperial aviation - may be a contributory 
factor in the limited attention that has been given by historians to the civil Indian air 
route. Given that academic coverage of imperial aviation has generally been uneven, 
and that the significance of civil aviation to imperial history has been to a great extent 
disregarded, the thesis makes a considerable contribution to the existing literature.  
A number of scholars have examined British imperial aviation within a broader 
context. For example, Charles Harvard Gibbs-Smith surveys the development of 
aviation from the earliest times until the end of World War II.4 In terms of European 
interwar aviation, Martin Staniland has investigated the role of the state in the 
development of civil aviation, in particular in Britain, France, and Germany.5 Narrowing 
the field further, Lucy Budd has outlined the progress of international and British 
imperial route development.6 As regards general studies of the India route, after its 
publication in 1960, Robin Higham’s Britain’s Imperial Air Routes, 1918-19397 
remained for five decades the standard text on the subject, although Higham gives the 
India route only one chapter. In 2009 Pirie’s Air Empire: British Imperial Civil 
Aviation, 1919-398 added greatly to the field, expanding upon civil aviation as a tool of 
empire and examining in more depth the reasons for the delays encountered in air route 
development. Given the geographical and historical extent of their subject matter, the 
                                            
2 Janet R. Bednarek, ‘Open Sky: The Broad Range of Recent Scholarship in Aviation History,’ Mobility 
in History, Vol. 4 (2013), pp. 89-94. 
3 Pirie, Air Empire, p. 5. 
4 Charles Harvard Gibbs-Smith, Aviation: An Historical Survey from its Origins to the End of World War 
II (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1970). 
5 Martin Staniland, Government Birds: Air Transport and the State in Western Europe (Oxford, Rowman 
and Littlechild, 2003). 
6 L. Budd, ‘Global Networks before Globalisation: Imperial Airways and the Development of Long-Haul 
Air Routes’ (2007) (http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/rb/rb253.html, 2007, last accessed 10 April 2014). 
7 Robin Higham, Britain’s Imperial Air Routes, 1918-1939 (London, G.T. Foulis, 1960). 
8 Pirie, Air Empire. 
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work of Higham and Pirie is necessarily broad, and there remains no single detailed 
account of the development of the India route as a whole. In addition, within the 
standard texts of Higham and Pirie, although the Imperial Airways company receives 
ample coverage there is a considerable gap in the literature relating to its passenger 
services in the Middle Eastern sector of the India route. The thesis also takes steps 
towards further establishing airships as a key – if short-lived – component in the 
development of Britain’s imperial aviation policy. The role of airships as part of a 
dimension of Britain’s empire has generally received little scholarly attention, with 
aviation commentators treating airships separately from aeroplanes. Higham’s 1961 
book on airship policy from 1908 to 1931,9 for many years the standard text on the 
subject, dealt mainly with the strategic aspects of airship aviation. More recently, 
however, John Duggan and Henry Cord Meyer have opened up the field and examined 
the role of British and German airshipping from an international perspective, comparing 
the performance of these countries.10  
The following section provides an introduction to each chapter, with a brief 
summary preceding a review of the primary and secondary literature. After the general 
introduction in Chapter One, Chapter Two firstly reviews Britain’s aviation record up to 
the Armistice in 1918. It then goes on to deal with the British response to the claims of 
civil aviation in the early post-war period, during Winston Churchill’s term as the first 
Secretary of State for Air from January 1919 until the Spring of 1921. This was a period 
during which aviation was accorded low priority at the national level, and the reasons 
for this are explored. The chapter also examines the challenges faced by Churchill, and 
investigates the effect of constraints upon him – for example the heavy demands upon 
his time and attention – at what was a crucial juncture for civil aviation policy-making. 
The research therefore goes some way towards redressing the sparse coverage by 
historians of Churchill’s relationship with civil aviation during this particularly busy 
phase of his career.  
While for contemporary sources the chapter particularly relies upon the 
reportage of The Times and the aviation journal Flight, in terms of secondary sources it 
draws upon the work of Higham and Pirie, and also upon a stimulating MA thesis by 
                                            
9 Robin Higham, The British Rigid Airship, 1908 to 1931. A Study in Weapons Policy (London, G.T. 
Foulis, 1961).  
10 John Duggan and Henry Cord Meyer, Airships in International Affairs, 1890-1940 (Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), Henry Cord Meyer, Airshipmen, Businessmen and Politics, 1890-1940 
(Washington, Smithsonian Press, 1991). 
4 
P.E. Fitzgerald.11 An article by Robert McCormack provides a major resource for the 
discussion of Churchill’s performance at the Air Ministry. McCormack argues that 
Churchill’s influence on civil aviation development was ‘malign,’ not only because he 
was easily distracted from his air duties but also because of his lack of interest in 
aviation – faults that were exacerbated by his excessive caution and timidity.12 This 
assessment is explored in greater depth, and a broader view taken of the financial, 
political, and practical circumstances that influenced civil aviation policy during 
Churchill’s term of office.  
In Chapter Three the story moves forward, examining first the developments that 
took place in the eighteen months following Churchill’s departure from the Air 
Ministry. It investigates the forces – including Britain’s new official commitment, the 
urgings of enthusiasts, and the challenge presented by German advances in the air - that 
came into play as the potential of aviation as a tool of empire began to be revealed. 
After a consideration of both the political factors and the personal element in the 
advance of policy, the chapter gives an account of the formation of Imperial Airways 
and the Imperial Airship Scheme in 1924. The development of these projects signalled 
Britain’s increased commitment to aviation as a means of furthering its imperial agenda. 
In particular, the chapter discusses the role of airships in Governmental policy for 
services to India. It also examines Britain’s response to the challenge presented by 
Germany’s airship progress. The research draws from a wide range of contemporary 
material - the archives of Hansard (House of Commons debates), the Cabinet, the 
Admiralty and, in addition, to those of The Times and the aviation journal Flight. As 
regards secondary material, here, as in Chapter Two, reference is made to Fitzgerald’s 
study, which has pointed to a number of important factors that include the ‘short hop’ 
aspect of Imperial Airways’ operations. The work of Duggan and Meyer13 has been 
valuable for the study of airship policy, while a section on Britain’s response to the 
technological challenge presented by aviation includes a critique of the work of David 
Edgerton.14 
In its second half, Chapters Four to Six, the thesis examines British attempts to 
introduce permanent passenger air services through the Persian Gulf region. Here, the 
                                            
11 P.E. Fitzgerald, Lost Horizons: The British Government and Civil Aviation between the Wars, 1919–
1939 (MA, McGill University, Canada, 1994). 
12 Robert L. McCormack, ‘Missed Opportunities: Winston Churchill, the Air Ministry, and Africa, 1919-
1921,’ The International History Review, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1989), p. 227. 
13 Duggan and Meyer, Airships in International Affairs; Meyer, Airshipmen, Businessmen and Politics. 
14 David Edgerton, England and the Aeroplane: An Essay on a Militant and Technological Nation 
(London, Macmillan, 1991). 
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British sought entry into environments in which their long-established systems of 
control and influence had moulded, and indeed still governed, relationships with 
regional elites. These historical associations created problems in the creation of the 
Indian air route at the local level, and also placed constraints upon British negotiators on 
the ground in both Persia and on the Trucial Coast. Because little in-depth analysis has 
been made of Britain’s efforts to develop aviation in the Persian Gulf, the research 
builds upon a particularly small secondary literature; as David Commins has 
commented, the role of the Gulf in air development is ‘Less frequently noticed in 
standard historical accounts.’15 Certainly Higham16 and Pirie17 give the Gulf sector a 
broadbrush treatment. Owing to the paucity of local primary material, the research relies 
heavily upon contemporary British records. In providing a fuller account than has 
existed hitherto, the chapter contributes greatly to existing scholarship on Britain’s 
dealings in the Gulf region.  
Chapter Four explores Britain’s relationship with Persia from the mid-1920s, as 
the British attempted to formalise the air route along the Persian shore and establish 
Imperial Airways services on a permanent basis. The chapter examines the problems 
that the British experienced in Persia, discussing the way in which relationships 
between the diplomatic elites in Tehran affected the progress of air route negotiations. 
Difficulties arose both as a result of obstructions placed in Britain’s way by Persian 
elites and of Britain’s own lack of ‘levers’ with which to drive through policy. The roles 
of Germany and the Soviet Union in influencing the Anglo-Persian relationship are also 
examined, and in particular the implications and effects of the domestic aviation 
network developed in Persia by the German aviation company, Junkers. The research 
owes much to the work of a number of historians of Persia that include, notably, Ali 
Ansari, who makes a penetrating analysis of the ‘weapons of the weak’18 which Persia 
allegedly employed in its diplomacy. These ‘weapons,’ analysed as a construct rather 
than as a historical reality, included tactics such as prevarication and the stalling of 
negotiations. The chapter assesses the British response to the difficulties that the 
‘weapons’ brought about. A number of other writers, including Miron Rezun,19 
                                            
15 David Commins, The Gulf States: A Modern History (London, I.B. Tauris, 2012), p. 121.  
16 Higham, Britain’s Imperial Air Routes, pp. 124-33. 
17 Pirie, Air Empire, pp. 148-50. 
18 Ali M. Ansari, Modern Iran since 1921: the Pahlavis and After (London, Longman, 2003), p. 10. 
19 Miron Rezun, The Soviet Union and Iran (Geneva, Sijthoff and Noordhoff International, 1981). 
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Mohammad Majd,20 Cyrus Ghani,21 and Nikkie Keddie,22 have also contributed to the 
understanding of Persia in the interwar years. In particular, Rezun’s pioneering study of 
Teymourtash, the Persian Minister of Court with whom the British conducted the 
majority of the air negotiations, has provided important insights.23 In addition, two more 
recent volumes of essays24 have added to the field through their examination of aspects 
of interwar Persia. 
Chapters Five and Six together chronicle attempts made by the British between 
1926 and 1932 to establish an alternative to the Persia route, and to introduce landing 
facilities and associated ‘night-stop’ accommodation on the Trucial Coast. As little is 
available by way of contemporary Arab accounts, roughly two thirds of the references 
in these chapters are drawn from contemporary official British records. The majority of 
these are from the archives of the India Office and relate to the Indian Government’s 
administration of the Gulf. The somewhat one-sided coverage that these resources 
provide is balanced to an extent by reference to two PhD theses, by Fatima Al-Sayegh25 
and Obaid Butti.26 These are valuable because, as they draw upon local knowledge and 
oral testimony, and thus express the Arabian viewpoint, they may to a degree stand in 
for the contemporary evidence that is otherwise lacking. 
Chapter Five sets out to account for the problems experienced by the British as 
they sought air facilities on the Trucial Coast. It reviews Britain’s ‘Pax Britannica’ 
policy and traditional system of control in the Gulf, and the political and cultural 
environment that had evolved. Although initially it seemed that Britain’s long-term 
relationship with the Trucial Arabs would provide a helpful diplomatic basis for 
negotiations, the air proposals constituted a deviation from traditional policy; the 
problems that resulted are investigated. The chapter also examines the motives for, and 
effects of, the policies of the Indian Government on the progress of aviation in the Gulf 
region. In terms of resource materials, official British records, but in particular those of 
the India Office, have been heavily used, and the research also draws upon general 
histories of the United Arab Emirates by writers with extensive personal experience of 
                                            
20 Mohammad G. Majd, Great Britain and Reza Shah, The Plunder of Iran, 1921-1941 (Gainesville, 
University Press of Florida, 2001). 
21 Cyrus Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah: From Qajar Collapse to Pahlavi Power (London, I.B. 
Tauris, 1998). 
22 Nikkie R. Keddie, Qajar Iran and the Rise of Reza Khan, 1796-1925 (Costa Mesa, CA, Mazda 
Publishers, 1999). 
23 Miron Rezun, ‘Reza Shah’s Court Minister: Teymourtash,’ International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1980), pp. 119-37, p. 134. 
24 Stephanie Cronin, The Making of Modern Iran, and Vanessa Martin (ed), Anglo-Iranian Relations since 
1800 (London, Routledge, 2005). 
25 Fatima Al-Sayegh, Imperial Air Communications and British Policy Changes in the Trucial States, 
1929-1959 (PhD, Essex University, 1989). 
26 Obaid A. Butti, Imperialism, Tribal Structure, and the Development of the Ruling Elites: a Socio-
economic History of the Trucial States between 1892 and 1939 (PhD, Washington DC, 1992). 
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the region. In this category Frauke Heard-Bey27 and James Onley28 offer counters to 
contemporary official British material, with Onley’s in-depth analysis, especially 
valuable because of its sympathetic attitude towards Gulf conditions, providing a useful 
background on the Residency system and Britain’s long-term policy. In addition, the 
chapter also makes reference to a number of other commentators on Gulf history, 
notably Glen Balfour-Paul,29 Briton Cooper Busch,30 Simon Kelly,31 and Robert J. 
Blyth.32  
Chapter Six concludes the Trucial Coast story begun in Chapter Five with a 
detailed examination of the air facilities negotiations at Sharjah, and the means by 
which a successful outcome was achieved in 1932. In particular the chapter investigates 
Britain’s methods of dealing with the Trucial elites, the play of culture and personality 
between the two sides, and the implications of British attitudes in terms of theories of 
Orientalism. The final part of the chapter analyses the agreement made between Sheikh 
Saqar and the British Residency official, Harold Dickson, and how obstacles on both 
sides that had prevented the success of previous negotiations were overcome. In the 
analysis of British interaction with Trucial elites, the chapter makes a considerable 
contribution to the literature. Again, official British records have provided the core of 
the contemporary record. With regards to Orientalism, the work of Edward Said has 
informed the discussion of British attitudes in the region,33 while that of Susan Nance34 
has pointed to differences between Trucial Arabs and the more commonly-accepted 
Orientalist stereotypes. The section on the agreement made at Sharjah relies largely 
upon a number of contemporary reports made by Harold Dickson,35 supplemented by an 
account that he wrote some years later.36 In combination, these two records highlight the 
importance of the contribution that this key official made to the Indian air route.  
The methodology of the research focuses upon several interconnected theoretical 
                                            
27 Frauke Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates: A Society in Transition (Dubai, 
Motivate Publishing, 2004). 
28 James Onley, The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers, and the British in the 
Nineteenth Century Gulf (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007). 
29 Glen Balfour-Paul, The End of Empire in the Middle East (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1991). 
30 Briton Cooper Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914 (Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 1967). 
31 Simon Kelly, “Britannia has Ruled Here”: Transcaucasia and Considerations of Imperial Defence in 
Lord Curzon’s Search for a Near Eastern Settlement, 1918-1923 (MA, Simon Fraser University, 2003). 
32 Robert J. Blyth, ‘Britain versus India in the Persian Gulf: The Struggle for Political Control, c. 1928-
48.’ The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2000), pp. 90-111. 
33 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York, Vintage, 1979). 
34 Susan Nance, How the Arabian Nights Inspired the American Dream, 1790-1935 (University of North 
Carolina Press, 2009). 
35 IOR R/15/5/282. ‘Political Agency Kuwait, Sharjah Aerodrome Agreement, 1 July 1932 to 20 October 
1932,’ contains a letter from Dickson in Kuwait to Air Vice Marshall C.B. Burnett in London, 12 
August 1932; BT 217/1028. Letter from Dickson to Foreign Secretary, Government of India, 4 August 
1932. 
36 H.R.P. Dickson, Kuwait and her Neighbours (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1956). 
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concepts which may help us to understand debates relating to British imperial policy 
and the development of the India route. These concepts may be categorised under two 
broad thematic headings – empire and technology. They concern ideas relating, firstly, 
to interwar civil aviation as part of a dimension of empire, its role in imperial 
development, and the concept of the ‘official mind.’ Secondly, the thesis considers 
concepts relating to the history of aviation as a new technology. Within the first 
concept, that of empire, the research seeks to expand upon the role of early international 
aviation in relation to existing definitions of, and ideas about, imperialism. Britain’s 
aviation policy is discussed in terms of debates upon imperialism, and the extent to 
which the British either desired or were able to use aviation to further their imperial 
agenda is investigated. The thesis therefore acts as a case study which serves to test the 
sufficiency and accuracy of the larger theories of imperialism, either confirming them or 
allowing refinement and correction as appropriate. One of the main theories which is 
tested is that of Cain and Hopkins, who argue that imperial expansion originates in the 
core, and that therefore, as the ‘direction of causation’ moves out towards the periphery, 
the core becomes the driver of imperial interaction with the periphery.37 This theory has 
hitherto received little attention in terms of British imperial aviation, and is investigated 
in particular via an examination of the extent to which civil aviation did indeed emanate 
from the core, and the role of London officials. In Chapters Four, Five, and Six, the case 
of imperial aviation is used to test a further viewpoint of Cain and Hopkins, which is 
that imperialism is an incursion into state sovereignty, with one power having the 
capacity to influence the affairs of another.38 Also discussed is the challenge that 
aviation poses to the ‘excentric’ theory of Robinson and Gallagher, which proposes a 
direction of causation from periphery to core.39 In relation to this, the research examines 
the role of the Government of India in the progress of the air route in areas of its 
responsibility – the Persian Gulf and the Subcontinent.  
The research also contributes to debates on the concept of civil aviation as part 
of a dimension of empire, a topic upon which there has been a marked divergence of 
opinion among commentators. McCormack, for example, has argued that in the interwar 
years imperial aviation was given a high profile, and that ‘Air transport was assigned 
the critical task of giving substance to the shadow of empire.’ He goes so far as to 
                                            
37 P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-2000 (London, Longman, 2001) p. 60. 
38 Ibid, p. 13. 
39 Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher (2nd edn), Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of 
Imperialism (London, Macmillan, 1981). 
9 
suggest that ‘air policy became synonymous with imperial policy to the extent that the 
understanding of one is implicit to the understanding of the other.’40 However, other 
writers have suggested that the British failed to develop a progressive and coherent 
aviation policy, and that this indicated complacency. For example, Higham has 
criticised the post-war failure of the British to recognise that ‘aerial might was rapidly 
becoming the potential measure of power.’41 Britain’s apparent reticence to exploit civil 
aviation has been identified as an example of flagging imperial impetus, and perhaps 
even an indication of waning imperial spirit. Correlli Barnett - a keen proponent of the 
concept of imperial decline – regards Britain’s slowness in grasping the opportunities 
presented by aviation as being the empire’s ‘most important failure’ of the 1920s and 
1930s.42 In addition, more recently Pirie has argued that ‘The gap between the rhetoric 
and reality of Empire aviation was a marked one. Anticipation and intention exceeded 
actuality and implementation.’ Pirie goes on to suggest that Imperial Airways’ 
lacklustre performance as air transport provider was indeed a sign of weakness: 
‘aviation is a window onto late imperial desire, delusion and dismay…What happened 
in Empire civil aviation tells about the problematic implementation of imperialism.’43 
The thesis will consider how far the development of the India route undermines or 
supports these competing viewpoints. 
Also in relation to the concept of aviation as part of an imperial dimension, the 
thesis applies to the subject the construct of the ‘official mind’ of government, as 
proposed by Robinson and Gallagher.44 Attitudes towards aviation were informed by 
individual and collective assumptions not only about aviation itself, but also about how 
it related to factors such as politics, economics, imperialism, and finance. The thesis 
examines the role of the ‘official mind’ of British elites in the development of civil 
aviation policy, and discusses the forces that worked for and against the coherence of 
the ‘official mind’ in relation to imperial aviation. Factors which created cohesion of 
thought and action in the ‘official mind’ as a result of a shared gentlemanly background 
of British elites in both London and Delhi are examined. In this, particular reference is 
made to the roles of Air Ministry officials Winston Churchill, Samuel Hoare, Sefton 
Brancker, and Lord Thomson, as well as other contributors to the ‘official mind’ - for 
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example the airship promoter Dennis Burney and Harold Dickson, the Gulf Residency 
deputy. The research also comments upon aspects of incoherence, assessing the extent 
to which policy was determined by ad hoc factors such as the ideas or feelings of 
individuals. 
The question of Britain’s policy regarding imperial aviation is closely connected 
with the second theme which sets a general context for the study of policy for the India 
route, which is the history of aviation as a new technology. In this regard, the thesis 
explores both Britain’s efforts to gain prestige in the empire, and its participation in the 
race for aviation superiority among its European peers. McCormack,45 Sean Seyer,46 and 
Marc Dierikx47 have discussed the international dimension that aviation gave to the 
traditional struggle for power in Europe. Germany’s advances in aeroplane and airship 
technology are discussed throughout the thesis, considered in terms of the imperial and 
technological challenges that German development presented to the British. Germany 
outshone Britain not only by the geographical reach of its aeroplane routes (this being 
particularly galling to the British with regards to Junkers passenger services in Persia), 
but also by the success of its airship programme during the tense period of competition 
from 1928, as Britain struggled to bring its own Imperial Airship Scheme to fruition.  
Britain’s response to the challenge that aviation technology presented is 
assessed, with the thesis engaging with allegations of British technological deficiency. It 
enters the debate on the cultural dimensions of technology, evaluating the merits of rival 
claims. Edgerton, for example, has denied that Britain suffered a ‘failure’ of 
technology,48 but a number of other historians have disagreed. Peter J. Hugill, for 
example, comments that technology remained the preserve of the middle and lower 
classes owing to ‘The inability of British elites to think in technical terms,’ and ‘most 
markedly a fault in their education.’49 Therefore the influence of the British gentlemanly 
education in terms of a public school system that placed little emphasis on science and 
technology is examined.  
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Chapter Two: Imperial Aviation: Context and Policy to 1921 
 
So great were the advances in aviation technology made as a result of the Government’s 
wartime investment that at the Armistice Britain led the world in the air, at least in 
regards to aeroplanes if not airships. The British seemed well-placed to build upon this 
advantage and restart civil aviation - grounded during hostilities - to make the first steps 
towards the development of imperial aviation. The chapter starts with a general 
historical survey which sets the context for understanding the issues and problems that 
Winston Churchill faced from January 1919 until the spring of 1921, when he served as 
Secretary of State for Air. The first section also examines some key factors which 
seemed to promise much for post-war civil aviation development. These included the 
Government’s establishment of the Air Ministry, which created a new administrative 
structure for both civil and military aviation. In addition, civil aviation was also 
supported by the private sector, and had the backing of a vociferous air lobby. Secondly, 
the chapter investigates the reasons for the failure of forward policy-making, and the 
associated lack of adequate funding. In doing so it discusses financial, practical, and 
political aspects of British policy. Finally, the chapter analyses Britain’s quandary with 
regards to airships, and the problems the Government faced as it attempted to determine 
airship policy. 
 
The promise of aviation 
At the War’s end, Britain was faced with the challenge of bringing civil aviation into the 
post-war era, but aviation carried forward with it a whole raft of perceptions and 
misconceptions accrued over decades. A number of themes had emerged from Britain’s 
historical relationship with aviation from the mid-nineteenth century up to 1918 that had 
coloured British perceptions, and would continue to resonate throughout the 1920s. 
People grappled to understand aviation, and old perceptions died hard. For example, the 
suggestion in 1909 of Orville Wright, inventor of the aeroplane, that such were the 
limitations of aircraft that they could never come into commercial use,50 could have 
done little good to the reputation of the craft. Nor could the opinion of the Manchester 
Guardian, which as late as May 1919 was still insisting that air travel could be 
‘dismissed from serious consideration as an everyday form of transport or for use for 
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ordinary commercial freight.’51 In their minds, the general public tried to orient air 
routes in terms of existing transportation modes, but the intangible nature of air routes 
rendered them less easy to comprehend than rail or road systems. These were physically 
manifested on the ground and, although sea-going ships left few visible markers 
between stopping places, they generally travelled between locations that could not be 
changed. Air routes, on the other hand, could pass over land or sea; on the ground they 
appeared fragmented, represented only by landing sites at intervals of a few tens of 
miles, and in these early days, landing grounds could be moved relatively easily. In 
addition, uncertainty was compounded by the effect of fictional accounts, which, in 
exploring the potential of aviation, had pre-conditioned people in their perceptions. 
Traditionally, as Bowdoin Van Riper comments, the air had been the realm of religion 
and myth: ‘Ordinary mortals…flew only with magical aid,’52 for example by riding a 
magic carpet. Therefore, when the first airship flights were made in the mid-nineteenth 
century, aviation already had a reputation founded not on science but on superstition 
and faith. The first true ‘powered flight’ was probably made in 1852 by a French 
engineer, Jules Henri Giffard, in a dirigible airship. Giffard’s cigar-shaped craft, 144 
feet long and containing 113,000 cubic feet of hydrogen, obtained its movement from a 
propeller driven by an engine. Giffard, suspended in a gondola beneath the gasbag, flew 
17 miles from Paris at a top speed of six miles per hour.53  
Flight, as Van Riper writes, appeared to ‘democratise the magic’ and offer 
‘godlike possibilities’ to man,54 but it also caused unease, which was compounded from 
the mid-nineteenth century by a mass of fiction which presented the flying machine as 
an agent of turmoil and even apocalypse. Science fiction writers both reflected and 
directed public opinion as they considered how aviation ‘might be adapted for military 
needs.’55 Examples included Jules Verne’s The Master of the World of 1904, and H.G. 
Wells’ The War in the Air of 1907. Such works established aerial warfare in the public 
imagination ‘as a future certainty,’ and Michael Paris suggests that this literature 
‘exerted considerable influence…on those young men who came to maturity in the 
period 1900-1917 and were themselves the pioneers of military aviation.’56 As Van 
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Riper comments, as aircraft ‘symbolize…the settlement of old frontiers, the opening of 
new ones, the greatness of nations and of individuals,’57 they inevitably become an 
agent of political change and revolution. The potential of flying machines in the 
expansion of empire were explored in fiction such as Harry Collingwood’s 1887 boys’ 
adventure, The Log of the Flying Fish, in which an aerial craft reaches the North Pole. 
Once there, a crew member plants a Union Jack flag and announces: ‘In the name of her 
most gracious majesty Victoria, Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, I annex this land as 
a dependency of the British crown!’58 By 1912 Rudyard Kipling was exploring wider 
and more sinister possibilities. In his fantasy As Easy as ABC, set in 2065, the world is 
ruled by the ‘Aerial Board of Control,’ described as a ‘semi-elected, semi-nominated 
body of a few score persons.’59 
By the early twentieth century, European governments had begun to develop 
airship programmes. For example, Germany’s LZ1 Zeppelin first flew in 1900, while in 
1907 The Times reported that a military craft, Patrie, was the first of a planned French 
‘fleet.’60 Britain demonstrated its desire to compete with its European peers via airship 
experimentation made by the Army, and in 1907 its first military airship, given the 
optimistic name of Nulli Secundus (‘Second to None’)61 gave a public demonstration. 
The craft flew from Aldershot to London, making an impressive spectacle as it circled 
St. Paul’s Cathedral, reached a top speed of 40 mph, and at one point rose to 1,300 
feet.62 The implications were clear - nowhere was now inviolable – but the vulnerability 
of airships also became apparent. The French Patrie had already been lost over the 
Atlantic, and now headwinds forced the Nulli Secundus to land at Crystal Palace, where 
it was wrecked in bad weather.  
After the pioneering flight of the Wright brothers in 1903, aeroplane technology 
entered the field, but was little understood. As H.G. Wells wrote, initially, the aeroplane 
was ‘merely a rumour, and the “Sausage” held the air.’63 However, those with 
knowledge perceived the potential of aeroplanes. For example, in 1908 Sir Hiram 
Maxim, after constructing prototype aeroplanes, insisted that ‘the future of aerial 
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navigation’ lay with them.64 Orville Wright agreed: ‘an aeroplane flies faster, is cheaper 
to run, and is more easily handled than any other machine. Airships…can never be as 
practicable as aeroplanes.’65 Yet the primitive nature of their technology meant that 
early aeroplanes were seen in terms of sport rather than a means of transportation; in 
1910 Flight magazine complained that the aeroplane was regarded as ‘a mere toy,’ and 
most people believed that ‘Britain should pay all her attention to the dirigible balloon.’66 
Aeroplanes now joined airships as the butt of jokes. In 1909, the well-known aviator 
John Moore-Brabazon bitterly advised aviation inventors to go to France, where they 
would be encouraged, rather than stay in Britain to receive ‘Ridicule, discouragement, 
and…[be] called an imposter, a crank and a lunatic.’67  
The realisation that the development of large aeroplanes was only a matter of 
engine size began to suggest the commercial potential of aeroplanes. As pilot J. 
Laurence Pritchard pointed out in 1910, the Wright brothers’ craft had a 30hp engine, 
and its total weight, with pilot and a passenger, was about 1,150 lbs. This meant that the 
engine lifted about 38lbs per hp., but ‘With engines of 450-h.p., a Wright machine 
would lift 15,750 lbs. Thirty-five passengers at 150 lbs. each would weigh 5,250 lbs.’68 
While commercial aviation was clearly a possibility, cost was a drawback. Flight 
equated the cost of air transport with that of ‘dragging an equal load over a road of sand. 
Only one thing can outweigh the question of cost…its attribute of exceedingly high 
speed.’69 Aeroplane enthusiasts continued to push back the boundaries of technology. In 
1911, Flight reported that a French pilot had squeezed 12 people into his plane and 
flown for almost a kilometre.70 Then in 1914 a Russian pilot, Sikorsky, flew for 18 
minutes with 15 passengers, reached 6,560 ft. with ten, and made a duration flight of six 
hours 33 minutes with six passengers.71 Meanwhile, the British preferred to pursue 
passenger services by airship; a company planned to build six craft to operate a 
domestic network, and a route to Paris. Although this was a commercial undertaking, 
reported the Times, ‘in time of war they could be fitted with guns without difficulty.’72 
However, the scheme seems not to have been taken any further.  
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From the early years of the century, foreign aviation developments had 
demonstrated the potential to threaten Britain militarily. A number of writers, including 
Peter Fritzsche, Bernard Rieger, Charles Harvard Gibbs-Smith, Duggan and Meyer, and 
Dienel and Schiefelbusch73 have discussed the development of airships in Germany 
from 1900, and the meaning of the craft to the German people. As Dienel and 
Schiefelbusch comment, in Germany airship development was promoted ‘with greater 
intensity and over a longer time in history than in any other country and is peculiar to 
the German course of aviation history.’74 The military threat to Britain from German 
airshipping became apparent from 1908, when the LZ4 Zeppelin was launched amidst 
great publicity. Although six weeks after its launch the craft crashed in bad weather and 
burned, it had served to raise nationalist fervour. Reporters on the spot described the 
‘wild frustration’ and ‘curses, sobs, tears, threats’ with which witnesses initially reacted 
to the LZ4 disaster.75 Yet such responses soon ‘gave way to unprecedented public 
commitment’ to support Graf Zeppelin, the founder of the Zeppelin Airship Company, 
in his endeavours. When a ‘spontaneous and popular subscription was launched 
virtually overnight,’ it received donations of five million marks within six weeks.76 This 
massive patriotic effort ‘put the zeppelin works in Friedrichshafen on a firm financial 
foundation,’ and revealed the German people ‘to be at once self-reliant and patriotic.’77  
It was not surprising that, as Fritzsche argues, publicists, politicians, and 
academics thenceforth saw airships as a ‘national treasure’78 which helped ordinary 
Germans to construct ‘a heart-felt and popular nationalism.’ Sponsored by the public, 
the airships ‘displayed the technical virtuosity and material achievements of the German 
people, not the German state.’79 In their enthusiasm, Fritzsche suggests, Germans 
seemed to follow ‘common scripts that revealed basic turn-of-the-century dispositions 
about the power of humans against nature and also about the power and ambition of the 
German nation…Without any sense of foreboding about the mingling of technology and 
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power.’80 Germany now began to see the potential of airships for international influence. 
The Zeppelin programme, Fritzsche explains, ‘realized universal hopes and technical 
aspirations, but also enlarged Germany’s arsenal and stoked Germany’s fantasies’81 and 
became ‘an affirmation of German prowess and overseas expansion.’82 Airships seemed 
to promise Germany ‘a weapon of unprecedented mobility’ that would allow it to 
challenge Russia or Britain: ‘It was a heady feeling of sovereignty.’83 Graf Zeppelin, 
Fritzsche suggests, was a prime mover in German strategic thinking: ‘His examples, 
drawn halfway across the globe from Germany, are explicit references to the geography 
of European imperial rivalry.’ Meeting military strategists in 1909, he explained that his 
airships could provide Germany with an ‘action radius’ of 1,200 kilometres of 
‘conquered space.’84  
Rieger has made a comparative study of German and British attitudes towards 
airships as a new technology. He argues that in the interwar years both countries were 
convinced that ‘national self-assertion depended on technological leadership,’ and that 
in both, this ‘engendered a multitude of arguments in favor of technological change.’85 
Indeed, Rieger suggests, ‘The British and German publics often reacted towards new 
technologies in similar ways, which highlight transnational cultural patterns that 
promoted innovation in a politically heterogeneous Europe.’86 However, opinion was 
also ‘inflected with dreams of the modern that took on nationally specific, highly 
divergent dimensions and point to the different roles that destructive impulses played in 
the promotion of technological innovation.’87 In Rieger’s view, ‘British and German 
assessments of the national importance of technology reveal fundamentally different 
ways of publicly promoting innovation despite certain similarities.’ Aeroplanes as well 
as airships became ‘potent national symbols because they bestowed prestige in both 
countries and lent material expression for national self-assertion in competitive 
environments that were crucially shaped and driven by Anglo-German rivalry.’88 
On the side of the Germans, Rieger argues, there was ‘an aggressive streak in 
German assessments of technology’s national significance.’89 Technology was seen by 
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Germans as a tool able ‘to transform the international environment that stifled their 
political ambitions.’90 Such views were influenced by a ‘widespread myth of 
victimization that claimed that German technological innovations had to be achieved in 
an unfavorable international setting.’ German opinion was drive by the press, which 
‘employed the motif of “German” resistance and perseverance in the face of adversity 
when covering aerial and naval events. The most eloquent rhetorics of national 
resistance were devoted to airships.’91 As a result, Germans ‘displayed more pugnacious 
motifs than comparable British evaluations,’ while the British ‘tended to adopt 
defensive motifs’92 and to see technology as an instrument with which to ‘stabilize an 
international status quo favorable to their nation.’93  
As early as July 1908, reports of aggressive German attitudes reached Britain, 
when retired German Privy Councillor Rudolf Martin claimed that an airship fleet could 
ensure German power in Europe: ‘“To the extent that motorized air travel develops, 
England will cease to be an island.”’ This, Martin argued, would also give Germany 
influence internationally, for example in Persia, Turkey, and Morocco, free of British 
naval power. Martin, comments Fritzsche, ‘envisioned a future in which German 
airships would permit the global extension of German power and secure the Second 
Reich its coveted “place in the sun.”’94 Martin was reported in the Daily Mail as 
suggesting that Zeppelin airships could be used in an invasion of England. If enough 
were built, Martin said, 350,000 German soldiers could reach Dover from Calais in the 
course of one night.95 Two days after this report, an alarmed Times correspondent 
argued that ‘the real gravity of the situation has not seized either the public mind or that 
of the authorities, much less the Government of the country.’ While Germany had five 
airships and France seven, Britain had only two – on a par with Italy: ‘it is not yet 
realized that England’s safety as an island will vanish if not ensured against aerial 
attack...“Wake up, England” must be the watchword again, it seems.’96 As Fritzsche 
records, among the British public, ‘zeppelins loomed in overheated imaginations.’ A 
number of sightings were reported, prompting the publication of articles with titles such 
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as ‘The Airship Menace,’ and ‘Foreign Airships as Nocturnal Visitors.’97 Yet the War 
Office was not roused, and a year later, in July 1909, it issued a press release which 
stated that airships were a ‘failure,’ and would present no threat for a long time to come: 
‘When it is possible to cross the Channel, say with a party of excursionists, the War 
Office may be prepared to regard recent experiments seriously.’98 Extraordinarily, only 
two days after this declaration, the first Channel crossing by air was made by heavier-
than-air flight. Louis Blériot, a French engineer, lured by the offer of a £1,000 prize put 
up by Lord Northcliffe, the owner of the Daily Mail, teetered across from Calais in an 
aeroplane driven by a motorcycle engine. Blériot was given a grand dinner at the 
London Savoy Hotel, at which the British speakers put on a brave, and gracious, face, 
but the fact remained that this was a French, and not a British, achievement.99  
Still the Government held back. R.B. Haldane, Liberal Secretary of State for 
War from 1905 to June 1912, studied the aviation question but concluded that Britain 
was ‘at a profound disadvantage compared with the Germans, who were building up the 
structure of the Air Service on a foundation of science.’ His objection seems to have 
been founded on cost. Later, looking back on this period, Flight reported that the £2,500 
required for military aircraft in 1909 had been too great a sum for Britain to risk, but 
meanwhile, in the same year, Germany had allotted about £400,000.100 Haldane was 
backed, Alfred Gollin reports, by ‘A school of generals in the War Office,’ and the 
claims of military aviation could not withstand such opposition.101 The subsequent 
cancellation of Britain’s programmes caused considerable frustration, with Lord 
Montagu of Beaulieu criticising Haldane’s watch-and-wait policy in the House of Lords 
in March 1909. It was ‘absolutely imperative,’ Montagu argued, for Britain to give more 
attention and money to military aviation. Officials were wrong to ‘pooh-pooh the whole 
business,’ and to believe that there was ‘plenty of time’ to address the issue. He 
explained British vulnerability; few military installations, and no dockyards, were 
fortified against air attack: ‘to-day the insularity of this country is not what it was.’ 
Montagu also suggested that there was ‘a natural dislike in Government offices to 
anything new,’ and cited resistance to past inventions such as torpedoes and breech-
loading rifles. Britain’s traditional method of pursuing technological development, 
which involved waiting ‘until private investors or foreign nations have perfected their 
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arrangements and then to come in with a rush’ was too risky in this case.102 Haldane 
held firm, in August 1909 insisting in the House of Commons that, given the current 
state of aviation technology, it was indeed too early to commit large amounts of money. 
He was little concerned by Britain’s lack of progress in comparison to Germany, 
France, and the United States, for he argued that although Britain had also lagged 
behind in the development of submarines and motor cars, it was now equal to, or ahead 
of, other countries in those fields. Britain’s policy, Haldane advised, should be to carry 
out scientific experimentation, while also gathering ‘the fullest knowledge of what was 
going on in aerostatics all over the world.’103 Perhaps Haldane’s watch-and-wait policy 
was after all only a cover for inaction, because after he left office in 1912, progress 
began to be made. With the approach of war, in April 1913 the Navy Estimates showed 
that whereas in 1912 the Navy had had five aeroplanes and four pilots, it now had 40 
planes and 60 pilots, with 20 more planes on order. It was planned that the Navy and 
Army would together have almost 300 planes by the end of the year.104  
Anthony Sampson has commented that the Germans, although ‘not necessarily 
the most innovative,’ were among European countries ‘the most ambitious and 
organized, whether for aircraft or for their specialty, airships.’105 Certainly Germany 
pressed ahead with a forward airship building programme prior to the First World War. 
Although most of its craft were destined for military purposes, six were intended for 
commercial use and began domestic services.106 The Germans, Duggan and Meyer 
comment,107 having overcome basic problems in the early years of the century, went on 
to establish an enviable record. The performance of the Zeppelins was impressive; 
unlike aeroplanes they could stay aloft for many hours and carry a heavy payload. 
Before the War, Germany operated successful passenger airship services, notably with 
the Viktoria Luise, which made 489 flights carrying 2,995 fare-paying passengers in 
total, and with the Sachsen, which carried 2,465 passengers before being handed over 
for military purposes.108 Gibbs-Smith records that between 1910 and 1914, Germany’s 
airships carried more than 35,000 passengers 170,000 miles within the country without 
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one fatality.109 As Fritzsche remarks, ‘Given this superior record, German observers 
could be excused for seeing zeppelins as the most technically expert means to conquer 
the air.’110  
Once the War began in 1914, it indeed seemed that the worst fears of the British 
regarding German airships would be confirmed, but now, with the rapid development of 
technology, aeroplanes entered the military arena. As Robert Hedin has noted, ‘What 
had once been looked upon as essentially an aerial curiosity was transformed into a 
military tool,’111 and some forward-thinkers began to see aircraft as the war machine of 
the future. For example in 1916, Lord Montagu predicted that ‘invasion would not be by 
a score or two of airships and a hundred or two of aeroplanes, but on an infinitely larger 
scale.’112 His view must have seemed terrifying at that particular time, for German 
airships were attacking areas that included London, Sunderland, the Humber area, and 
Norfolk. Air raids, George Robb argues, brought a ‘new sense of vulnerability’ which 
‘deeply shocked and angered Britons.’113 For the first three years of war, British aircraft 
were ineffective against Zeppelins, which, being slow-moving and armed with heavy 
machine guns, could pick off aeroplanes easily.114 As the War progressed, however, 
aeroplanes began to play a more important role. In 1916, after a British pilot destroyed a 
Zeppelin by bombing it from above, Germany withdrew airships overnight, and 
replaced them with the Gotha bomber. By the end of the war, 1,413 people had been 
killed in German air raids, and 1,972 injured. As Uri Bialer comments, ‘for the first time 
in British history, an enemy might strike directly at the civilian population without 
necessarily overcoming the nation’s defences against conventional invasion.’115 As the 
air lobby had warned before the War, Britain had proved vulnerable from the air. 
Attacks on London, not just the nation’s capital but also that of the empire, made it clear 
that ‘Not only was seapower less important for British security, it was also less effective 
in protecting Britain’s empire and trade.’116 
By the Armistice in 1918, it was clear that aircraft had great potential as both a 
military and a civil tool. In the weeks that followed, there were promising indications 
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that the National Government, elected in December 1918, was committed to the rapid 
driving forward of aviation policy. A new department, the Air Ministry, was created in 
January 1919, established largely at the instigation of Jan Smuts (South African Prime 
Minister and member of Britain’s War Cabinet). Formed from wartime Air Committees 
and Air Boards, it was given responsibility for both civil and military aviation 
development at both national and international levels, and therefore called upon to 
transfer into the post-war era administrative systems which had hitherto dealt only with 
military aviation, and also to incorporate civil aviation in its workload. Given its 
military background, it is hardly surprising that the Ministry’s focus remained largely 
on strategic aspects, and that in practise civil aviation became, in many respects, only a 
subset of military aviation. A further military emphasis was added because, at the War’s 
end, the Government’s initial intention was to develop an air service that would be on a 
par with the Army and Navy. Partly for this reason the Prime Minister, David Lloyd 
George, placed the Air Ministry together with the War Office, and appointed Winston 
Churchill (Fig. 2.3) as Secretary of State for both War and Air. There were few other 
candidates for this joint role. As far as the air side was concerned, P.E. Fitzgerald notes, 
‘British aviation had a very small number of key players.’117 Churchill, at that time 
Minister of Munitions, appeared a strong candidate. Since before the War he had proved 
his ‘ardour’ for aviation by taking flying lessons as early as 1913, travelling by air on 
official duties, and inventing the terms ‘seaplane,’ and ‘flight’ as it referred to a number 
of military aircraft.118 He also had a forward-thinking attitude towards technology, and it 
was recognised that the air post in particular required both imagination and 
technological flair. Even before the War, as First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill had 
pushed through a policy of equipping battleships with 15 inch guns – the first in the 
world – without the extensive testing which would have delayed deployment by many 
months.119 During the War he had been instrumental in creating the Royal Naval Air 
Service, and had introduced the oil-fuelled Queen Elizabeth-class battleships, which had 
far greater fuel endurance than the former coal-powered craft. He had also been an 
advocate of tanks. Churchill therefore had credential as someone who engaged with new 
technologies. 
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Upon his appointment as Britain’s first Secretary of State for Air in January 
1919, Churchill became responsible for rekindling civil aviation, halted since 1914, and 
overseeing the start of commercial aviation, both of which were necessary prerequisites 
for the start of imperial aviation. During the War, the Government had set up the Civil 
Aerial Transport Committee to investigate the possibilities of post-war civil aviation. 
The committee had reported that rapid and extensive development was in the national 
interest, but its findings had been largely ignored. However, as Peter Lyth has 
commented, it was out of the question that Britain, as a great military power, should not 
develop commercial air transport: ‘for reasons of prestige alone Britain could not afford 
to let itself fall behind.’120 In October 1919 Churchill addressed the question afresh by 
setting up a second body, the Advisory Committee on Imperial Aviation, which made 
the first official attempt to determine policy for an Indian air route. This new committee 
recommended that an immediate start be made on planning a service to India and 
ultimately Australia, operating on a system of ‘main trunk’ routes fed by ‘local’ lines. 
The Advisory Committee reported that in its deliberations it had been struck by the 
great variety of problems on each sector of the proposed India route, and that these 
would make policy formulation ‘exceptionally difficult.’ It concluded that the most 
favourable conditions for aerial navigation were to be found between Egypt and 
Karachi, and that therefore this sector should be tackled first.121 (Map 1 shows routes 
proposed in 1919 for the Cairo to Karachi section). Churchill supported these 
recommendations, arguing in the House of Commons in December 1919 that as Britain 
would ‘have to keep [Air Force] stations there anyhow,’ the addition of mail and 
passenger services along the Egypt to Karachi route would be no great inconvenience. 
This air sector would, he thought, be valuable to the empire because of the great time 
saving (of about nine days) that it would allow over a sea voyage. Its development 
would also have ‘the effect of buckling the Empire together in a very remarkable 
manner,’ and enhance British power from the Mediterranean to the East.122 (Map 2 
shows the distribution of the empire during this period.) 
Aviation had strong support from a core of elite British figures that formed an 
air lobby that understood the nature and potential of aviation, and which was vociferous 
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and convinced of the rightness of its cause. From November 1918 the lobby exerted 
relentless pressure on the Government to expend money and resources. Nevertheless, 
little action resulted, and advance was even discouraged by some influential figures in 
British industry who discounted aviation as a commercial proposition. For example, the 
pilot Alan Cobham recounted how he proposed to Lord Inchcape that Inchcape’s 
maritime company, P&O, should develop its own air transport services and ‘take 
passengers to Karachi in four days instead of three weeks.’ Inchcape dismissed the 
suggestion out of hand and ‘laughed kindly: he thought I was being very amusing 
indeed.’123 While British civil aviation remained on hold, the intentions of other powers 
began to be amply demonstrated by their rapid development of commercial air services 
and military aircraft. This topic has been discussed by Staniland, who gives a brief 
overview of subsidisation policies in Europe, where France, Germany, and the 
Netherlands all grappled with the question of government support for civil aviation. 
Staniland analyses the processes of consolidation and ‘statization’ that followed from 
the mid-1920s.124 Such competition might have been expected to act as a goad to British 
officials, but it did not.  
 
Map 1. Air 
routes 
between 
Cairo and 
Karachi 
under 
consideration 
by the 
Government 
in 1919.125 
 
A 
year after the 
Armistice 
Flight 
reviewed the state of European civil aviation. France, by means of Governmental 
subsidies, appeared to be furthest advanced, having several commercial routes in 
operation (including mail services in the Near East), and many more projected. In Italy, 
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development was also assisted by the Government, while Germany was selling planes 
and engines to Scandinavia, Holland, and Switzerland. In Britain, on the other hand, 
since the Armistice the Government had done nothing to encourage private aviation 
enterprise; its ‘whole attitude is one of non possumus.’126 Nine months later, in 
September 1920, The Times put pay to any pretensions of British superiority when it 
printed a map showing the extent of existing and planned European air routes. As for 
Britain, The newspaper reported, ‘Even a year ago we were in a better relative position 
than we are in to-day.’127  
 
Map 2. The British Empire in 1921 (marked in red). 
 
The situation continued to deteriorate throughout Churchill’s time in office. For 
example, among Britain’s key competitors, France continued to commit such large sums 
to the development of commercial aviation that in 1922 alone it would build 3,300 
aeroplanes (both civil and military). In contrast, whereas in 1918 British firms had 
produced 3,000 aeroplanes,128 for 1922 the total was 200. It was perhaps already 
becoming apparent that, as Sampson has argued, ‘French governments were much more 
determined than the British to lead the air world, and to use planes to connect up their 
empire to Africa and the Far East.’129 Certainly Flight concluded that the French, had 
‘infinitely more foresight and imagination’ than the British Government, with its ‘wet-
blanket character.’ France’s subsidy system had encouraged real progress, while British 
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commercial aviation was ‘languishing, its factories either closed down altogether or 
devoted to other purposes, and its technical staffs distributed to the four winds.’130 The 
disparity was particularly worrying in view of Britain’s uneasy relationship with the 
French. David Reynolds argues that in the interwar years ‘most British leaders saw the 
Anglo-German antagonism of 1904-1918 as an aberration and were more suspicious of 
France than of Germany.’131 Concern about France was particularly strong among 
imperialists such as Lord Curzon who in 1918, Sean Kelly states, saw France as ‘the 
only great military Power on the Continent,’ and as having political interests which 
intersected with those of Britain. Curzon concluded that it was ‘not unreasonable to 
assume that France would once again become Britain’s main colonial rival.’132  Clearly, 
large-scale aviation development on the Continent presented a threat to Britain’s 
security in the event of another war.  
 
Fig. 2.1. Frederick Sykes, 1919. A 
portrait by William Orpen.133 
 
Even so, with hostilities only 
recently ended, Britain was naturally 
sensitive about Germany. Kelly suggests 
that the War had finished before 
Germany had been able to pursue its 
Drang nach Osten, and that some British 
officials, but Curzon in particular, feared 
that unless Britain acted to protect India, 
the empire would collapse.134 Despite 
such fears, the British seem to have failed to keep a close watch on Germany’s aviation 
development, or even to attempt to address the challenge it offered, although they would 
do so later. In July 1919 Flight reported that it was now apparent that Germany had 
been operating an extensive domestic network of passenger aeroplane services since 
February. Full of admiration, Stanley Spooner, the journal’s owner and editor, explained 
that ‘The whole thing seems to be organized on typically German lines, with nothing 
left to chance. Return tickets are issued, and are valid for a period of thirty days. Flying 
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kit and motor transport to and from the aerodromes are provided.’ All of this, Spooner 
reflected, seemed ‘in marked contrast to the laggard way we are conducting things here. 
We have not a single regular aerial service running even now…Germany has once more 
stolen a march upon us.’135 The German rate of progress continued to surprise even 
aviation insiders. For example, although in 1920 Major-General Sir Frederick Sykes 
(Fig. 2.1), appointed Controller of Civil Aviation in February 1919, wrote that the 
Germans had failed to produce an aeroplane suitable for civil aviation, already by that 
time their F.13 was operating on commercial routes.136 By May 1920 the matter could 
no longer be ignored, and Lord Northcliffe stated that Germany possessed far more 
aeroplanes than the British Government’s estimate of 15,000, and that the Germans 
were ‘talking and writing today about revenge by air.’ The British, he urged ‘must 
watch them and see to our own efficiency and progress.’137  
Sampson has commented that ‘Airlines and politics have collided with each 
other from the beginning. The airlines, as they changed the shape of the world, were 
also locked into the ambitions of nations.’138 Certainly the report of the Civil Aerial 
Transport Committee, set up during the War years but disbanded once hostilities ended, 
had connected civil aviation with military strategy. The idea that civil aviation could 
provide a military reserve for Britain had therefore originated before the Armistice. In a 
wartime study of post-war air strategy for the War Cabinet, Sykes had also warned that, 
‘National and Imperial safety demand the maintenance of the [aviation] industry and the 
development of civil aerial transport for supplying a reserve air power.’139 After the War 
the air lobby continued to push arguments that advocated civil aviation as a key factor 
in Britain’s national security and strategic interest, and as a practical solution to imperial 
problems. Indeed, Gordon Pirie has suggested that ‘The idea and pursuit of Empire 
aviation might have folded had it not been for people who aligned it with British 
strategic interests.’140 Foreign countries, the air lobby argued, could easily turn their 
civil expertise and reserves to military use, and the development of civil aviation in 
Britain was essential to national security because it would enable Britain to counter 
foreign advances. Flight took up the cause in January 1919, urging that Britain should 
face up to the fact that within only a few years its European rivals would have 
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developed the capability to ‘suddenly renew the war in the air,’ by means of aircraft 
which had been produced ‘ostensibly for peaceful purposes.’141  
This argument was developed further during the summer of 1919. Civil aviation, 
stated a Times leader in August, was ‘more vital’ to Britain’s future than ‘a 
preponderant development of the Service side.’ The newspaper pointed out that 
although RAF craft and personnel were ‘well-nigh useless’ for civil purposes,142 
advances made in civil aviation could be applied to military aviation. In addition, in 
time of war, civil reserves of aircraft and trained key personnel such as pilots and 
mechanics could provide a means of supplying and supplementing military aviation. In 
this way, George Holt Thomas, aircraft manufacturer and Chairman of AT&T (Aircraft 
Transport and Travel company), argued in January 1920, civil aviation could act as ‘a 
form of national insurance against what might be one of the most appalling disasters 
which could possibly befall this country - namely, a sudden and successful invasion 
from the air.’ In a further effort to persuade the Government that civil aviation was a 
sound economic prospect, Holt Thomas suggested that first-class mail should travel by 
air, a move that would provide the financial means to allow Britain to develop the civil 
planes and support systems vital for national defence. Perhaps to emphasise the value of 
civil craft as a military reserve, he proposed that aeroplanes should be fitted with 
machine gun mountings and ‘bomb-dropping apparatus.’143 The Times concluded that 
although it seemed ‘revolutionary’ to the Government, a ‘doctrine’ which connected 
civil aviation with a strategy for national security was a rational policy. This formed 
‘the secret of sound policy for the future of flying’ – a fact that would have to be 
recognised if the British advantage gained in the War was not to be ‘weakly cast 
away.’144 These arguments, however, could not prevail in the face of the forces ranged 
against rapid development. In reality, the argument that civil aviation should be boosted 
in order to support military aviation lacked power, in part because British military 
aviation was itself given low priority. For example, although a plan was drawn up in 
1922 to upgrade RAF training facilities at Cranwell in Lincolnshire, Treasury objections 
meant that not until 1929 could the Air Ministry gain approval even to commission an 
architect to design the proposed buildings.145  
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More attractive than the concept of civil aviation acting as a military reserve 
were arguments about its role in promoting imperial unity. After the War, Simon Potter 
argues, discussion took place as to whether new communication technologies could play 
a role in shaping, rather than only reflecting, the ‘destiny of the Empire…in the face of 
countervailing tendencies towards disintegration.’146 Even during the War, the air lobby 
had argued that civil aviation offered a means of uniting the disparate territories of the 
empire in a time of post-war stress. For example, in May 1917, Jan Smuts had expressed 
the view that as the empire was ‘peculiarly situated, scattered over the whole world,’ it 
was ‘dependent for its very existence on world-wide communications which must be 
maintained, or that Empire would go to pieces.’147 The question was taken up afresh 
after the War, but some visions of the future of aviation seemed aspirational rather than 
practical, and, as Sampson has argued, ‘the air provided a kind of refuge for imperial 
dreams and fantasies.’148 For example, in April 1920 Sir Geoffrey Salmond, General 
Officer Commanding of the Royal Flying Corps in the Middle East, told the Royal 
Geographical Society that a broad and integrated approach was required to facilitate a 
system of air routes radiating out from Britain towards empire territories. He argued that 
policy for the creation of an imperial air network ‘must be bold and large and not 
fragmentary. We must view the problem as a whole.’ Salmond’s broad vision 
encompassed the empire as ‘some great giant whose head is in England, whose 
enormous limbs stretch from Cairo to Australia and from Australia to the Cape, whose 
veins are the air routes, whose arteries are…great air organizations.’149 In terms of this 
metaphor, in that aviation allowed the ‘giant’s’ hands to reach out from the core and 
grasp empire lands, it offered a means of increasing Britain’s ability to increase its grip 
on its imperial territories. Sykes expressed the view that as aviation ‘arteries’ would 
carry the very lifeblood of the empire, they would be able to resolve its ‘greatest 
weakness,’ which was the problem of distance between territories.150 Aviation, 
therefore, could even be thought of as key to the health, and perhaps even the survival, 
of the empire. The assumption that imperial air routes should be modelled on the 
anatomical structure of the human body was powerful and persisted throughout the 
                                            
146 Simon J. Potter, Broadcasting Empire: The BBC and the British World, 1922-1970 (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2012), p. 3. 
147 Quoted in: ‘Commercial Aeronautics,’ Flight, 31 May 1917, p. 537. 
148 Sampson, Empires of the Sky, p. 27. 
149 Winston Churchill et al, ‘Imperial Air Routes: Discussion,’ The Geographical Journal, Vol. 55, No. 4 
(1920), p. 267. 
150 Major-General Sir Frederick Sykes, Controller of Civil Aviation: ‘Linking up the Empire,’ Flight, 27 
February 1919, p. 262. 
29 
1920s. For example, in August 1929, Christopher Bullock of the Air Ministry wrote to 
Lord Thomson, Secretary of State for Air, that the first stage of development should be 
the creation of a ‘backbone’ made up of trunk routes, with the second stage being the 
addition of ‘ribs,’ or subsidiary feeder services, attached to the backbone.151 Adherence 
to this untried blueprint, and the forcing of aviation planning to conform to a pre-
conceived design strategy, could only inhibit experimentation and genuine organic 
development. The creation of air routes required a more flexible approach, which would 
reflect their versatile nature.  
There were also a number of more practical arguments in favour of imperial 
aviation. Financial advantages could offset the higher transportation cost, for Sykes 
suggested in February 1919 that the passage of gold bullion from Australia by air rather 
than by sea would afford Britain ‘enormous gain.’152 Air travel would also save time and 
money, and shorten passenger journeys. For example, in 1917 Holt Thomas, as a 
prominent member of the air lobby, had explained that in empire locations, aeroplanes 
and flying boats could carry district officials and mail, and provide feeder services to 
railway stations. Instead of ‘50 miles in a bullock wagon, or perhaps walking over jolty 
roads, or no roads at all, taking one or several days,’153 by air the same journey could be 
made in half an hour. Aviation would also allow faster mail services, and thus sate the 
longings of expatriate Britons for news from ‘home,’ and lessen anxiety about loved 
ones. A reduction in travel time would also extend the holidays of empire officials. As 
imperial aviation was not yet seen as having extensive commercial application, 
arguments tended to reflect personal and social concerns such as these, but it was also 
suggested that business and finance would be facilitated by the faster arrival of 
newspapers. In addition, in affairs of state or commerce, Captain Acland argued in 
1921, ‘the right man at the right moment in the right place may turn defeat into 
victory…Swift travel offers the nearest approach to ubiquity.’154 Even given the 
investment in aviation technology during the War, it was undeniable that both aeroplane 
and airship technology was still so primitive that the craft appeared incapable of 
fulfilling all that was promised by enthusiasts. Uncertainty about the nature and 
potential of civil aviation raised doubts about its value, and ensured that many officials 
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were reticent to engage with the possibilities of the new technology, even when 
presented with evidence that the matter needed to be addressed at a national level. The 
proposed benefits of civil aviation could have only limited influence over more 
powerful arguments relating to financial, practical, and political aspects of British 
aviation policy.  
 
A failure in forward policy-making 
A number of key pressures which weighed upon Churchill, and acted against 
development, need to be examined in relation to aeroplane development. Although the 
factors involved were complex and inextricably entwined, two major categories can be 
identified - organisational and financial. The difficulties that arose were exacerbated by 
problems that included those of developing aviation in a post-war environment, 
administrative issues, and the effects of Churchill’s personal agenda. As the negative 
effects of these factors did not become clear immediately after the War ended, from the 
public viewpoint, the barriers to the development of civil, and hence commercial and 
imperial aviation, seemed to be only practical. However, the Air Ministry did not get off 
to a flying start after its formation in 1919, for, to give the country time to make 
practical arrangements and develop administrative systems, the national wartime ban on 
civil flight remained in place until May 1919, six months after the end of hostilities. As 
the speed of wartime development had naturally raised expectations that post-war 
progress would be rapid, the delay caused widespread frustration. That so little progress 
was made during Churchill’s term as Air Minister became a constant source of irritation 
and frustration to those concerned with air matters - from officials within the Air 
Ministry to aviation journalists and the aeroplane construction and operating sectors. 
The effect on industry was particularly damaging. Now that aircraft manufacturers were 
no longer receiving the Government’s wartime business they were forced to seek orders 
elsewhere, but demand was limited. In addition, many people retained a pre-war 
mindset. They failed to take into account changes both in aeroplane capability and 
infrastructure requirements that had occurred as a result of wartime investment, and 
hence their expectations no longer matched reality. They interpreted the Government’s 
determination to establish civil aviation on a solid and formal footing as a reluctance to 
act in a proactive and decisive manner. For example, in December 1918 Flight 
expressed the popular view with the comment that, ‘We are all talking about the 
development of commercial aviation, yet every possible bar is placed on civilian flying.’ 
31 
The journal, convinced that the Government planned to retain wartime levels of control 
of the aviation industry, put the blame on bureaucracy. It criticised the ‘large numbers 
of officers and officials who are being paid salaries they could never command in 
civilian life,’ who had ‘fastened themselves to public funds’ and were determined to 
obstruct civil aviation progress.155  
Not all such criticism was fair. Pre-war aviators had needed little more than an 
aircraft, a shed, and a field; items such as licenses and airworthiness certificates had not 
been required.156 After the War, the restarting of aviation was a mammoth task, in 
particular in dealing with a mass of administrative detail. As American aviation pioneer 
Clement M. Keys (1876-1952) pointed out, ‘ten percent of aviation is in the air, and 
ninety percent is on the ground.’157 For example, before flying could be resumed, 
questions involving aircraft registration, logbooks, prohibited areas, lighting, signalling, 
route approval, and regulation of Britain’s 120 aerodromes that needed to be resolved. 
Although the public remained largely unaware of these difficulties, they were so great 
that Sykes would explain later that it was only ‘By dint of superhuman exertions’ that in 
April 1919 the Air Ministry achieved the publication of the comprehensive Air 
Navigation Regulations that were intended to govern British civil and commercial 
flying in the post-war world.158 The Government itself was partly to blame for the 
criticism that it received, for it raised anger by failing to communicate effectively either 
the extent of the problems it faced or its policy aims. Those officials who did respond to 
critics did not help matters, for their warnings of slow progress caused only frustration. 
For example, Lord Weir, Secretary of State for the RAF, in a speech delivered four days 
after the signing of the Armistice, suggested that while the possibilities of commercial 
aviation were ‘great…the probabilities were not so great.’ He warned those who 
predicted rapid advance that, just as a period of ‘pioneer’ work had been required for 
military aviation at the start of the War, so now ‘extensive’ work, with State assistance, 
was required to set commercial aviation on its feet.159 In February 1919 Churchill 
further dampened hopes by commenting that the necessary aircraft performance for safe 
and reliable commercial aviation was ‘within view [but] certainly not yet within 
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reach.’160 In the same month, Air Ministry official Sefton Brancker adopted a more 
abrasive line, stating bluntly that ‘The British public thought that the moment peace was 
signed, and the conservative and tiresome Air Ministry removed the embargo on long 
flights, they would be able to fly to India, America, and Australia. They would not.’161 
The burst of activity which followed the resumption of civil flying in May 1919 
demonstrated the strength of pent-up impetus, and British aviation rapidly achieved 
some important ‘firsts.’ Most notably, in June 1919, flying a Vickers biplane (Fig. 2.2), 
Captain John Alcock and Lieutenant Arthur Brown of the RAF made the first crossing 
by air of the Atlantic Ocean.162 In the following month the British wartime R34 airship 
(Fig. 2.6) made the first east-west air crossing of the Atlantic, travelling from Scotland 
to Long Island in 108 hours. Then in August 1919 AT&T began the world’s first regular 
daily international air service on a cross-Channel route, flying between RAF Hendon 
and Paris. AT&T was also eyeing imperial routes, for The Times reported that the Paris 
services were ‘looked upon as typical of a stage in a big Trans-continental service – 
such as from London to India – and it is hoped that a great deal will be learned as to 
how best to work a long air service economically and efficiently.’163  
 
Fig. 2.2. The 
Vickers Vimy 
biplane in which 
Alcock and Brown 
crossed the 
Atlantic, 1919.164 
 
Only a few 
weeks after the 
inception of the 
Air Ministry, the 
Government was 
being criticised for its inattention to the challenges and claims of aviation. For example, 
in March 1919 a Times journalist had already identified the characteristics that would 
dog the Ministry under Churchill: there were ‘disturbing signs that something like chaos 
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prevails,’ and the necessary backing, staff, and funding were absent.165 Sykes also 
complained of the low status accorded to the Ministry in his autobiography. Civil 
aviation administration got off to a bad start, the negative effects of which could not be 
shaken off for years. Sykes claimed that in particular, the Department of Civil Aviation 
suffered from a ‘lack of…suitable organization and official support in the prosecution of 
research and operational development.’ Progress was held back by ‘public apathy in the 
importance of aviation in national life, and, I regret to add, Service jealousy.’166 ‘From 
start to finish,’ Sykes wrote, his department had been ‘overworked and under-staffed. 
For years practically no money was made available to it,’ and these factors contributed 
to his resignation as Controller of Civil Aviation in 1922.167 As John Ferris, in a 
discussion of policy-making up to 1924, suggests, policy was determined by a 
‘kaleidoscope range of departmental and political coalitions.’ It was made ‘almost on 
the basis of accident instead of deliberation,’ and ‘shaped by the pursuit of individual 
departmental and political interests, by the eccentric effect of personalities and by 
fundamental misunderstandings of important issues.’168 This resulted in power struggles, 
rivalries, and ill-informed and convoluted intra- and inter-departmental agendas. With 
no unified vision, it was unclear where policy responsibility lay, and the workings of the 
Air Ministry mystified even close observers. For example, in December 1919, Stanley 
Spooner, editor of Flight magazine, despite his expert knowledge, puzzled over 
Britain’s failure to pursue imperial aviation effectively: ‘How far the fault lies with the 
Government themselves and with the Secretary of State, and how much is to be laid to 
the weakness of the Department [of Civil Aviation], we have no means of knowing.’169  
In part the situation was the result of a lack of effective leadership. Sykes was 
‘disappointed to find that [Churchill’s] old enthusiasm for the needs and possibilities of 
the air seemed to have evaporated’170 once he became Air Minister. Although intrigued 
by the technological aspects of flight and the possibilities it opened up, not until 1921 
would Churchill achieve the practical application and forward policy-making that was 
required, by which time it was too late. Despite the minute attention given to other areas 
of Churchill’s life, his tenure at the Air Ministry has received less attention from 
biographers, although his performance has been discussed by several historians, 
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including Robin Higham, Gordon Pirie, John Sweetman and, most notably, Robert 
McCormack. McCormack is perhaps the sternest critic, arguing that as Churchill was 
‘the first air minister called upon to formulate civil aviation and air transport policy at 
home and in the empire,’ he was thus ‘uniquely placed to translate enthusiasm into 
reality, and to influence strongly the course of British civil aviation.’ Yet Churchill was 
‘cautious and timid to a fault, easily distracted from the task at hand, and too often 
uninterested…one might reasonably have expected more of him.’171 As a result, 
McCormack argues, Churchill opted for a ‘path of political and economic expedience 
with almost mindless disregard for the future and hard-won gains of war.’ McCormack 
concludes that Churchill’s influence on civil aviation policy was ‘malign,’ and that after 
his departure from the Air Ministry it would persist throughout the interwar years.172 
McCormack also concedes that Churchill operated under constraints that meant 
that the options open to him were ‘less apparent than hindsight allows.’173 The many 
claims upon his time and attention included a massive workload, and the need to satisfy 
Tory demands for cuts in Government expenditure given the national debt accumulated 
during the War. Churchill was distracted from the air portfolio by responsibility for 
matters such as the January 1919 demobilisation crisis, the Versailles peace conference, 
the civil war in Russia, and problems in Turkey, India, and the Middle East.174 In 
September 1919 he wrote to Lloyd George that in 14 years’ of experience, he had ‘never 
seen anything to compare with the difficulties of the questions now pressing for 
decision, while the daily routine business in volume exceeds several times the greatest 
pressure known before the war.’175 176 In addition, as Fitzgerald points out, much of the 
official ‘manoeuvring’ in the War Office and Air Ministry during Churchill’s term in 
office was related to ‘a still-born plan aimed at creating an all-embracing Ministry of 
Defence with Churchill as Minister.’ Under such an arrangement, aviation would have 
been ‘merely one of the subordinate spheres.’177 Even though this would never 
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materialise, the knowledge that it was under consideration must have had a restraining 
effect upon the formulation of forward policy.  
While the Ministry of Defence scheme was eventually abandoned, the 
combination of War and Air Ministries in 1919 under one Secretary of State had a 
negative effect on the status of civil aviation. Initially, at least, Churchill had opposed 
the joint arrangement. In December 1918 he appealed to Lloyd George against being 
given the Air Ministry post: ‘My heart is in the Admy [Admiralty].’ Given his personal 
preference, Churchill proposed putting the Air Ministry together with the Admiralty 
rather than the War Office. He attempted to justify this by reasoning that ‘though 
aeroplanes will never be a substitute for armies, they will be a substitute for many 
classes of warships.’178 Churchill was overruled, but the combination of the War and Air 
ministries was criticised sharply. A Flight editorial concluded that it was an ‘absurdity’ 
to think that anyone could fill both posts at the same time: ‘We cannot conceive that the 
Prime Minister can fall into such a capital error.’179 The Times argued that Churchill 
should have been given the Air Ministry alone, for the future of aviation was 
‘incomparably too vast to be treated as a “side show.”’180 While, given Churchill’s 
military background, it was acknowledged that he was qualified to act as Secretary of 
State for War, doubts about the wisdom of his air appointment were publicly expressed, 
although The Times pointed out that he did bring to the role the needed qualities of 
‘drive, enthusiasm, and imagination…whatever others he may lack.’181 In the event, the 
arrangement proved onerous from the start, for in March 1919 his wife wrote to 
Churchill: ‘Darling really don’t you think it would be better to give up the Air & 
continue concentrating as you are doing on the War Office?...It is weak to hang on to 2 
offices – You really are only doing the one.’182 In public, Churchill defended the joint 
leadership arrangement on the grounds that it enabled him to settle quickly and without 
friction any matters relating to both ministries. In practice, he was over-stretched, 
sidelining the Air Ministry and doing little more than bluffing his way through his 
duties as Secretary of State for Air.  
The dual post arrangement therefore led to an imbalance in the treatment of 
military and civil aviation. The new Air Ministry was placed in the role of junior partner 
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to the War Office, and the dominance of the War Office, plus the military bias within 
the Air Ministry, drew continual complaints. Churchill was held responsible for the 
weak position of the Air Ministry, for he was occupied with the pressing concerns of the 
War Office after the Armistice, and in any case he had a personal preference for military 
matters. He prioritised the War Office to the extent that even his friend John Seely, 
President of the Air League of the British Empire and former Under-Secretary of State 
for Air, commented that Churchill gave only ‘about an hour a week’ to the Air Ministry 
side of his duties.183 In February 1919, John Moore-Brabazon complained in the House 
of Commons about the ‘enormous rise of militarism’ within the Air Ministry. Together 
with the War Office, it was ‘fuller of generals than any other building in England.’184 
The implication was that the War Office was run by military men who were more 
concerned with the Army and the Navy than with the fledgling RAF, and its dominance 
was blamed for holding back military aviation. Flight accused the War Office of being 
‘reactionary.’ Incapable of developing aviation by itself, it was ‘still so far willing to act 
the part of dog-in-the-manger as to refuse to allow anyone else to do so.’185 Writing in 
the Daily Mail, ‘A Service MP’ complained that ‘Mr. Churchill and his “brass hat” 
friends have been brought up among foot soldiers and horse soldiers. They cannot 
understand the air soldier, his method of fighting, and his command of all war in the 
future. They are angry, and trying to suppress what they cannot understand.’186 In June 
1920, Seely pleaded with the Government to free the Air Ministry from the War Office 
so as to eradicate the ‘paralysing and strangling hold of old-fashioned military 
minds.’187 Under these pressures, as Fitzgerald notes, the Air Ministry ‘only just 
survived amidst the governmental politics of the period. Somewhere between 
Churchill’s ambition and the War Office, the Air Ministry emerged as a lesser entity.’188  
The responsibilities of the War Office distracted Churchill from his air portfolio, 
and within the Air Ministry itself he paid more attention to military than to civil 
aviation. As The Times commented, ‘The question whether the military or the civil side 
of aviation will be the more important in the long run seems never to have been thought 
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out by those in authority.’189 The fundamental weakness of civil aviation, Fitzgerald 
argues, was that it had been born ‘amid the gestation of service (military) aviation 
during the First World War.’ The location of the Department of Civil Aviation within 
the Air Ministry meant that it risked ‘being crushed in the nest by its larger, older and 
more aggressive sibling’190 – military aviation. A military bias within the Department of 
Civil Aviation did receive critical assessment, and in February 1919 Moore-Brabazon 
told the House of Commons that the department was ‘run by a general’ (Sykes, former 
Chief of Air Staff), and ‘You cannot change the spots of a leopard.’ As post-war civil 
aviation dawned it was essential, Moore-Brabazon insisted, that Britain’s hard-won 
position in the air should not be jeopardized by ‘lethargy and by trying to run the thing 
on a military line.’191 As Fitzgerald argues, this pattern of military dominance would 
continue, meaning that civil aviation would exist ‘in the shadow of service aviation’192 
throughout the interwar period. Churchill’s enthusiasm for civil flight may also have 
been dampened by an accident in the summer of 1919 in which he crashed while 
piloting an aeroplane during a flying lesson. While Churchill escaped with only 
bruising, his instructor broke both legs, and Churchill thenceforth gave up piloting 
aeroplanes.193 
In part, civil aviation was afflicted by its involvement in a tussle for funding 
with military aviation, which would continue throughout Churchill’s Air Ministry. In 
1921 The Times reported that owing to the close relationship between the Air Ministry 
and War Office, it had been ‘taken for granted that the great bulk of the money available 
should be assigned to the military side’ of aviation.194 As a large proportion of civil 
funding derived from, or was incidental to, military aviation, civil aviation was directly 
influenced, and often adversely affected, by factors governing strategic policy 
formulation. As military expenditure could be kept firmly under Governmental purview 
and control, in a tight economic situation it made sense to filter money down to civil 
aviation via the service channel. In practice, funds were often waylaid by military 
requirements, and even Churchill acknowledged that the more money was spent on the 
RAF, the less there was available for civil aviation. For example, in 1920 he reported 
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that RAF involvement in an uprising in Mesopotamia meant that the year’s military 
aviation expenditure amounted to about £50 million. This would be responsible for 
‘knocking all the bloom off any commercial possibilities which may have existed.’195 
Certainly, military aviation seemed to get the lion’s share of funds; in the August 1919 
Air Estimates only £3 million (or 6%) out of the £66,500,000 requested for the Air 
Ministry was allocated to civil aviation. Already by the close of 1919, sufficient money 
had been provided to give the RAF a permanent structure and basic training facilities.196 
There was no outcry, a fact which The Times attributed in part to the recognition that 
military aviation would effectively subsidise civil aviation, because facilities such as 
aerodromes, lighting, and meteorological services would be shared.197 It was clear that 
the Government’s policy was to use spending on military aviation to support civil 
aviation, rather than supporting civil aviation with a view to it acting as a military 
reserve.  
The debate on spending began immediately the War ended, and revealed a 
chasm between those who believed that aviation should play a key role in Britain’s post-
war recovery, and those who thought that the money would be better spent elsewhere. 
An early post-war period is described by Higham as a ‘limbo’ in which pre-war, 
wartime, and new ventures jostled for place: ‘Confusion and uncertainty will result 
while the government consolidates in some areas and expands in others.’198 In such 
circumstances, from 1919, aviation, having served solely in a service role during the 
War, was held back from either consolidation or expansion. John Ferris attributes the 
delay in the drawing up of policies for the armed services to the Government’s waiting 
until the outcome of the post-war peace conferences became apparent.199 Yet in practice, 
even after the Versailles Conference closed in January 1920, civil aviation remained in 
limbo. Partly, it suffered as a result of the formation in 1919 of the League of Nations, 
which initially was widely expected to bring disarmament in Europe and thus prevent 
future wars. Although historians have given little attention to the role of the League in 
relation to aviation, at the time it was anticipated that disarmament would reduce the 
need for military aviation. Clearly, this could be expected to have a bearing on civil 
                                            
195 Quoted in: James Barr, A Line in the Sand: Britain, France and the Struggle that Shaped the Middle 
East (London, Simon and Schuster, 2011), p. 114. 
196 John Sweetman, ‘Crucial Months for Survival: The Royal Air Force, 1918-19,’ Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1984), p. 544. 
197 ‘A Separate Air Ministry,’ The Times, 28 January 1921, p. 11. 
198 Robin Higham, ‘Government, Companies, and National Defense: British Aeronautical Experience, 
1918-1945,’ Business History Review, Vol. 39, No. 3 (1965), p. 332. 
199 Ferris, ‘Treasury Control,’ p. 866. 
39 
aviation, and imply the potential to take the force from air lobby arguments regarding 
the role of civil aviation as a military reserve. If military aircraft were to become as 
valueless in peacetime as, for example, tanks,200 the resulting cuts in military spending 
would affect funding for civil aviation.  
 
Fig. 2.3. Winston Churchill, 1921.201  
 
As Secretary of State for War, 
Churchill warned of overstretch of the Army 
overseas. Although this meant that no 
increase in military spending could be 
justified, it also seemed to provide a window 
of opportunity for a third service, the RAF. 
Military aviation appeared to offer a cheap 
means of reinforcing Britain’s overseas 
involvement. However, with overall 
spending on military forces contracting, this 
view did not receive strong backing, and the RAF, as the junior service, had to compete 
against the claims of the existing services. This also had knock-on effects for civil 
aviation, because the older services did not wish to share decreasing resources with a 
new rival. The Army and Navy, as Churchill had commented in 1916, were well-
established, powerful, and strongly backed by press and Parliament.202 After the War, 
‘The War Office wished the army to be twice as big and more modern than in 1913,’ 
while ‘The Admiralty wanted the largest navy in the world.’ Meanwhile the Air 
Ministry advocated a permanent RAF which was not far short of its peak wartime 
strength.203 In seeking political backing and financial support, however, the Air 
Ministry, being ‘small and new,’ had ‘few friends.’204 That the RAF held its ground 
against the older services was owed largely to Trenchard, Chief of Air Staff. Amidst 
rumours about the reduction or abolition of the RAF, Trenchard collaborated with 
Churchill to support the air service.  
Unfortunately, Trenchard’s support for the RAF, McCormack argues, had a 
detrimental effect on civil aviation for, ‘While Churchill turned to Trenchard for advice 
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and counsel, Sykes [as Controller of Civil Aviation] was by and large ignored.’205 
Sykes’ ideas and abilities could not have free rein in the tense atmosphere that existed 
between him, Churchill, and Trenchard. The problems were exacerbated by an 
unfortunate personal dislike of Sykes by both Churchill and Trenchard, with the latter 
finding Sykes ‘“most difficult” and an obvious rival.’206 While Trenchard’s proposals 
were ‘succinct, inexpensive and definitely focused on service aviation,’ Sykes had a 
broad vision for civil aviation that encompassed international routes; his sweeping 
proposals were ‘literally imperial in scope…and gave civil aviation a predominant 
future.’207 Clearly Sykes’ ambitions for civil aviation would involve considerable 
expenditure and, after an argument in 1919, Churchill adopted the policies of 
Trenchard, which were favourable to the RAF, over those of Sykes. With Churchill and 
Trenchard together driving RAF policy, Sykes became ‘a perceived pariah,’208 which 
had a negative effect upon the Department of Civil Aviation. As a result, as Norman 
Macmillan, wartime air ‘ace’ and post-war test pilot, recalled, a ‘feeling’ developed on 
the ‘Service side’ of aviation, by which ‘funds allotted to civil aviation were 
resented.’209 Certainly Trenchard appears to have opposed spending on civil aviation,210 
and the RAF guarded its funds jealously. Churchill’s military spending bias was 
confirmed in the spring of 1921, when it was revealed that his first task at the Colonial 
Office, of which he had been appointed Secretary of State in January, would be to work 
with Trenchard to plan five military air stations in Egypt. These required funding of 
£670,000, and Flight described them as ‘costly and useless enterprises,’ in particular as 
the Air Estimates had granted only £60,000 to civil aviation.211 Sykes would later 
condemn this as a ‘glaring’ example of the ‘unequal allotment of funds.’212 This military 
emphasis, Peter Fearon claims, was a ‘cardinal error…at a time when there was no 
money and no demand for war machines,’ and it resulted only in the neglect of civil 
aviation development.213  
Part of the problem was that during the early 1920s there were no certainties 
about any aspect of aviation, and no precedent for the support of civil aviation with 
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public money. Post-war economic difficulties contributed to the problems. The 
uncertainty about civil aviation spending was displayed in early 1919 when The Times 
printed seemingly conflicting articles. In January the newspaper advocated expenditure, 
expressing the hope that aviation policy would not be ‘cramped by a desire to save 
money for political reasons…The admitted waste of money during the war should be no 
reason for feverish and ill-considered economies now. Let us have economies of 
administration, not economies of development.’214 Then, only a few weeks later, a 
second article preached that as civil aviation was ‘an experiment in Government 
activity…It would be fatal to spend too much money on it at first, and every pound 
spent must be accounted for.’215 In response, Flight retorted that it was ‘extremely 
difficult to say what would be too much…it would be better to err on the side of 
generosity than on that of parsimony, which might easily cripple the development of the 
movement for years to come.’216  
While the potential of aviation seemed great, demands for funding coincided 
with both a lack of availability of capital and with administrative problems. The dispute 
over the support of aviation was in part due to the Treasury’s post-war struggle to regain 
control of Whitehall spending and of the British economy, both of which, David 
Reynolds argues, it had lost in the War years, ‘with alarming inflationary 
consequences.’217 It was a struggle in which the Treasury, as Duggan and Meyer 
describe it, became ‘England’s most formidable hierarchy of civil servants.’218 A ‘post-
war backlash’ gave Sir Warren Fisher (Permanent Secretary of the Treasury from 1919 
to 1939), ‘unrivalled authority through his right to scrutinize any proposal involving 
government spending,’ which, of course, included spending on defence and foreign 
policy.219 Between 1919 and 1924, Ferris suggests, the Treasury aimed ‘to become the 
government’s general staff…It wanted the decisive departmental voice in determining 
the government’s priorities and to dominate all aspects of policy, including service 
policies.’220 Its power to rein in spending was ‘continual and almost irresistable.’221 
From early 1919, Treasury policies held back aviation progress. For example, when 
Churchill asked for a ‘modest £3 million – of £66 million set out in the air estimates of 
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1919-1920 – for research, new aircraft, and general improvements in civil aviation,’ he 
was ‘abruptly over-ruled.’222 The Treasury’s role in preventing aviation development 
was severely criticised. In March 1919, with the Air Estimates about to be released, The 
Times pressured the Government by warning that Treasury ‘parsimony or meanness’ 
would ‘cripple the whole future of British Civil Flying.’ The newspaper cited H.G. 
Wells, who had argued that because the empire’s core was small in terms of territory 
and population it needed a concomitantly large worldview, which included the 
exploitation of aviation. If, Wells had warned, Britain did not plan aviation on a grand 
scale it could not pretend to be more than a second-rate power: ‘We cannot be both 
Imperial and mean.’223 The Times kept up its attack, for three days later an editorial 
warned of ‘a real risk that the Treasury may be tempted to follow the line of least 
resistance, and may try to starve new Departments.’ The Department of Civil Aviation 
was ‘very young…it must necessarily be ill-equipped as yet for the struggle for 
financial existence.’224  
The Treasury was also criticised by prominent aviation officials. For example, in 
July 1919, Air Vice-Marshal Sefton Brancker, addressing the Ex-RAF Officers 
Luncheon Club, told his audience that the Air Ministry ‘was torn between an 
enthusiastic Press and a cold and unsympathetic Treasury which had not yet been bitten 
by the “bug” of aviation. (Laughter).’225 Brancker was making an understatement, for 
the dislike of aviation by some Treasury officials was entrenched. Sykes, for example, 
recalled a visit to the Treasury during which ‘A high official…opened the discussion 
with the jocular but dampening announcement that he viewed anything to do with civil 
aviation with “implacable hostility.”’226 The following year, Lord Weir identified the 
ignorance of Treasury officials about all aspects of civil aviation as a factor in their 
opposition to it. He recommended that Treasury officials ‘Go out to Croydon, which is 
the first complete terminal aerodrome in the world, and watch it at work for a couple of 
hours.’ By observing the aircraft, passengers, and cargo operations they would, he 
hoped, realise that ‘The whole thing is full of romance and of practical possibilities.’227 
Despite such attacks, the Treasury held firm, insisting in the summer of 1919 that 
overspending was ‘leading Britain down the “road to ruin.”’ It even pressured the 
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Cabinet to cut service spending from existing levels, on the grounds that for the 
‘foreseeable future’ there was no threat to British national security.228 So tight was the 
squeeze that progress on air routes in the Middle East and Africa was held back. Writing 
from Cairo in September 1919, Major-General Salmond, Officer Commanding the RAF 
in the Middle East, pressed Trenchard in London over these routes. Trenchard replied 
bluntly: ‘you have not got the atmosphere that is reigning here. That atmosphere is, 
economy at all cost.’229  
 
Fig. 2.4. Touting for ‘Peace 
enquiries’ – a Westland 
Aircraft Works company 
advertisement, 1919.230 
 
Such a financial 
environment could only 
place constraints on 
Churchill’s political 
ambitions, and influence his 
spending policies in a way 
that curtailed civil aviation 
spending. During this period 
Churchill became ‘fixated 
on expense’ because, James 
Barr suggests, he wanted to 
‘win a reputation for 
economy.’231 His long-term 
goal was to become 
Chancellor of the Exchequer 
as a stepping stone to becoming Prime Minister, which meant that he had to maintain a 
good reputation with the Treasury. As a result, Churchill did not lobby persistently on 
behalf of civil aviation, but he sacrificed it in vain, for when in the Spring of 1921 the 
position of Chancellor became vacant it went to Austen Chamberlain. Churchill, 
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‘embittered’ by his failure,232 would have to wait until 1924 to achieve his ambition.  
During the War the Government had taken control of large areas of the national 
economy, including transportation, armaments, heavy industry, raw materials, and 
commodities. With aviation, as with other industries which had received wartime 
support, the number of manufacturing companies had mushroomed. From the economic 
and business viewpoints, wartime aviation had been concerned mainly with the 
manufacture of airframes and aeroplane engines for military use, with the Government 
being the main customer. When the War ended and the flow of public money ceased 
abruptly, the aeroplane industry was thrown into difficulty. By the middle of 1919, as 
McCormack comments, there was ‘everywhere a palpable desire to return to pre-war 
“normalcy”, and thus a keenness to abandon the control of industry made necessary by 
the war.’233 The abandonment of Government control of industry implied the 
abandonment of civil aviation enterprises. Following the Armistice, several proposals 
for the development of commercial air services came from wartime manufacturing 
concerns, for example AT&T. Other companies, however, sought to survive by 
continuing as aeroplane constructors and also becoming vendors. An example was the 
Westland Aircraft Works (Fig. 2.4) which, in moving into the civil sphere, tried to cash 
in on its reputation by promising customers that its wartime design staff and 
organisation would continue to deal with post-war ‘Peace enquiries.’ It also offered the 
use of its ‘private aerodrome’ for test flights.  
With the aeroplane industry in difficulty, the question of subsidisation arose. 
Interwar aviation subsidisation has been examined by a number of writers, including 
R.W. Spurgeon and Eric Birkhead.234 Spurgeon focussed on the British and American 
experience, while Birkhead concentrated on Britain in the years 1919 to 1924. 
Spurgeon, writing in 1956, commented that the aviation industry had ‘never been self-
sufficient.’ It was, he suggested, ‘high cost…in comparison with the older forms of 
transport; it used the essentially uneconomic principle of expending power to overcome 
the force of gravity, a principle foreign to surface transport, and it experiences a high 
rate of obsolescence of its transport vehicle.’235 A system of state assistance for 
ownership of commercial enterprises had been recommended by the Civil Aerial 
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Transport Committee before the War ended. The Committee foresaw that the post-war 
commencement of civil aviation would require Government support. On taking office in 
February 1919, Sykes endorsed the Committee’s recommendations, warning that the 
cost of establishing international air services was ‘simply stupendous,’ and that 
commercial aviation would ‘have to be heavily subsidized by the State.’236 In Britain, 
with no history of passenger air services, for some time after the War ended, aviation 
continued to be regarded in terms of a construction industry rather than as a service 
provider or commercial venture. Under pressure to return to pre-war ‘business as usual,’ 
official support for schemes involving subsidisation was not readily forthcoming. The 
concept of using public money to back civil air transport had little precedent and was 
also politically sensitive, for it was feared that subsidisation would encourage 
inefficiency and also reduce sums available for other purposes. In November 1918, The 
Times suggested that aviation subsidisation would be ‘a big experiment in State 
Socialism…It is claimed by many that the new industry should be as free from State 
control as possible.’237  
Opponents of subsidisation took refuge in a number of arguments. One involved 
the tactic of equating aeroplanes with other modes of transportation in terms of 
expansion of usage and the development of the associated construction industries. 
Therefore it was proposed that aeroplanes were bound to mimic private motoring and 
that even without Government support, the aviation industry would follow the car 
industry and every home own its own aircraft. This view was expressed in the House of 
Commons, when an MP argued that Britain should foster aeroplanes to allow the craft 
to become ‘as practical and as commonplace as the motor-car.’238 However, this idea 
could retain credibility only while aeroplanes remained small in size and simple enough 
for amateur operation, and as the two types of transportation diverged and aeroplanes 
departed ever further from the category of household purchase, the motor car analogy 
could no longer be applied.239 Fitzgerald argues that wartime investment had skewed the 
natural evolution of aviation, which would otherwise have developed in a way that more 
closely resembled that of road and rail transportation technology.240 This is debatable, 
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because motor transport replaced or augmented existing traffic on existing roads; 
relatively little new infrastructure or administration was initially necessary. In addition, 
the presence of a good domestic British rail network, which already fulfilled passenger 
needs, prevented the growth of aviation services. Further, a railway system, once 
established, was relatively finite and its services prescribed. In contrast, aviation 
ventures demanded organisation on a national and then international scale, and hence 
could not be undertaken without the support of the Government.  
Arguments about cars and trains were subsidiary to a far more powerful factor 
which influenced public perceptions about Government funding of commercial aviation. 
This was the widely-held belief in economic liberalism, and with it ‘laissez faire,’ 
which implied opposition to subsidisation. As Cain and Hopkins argue, the Government 
aimed ‘to make industry help itself while preserving the orthodoxies of balanced 
budgets, low Government spending and a strong pound, all of which found support in 
industrial circles.’ Wartime spending, Daniel Ritschel suggests, had had the effect of 
‘temporarily suspending the laissez-faire order,’ and the War effort led to ‘an 
unprecedented degree of central regimentation which earlier would have been thought 
impossible.’241 After the War, financial assistance was offered mainly to ‘older 
industries because the underlying assumption of policy remained one of attempting to 
revive exports and the international economy.’242 The focus on traditional industries 
meant that, at the War’s end, the Treasury, a key stronghold of laissez faire ideology, 
cut Government aviation spending abruptly. Darwin attributes this in part to the post-
war desire of Westminster and Whitehall for economy in imperial administration and 
defence. As a result of the War, imperial expansion had taken place but, by restraining it 
afterwards, the Government was adhering to the laissez faire policy of the Victorian era. 
By this, officials kept up an ‘unremitting struggle to retain some official control over the 
centrifugal forces that drove…expansion, lest their unruly progress should disrupt the 
financial, military and political institutions of the metropole itself.’243 A study by Simon 
Potter suggests that there were precedents for a departure from the principles of laissez 
faire in cases in which the Government felt that such a move was in its own interest. 
Potter argues that in the nineteenth century the ‘worship’ of laissez faire resulted in 
responsibility for the creation of imperial communications infrastructure being left to 
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private enterprise. Where companies failed to fulfil Government requirements, the 
Government itself could step in. He cites as an example the case of support for steam 
shipping via subsidies provided in return for the use of services.244 Imperial shipping 
had similarities to imperial aviation, and there was therefore a precedent for 
Government intervention. When it deemed it expedient, therefore, the Government 
could provide subsidised transportation.  
Although officials did not at first recognise air transport as being of sufficient 
value to justify the abandonment of the laissez faire principle, once the War ended, the 
subsequent economic downturn began to make inroads into Britain’s traditional, and 
deeply entrenched, conservatism as regards subsidisation. Ritschel argues that while the 
War had expanded the technological capabilities of other countries, in Britain it had 
‘severely aggravated the growing problem of technological obsolescence’ in traditional 
exports such as coal, textiles, and shipbuilding.245 Although after the War, traditional 
hostility to Government intervention revived, wartime experiences had left their mark 
and in this new atmosphere, John Friedman suggests, Governmental regulation of 
business for public purposes began to seem ‘less outrageous than before,’ and it even 
began to appear that without some form of State intervention, ‘the “spontaneous” 
discipline of the market would merely exacerbate the evils of inefficiency, waste, and 
injustice.’246 Even so, aviation, as a new and untrusted entrant into the field of claimants 
for Government support, was not an obvious candidate for any funding that might be 
forthcoming in the early 1920s. 
As British air transport companies struggled to set up cross-Channel services, in 
February 1920 Flight made a fierce attack on the Government, accusing it of lacking 
‘ordinary prevision and honesty of intent,’ and instead being guilty of ‘derelictions’ and 
a ‘cheese-paring policy’ for the sake of saving money. Again bringing into play the 
argument that civil aviation provided a military reserve, Flight argued that the 
Government intended to leave national defence for a future administration to address: 
‘We know it is an unpleasant deduction, but what else is there left for us to believe?’247 
Meanwhile, cross-Channel passenger services were in operation between London and 
Paris, Amsterdam, and Brussels, but of the seven companies providing services only 
three were British. The Government was playing a game of brinkmanship, trying to 
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coax them into profitability. However, competition for the small number of passengers 
(particularly in the winter) was stiff, and set British companies not only against foreign 
competitors but also against each other. Staniland, in his coverage of early European 
aviation after WWI, has discussed factors implicated in low passenger numbers. While 
air travel had several advantages – for example the avoidance of seasickness on cross-
Channel travel - it also had a number of important disadvantages. In addition to cabin 
discomfort, the total travel time had to be taken into account: in 1921 ‘the city-center to 
city-center time between Paris and Amsterdam was six hours forty-five minutes by air, 
compared to nine hours thirty minutes by train.’ In addition, rail passengers could travel 
by night, but the air journey consumed a working day and cost three times the price into 
the bargain. Worse, ‘rail travel was estimated to be 160 times safer than air travel.’248  
The financial losses of Britain’s individual airline companies have been 
examined by Marc Dierikx,249 and in greater detail by Birkhead.250 The latter concludes 
that the problems were due to the fact that each individual airline received too little 
business (either passenger or freight), to allow it to cover running costs. Birkhead 
attributes the low demand to three factors: challenges in keeping to advertised schedules 
(largely owing to weather-related factors), a poor reputation for safety, and high fares. 
Unfortunately, while ‘an increase in the scale of operations was probably a prerequisite 
of success in air transport,’ it was ‘clearly useless to provide greater capacity.’ 
However, Birkhead argues that Britain’s early aviation problems did serve the purpose 
of ‘revealing the problems and…suggesting some of the solutions,’ thus paving the way 
for the smoother operation of Imperial Airways from 1924.251 In addition, Marc Dierkx 
suggests that, in Britain as elsewhere, airlines could not easily break even financially 
because they ‘had to operate in the area of tension between politics and commerce and 
were thus not always free to concentrate on flying the more profitable routes or operate 
the most cost-effective aircraft.’252  
By early 1920, after only seven months of commercial operations on cross-
Channel routes, the problems of British airline companies, and therefore of the aircraft 
constructors who relied on their custom, came to a head. On 10 March, Sefton Brancker 
warned that without direct financial assistance, Britain’s construction industry ‘might 
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very well die.’253 The following day Churchill hit back in the House of Commons, 
rebutting Brancker’s remarks and making a statement which would become something 
of a mantra:  
Civil aviation must fly by itself; the Government cannot possibly hold it up in 
the air. The first thing the Government have got to do is to get out of the way, 
and the next thing is to smooth the way. But when both these steps have been 
taken…it must fly on its own power, and any attempt to support it artificially by 
floods of State money will not ever produce a really sound commercial aviation 
service which the public will use, and will impose a burden of an almost 
indefinite amount upon the Exchequer.254  
 
Churchill’s exaggerated but emotive references to red tape and ‘floods of State money’ 
deflected blame from the Government’s failure to provide financial support. 
Predictably, the response from aircraft constructors was rapid and bitter. They felt, The 
Times reported, that ‘the door through which they had hoped assistance might come to 
them has been banged, barred, and bolted in their faces.’ George Holt Thomas criticised 
the Government for having ‘completely missed the importance of…civil aviation in its 
twofold aspect of national defence and assistance to British trade.’255 A few days later 
Holt Thomas resigned as Chairman of Airco, Britain’s largest aircraft manufacturing 
concern. This move was no mere ploy, for the company’s associated AT&T London to 
Paris commercial service would fail in December.  
Embarrassingly for Churchill, in April 1920, only a month after his Commons 
declaration, the Advisory Committee on Civil Aviation, which he had set up in 1919, 
proposed a temporary subsidy of £250,000 for the operation of Britain’s Channel routes, 
to be paid over two years.256 This brought forth fresh objections not only from the 
Treasury but also from Trenchard, who Flight subsequently accused of trying to use 
calls for economy to divert money from civil to military aviation.257 Committee 
Chairman Lord Weir retorted that the proposal was not for a ‘dole.’ Instead, the onus 
was on the recipient companies which, he explained, ‘must incur their capital 
expenditure…must show in a practical form their enterprise and faith…must carry the 
passengers and the goods before the State contribution is earned…must run all the 
risks.’ Weir savaged the Treasury, suggesting that with something as novel as civil 
aviation, ‘calm and logical reasoning’ was insufficient for determining State support. 
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The Government’s response was merely ‘cold-blooded’ and ‘unimaginative,’ in a 
situation in which ‘Imagination and intuition’ were the required characteristics of 
policy-makers. Weir reminded his readers that Britain had lost an ‘enormous world’s 
industry’ – the motor industry - to ‘lack of imagination,’ although the Government was 
not at fault in that case. Now, another industry was under threat from Treasury 
objections, which were ‘not based on definite stringency or the necessity for economy, 
but on the grounds of principle.’ Weir cited Trenchard as a prominent opponent of 
subsidisation, but one who had no real grounds except that ‘subsidies are bad.’ While 
Weir agreed in general, he argued that an exception should be made in the case of 
aviation. It would, he argued, be ‘a dangerous thing’ to delay investment until its 
necessity had been ‘absolutely proved because it may then be too late, and enterprise is 
not cheaply reawakened.’258  
Weir’s urgings had no immediate effect, and a few weeks later it appeared that 
the Government’s heel-dragging might after all have some justification. At a meeting of 
29 July, the Cabinet was told that one unnamed British airline had ‘begun to pay its way 
with a turnover of £100,000 per annum.’ The Air Ministry asked that the ‘question 
might be postponed until the figures…had been examined.’259 The message was clear – 
there would be no Government funding while there was the slightest chance that civil 
aviation could manage without - but the glimmer of hope soon died. In September 1920 
Flight accused the Government of ‘supineness,’ and of being ‘false to the trust reposed 
in it by the nation’ in relation to imperial defence. Politicians, the journal complained, 
were ‘so busy in looking after their own interests and those of their limpet friends that 
they have no time to look to the real interest of the Empire.’260  
Charting the difficulties of the British Government as it experimented with early 
aviation subsidisation from 1919, Spurgeon argues that the application of subsidies to 
the problem of the failure of the small independent companies was ineffective because it 
provided only ‘an assured income to each firm in return for a given service.’ It gave the 
companies no incentive for development or expansion. Although the early subsidy 
schemes did increase the British proportion of air traffic and gave experience in the 
development of airline operations, they did not encourage British air transport to ‘fly by 
itself.’261 Yet in other countries systems of subsidisation were more effective. As we 
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shall see in Chapter Three, Peter Lyth points out that in the interwar years, everywhere 
except in Britain, ‘subsidy and air travel were virtually synonymous.’262 While in the 
fiscal year 1921-1922 French airlines were subsidised to the tune of £1,328,600, during 
the same period Britain gave the ‘tiny’ sum of £88,200 to cover both civil and military 
aviation.263 In farsighted Germany, Fitzgerald notes, between 1919 and 1924 subsidies 
were provided at the local and national levels, with the result that small airline 
companies were able to thrive.264  
British parsimony would continue, until in 1924 the whole aviation industry 
would receive Government money that amounted to ‘one-fifth of the German equivalent 
and one-nineteenth of the French.’265 In competing against such heavily-subsidised 
foreign concerns, British companies operated at a disadvantage, and the Government’s 
policy of relying on private enterprise to achieve commercial aviation on a national 
scale was only a gamble. The excruciating wait-and-see policy would continue for 
several months. Basil Collier comments that the dire state of British civil aviation 
‘frightened’ the Government only ‘into making soothing declarations.’266 For example, 
in October 1920, at a high profile conference organised by the Air Ministry, Churchill 
made an apparent U-turn when he stated that ‘We…intend to help civil aviation by 
every means in our power.’ Despite the fact that Churchill added the qualification that 
‘In the main…aviation must fly by itself,’ with the Government acting only to ‘liberate, 
stimulate and encourage,’267 still his words raised hopes. Flight, for example, rejoiced 
that ‘at last the Government does realize the vital consequences to the Empire of…a 
strong and healthy mercantile air fleet.’268 Elation rapidly turned to despair, for a 
fortnight later the journal reported bitterly that ‘precisely nothing’ had been done.269  
Even so, Government plans, albeit modest, were afoot. On 5 January 1921 
Churchill wrote to Austen Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer, regarding a 
subsidy of £60,000 for civil aviation. Acknowledging the demoralised state of the 
aircraft industry, Churchill suggested that the announcement of the subsidy ‘should be 
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made at once (in order to encourage them before they are quite dead).’270 The reception 
of the announcement was mixed. While a Times columnist looked on the bright side, 
suggesting that ‘the psychological stimulus to a drooping industry may be almost as 
valuable as a richer material succor,’271 a second correspondent, lamenting Britain’s 
‘lost national prestige’ and disbanded aeroplane companies, pointed out that the sum 
allocated was only about a quarter of that recommended by the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Aviation.272 Flight was by now disillusioned with Government pronouncements: 
‘Parturiunt montes nascetur ridiculus mus’ (‘mountains will be in labour and an absurd 
mouse will be born’), the Editor wrote. Not only, he complained, was the subsidy 
‘beggarly,’ but it was guaranteed for one year only.273  
 
Fig. 2.5. Instone 
airline publicity 
material, c. 
1924.274 
 
In 
February 1921 a 
further blow 
came, that 
would prove 
decisive to 
Britain’s cross-
Channel services. The French announced a reorganisation of their subsidy system, 
which meant that their cross-Channel passenger and goods rates would be reduced, 
bringing a single fare down to about £6.6s. against the British rate of £15 15s. This, The 
Times reported, amounted to a ‘rate war.’275 As a result, all British services ceased on 28 
February, a date The Times described as ‘the darkest day British civil flight has 
known.’276 Thus a year after Churchill’s pronouncement that civil aviation should fly by 
itself, the collapse of Britain’s European routes (its only international services) proved 
him wrong. The humiliation was acute. With only foreign planes now crossing the 
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Channel, British mail was being carried by foreign services and, as Robin Higham 
points out, ‘British taxpayers’ money was being spent to create aerodromes and other 
facilities purely for the benefit of foreigners, principally the heavily-subsidized 
French.’277 The Channel routes, which, as The Times reminded its readers, were ‘the 
indispensable foundation of an Imperial system of air transport,’278 had been abandoned 
by Britain. This ‘calamitous’ state of affairs, the newspaper scolded, had not come about 
unexpectedly or without warning; Britain had negligently ‘drifted’ into it.279 Perhaps not 
as a coincidence, Churchill chose this embarrassing moment to depart for Egypt with 
Trenchard on duties connected with his new post of Colonial Secretary. 
The fact that the alarming failure of British services had been allowed to occur 
showed the strength of resistance to the concept of subsidisation. It took this crisis to 
break the grip of laissez faire ideology and wring money from the Government for 
British air transport. Immediately before Churchill’s hasty departure, in an attempt to 
solve the pressing problems of British aviation, he commissioned another committee, 
the Cross-Channel Subsidies Committee. Its members, including aircraft constructors 
and airline operators, were charged with searching for ways of meeting the French 
challenge.280 Despite Churchill’s previous declarations, and even though there seemed 
little room for manoeuvre, only a week after the Committee’s first meeting The Times 
was able to report: ‘London-Paris Air Route. British Service Restored. Daily Flights.’ 
The Air Ministry, an article stated, had made an agreement with the Handley Page and 
Instone (Fig. 2.5) companies by which, through a financial reorganisation, British 
companies would offer the same fares as the French. Britain’s air service services to 
Paris, Brussels, and Amsterdam resumed, albeit still in competition with five 
Continental airlines. The subsidisation was planned to be only temporary, yet The Times 
hailed it as ‘the turning point in the history, hitherto sombre, of British civil aviation.’281 
Not surprisingly, both The Times and Flight suggested that it would have been better if 
action had been taken before British services had closed down.  
The emergency subsidy scheme recommended by the Cross-Channel Subsidies 
Committee was now formalised. A £600,000 grant awarded to civil aviation, spread 
over three years, averted the immediate crisis. Even so, the funding provided, Sykes 
wrote later, proved ‘so inadequate’ that Instone reported a net loss of £5,398 at the end 
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of 1921. In addition, nothing was allowed for research and development, or even aircraft 
refurbishment. Sykes complained that as a result, Britain’s airlines were in the early 
1920s ‘so behind their competitors in comfort that passengers were chary of using air 
transport and difficult to convince that they were not taking their lives into their 
hands.’282 However, the reticence to fund commercial aviation would continue, and 
laissez faire ideology hold sway until the formation of Imperial Airways in 1924. 
Meanwhile, during Churchill’s Air Ministry, if little attention was given to civil aviation 
policy with regards to aeroplanes, the problem of the future of British airship policy was 
accorded even lower priority. Although during Churchill’s Air Ministry Government 
and industry in some measure addressed the challenges presented by aeroplanes, this 
was not the case with airships. 
 
The airship problem 
Airships would become a key component of British imperial aviation policy in 1923 
but, prior to that, post-war lighter-than-air policy stayed in the doldrums. Britain’s 
airship policy in the period after the Armistice, and up to the adoption of the Imperial 
Airship Scheme in 1924, has been examined by several writers, including Higham,283 
more recently Christopher Neilson,284 and notably Alex Spencer.285 Spencer has 
suggested that Britain’s airship programme was ‘a microcosm of the problems of 
Britain’s postwar aviation network: private versus public funding, airplanes versus 
airships, the Royal Air Force versus the Royal Navy, and commercial enterprises versus 
military endeavors.’286 A number of key factors emerged during Churchill’s term in 
office to prevent the emergence of a clear policy, of which certain aspects would 
continue to dog Britain until the R101 disaster of 1930 brought an end to its airship 
ambitions. Airship policy hung in the balance as Churchill ‘moved, reversed, 
compromised, and moved again to appease all interests, from airship proponents to the 
stern budgeteers of the Treasury. It was a tiring game of airship musical chairs.’287  
Generally, there was considerable ignorance in Britain about airships; because 
aeroplanes were more commonly seen in the skies, public knowledge about them was 
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greater. There was also a gulf in knowledge and perception between types of flight 
technology. For example, RAF officer and prominent airship proponent W. Lockwood 
Marsh declared in 1919 that while Britain had two craft - the R33 and R34 - which were 
capable of crossing the Atlantic, he ‘did not believe there was a plane in existence’ 
which could perform this feat.288 Only three months later, Alcock and Brown made their 
Atlantic crossing by aeroplane, beating the R34 by two weeks.289 Even within the Air 
Ministry airships had few supporters. In 1921 a Times editorial stated that Churchill’s 
‘adventurous soul abhorred the prosaic safety of the airship,’290 and this dislike cannot 
have failed to play a part in the Government’s lack of enthusiasm. Frederick Sykes, 
Controller of Civil Aviation, rarely mentioned the craft, and sat on the fence when he 
did. In January 1919, for example, he suggested that commercial airships ‘may belong 
to the future more than to the immediate present…Someday perhaps when the problems 
are solved…it may be possible to run a continuous airship service between England and 
America.’291  
Fig. 2.6. March 1919. Britain’s R34 airship was 196 metres in length, with a diameter 
of 24 metres and a volume of 5,5218m3. With a maximum speed of 99.7 kph., the R34 
was powered by five 275 hp. (205 kw.) engines and had a ‘useful lift’ capability of 
26,417 kg.292 
 
In the atmosphere of uncertainty and ignorance surrounding the gas craft, 
officials were unable to ascertain a clear picture of their capabilities and potential, 
economic or otherwise. Hitherto the main role of British airships had been to provide 
the Navy with air support during the War, and they had therefore become the 
responsibility of the Admiralty. At the War’s end, the nation’s airship possessions 
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amounted to several bases, three tired old rigid airships, and 73 rapidly-decaying non-
rigid naval patrol craft. At the Armistice, as their useful life seemed to be over, the 
Navy wished to withdraw from its involvement with airships to focus on aircraft 
carriers. Duggan and Meyer recount how for the first six months of 1919 the Admiralty 
and Air Ministry ‘fenced adroitly to escape from costs of airship procurement.’ The 
Admiralty retained ownership until October 1919 but then, although it kept some older 
craft for training, cancelled other orders and tried to dump the remaining, unwanted 
craft on the Air Ministry. During Churchill’s tenure, the Admiralty, Cabinet, Parliament, 
Treasury, the Ministries of Commerce and Transport, and the Post Office were all 
entitled to a say in policy-making.293 Discussion on a development programme took 
place, but there was no consensus about the number of airships that should be built, 
where they should be constructed, for what purpose, or with what money. It was even 
uncertain as to whether airships should be classified as military or civil and, in either 
case, which Government department should hold responsibility. 
Reflecting the military background of the craft, and the fact that they were few 
in number, the ‘world’ of the airship was smaller and more tightly-knit than that of the 
aeroplane. Airships had fewer advocates, their main support coming from what Duggan 
and Meyer describe as a ‘loosely functioning’ lobby, a subset of the wider air lobby. In 
1919 and 1920 this lobby was made up of two groups - ‘the tiny nucleus of experienced 
designers, engineers, and fliers who had been emotionally seized by the practice and 
promise of airship technology,’ and ‘a larger group of men in transport, commerce, and 
government who were open to reasonable persuasion that the airship was a key to 
postwar imperial enterprise and prestige.’294 As the aviation movement as a whole was 
misunderstood and criticised, regardless of private misgivings the lobby’s members felt 
honour-bound to present a united front, and support the claims of every form of aviation 
technology on an equal basis. For this reason, they viewed an attack on one type of 
aircraft as an attack on the whole aviation movement. By 1918 the view of airships had 
changed. With a history of airship crashes and disasters, and their proven vulnerability 
in wartime, clearly demonstrated the critical weakness of the craft. As Fritzche argues, 
the forced retreat of Germany’s airships from their role as bombers meant that at the 
War’s end, ‘Germany celebrated airshipmen, not airships; resolve in the face of 
technology, not the power of technology; the aesthetic of struggle and defeat, not 
                                            
293 Duggan and Meyer, Airships in International Affairs, p. 62. 
294 Ibid, p. 61. 
57 
dominion; and so had completely reversed itself on the zeppelins.’295 While wartime 
experiences suggested that the technology would prove unsustainable, the air lobby 
treated airships as having equal validity to the superior type of aircraft, the aeroplane. 
The lobby’s support of airships in the face of public fear and derision had the 
unfortunate effect of reducing its credibility and weakening its claims, while at the same 
time tarnishing the reputation of aeroplanes by their association with airships under the 
‘aviation’ classification.  
The airship lobby, however, continued to promote airships, stressing the 
potential benefits of the large craft to nation and empire. The advantages of ‘lighter-
than-air’ airships over ‘heavier-than-air’ aeroplanes were put forward. The two types 
had always occupied separate spheres and involved separate technology and methods of 
construction. The unique capabilities of airships - notably staying aloft for long periods 
and flying at night – had been of value in Naval operations during the War, and now 
promised to give airships the advantage over aeroplanes for long-distance and hence 
imperial flight. As a Times leader explained in January 1919,  
in winter the London to Cairo route will always be uncomfortable and often 
dangerous for aeroplanes. Landing grounds are few and treacherous, and the 
approach of the lofty Alps to the sea makes the shores of the Mediterranean the 
arena of swift and violent atmospheric change. But an airship flying 
continuously night and day at a high elevation should bridge the dangerous 
gap.296  
 
Other practical benefits of airships to Britain’s imperial agenda were propounded by 
advocates. Their role in transporting mail and goods, carrying out exploration, policing 
imperial territories, and generally ‘flying the flag’ were stressed. The most prominent 
advocate, until his death in the R38 airship crash over the Humber in August 1921, was 
Air-Commodore Edward Maitland. In April 1920 Maitland suggested that as ‘the unit in 
life is Time not Distance, and the Distance between two countries is in practice 
measured by Time,’297 airships had the advantage over all other forms of transport. He 
proposing a weekly airship service to India, operated by four airships making a two-
stage flight with a stop in Egypt. The total journey time would be 50 hours, and 
Maitland calculated that each craft could carry a 15 ton payload, giving a 15 percent 
profit. The advantages of airship transport for passengers were also propounded, and 
fanciful claims made. For example, one enthusiast suggested that, being quiet and 
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spacious, the craft could provide a travel experience superior to that offered by the 
aeroplane. An airship could be equipped with a lift ‘to take one to a roof garden on the 
top of the vessel,’ and the problem of limited airship stops could be solved by dropping 
passengers at their destination by parachute between landing places.298  
The commercial potential of the craft was also considered. In January 1919, an 
Air Ministry memorandum noted that airships had unique capabilities for commercial 
work. A huge craft with a gas capacity of ten million cubic feet and a ceiling of 30,000 
feet could, it was speculated, have a range of over 20,000 miles ‘or nearly once round 
the world.’ Airships were thought capable of carrying a large payload on long-haul 
flights, which could include the crossing of oceans and mountain ranges. As aeroplanes 
could not compete in these respects, it was anticipated that their role would be 
complementary and subsidiary, providing feeder services to airship trunk route 
junctions. Therefore, Flight explained, ‘the future uses of the two types for commercial 
purposes will not conflict.’299 The capability of airships in operating commercial 
services had been proven before the War. During it the potential for carrying a 
profitable payload had been further demonstrated when a German naval airship, the 
L59, had famously carried 15 tons of supplies from Bulgaria to Khartoum in East 
Africa, making the journey of 4,200 miles in 100 hours.300 Immediately after the 
Armistice, while Britain’s air policy floundered, both Germany and France, building 
upon their experience, began construction programmes for civil craft. Already by 
August 1919 Germany’s main airship works at Friedrichshafen had reopened and a 
commercial service to Switzerland begun,301 with two further services planned.302 
Meanwhile, by December, the French were developing services to Africa and South 
America with four airships. As their imperial rivals forged ahead, the British achieved 
little more than a contemplation of possibilities. The arguments for and against airships, 
involving as they did national policy, imperial prestige, and the potential requirement to 
commit large sums of money, were complex and, given the potential value of airships to 
the nation, would not be easily resolved.  
As the Government still regarded airships largely as military craft, officials 
failed to acknowledge the commercial potential which was so clearly seen on the 
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Continent. However, it was recognised that the strong psychological effect of airships 
offered Britain powerful, although more nebulous, imperial benefits by making ‘a great 
impression on the native mind.’303 This would become perhaps a greater factor than 
practical considerations in Britain’s airship policy-making. Implicated in this was the 
question of competition with Germany. As was suggested earlier, before the War, 
Britons and Germans differed in their perception of the value of airships. After the War, 
Rieger argues, opinion remained divided,304 but the British attitude was complicated by 
conflicting attitudes towards Germany’s lighter-than-air achievements. On the one hand, 
Lyth comments, when in 1919 the British R34 airship crossed the Atlantic, ‘there was 
widespread belief in Britain that the airship was the long-range airliner of the future and 
there was much envious commentary on Germany’s headstart in the field. But the 
British experience was to be as disastrous as the…German.’305 On the other hand, the 
British were wary of the exciting effect of airships upon the German psyche, seeing that 
they aroused in them feelings of extreme nationalism, Germanic pride, and cultural 
superiority.306 While Britain also relished the idea of garnering to itself ‘international 
political prestige’307 by harnessing both the psychic force attached to airships and the 
ability of the craft to impress by their sheer size, there remained the problem that the 
same effect could also benefit Germany. Britain’s desire not to be outdone by the 
Germans was deeply felt, although not usually expressed, and German airship 
development gave rise to fears not only about threats to British prestige and the empire, 
but also about the role of airships in future war.  
By the end of 1919 the problem of what to do with Britain’s wartime airship 
assets had become acute. Only three options were apparent: maintain existing facilities, 
develop a forward policy and begin a new construction programme, or abandon airships 
altogether. Even the basic maintenance option entailed cost, for, used or unused, the 
physical components of stored craft deteriorated rapidly, and Britain’s stocks were 
already in poor condition. The alternative, of starting a new construction programme, 
would be explored, but proved so daunting a prospect that no commercial group would 
come forward to meet the challenge. Yet abandonment of an airship policy required 
more courage than the Government possessed. As the air lobby was keen to point out 
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(albeit using a ‘red herring’ argument), Britain had already spent 40 million pounds on 
airship development, and a termination would constitute the admission of a massive 
waste of public money. As scrapping was expected to be final, taking this option would 
also permanently deny Britain any future advantage that airships might offer. In the 
event, during Churchill’s Air Ministry, no policy won enough backing to be pursued 
outright.  
While the Government mulled these unattractive alternatives, efforts were made 
to lure private investors to take responsibility for the craft, but uncertainty about their 
economic value meant that commitment was not forthcoming. An airship construction 
or operation programme could not be undertaken lightly. Aeroplanes, being relatively 
small, cheap, and easy to produce, could be in service within weeks, while the building 
of an airship took many months and required considerable investment. Once in 
operation, airships needed expensive infrastructure, including shed accommodation and 
mooring facilities. Aeroplanes offered greater flexibility and entailed much less 
financial outlay and risk. New hope came in January 1920, when Flight reported that ‘a 
powerful combination of shipping and armament interests’ had expressed interest in 
taking over Britain’s craft, and that routes within Britain, in Europe, across the Atlantic, 
and ‘from England to Egypt and from Marseilles to India’ were under discussion. 
Before going ahead, however, the investors had to be ‘thoroughly convinced that the 
running of big airships really is a commercial proposition.’308 The investors were clearly 
not convinced, for the scheme was soon quietly dropped without public explanation. 
With no capital forthcoming, in May 1920 the Government appointed the 
Commercial Airships Committee to further consider airship policy. The Committee 
reported to the Cabinet what they already knew: ‘Any solution presents great 
difficulties.’ The ‘last hope’ was for consolidation, by which no new construction would 
be scheduled, and existing programmes would be slowed. In addition, as a compromise, 
the Government’s previous investment would be protected by the development of a 
route to Egypt using existing craft. A shed and hydrogen plant would be built in Egypt 
at a cost of £844,400, allowing a commercial service to start in the Spring of 1921.309 
Not surprisingly, the Treasury disapproved, and argued instead that the Air Ministry 
should abandon airship development and either dispose of existing airships to 
commercial firms by sale or gift, or scrap them altogether. Although the abandonment 
proposal met with Cabinet approval, the Air Ministry, still hankering after an airship 
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programme, resisted the scrapping option. By October 1920 it was undeniable that 
Britain’s airships had become, as Flight remarked, ‘an expensive incubus.’310 Matters 
again went into abeyance until on 1 March 1921, shortly before leaving office, 
Churchill made an announcement in the House of Commons which demonstrated that 
Treasury policy had, for the time being at least, won the day. The Government would 
abandon its civil airship programme owing to ‘grave financial stringency,’ Churchill 
declared, and, taking up the Treasury’s suggestion, offered private companies ‘all our 
airships free of charge, together with all the spare parts in our possession, and the 
necessary ground establishments…as a free gift…if they care to come forward.’311 The 
offer seemed generous but was clearly regarded as entailing high risk, for there were 
still no takers. Investors had perhaps taken fright afresh at an accident to the R34 in 
January, in which the craft had been written off. Again the matter lapsed pending the 
forthcoming Imperial Conference at which, enthusiasts hoped, the Government would 
gain Dominion support for a revived scheme.  
By this time, however, Churchill’s attention had shifted away from aviation. 
When on New Year’s Day 1921 he had been offered the leadership of the Colonial 
Office, he had ‘started straight away to fix his mind’ upon it.312 Although Churchill 
stepped down as Secretary of State for War in February 1921 he retained his air position 
until 1 April, but Flight clearly considered his role as being over in January 1921, when 
it concluded that, under the circumstances, Churchill had ‘not done at all badly.’313 In 
March, after the closure of British international aviation services, Flight re-evaluated its 
judgement: Lloyd George and his Cabinet colleagues cared ‘nothing at all about 
whether civil aviation lives or dies, in spite of its proven value to the nation.’ The 
Cabinet was ‘deliberately gambling with the safety of the State, taking refuge behind the 
knowledge that there will be no great War in their time as a Government.’314 Rather than 
a statesman, Churchill was now revealed as a ‘soldier pure and simple,’ who had ‘a 
totally wrong conception of aerial policy.’ He had been ‘the wrong man for the Air 
Ministry.’315 Meanwhile, Churchill was out of the country, not returning to Britain from 
his Eastern trip with Trenchard until mid-April. Therefore the Air Ministry lacked 
ministerial leadership during a crucial period. A few days after Churchill left office in 
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April, The Times gave its verdict on his Air Ministry performance. His support of 
military over civil aviation, it concluded, had resulted in ‘Gold braid and metal polish, 
acres of cantonments, establishments aping the Army…He leaves the body of British 
flying at that last gasp when a military funeral would be all that would be left for it.’316 
By the end of Churchill’s tenure, the situation of civil aviation policy-making seemed 
little better than when he had started in 1919. Even so, the importance of aviation had 
been recognised at Cabinet level, because after Churchill’s departure the Air Ministry 
was divided from the War Office and accorded the status of an independent department.  
 
Conclusion 
Wartime spending had enabled Britain to become the strongest country in the world in 
aviation, and after the Armistice it seemed in a good position to begin the development 
of commercial aviation - the necessary prerequisite for imperial air services. However, 
under Churchill, civil aviation was accorded low priority at the national level, failing to 
attract the support it needed to develop effectively. Its progress during the early post-
war period proved that in order to thrive, the initial development of civil aviation would 
require Governmental commitment of resources and organisation on a national, and then 
international, scale. While countries such as Germany recognised this, in Britain, during 
Churchill’s Air Ministry, civil aviation policy was marked by uncertainty, disagreement, 
and slow progress. The Government gave mixed messages. On the one hand, in the first 
months of 1919 officials demonstrated commitment and a sense of responsibility for 
civil aviation by providing basic facilities and infrastructure. On the other hand, 
thereafter they resigned responsibility for the development of the services which would 
use these facilities to private companies. Meanwhile, given the state of aviation 
technology and the lack of aircraft suitable for passenger services at that time, empire 
aviation was not yet a practical proposition. Yet international routes, for example to 
Egypt and India, were required for military purposes, and planning for these did go 
ahead.  
While its preparation of facilities and regulations enabled the restarting of civil 
flying six months after the Armistice, the Government anticipated that its policy of 
leaving development to private enterprise would lead to the start of imperial services. 
Other countries, for example France and Germany, had recognised that the criteria for 
the successful development of civil aviation included a comprehensive policy at the 
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national level, which not only involved the provision of infrastructure but also nurtured 
users afterwards. Britain’s failure to perceive the truth of this meant that by the end of 
Churchill’s Air Ministry, the British had lost their international lead to their Continental 
peers.  
Civil aviation had to try to find its place in a period of national difficulty and 
Government overstretch, and within the context of a plethora of post-war practical, 
political, and financial concerns which consumed the attention of officials. In this 
environment, aviation development, and in particular civil aviation, was given low 
priority. Civil aviation administration was trapped within a structure that was in flux and 
transition. The Air Ministry was dominated by the War Office, but even within the 
Ministry an atmosphere of residual militarism ensured that the Department of Civil 
Aviation had low status. Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that Churchill 
failed to act as an advocate for civil aviation, and in any case he found that the pursuit 
of forward civil aviation policy-making was not politically expedient. However, the 
largest problems confronting civil aviation development were financial. In particular, 
the value of civil aviation – economic and otherwise – was unclear. Aviation technology 
was still too primitive to gain widespread credibility or to inspire confidence that it was 
capable of taking over from existing communication systems, even if money were made 
available to it. Treasury opposition, and a national ideology opposed in principle to 
subsidisation, destroyed initiative.  
Without the framework of a national strategy for planned development, a 
number of small British companies together entered the field to start cross-Channel 
services, but not only were they in competition with each other but, crucially, also 
against heavily-subsidised foreign concerns. Given the negative factors ranged against 
them, these commercial concerns did well even to achieve the opening of cross-Channel 
services, but they could not thrive and, without Government support, were driven to 
closure in a harsh and dispiriting economic and political climate. While some private 
backing had come forth for aeroplane services, capital investors shunned involvement 
with airships which were perceived as a ‘white elephant’ by both the public and private 
sectors. As a result, Churchill’s British airship policy, insofar as he had one, was 
unsuccessful. Unable to develop or to abandon airships, or to offload them on to private 
investors, he took the easiest course of action, which was to tread water. The problem 
was then carried over, to be dealt with by the succeeding Secretary of State for Air. 
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Chapter Three: ‘A Dangerous Gamble’: Formulating Imperial 
Aviation Policy, 1921-1930 
 
Winston Churchill’s departure from the Air Ministry in the Spring of 1921 seemed to 
offer fresh hope for British civil and imperial aviation. Many saw the moment as 
crucial. The next appointee, The Times reported, had not only to put civil flying on a 
sound footing and then progress to the development of imperial air transport, but in 
doing so had also to strike a balance between civil and military aviation: ‘Never was 
faith and daring more necessary.’317 This chapter will firstly examine Britain’s civil 
aviation policy, involving both aeroplanes and airships, in the eighteen months that 
followed Churchill’s exit, as well as the development of imperial aviation in relation to 
imperial theory. Secondly, the chapter will investigate the changes in aviation policy 
that followed the coming to power of the Conservatives in October 1922, and discusses 
the developments that would allow the introduction of Imperial Airways and the 
Imperial Airship Scheme – Britain’s major civil air projects of the interwar years. 
Finally, the chapter will explore some factors that determined the rate of advance of the 
India route in the second half of the 1920s. In this, the role of Imperial Airways in 
developing European, and then imperial, air routes will be examined, together with the 
progress of the airship project.  
 
Aeroplane and airship policy, 1921 and 1922 
Under Churchill as Secretary of State, the Air Ministry had made little headway in 
imperial aviation development. After Churchill’s departure, there would be only limited 
progress until the advent of a Conservative Government in October 1922. During the 
intervening 20 month period, the avoidance of commitment by officials ensured that any 
proposals for the rapid development of either aeroplane or airship services went largely 
unheeded, and policy remained unresolved. The muted response can be attributed in part 
to the failure of Churchill’s successor, the Liberal politician Frederick Guest (Fig. 3.1), 
to provide effective leadership. Aviation journalists expected little of Guest, seeing him 
as a poor choice for the important role of Air Minister, and perhaps even as having 
gained the position through nepotism. Flight, for example, remarked that Guest was 
Churchill’s first cousin but otherwise had ‘no conspicuous qualification’ for the post.318 
Worse, The Times suggested that Guest’s attitude towards civil aeroplane services was 
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‘cautious’ and towards airships ‘palpably incredulous.’ This was ‘alarming, because it 
so plainly reflects the official mind.’319 The Times correspondent was perhaps also 
suggesting that Guest had been placed in the Air Ministry solely to serve the non-
progressive agenda of his superiors. Clearly, if the Secretary of State for Air lacked the 
conviction to promote aviation, prospects for a forward policy were bleak. 
 
Fig. 3.1. Frederick Guest (c. 1910-1915).320 
 
There was, however, some cause for optimism. 
Between Churchill’s departure and October 1922, 
dedicated Air Ministry officials continued to grapple 
with problems in domestic aviation policy which needed 
to be solved before imperial aviation could take flight. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, a basic 
infrastructure for imperial routes had been put into place 
during Churchill’s Air Ministry, and development work 
continued throughout 1921 and 1922. The provision of 
an International Flying Code, comprehensive systems of aerodrome regulation, lighting, 
wireless facilities, and meteorological services, allowed domestic and Continental 
services to begin, while routes were ‘blazed’ to India, Australia, South Africa, Canada, 
and America.321  
In addition, the failure of Britain’s commercial air services during Churchill’s 
term of office had forced the Government to shift position and acknowledge that air 
transport was worth paying for. Now, under Guest, the Cross-Channel Subsidies 
Committee began to favour a wider scheme that would in time develop to allow the 
beginnings of imperial commercial air transport and eventually the formation of 
Imperial Airways. The Committee’s findings were supported by the air lobby, which put 
forward a number of influential suggestions. In March 1921, George Holt-Thomas, still 
in the post-war era Britain’s largest and most influential aircraft manufacturer, called for 
a ‘national corporation’ to run cross-Channel services ‘with British machines and 
British pilots.’ The routes thus developed would form the first stage of imperial and 
other international routes (Fig. 3.6). Holt-Thomas thought that support of the ‘national 
corporation’ project represented the best use of public money because it would be 
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‘subscribed towards a national ideal.’322 Frederick Sykes, Controller of Civil Aviation 
since 1919, agreed. Such an entity, he argued, would probably initially have to operate 
as a monopoly but, if ‘free from the control of vested interests and placed on a sound 
state-assisted financial basis, would be able to pull through the experimental period of 
Civil Aviation.’323 These suggestions were regarded by some officials as being risky. 
For example, in April 1921, Conservative MP William Joynson-Hicks told the House of 
Commons that he hoped Guest would not be ‘beguiled’ into a scheme that would 
prevent ‘free competition’ and, by patronising one aircraft manufacturer only, cause 
other firms to ‘quickly die of inanition.’324 Guest sided with this view, thereby 
demonstrating opposition to Sykes. He agreed that giving a single company a monopoly 
of all British routes was undesirable, explaining to the House in November 1921 that 
such a plan was ‘fundamentally unsound,’ and would both preclude private initiative 
and hinder development. In addition, the Government, committed to providing State aid 
indefinitely, would not receive a good return upon its investment.325 
Despite the dampening effect of Guest’s contribution, new signs of progress 
emerged during the Imperial Conference in the Summer of 1921. A Sub-Committee on 
Imperial Air Communications was appointed to study the development of commercial 
aviation both within and between empire territories, and its report recommended that 
Britain create a network of air routes ‘as far as possible touching British points 
throughout the world…linking…the centre of each group of air stations with the next 
group.’326 Demonstrating that imperial defence over-rode commercial considerations, 
the report concluded that the initial focus should be on strategic routes, with commercial 
services being introduced later. It was, however, seen as desirable to begin civil services 
from Cairo to Karachi as soon as possible, and indeed a sector of that route, between 
Cairo and Baghdad, opened that month (Map 1). The Cairo-Karachi sector, Flight 
reported, was of considerable importance because it established ‘a link, hitherto 
missing, in the chain of air communications between Britain and India and the Far 
East…and thus marks the completion of one of the most important of the world’s air 
routes.’327  
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Timing his efforts to exert maximum pressure on conference delegates, in a 
series of letters to newspaper editors, Holt-Thomas held out a vision of a future empire 
interconnected by air routes while at the same time keeping up a barrage of complaint 
about Britain’s slow progress in developing them. In August 1921, in a scathing critique 
in the Observer, he pointed out that while other countries were already operating 
thousands of miles of air routes, Britain was ‘still represented by the miserable seventy 
miles which lie between Croydon and mid-Channel.’328 To The Times Holt-Thomas 
wrote that the Paris route, ‘the first stage of our great Imperial airways,’ was well 
established, and that therefore ‘the development of the 40 stages of similar length to 
Australia, passing through vitally important areas of the British Empire, is sure and 
certain to come. The only question is – “When?”’329  
For an answer, Holt-Thomas and Conference delegates had nowhere to look but 
to Britain - the heart and economic core of the empire - to act as the source and 
instigator of air routes. Therefore the progress of aviation accords with the idea of Cain 
and Hopkins, who locate the causes of imperial expansion in ‘developments within the 
imperial power itself.’330 Cain and Hopkins’ model, Alan Lester argues, suggests an 
‘explicitly centrifugal sense of imperial space,’ and a core from which issued the 
‘driving force of interaction between Britain and its colonies.’331 Cain and Hopkins’ 
interpretation ‘traces the direction of causation from centre to periphery,’332 challenging 
the ‘excentric’ theory of Robinson and Gallagher, who seem to propose a direction of 
causation from periphery to core.333 As the present research finds that Britain cast air 
routes outwards from its core axis. Cain and Hopkins’ model is appropriate to the case 
of aviation in its ‘direction of causation.’ The development of the civil India route 
therefore supports the conceptual framework of these historians. Indeed, aviation 
followed a long-established tradition, by which imperial communication systems, and 
land and sea transportation, were launched from the metropole. For example, the rails 
and rolling stock of India’s first railways had been shipped out from Britain, and several 
decades had passed before India began to construct its own engines. On a practical 
level, traditionally only the British core had possessed the capability to drive imperial 
expansion. Aviation followed this pattern of technology flow from core to periphery, for 
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still in the interwar period only Britain held the necessary reserve of resources, 
including manufacturing facilities and skilled research and construction personnel. 
Therefore the core remained the point of origin of aviation. As Sir Richard Wells, MP 
for Bedford, told the House of Commons in 1932 while bemoaning the closure of the 
Cardington airship base in the wake of the R101 disaster, Cardington was ‘the only 
place in the Empire where British airships might have been successfully developed.’334  
However, aviation demanded a different relationship between core and periphery 
from that created by traditional systems. By its nature, as it involved no road or rail 
tracks, and did not require extensive ground infrastructure such as docks, aviation 
seemed to demonstrate a more tenuous link between two areas than did land or sea 
transportation. Nevertheless, the administrative and political implications of aviation 
were disproportionate to its appearance. As aviation involved the departure of aircraft 
from one location and their reception at another, services originating in Britain required 
the cooperation of elites at the destination with regards to the provision and oversight of 
routes and associated facilities. An air route therefore implied a strong bond between 
core and periphery, implicating the two in an interdependent relationship of policy and 
implementation.  
The construction of a coherent policy for imperial aviation was no 
straightforward matter but was highly complex, and the India route involved uncertainty 
about the imperial frontier and interdepartmental structures. After the War, aviation had 
to enter, and then survive in, an environment in which Government departments and 
policies were already well-established. The Indian air route was introduced as a ‘new 
boy’ into a pre-existing arena of administrative relationships and processes which 
involved the London Government, the India Office based in London, and sections of the 
Indian Government. In London, David Reynolds suggests a system characterised by 
internal disunity, and competing and opposing agendas. The Government’s business, he 
argues, was ‘handled by a plethora of rival departments, each with its own specialist 
career civil servants.’ These departments operated within a wider administrative 
arrangement, the nature of which rendered it ‘difficult for anyone to see the problems of 
British power as a whole.’335 Although responsibility for imperial aviation was allocated 
to pre-existing structures, it fitted only awkwardly. In India as in Britain, the 
Directorates of Civil Aviation were forced to operate within larger departments, the 
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aims of which might not necessarily be in harmony with the furtherance of civil 
aviation. As aircraft capability and geographical reach expanded during the 1920s, the 
implications of aviation grew and attracted the attention of a growing number of 
departments in the London and Delhi Governments. As Gordon Pirie comments, 
imperial aviation became ‘a mass of complex overlapping interests.’336 In particular, 
aviation policy was of interest to those responsible for finance, and foreign and imperial 
affairs. Also involved were representatives of the Army and Navy, which services had a 
direct interest, for strategic reasons, in the development of aviation. That a multiplicity 
of officials sought a voice in decision-making only complicated matters further, and the 
development of the India route suffered as a result of the complex and convoluted 
nature of its administration. 
Imperial aviation was dealt with within administrative structures in which the 
initiatory process and forces driving policy-making were opaque. In both Britain and 
India, imperial administration featured a curious combination of rigidity and flexibility, 
with shifts, checks, and balances occurring as a situation demanded. Where aviation 
promised to help in the pursuit of the agenda of an individual department or official – 
for example Thomson anticipated that the Airship Scheme would help him to fulfil his 
imperial ambitions - it was likely to be made welcome, but where it met resistance or 
faced pockets of apathy – for example, in the case of the Indian Government when faced 
with the necessity of granting overflight permission to the French and Dutch - its claims 
might be overlooked. In such circumstances, lines of responsibility were often not clear-
cut, and conflicts, tensions, and idiosyncrasies in relationships within and between 
departments and individuals influenced institutional form and placed constraints upon 
the ‘official mind’ that underpinned imperial aviation policy. John Darwin has discussed 
the fragmentation of responsibility that resulted, arguing that ‘The rough conditions of a 
decentralized parliamentary imperial state were hardly favourable to the authority, or 
even the coherence, of an official mind,’ and ministers and officials at the departmental 
level were ‘rarely free to impose their…view even when they had one.’337 For the 
purposes of the thesis, the ‘official mind’ may be defined in terms of the thinking of 
politicians, ministers, and civil servants in both London and India. The term ‘official 
mind,’ as coined by Robinson and Gallagher338 seems to imply that Britain’s imperial 
administration was a single entity with a united viewpoint, yet the present research tends 
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to suggest that in terms of imperial aviation, the ‘official mind’ was multi-faceted and 
divided. Into the 1930s, the collective authority controlling imperial aviation was never 
coherent and unified. The sheer variety of numbers of officials involved, and the 
competition of interests surrounding imperial aviation policy-making undermined 
coherence to the extent that policy might even be shaped in an environment of conflict. 
Therefore, the story of the India route reveals that the ‘official mind’ was highly 
complex, featuring a curious combination of coherence and incoherence.  
To those on the outside, the ‘official mind’ perhaps appeared to think largely as 
one. This was owed to the fact that still in the interwar years it was composed of 
gentlemanly and imperial ideals of the elites which acted as a force of cohesion, 
unifying it around certain key concepts. The imperial ‘establishment’ was still 
dominated by men who, as Cain and Hopkins comment, had ‘a strong association with 
aristocracy…with Eton and Harrow, with Oxford and Cambridge,’339 meaning that 
aviation policy was determined largely by officials who were bound together by a 
similar background, beliefs, and prejudices. Within this wider structure, aviation 
remained, As A.J. Robertson comments, ‘a very small world, a microcosm of the old 
boy network.’340 In this situation the nature of many departmental relationships was 
informal, whereby ‘personal connexions and influence must surely have tempered the 
power of red tape to a considerable extent.’341 Another effect of this ‘old boy network’ 
was that, as Robinson and Gallagher point out, among Britain’s policy-makers there 
were ‘many things too well understood between colleagues to be written down.’342 In 
hierarchical, politicised Government departments, personal alliances were influential, 
and agendas were pursued informally. With a decision made, for example, over a drink 
in a bar or confirmed via the nod of a head round a door, no ‘paper trail’ resulted. The 
improvised nature of policy-making often resulted in a calculated lack of 
documentation, which now presents obvious difficulties for the historian. Depending 
upon circumstances, the informality could work either for or against the progress in 
imperial aviation. The collective view of the ‘official mind’ could either encourage 
officials to support aviation or to deny it support. For example, when aviation promised 
to speed up official mail it gathered support, but the common attitude towards 
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subsidisation worked against a forward policy.  
Another factor that allowed civil aviation to retain a cohesive policy was the 
employment of Sefton Brancker as Director of Civil Aviation. After his appointment in 
May 1922, Brancker, a former Army officer, immediately set to work to overcome the 
factors that continued to hold back policy-making. The fact that Brancker would serve 
continuously, regardless of the political party in power, until his death in the R101 
disaster in October 1930 (Fig. 3.4), helped the Air Ministry to adhere to a coherent 
policy. Brancker identified the key obstacle to progress as being the ‘cut-throat’ 
competition between British companies, which had arisen after the introduction of the 
temporary subsidy scheme in early 1921.343 He worked with characteristic speed and as 
a result of his deliberations, in September 1922 the Air Ministry announced a 
reorganisation of the subsidy arrangements and approval of a system that would allow 
the companies to operate with a greater degree of unity. By this action, the Government 
was moving towards the ‘monopoly’ scheme proposed by Holt-Thomas and Frederick 
Sykes in the Spring of 1921.344 345 Under the terms of the new arrangements, although no 
more money would be made available, each company would be allocated its own route. 
It was anticipated that this would eliminate competition, and that the introduction of 
joint arrangements for advertising and the booking of flights would help draw the 
companies towards the unification that would occur in 1924 with the creation of 
Imperial Airways.  
Another factor in the shift towards harmonisation of operations was the 
involvement of Sir Eric Geddes, who, as Robert McCormack comments, ‘brought a 
hard-nosed approach to the business of aviation.’346 He also brought considerable 
experience to the debate over imperial transportation, having during the War served for 
eighteen months as First Lord of the Admiralty and from 1919 to 1921 as Minister of 
Transport. At the Admiralty, Geddes, Daniel Ritschel explains, had spoken of an 
‘altered conception of the duties of Government’ and called for an end to obsolescence 
and inefficiency via rationalisation in industry and public spheres. His ‘grandiose 
scheme for the unification of the nation’s inland transport services, shipping, and 
electricity supply into a single system under state control represented the peak of 
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reconstructionist ambitions in industry.’347 348 Geddes’ work to amalgamate several 
small airline businesses to form the state-supported Imperial Airways in 1924 can 
therefore be seen, Ritschel suggests, as a product of the new thinking regarding 
rationalisation.349  
As civil aviation struggled to find a niche in Britain’s post-war transportation 
policy, airships, as a subset of aviation, proved particularly problematic. As Samuel 
Hoare, Secretary of State for Air, would recall later, after Churchill’s announcement in 
March 1921 that Britain’s airship programme would be terminated if private backing 
was not forthcoming, progress became ‘chequered with zigzags and tracks that 
continually return upon themselves.’350 In 1921 hope was pinned upon financial support 
from Dominion governments, and empire air communications were hotly debated that 
year at the Imperial Conference, which was attended by representatives of the 
Governments of Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, and South Africa. For a brief 
period, such was the attention focused on airships that the term ‘imperial aviation’ 
tended to mean ‘airship aviation.’  
Fig. 3.2. The wreck of the R38 airship in the Humber Estuary.351 
 
Conference debates proved inconclusive, with Flight reporting that while the 
Dominions agreed that they wanted empire air services, they did not consider them 
commercially viable. What was required, the journal advocated, was a determination of 
the value of civil air services to the empire, and of the extent to which they were worth 
supporting until they could operate on a financially independent basis. In a suggestion 
that implied the devolving of financial responsibility from London, the empire’s 
economic core, to the periphery, Flight suggested that, ‘In a word, if the Empire wants 
more and better means of communication, then the Empire must be prepared to pay for 
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them.’352 In the event, only the Government of Australia declared itself prepared to put 
up any money.353 Australia was enthused by Prime Minister William ‘Billy’ Hughes 
who, Flight reported, prepared for his parliament proposals for an experimental service 
operated by four airships. Hughes’ scheme, which involved the building of mooring 
masts at Cairo, in India (at Karachi or Poona), and in Australia, was projected to cost 
£250,000 over two years. Hughes hoped eventually for a fortnightly service between 
England and Australia, operated by ten or twelve airships and having a journey time of 
eight to ten days.354 However, Hughes’ political influence was then declining prior to his 
resignation in early 1923, and no action was taken by Australia.  
The lack of progress in airship policy following the 1921 Imperial Conference 
may also be attributed to the disaster which befell Britain’s R38 airship (Fig. 3.2) only 
three weeks after the conference ended. Construction of the R38 had begun in February 
1919, but owing to a lack of funds the project had been sold off to the United States 
Navy later that year. The Americans, stated Flight, were ‘fully convinced of the value of 
large airships in commerce,’ and already planned ‘A chain of mooring masts…right 
across the Continent, from Atlantic to Pacific.’355 Upon its completion in the summer of 
1921 the R38, The Times reported, was ‘the biggest airship in the world and the most 
efficient.’356 On 24 August, in preparation for its Atlantic voyage, the craft was 
undergoing rudder tests over the River Humber with 49 people aboard including 17 
Americans. When it suddenly broke up in the air and caught fire, all but one of the 
Americans was killed. Duggan and Meyer suggest that, if successful, the R38 project 
could have led to further orders from America, ‘thus establishing Britain as a premier 
builder and exporter.’357 Not surprisingly, the United States now turned to other 
countries, and the R38 disaster, in ending Britain’s American prospects, was a blow 
both to British prestige and export hopes. In addition, the deaths of key British experts 
who had been on board jeopardised future airship progress. With Britain’s airship policy 
again under threat, Flight argued staunchly that ‘To think of abandoning airships would 
be treachery to those who have given their lives in the great cause, and would render 
their sacrifice in vain.’358 But this was a specious argument that deflected attention from 
important questions regarding the safety and viability of the craft.  
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A period of frustration ensued, in which Flight lamented the £40 million already 
spent and the waste of British airship expertise,359 and endured a ‘gloom of despair at 
ever getting anything done.’360 A key complaint was that Britain’s airship progress was 
falling behind that of foreign competitors, with The Times urging that ‘the race was to 
the swift, and this country, of all others, cannot afford to be left behind at the post.’361 
The main threat came from Germany, which had restarted airship production after the 
War. After Churchill’s departure from the Air Ministry, the record of the Germans 
continued to be used as an argument in favour of a forward British policy. Germany, a 
Conservative MP told the House of Commons in April 1921, ‘a pretty shrewd country 
in regard to aviation, still believes in airships. She has not come to the conclusion that 
Count Zeppelin was wrong and that airships are no use.’362 The argument that airships 
were a worthwhile project for Britain simply because another country believed in them 
was a simplistic argument that constituted a failure of logic. The enthusiasm of the 
Germans was not a sound basis for the development of a British scheme, but the 
argument nevertheless had power because the prospect of German domination in the 
world of airshipping threatened Britain’s imperial ambitions. Reports of other advances 
on the Continent also fed Britain’s fear of humiliation. For example, in July 1921, 
Flight reported that the pursuit of airship programmes by France and Italy left Britain 
‘alone among the Powers…about to throw to the winds the whole results of the research 
and expenditure incurred during the War years…the Government is guilty of wanton 
extravagance perpetrated in the name of economy.’363  
The foreign threat was highlighted again at the Air Conference of early 1922, 
when Frederick Guest, seeking to deflect criticism of the Air Ministry, told delegates 
that accounts of foreign developments had been ‘largely exaggerated,’ and that Britain 
‘need not have any fears on that score.’364 Embarrassingly, Guest’s comments were 
quickly countered by Major G.H. Scott, celebrated for piloting the R34 airship across 
the Atlantic in 1919, who pointed out that France, Italy, and America were all planning 
commercial airship services. Scott also lent weight to criticism of Government inertia 
by voicing his fear that, via collusion with Spain over a route to the Argentine, Germany 
could gain ‘a commanding position in the airship world.’ Flying in the face of Guest’s 
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efforts to re-assure delegates, Scott recommended that Britain enter the international 
race by building a craft with a capacity of 2,500,000 cubic feet, which would be capable 
of operating a commercial route between England and India with a half-day stop in 
Egypt.365 In turn, Scott’s arguments received a set-back as a result of another disaster 
later that month, when America’s Roma airship, purchased from Italy in 1921, crashed 
and exploded during a test flight. Thirty-four of the 46 on board perished, making it 
America’s worst aviation accident to date.  
With the reputation of airships at a low ebb, by February 1922 the British 
Government was making plans to hand over all of its lighter-than-air equipment to the 
Disposals Board. The Times, while agreeing that the disposal plan was indeed ‘drastic,’ 
explained that it was due partly to the failure of Dominion support after the lukewarm 
response at the 1921 Imperial Conference, and partly to the need for economy (the 
findings of the Committee on National Expenditure were at that time about to be 
published).366 Flight accused the Air Ministry of taking advantage of the negative 
effects of the Roma disaster on public opinion, and the simultaneous publication of the 
R38 disaster report, to scrap its programme.367 However, the Government’s proposal to 
abandon airships prompted an approach from Commander Dennis Burney, who would 
play a key role in the future of Britain’s policy. Burney was a Navy man who had made 
his name and fortune in the War through the invention of the paravane, an anti-mine 
device, and by 1922 was a Conservative MP and consultant for the Vickers aviation 
construction company. The paravane success added credibility and consequence to the 
natural buoyancy of Burney’s character, for he was ‘a man of whom one could believe 
that no situation could be so awful as actually to daunt him.’368 His influence may also 
have been heightened at this time by the fact that his father, Cecil Burney, was 
promoted to Admiral of the Fleet in 1920 and created a baronet in 1921. Behind 
Burney’s enthusiasm was his desire to form an airship production company in 
partnership with the Government, and he was therefore ‘naturally inclined…to survey 
the prospects of the company through the rose-tinted spectacles of a man who for the 
moment was a company promoter.’369 For all Burney’s enthusiasm, he had to work 
against the general unpopularity of airships. Between 1909 and 1921 the British had 
built 14 rigid craft, drawing largely upon the design of a German airship captured 
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during the War. After a series of disasters and mishaps, Burney concluded that the 
original German design had been flawed and attributed the crashes of the R38 and the 
Roma to this: ‘Both disasters could have been prevented and were due to lack of 
experience and the lessons learned therefrom will be remembered.’ The solution, he 
urged, was to press on with development; disaster, he stated dogmatically, always 
preceded commercial success.370 Over the coming months, this argument grew in power 
to become a key factor in the persuasion of the Government to adopt Burney’s 
proposals.  
Burney was aided in his promotion of the airships by what Meyer describes as 
the ‘unusual psychological attraction’ which enabled the craft to embody a ‘magical 
spell.’371 For example, the appearance of an airship in Germany in 1908 had brought 
forth ‘a massive surge in public psychic response to the awe, wonder and stimulating 
incongruity of the huge rigid airship moving spectacularly through the skies.’372 British 
officials were reluctant to abandon the giant craft and the imperial advantages that they 
seemed to offer. As successors to the great sea ships and railway trains, airships offered 
the ‘generic attractiveness of gigantism,’373 which has been described as ‘a national 
inferiority complex that has to make everything bigger and biggest.’374 Gigantism as a 
technique to impress Britain’s imperial subjects had been exploited in the past. For 
example, in 1903 Lord Curzon had entered the Delhi Durbar atop India’s largest 
elephant, and in the same year had toured the Persian Gulf in the cruiser HMS Argonaut, 
at 453 foot the largest ship the local inhabitants had ever seen. Now Britain’s airships 
seemed to promise to boost British prestige via the same method. Burney used such 
arguments to target select groups. To empire enthusiasts he proposed that airship travel 
could centralise administration through the creation of ‘a real Imperial Parliament,’ with 
elected members sitting in ‘an Imperial House of Commons…What is the establishment 
of such a service worth to the Empire?’375 At the Admiralty he aimed the suggestion that 
airships could save on military spending. With the future of Naval power a sensitive 
topic in 1922 due to restrictions imposed by the Washington Treaty, Burney went so far 
as to suggest that in time of war the Admiralty could replace battleships with Britain’s 
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stock of lighter-than-air craft. He informed the RAF that by utilising airships as aircraft 
carriers, it could ‘transport a whole squadron of military fighting aeroplanes ready and 
fitted for action to any part of the Empire within SEVEN DAYS…What other form of 
transport can do this?’376  
Although enticing, these arguments were not decisive and, as Burney’s plans 
were both speculative and expensive, the financial aspects came under particular 
scrutiny. In a memorandum to the Cabinet of June 1922, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer wrote that even if Burney’s suggestions were practicable, ‘the finance 
presents difficulties of an exceedingly serious if not insuperable nature.’377 Questions 
were asked in the House of Commons. For example, in July 1922 Cecil L’Estrange 
Malone, a pioneer of Naval aviation during the War and now Britain’s first Communist 
MP, expressed opposition to Burney when he inquired rhetorically whether the 
Department of Civil Aviation had considered that a service to India using aeroplanes 
instead of airships could be operated ‘with more certainty, in a shorter time, with less 
capital expenditure, and smaller Government guarantees’?378 With such questions 
remaining unanswered, the Government continued to hold back from commitment, and 
in reply to a further query later that month, Lloyd George reported that the Committee 
of Imperial Defence had, in the interests of economy, decided that ‘no money should be 
expended in developing an airship service, either for commercial purposes or with the 
object of establishing Imperial communications.’379 As 1922 closed The Times reported 
that the year had been one in which Burney’s proposals were ‘passed from one 
committee to another,’ with ‘nothing tangible’ resulting.380 Yet Burney, never a man to 
give up easily, would not let the matter rest there. His powers of persuasion, in 
conjunction with his ability to market his projections and predictions about the value of 
airships, were so great that in the coming months his vision would gain credibility and 
begin to move towards the mainstream of Government thinking on aviation policy.  
 
The formulation of imperial aviation policy, 1922-1924 
The coming to power of the Conservatives under Andrew Bonar Law in October 1922 
marked a shift in gear in the progress of civil and imperial aviation policy. In less than 
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two years, Imperial Airways would become operational as a national enterprise, and the 
Imperial Airship Scheme began construction operations. Even so, funding remained a 
problem for the remainder of the decade, for in 1929 Hoare, Secretary of State for Air, 
would inform the House of Commons that the main difficulty for the India route of the 
1920s had been that of ‘finding the money.’ In addition, other factors had combined to 
create an environment so frustrating that Hoare would also comment that 
scarcely a week, indeed scarcely a day, has passed since I have been connected 
with the Air Ministry – now I am afraid many years – that I have not been 
attempting to get this air service to India started…I do not suppose there ever 
was a project of this kind that was faced with so many obstacles381 
 
The release of funds was a decisive factor, but a number of important moves contributed 
to progress. Despite the Government’s reticence since 1919 to fund aeroplanes, the 
extensive body of evidence pointing to the vulnerability of airship technology, and the 
considerable financial investment involved, these projects did gain national support. 
Some factors that enabled progress are investigated here. Although Hoare’s comment 
about ‘finding the money’ suggested that the Treasury, deeply opposed to a forward air 
policy during Churchill’s Air Ministry, had by no means released its grip on spending 
thereafter, the public funding of the two great aviation schemes of the 1920s 
demonstrated that it did at least grow less grudging. By 1922, four years had passed 
since the ending of the War and the difficulties that had consumed Churchill’s time and 
attention had abated to a great extent. This factor, added to advances in technology, now 
made aviation seem a more practical proposition, and the British were prepared to 
consider anew the question of long-distance and hence imperial flight, and to upgrade it 
in terms of national priority.  
While the groundwork by Burney, Sefton Brancker, and Eric Geddes prior to 
October 1922 had to some extent prepared the way, the fresh commitment of the 
Conservatives after that date became the decisive factor, ensuring that the Air Ministry 
received greater support from the Government. A key factor was the leadership and 
commitment of Samuel Hoare (Fig. 3.3). During his periods in office as Conservative 
Secretary of State for Air from October 1922 until June 1929 (with a break of nine 
months during the Labour Government of 1924), Hoare was able to tackle the aviation 
question with rigour. Hoare became the most prominent mainstream advocate of civil 
aviation of the 1920s. Having been put in place by Prime Minister Bonar Law, Hoare 
had the backing of the Cabinet. Law, Flight stated in May 1923, was ‘very favourably 
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disposed towards aviation, and…might almost be said to be “one of us” owing to the 
fact that his daughter is the wife of Sir Frederick Sykes’ (former Controller of Civil 
Aviation).382 When Stanley Baldwin’s Conservative Government succeeded that of 
Bonar Law in May 1923, it continued this positive progression to become instrumental 
in both the formation of Imperial Airways and the pursuit of airship policy.  
As the upturn in enthusiasm for aviation at the national level began with the 
advent of a Conservative government, it is not surprising that historians have argued 
that the natural inclination of those on the political Right was a key factor. David 
Edgerton, for example, suggests that during the 1920s and early 1930s ‘aeroplanes were 
overwhelmingly associated with the Right.’383 He points out that a number of prominent 
figures saw the craft as a means of boosting Britain’s reputation internationally, and 
argues that the ‘Right’ was instrumental in driving aeroplane policy. Certainly, some 
prominent individuals backed aviation strongly, one being the wealthy, eccentric, and 
ardently nationalistic Lady Houston, a supporter of the Italian Fascist leader Mussolini. 
After the Government withdrew funding from the Schneider Cup air trial competition in 
1931, Lady Houston provided £100,000 to support Britain’s winning entry. Then in 
1933 she paid for the British Everest-Houston Expedition, in which aeroplanes flew 
over Mount Everest for the first time – an achievement which she intended to boost the 
prestige of the British raj in India. Edgerton also points out that some elements of the 
right-wing press were also strong supporters of aviation,384 and the leading industry 
journal, The Aeroplane, was ‘quite openly pro-Nazi’ and pro-Fascist.385  
Yet in suggesting that members of ‘the Right’ were united in their backing of 
Britain’s aviation agenda, or that aviation was their preserve and that aeroplanes had 
little support beyond far ‘Right’ circles, Edgerton overstates his case. He places too 
great an emphasis on the importance of a political element in the development of 
imperial aviation; instead, the overriding factor was the motivation of key individuals 
such as Hoare to further aviation, regardless of political conviction. The belief in the 
power and potential of aviation transcended political boundaries, and Edgerton misses 
an important point when he disregards the personal element and the evidence that in the 
small world of aviation in particular, individual policy-makers had undue influence, for 
good or ill. In the case of Lady Houston, for example, her motive was not to further 
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Fascism, but to support the empire. In his autobiography, Hoare also wrote that his 
interest lay in imperial possibilities: ‘brought up in the days of Rudyard Kipling, Joseph 
Chamberlain and Milner, I saw in the creation of air routes the chance of uniting the 
scattered countries of the Empire and the Commonwealth.’386 As will be shown, the 
Labour party put aviation above party political concerns for, upon coming to power in 
1924, it followed through with the policy of the Conservatives. Further, Sefton 
Brancker, Director of Civil Aviation, described by Hoare as ‘the outstanding figure in 
the world of civil flying’387 in the 1920s, was not a political figure. His biographers, 
Basil Collier388 and Norman Macmillan, both express the view that what little political 
inclination Brancker had veered not toward the Right but to the Left, for ‘At times he 
expressed a leaning towards the Bolshevik system of government.’389 In addition, the 
backing of aeroplanes by the Communist MP, L’Estrange Malone, has already been 
demonstrated. Therefore, rather than political affiliation, it was the ability, conviction, 
and commitment of individuals and groups that would prove effective in shifting 
aviation towards the core of national policy.  
Edgerton also attacks a view long-held by historians such as Barnett that British 
interwar elites were ‘pathetically idealistic about the world…antiscientific, anti-
technological and anti-industrial,’390 and that Britain experienced a ‘failure’ of 
technology.391 Barnett has argued that interwar imperialists retained ideas more 
appropriate to an era of ‘mid-Victorian prosperity and security’ and could scarcely 
conceive of British power in terms of science, technology or even industrial 
competitiveness.392 Edgerton denies that gentlemen were ill-prepared by training and 
inclination to pursue an effective aviation policy, but, given the nature of their education 
system, it could be assumed that they could scarcely be otherwise. The cases of Hoare, 
Thomson, and other officials go some way to substantiate Edgerton’s argument. 
Edgerton opposes the idea that gentlemen avoided technological issues, and indeed, 
Hoare and Thomson dedicated themselves to the study of aviation with impressive 
dedication. Burney and Brancker brought aviation expertise to their roles, whereas 
Hoare and Thomson did not, developing it only after they took office. Bonar Law’s 
selection of Hoare as Guest’s successor as Secretary of State for Air came as a surprise 
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to some. Hoare had ostensibly no affinity with aviation, and Flight commented that 
‘nothing in his Parliamentary career has hitherto associated him with aviation. Sir 
Samuel as a banker and recognised authority on financial matters is paramount, but 
whether that is an advantage or the reverse in an Air Minister yet remains to be seen.’393 
Hugill points out that Secretary of State, Samuel Hoare, had had ‘imperial but no 
technical education. At school at Harrow he kept to “cricket and the classics.”’394 
Indeed, Hoare himself wrote later that he ‘knew nothing about the technical problems of 
air transport services,’395 and that when he accepted the post he ‘had little or no idea’ 
what it involved. He had flown only once in his life, and that in an airship over Rome in 
1917.396 Even so, Hoare rapidly embraced the cause so completely that Flight would 
joke later that he had been ‘bitten by a mad aeroplane,’397 at the level of national policy-
making, his financial and business background became an important factor.  
However, the case of Lord Thomson suggests that some gentlemen could not 
easily overcome their cultural background. While as Air Minister Thomson made every 
attempt to embrace science, technology, and supported Britain’s airship construction 
bases at Howden and Cardington, he remained ‘pathetically idealistic’ about the 
romance and potential of airships, with unfortunate effects. Thomson was a former 
Army officer who, having distinguished himself in the Royal Engineers, subsequently 
became a Labour politician and close friend of Ramsay MacDonald. Like Hoare before 
him, prior to his appointment Thomson had only an amateur’s interest in aviation, but 
he rapidly became a fervent aviation advocate. Flight remarked that although Thomson 
‘shared the prejudices of most Army and Navy officers against new-fangled ideas,’ he 
‘instances his conversion as a sort of proof of his impartiality and sweet reasonableness; 
but it is notorious that the convert is the worst fanatic.’398 Unfortunately, although 
Thomson’s enthusiasm for aviation was as great as that of Hoare, his vision was less 
practical and clear-sighted. Indeed, Thomson’s attitude towards airships did approach 
fanaticism and the fantastic. The product of a Victorian education, he was a member of 
what Correlli Barnett has described as an imperial ‘race of innocents dedicated to 
romantic ideals,’399 and he brought an aura of romanticism to his role. For example, in 
the House of Lords in 1924 Thomson summoned an unlikely vision of the future in 
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which ‘noble Lords will leave this House and the terrace in gliders with light engines,’ 
stopping on their journey ‘at some great flying caravanserai in order to take a rest or 
greet a friend, and that great caravanserai may be one of these giant airships floating 
serene and safe high up and far removed from terrestrial dirt and noise.’400  
 
Fig. 3.3. Samuel Hoare demonstrates 
commitment to aviation.401 
 
A strong motivating factor in 
the new moves after 1922 was the 
desire to harness aviation to serve 
Britain’s imperial agenda. This desire 
was not the exclusive preserve of 
political extremists, for Hoare, 
Thomson, and Brancker were united in 
their vision for Britain’s imperial 
future. Thomson, for example, in large 
part staked his career on the provision 
of imperial air transport by means of 
airships.402 With the Imperial Airways 
project underway when he first took office in 1924, he strove to make his mark by 
means of the Imperial Airship Scheme. While he built upon and developed the policy of 
the Conservatives, the ‘Socialist’ aspect – involving the construction of the publically-
funded R101 - was his own contribution. In this, as he would tell the House of Lords in 
June 1930, four months before his death in the R101 disaster, he took ‘special pride.’403 
Brancker, like Hoare and Thomson, was an ardent imperialist who saw aviation as an 
agent of imperial progress and spent considerable amounts of energy in promoting its 
advantages to Britain. Macmillan, who knew Brancker, wrote that the Air Ministry 
official was driven and obsessed by an imperial dream, and hoped that ‘commercial 
aviation would outgrow military aviation and make the world a better place…and make 
the British Empire a family of peoples.’404 Impatient and restless by nature, Brancker 
found ‘something parochial, almost niggling, in the thought of flying by scheduled 
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routes to Paris, Amsterdam or Brussels.’405 He wanted ‘services to run everywhere, as if 
funds were unlimited,’406 demonstrating his breadth of vision in 1924 when he told the 
Institute of Transport that he had under consideration ‘services from Singapore to 
Australia via the Dutch East Indies, British East Africa to the Mediterranean, the British 
West Indies and Guiana and Calcutta to Rangoon.’407  
However, of the men who drove imperial aviation policy at the national level, 
Hoare had the steadiest character and the most rounded view. As an aristocrat, financier, 
and well-connected businessman, he embodied a synthesis of characteristics which 
made him the right man to represent aviation to the country at the time. The placing of 
Hoare at the heart of aviation policy-making was therefore a shrewd move. Although 
Hoare was a firm believer in the empire, he lacked the romanticism that clouded 
Thomson’s judgement and, where Brancker was mercurial, Hoare was level-headed. 
Incidentally implying that neither Churchill nor Guest had played a serious role at the 
Air Ministry, Basil Collier has commented that Hoare, being ‘Earnest, correct, astute,’ 
seemed ‘just the man to bring an unaccustomed gravity to the concerns of a department 
hitherto eyed askance by many solid citizens.’408 Not only did Hoare’s word have 
authority with the Treasury and City but, with his status as an upright Establishment 
figure, he raised the reputation of flight among the middle classes. His combination of 
attributes enabled him to connect aviation with the business and financial sectors, and to 
bring in his own trusted contacts to address problems. Hoare’s stature and his ability to 
assimilate knowledge of aviation rapidly also allowed him to hold his own with military 
figures, and to speak frankly and ‘without fear or favour’ within the RAF-dominated Air 
Ministry.409 So well did Hoare perform during his first six months in office that with the 
accession of Stanley Baldwin in May 1923 his position was elevated politically, and 
Hoare became the first Air Minister with that portfolio alone to hold Cabinet rank.410 As 
The Times, taking a swipe at Hoare’s predecessor Guest, remarked, ‘an era of solid 
improvement and advance was at hand…It could no longer be said that the Secretary of 
State was frankly an unbeliever in the future of civil aviation in Europe.’411  
Upon coming to office on 31 October 1922, Hoare displayed determination to 
get to grips with the challenges facing aviation. The aviation lobby, scenting the new 
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enthusiasm of the ‘official mind,’ made fresh appeals for progress with The Times, for 
example, calling for renewed efforts: ‘Our air policy has too long been at the mercy of 
rivalries between the Navy, Army, and Air Forces on the one hand, and between 
military and civil aviation on the other.’ Now, British aviation should develop along 
‘consistent lines.’412 Hoare, finding that British civil aviation ‘scarcely existed,’413 
rapidly established yet another body to examine the question - the Civil Air Transport 
Subsidies Committee. This became known as the Hambling Committee after its 
Chairman, prominent banker Herbert Hambling. As The Times remarked, Hoare 
‘wanted a business view of the matter, and he went to business men to get it.’414 The 
Hambling Committee began its work in time for the third Air Conference, a two-day 
event organised by the Air Ministry, which opened on 6 February 1923. Its purpose was 
to examine the problems associated with the development of air transport. The main 
speakers were Sefton Brancker, who discussed aviation in general, and Dennis Burney, 
who spoke on ‘The Establishment of a Self-Supporting Airship Service.’415 On the 
opening day The Times set the tone, pressuring the Government to 
make up its mind, on behalf of the nation, to what extent we ought to commit 
ourselves in the air. The want of a clearly-formulated Government policy, or 
even of the broad outlines of one, lies at the root of the existing dissatisfaction 
with the inadequacy of such services as we now command or control, and of the 
discomfort and uncertainty which prevail among those who have to do with 
aviation.416  
 
Whereas the 1922 Air Conference had exposed the inadequacies of Guest as 
Secretary of State for Air, at the 1923 event Hoare, his successor, demonstrated 
determination to establish a forward policy. With characteristic British modesty Hoare 
told delegates that because of his inexperience - he had been in office for only three 
months - he was unlikely to have any worthwhile opinions, but then went on to give a 
competent analysis of the problems faced by civil aviation. There were two main 
obstacles: a lack of money and a continuing ‘atmosphere of war’ in the world. As a 
result, emphasis remained on military rather than civil aviation, and created 
international uncertainty about aviation in general. Hoare promised a sober review. 
What was needed, he told delegates, was to ‘get down from headlines and wild promises 
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to an atmosphere of quiet instructed discussion and development.’417 The conference 
demonstrated that, on the whole, Government thinking was positive about aeroplanes 
and negative about airships. In regard to aeroplane development, the Hambling 
Committee acted quickly, publishing its report a week after the Air Conference closed. 
The report provided a basis for the ‘instructed discussion and development’ that Hoare 
wanted. The committee, Spurgeon comments, concluded ‘that demand for air transport 
was simply too limited for subsidisation to be effective, and resulted only in the 
Government competing against itself.’418 Crucially the committee recommended the 
amalgamation of Britain’s existing aviation companies into a single large national 
concern. With earlier fears of monopoly and nationalisation apparently forgotten, the 
Government, stated The Times, proposed a subsidy of £1,000,000 spread over ten years. 
Although not exercising direct control, the Government would retain the right to 
appropriate to itself all craft and infrastructure in the event of war.419 This proposal 
would form the basis of Imperial Airways.  
Hoare backed these developments strongly, arguing in May 1923 that although 
the amount of air traffic was small and the costs considerable, the combining of the 
companies involved would create ‘a single strong undertaking, with a substantial 
amount of private capital behind it.’ He conceded, however, that there would ‘have to 
be Government support.’420 In this way Hoare was proposing, as Collier argues, that the 
Conservatives become the ‘unlikely supporters of a national air line underwritten by the 
State.’421 Despite Hoare’s careful groundwork to ensure that the Hambling report would 
appeal to financial interests, its proposals met considerable opposition. The City, Hoare 
wrote later, ‘regarded air transport as a dangerous gamble,’422 while the Treasury ‘did 
not believe in civil aviation, and strongly objected to long-term commitments to 
companies that were obviously in financial difficulties.’ Although Hoare was 
challenged because his views appeared to resemble ‘the doles that had hitherto proved 
useless and extravagant,’423 he stuck to his guns: ‘If Governments wish for rapid 
transport, they will have to pay for it.’ In an appeal both to those in favour of 
technological advance and those who valued Britain’s imperial reputation, he argued 
that the British should lead the world in aircraft construction, engine development, and 
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air organisation: ‘we have an especial need from the fact that our Empire is scattered all 
over the world. Also, we have always taken the lead in new forms of transport in the 
past.’424 The Times again backed Hoare, arguing that the Hambling proposals would 
‘make the first step to the ideal to be aimed at – a network of aerial lines radiating from 
Great Britain to the principal centres of the Continent, extending…even across the sea 
to Australia.’425 In November 1923 Hoare urged the Cabinet to agree to the scheme, 
arguing along both financial and aviation development lines. Whereas, he explained, the 
Air Ministry was currently ‘giving £200,000 a year in subsidies to four separate and 
weak companies,’ the ‘future subsidy will work out upon an average at only £100,000 a 
year.’ This represented a ‘good’ bargain and also offered ‘a real chance of big future 
developments and the possibility of civil air transport becoming a national asset.’426 
Despite the fact that Hoare could muster no language more persuasive than ‘chance’ and 
‘possibility,’ he won the argument. Treasury opposition was overcome, and the 
Government offered the proposed company a subsidy of £1 million over ten years, 
laying down strict rules regarding mileage and setting out penalties for failure.  
Eric Geddes was appointed to oversee the formation of the new concern and 
would serve as Chairman of Imperial Airways from 1924 until his death in 1937. 
However, he also remained Director of the Dunlop Rubber Company, and this, Pirie 
comments, demonstrated ‘wobbly conviction…the man selected to steer winged 
Britannia would only work part time.’427 Geddes planned to amalgamate Britain’s three 
existing air transport companies – Handley Page, Instone, and Daimler (later joined by 
British Marine Air Navigation Co. Ltd., which operated flying boats from Southampton) 
- but, perhaps not surprisingly, these concerns were reluctant to give up autonomy over 
their individual routes. Instone in particular wished for more time to prove itself on an 
independent basis. Resistance to Geddes, proved useless, and in August 1923 The Times 
argued irrefutably that any company that failed to combine ‘must be left without any 
State aid on April 1 next year…which means, of course, virtual extinction.’428 Despite 
protests by some airlines, all reached agreement in December 1923. The arrangement 
did not meet with universal approval but even Flight, opposed to the ‘Million Pound 
Monopoly Company,’ had grudgingly to concede that it was ‘unavoidable.’429  
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On 31 March 1924 Imperial Airways Limited came into being, merging 
Britain’s existing companies into one large business concern that was intended to have 
sufficient strength to develop British international aviation. As Lyth comments, the 
years of competition between the small independent air companies had held back 
development, and in the formation of Imperial Airways, Britain was forced to follow the 
European pattern – subsidy plus ‘monopoly privilege’. The company operated as ‘a 
private monopoly with a public subsidy,’ paying a dividend to shareholders, yet 
supported by public money. In the early days of the airline industry this, Lyth argues, 
was ‘probably the only way to create adequately capitalized undertakings.’430 Such an 
arrangement did not give the company a strong start. Based at Croydon, it inherited only 
13 aircraft from its constituents – ten aeroplanes and three flying boats. These were ‘a 
motley collection,’ with only three being purpose-built as passenger aircraft, and the 
remainder converted War stock.431 Imperial Airways, Lyth comments, showed itself to 
be ‘obsessively anxious to reduce costs and squeeze the last penny out of its assets. It 
seemed to make the conservation of its resources an article of faith,’ holding back on 
spending for as long as possible. This had the result that services were sometimes halted 
due to a shortage of aircraft.432 In this, Lyth argues, the British continued to adhere to 
their earlier ‘guiding philosophy,’ that transportation should involve ‘the minimisation 
of charges on the public purse.’433 At the same time, as Sampson has remarked, the company 
had been forced into a situation in which it had to act in a way that was ‘emphatically patriotic,’ 
and therefore ‘it could only buy British planes, which flew the blue ensign as they taxied along 
the runway.’434 The company, Pirie comments, as well as being Britain’s ‘designated 
imperial airline,’ also became ‘a share-stock business part subsidised for ideological 
purposes.’ In addition, ‘In a foreign policy vacuum, and in the context of reluctant 
imperialism, Imperial [Airways] became a de facto agent of Empire.’435 As Pirie 
comments, whereas Britain’s maritime empire had several ‘home anchors,’ with the 
creation of Imperial Airways, all British imperial aviation had its point of origin in, and 
was managed from, London. This meant that the company was a ‘highly centralised 
parastatal organisation,’ and thus aviation changed Britain’s internal ‘imperial 
geography’ by polarising attention on to the capital city of Britain and the empire.436 
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Only later, as aviation became, as MacKenzie suggests, increasingly ‘multi-continental, 
multi-lateral, unconstrained by imperial political relations,’437 would air route expansion 
challenge this centralised structure. 
That Imperial Airways was still receiving only minimal resources was obscured, 
because the company’s inception came during a period of increased imperial 
enthusiasm. The post-war atmosphere involved uncertainty regarding the future of the 
empire, and by the mid-1920s officials and public figures were attempting to shore up, 
and boost, imperial fervour. In this, the Empire Exhibition, which opened at Wembley 
on 23 April (St. George’s Day) 1924, was a key factor. Enthusiasm for empire, as 
Bernard Porter argues, was enshrined in the visions of Lord Beaverbrook, owner of the 
Daily Express, and Leopold Amery, Colonial Secretary, who ‘had a whole army of 
regiments behind them: like the Royal Empire Society, the British Empire Union, the 
Empire Day Movement, the British Empire League.’ A number of traditions were 
invented, but ‘As ever a good proportion of the working classes proved impervious to 
Empire Days, Empire Songs, Empire Essay Competitions, “Empire Meals on Empire 
Day…”’438 Even so, in 1924, as Imperial Airways employee A.J. Quin-Harkin wrote 
later, the words ‘Empire’ and ‘Imperial’ were ‘still dignified, fashionable, and 
descriptive,’ and ‘It was inevitable that the title and quality “Imperial” should be 
included’ in the name of the new aviation ventures.439  
Aeroplane policy was advancing at last but, although imperial aviation policy 
ostensibly also included airships, airship policy remained in the doldrums. At the 1923 
Air Conference, officials had blown hot and cold about the gas-filled craft. Burney’s 
proposals of the previous year had been brought before delegates but Brancker 
expressed reservations. He warned that the pursuit of Burney’s project would require 
nine airships ‘of the very latest German design,’ as well as sheds and mooring masts at 
various locations. The costs would be large, as would the liability if the scheme were to 
fail.440 Burney, however, had been undeterred and had continued to spew out proposals. 
By July 1923 he had come up with a revised scheme, and his doggedness began to pay 
off. Perhaps owing to the new mood after the acceptance of Government backing of 
Imperial Airways, Burney’s arguments won support, and the Government began to be 
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‘seduced by the long-range potential of the airship.’441 With the Imperial Conference 
scheduled for October 1923, officials felt pressured to act, and Burney’s scheme was 
approved in principle by the Air Ministry. When Hoare told the House of Commons that 
the plan would materialise within two years, it was clear that Burney had won his battle. 
Certainly Hoare became a convert, for in August 1923 he wrote to William Joynson-
Hicks, Financial Secretary to the Treasury, that he was ‘most anxious’ for Burney’s 
plans to go ahead, and believed that they had ‘greatly impressed public opinion in the 
Empire.’442  
By November 1923, negotiations for what was designated the ‘Burney Scheme’ 
were in their final stages. Burney’s project, which made provisions for a regular service 
via Egypt and India to Australia, has been examined by Robin Higham443 and, more 
recently, Gordon Pirie.444 It was planned that, with the aid of a Government subsidy of 
£400,000, Burney, via the Vickers company, would ‘construct a giant airship and fly it 
to India in 100 hours.’445 In the event of success, the scheme would progress to two 
further stages which would involve additional heavy subsidy payments, but would 
enable Burney to build five more airships and operate a bi-weekly India service. Hoare 
weighed the financial benefits, noting in a ‘Secret’ Cabinet report that ‘to achieve 
comparable results by any method other than that of subsidising a commercial company 
would cost the Exchequer a great deal more.’ Hoare reminded the Cabinet that it had 
‘already decided upon the revival of airships on the ground of their strategic value,’ and 
urged it to sign off on the Burney plan, as this offered ‘a not unsatisfactory bargain’ to 
the Government.446 Indeed, this scheme was more hard-headed, and required less public 
money and Government support, than its successor, the Imperial Airship Scheme, that 
would be brought in under Labour the following year. At this crucial juncture, however, 
Hoare’s plans suffered a setback. Despite his urgings, the Cabinet had not subscribed to 
the Burney Scheme and in late December 1923 the credibility of airships received a 
further blow when the French Dixmude (an old German airship given to France as War 
reparation) was lost off Sicily with all on board. The Times tried to limit the damage, 
pointing out the craft’s weaknesses and the strengths of the proposed British scheme.447 
With great prescience, Flight now called nervously for an investigation of airship 
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problems before the Burney Scheme was adopted: ‘a few thousands wisely spent on 
research may be the means of saving millions later.’448 After this, the airship question 
again hung in the balance, and when in January 1924 the Conservatives went out of 
office, the Burney Scheme was put in further doubt.  
Hoare had initiated the airship project but, as Britain’s first Labour 
administration came in under Ramsay MacDonald, he was replaced by Lord Thomson. 
In subsequent analysis of airship policy, greater attention has been focussed on 
Thomson than on Hoare, because Thomson both introduced the Imperial Airship 
Scheme and was responsible at the time of the R101 disaster, which ended it. However, 
between these events, for the best part of five years, it was Hoare who was the Minister 
in charge. Thomson, as Flight pointed out, was, like Hoare before him, ‘somewhat of an 
untried quantity in the administration of the affairs of the Air.’449 Yet as men with 
appropriate experience were in short supply, particularly in the Labour Party, the 
situation could scarcely have been otherwise. Thomson quickly made it clear that his 
administration would not abandon the airship programme of the Conservatives. 
Designating the Air Ministry the ‘parent’ of airship development,450 he ordered a 
revision of the Burney Scheme and an ambitious new plan, the Imperial Airship 
Scheme, which involved far greater Government backing than the Conservative 
programme, was drawn up. Burney’s construction plans would now to an extent become 
eclipsed by Lord Thomson’s government-funded project at Cardington (Fig. 3.7). 
Nevertheless, Burney’s role was acknowledged in May 1924, when Thomson 
commented in the House of Lords that in pursuit of airship policy ‘the enthusiasm, 
optimism, and driving power of Commander Burney have been remarkable. He has kept 
alive interest in airship development when others doubted.’451 In 1930 an MP would 
comment in the House of Commons that Burney had single-handedly been responsible, 
‘by his persuasion and his energy and his skill,’ for influencing successive governments 
in favour of airships.452 
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Fig. 3.4. Lord Thomson boards the R101: a trial flight, October 29.453 
 
The Imperial 
Airship Scheme that 
emerged under Labour 
has been examined in 
detail by several 
commentators.454 It 
involved the 
construction of two 
giant craft; the R100 
would be built by the 
Airship Guarantee Company (a subsidiary of Vickers), a company set up by Burney at 
Howden in Yorkshire, while the R101 would be built at the Royal Airship Works at 
Cardington and be funded completely by the Government. The combining of public and 
private spending under one umbrella scheme was intended to appease political critics on 
both Left and Right. Thus the R100 became known as the ‘Capitalist’ airship and the 
R101 the ‘Government’ or ‘Socialist’ airship. Each craft would have a capacity of five 
million cubic feet and the R101, in its final form, would, at 777 feet long, be the world’s 
largest airship. It was intended that, once proved airworthy, the R100 would be 
purchased by the Government and together the great airships would provide transport on 
the Canada and India routes. It was also hoped that confidence would be revived in 
Britain’s airships, and that the country would gain a new export industry.  
Ramsay MacDonald’s Government lasted for less than a year and in November 
1924 the Conservatives renewed their leadership under Stanley Baldwin. Hoare 
displaced Thomson and was reinstalled as Air Minister. Hoare resumed with 
enthusiasm, declaring that he intended to focus on aeroplane routes to India and 
Australia.455 Having previously invested so much effort in the Burney Scheme, he was 
keen to continue Labour’s imperial airship initiative, telling the House of Commons in 
February 1925 that he was ‘genuinely nervous lest a sudden new reversal of policy 
might plunge the whole question back into the melting pot and stop airship development 
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altogether.’456 Hoare’s speech suggests a delicate situation in which policy was again 
hanging in the balance, and in this situation Hoare was unlikely to suggest major 
revisions. Hoare’s fears proved unjustified, for the die was now cast and, with the 
Government under the delusion that the airship would be the civil imperial aviation 
provider of the future, the tragedy of the Imperial Airship Scheme would play out for 
another six years.  
 
Challenges to the progress of imperial aviation, 1924-1930 
Once Imperial Airways and the Imperial Airship Scheme were established, their 
progress would be held back by problems which were mainly repercussions of a number 
of wrong British decisions. In terms of the Imperial Airship Scheme, Britain suffered by 
its application of an inappropriate form of technology – that of lighter-than-air flight – 
to the question of imperial aviation, and this will be discussed later in the section. In 
relation to Imperial Airways, these included a failure to fund the company 
appropriately; making the company responsible for forming a European air network; 
and a lack of rigour in the pursuit of technological advance. Ironically, while the 
concept of Empire was promoted among the general public, the Government was not 
prepared to stump up funding for Imperial Airways. The company was given the 
appearance of importance but this was a mirage, and, behind the fanfare, the practical 
backing on offer by the Government was minimal. This was illustrated in late 1924 
when Brancker was sent on an air mission to India. His remit was ‘to sound out various 
governments along the way as to their willingness to co-operate in allowing, and 
possibly subsidizing, a British air route to the East across their territories.’457 Once in the 
Subcontinent, he was to confer with the Indian Government on questions relating to the 
construction of airship facilities.458  
Brancker experienced considerable difficulty in procuring funding for this 
seemingly important project. The problems he experienced also indicated the haphazard 
and unclear relationships between private investment, Imperial Airways, the airship 
project, and Government departments. Initially, the Air Ministry instructed Brancker to 
travel by sea because, Flight reported, ‘A very “Scotch” Treasury failed to see any 
obligation’ to finance the journey by air.459 However, the well-known pilot Alan 
                                            
456 ‘Air Estimates,’ The Times, 27 February 1925, p. 7. 
457 Higham, Britain’s Imperial Air Routes, 1918 to 1939, p. 120. 
458 ‘An Aerial Tour to India,’ Flight, 20 November 1924, p. 736. 
459 ‘London-Rangoon-London,’ Flight, 26 March 1925, p. 174. 
93 
Cobham, who had flown Brancker on several previous occasions and clearly wished to 
do so again, thought it ‘monstrous’ that Britain’s Director of Civil Aviation should 
travel by sea. Cobham went to see Hoare, who was sympathetic but could offer only to 
donate the cost of the sea voyage towards an air journey. Cobham then set out to raise 
the balance himself, appealing to leaders of industry ‘Like a mediaeval priest-mendicant 
begging funds for a crusade and offering palpable returns which no true believer could 
despise.’ Fortunately, in the private sector Cobham found ‘men both generous and 
shrewd enough to cast their bread upon the waters.’460 As a result, Brancker, piloted by 
Cobham and accompanied by a mechanic, would make the 17,000 mile return journey 
to India by air, in a single-engined de Havilland biplane (Fig. 3.5), which had ‘Imperial 
Airways Ltd.’ painted on the side.  
Fig. 3.5. Brancker, Cobham, and Elliot (mechanic) with the de Havilland 50 aircraft in 
which they flew to India.461 
 
Brancker’s journey was demanding. After delicate diplomacy in Berlin relating 
to the air route through Germany, he travelled east via Warsaw, Bucharest, 
Constantinople, Baghdad, Karachi, and Calcutta, making fourteen other stops besides, 
and everywhere representing Britain in air negotiations.462 This journey allowed Branker 
to perceive a truth which Britain would subsequently ignore to its cost. En route to 
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India, Cobham wrote later, Brancker recognised the implications of the clash of aviation 
technologies in relation to their usefulness for commercial aviation. Even as Imperial 
Airways was formed in 1924, the state of technology was such that aeroplanes were still 
impractical for long-distance flight, and in particular that over mountain ranges and 
oceans. Aeroplanes were thus unsuitable for imperial aviation, and in this regard 
airships still had the advantage. Brancker’s experience demonstrated to him the 
possibilities of aeroplane technology for the India route in terms of flexibility and speed 
of travel. As a result Brancker lost faith in airships because, Cobham wrote, ‘It was 
already becoming clear that the 200 m.p.h. airliner was a possibility: the slower airship 
would lose the race.’463 However, by this time it was too late to cancel the Imperial 
Airship Scheme, and besides, a comprehensive plan for British imperial commercial 
aviation had been worked out, under which airships and aeroplanes would complement, 
rather than compete with, each other. Aeroplane services, it was projected, would 
operate in tandem with airship services,464 with airships plying main trunk routes 
between empire transport hubs, while ‘branch or feeder lines operated with aeroplanes 
or seaplanes.’465 Even so, as the terms ‘civil aviation’ and ‘aircraft’ were used to 
encompass both types of craft, there often remained a lack of clarity as to which would 
operate any given route.  
While Britain’s great airships remained in their sheds in the second half of the 
1920s it was left to Imperial Airways to serve as Britain’s sole imperial air transport 
provider. This meant that the success of Britain’s policy was dependent upon the 
performance of a single company, and therefore the financial constraints imposed upon 
Imperial Airways had a considerable effect upon development. Liberal MP Sir 
Archibald Sinclair complained in the House of Commons in March 1925 that although 
civil aviation was ‘vital’ to Britain’s economic and strategic interests, the Air Ministry 
allocated it only two percent of its expenditure.466 Hoare retorted that in fact Britain was 
‘spending much more like £1,250,000 in one way or another’ on civil aviation, and that, 
while spending was admittedly constrained, the Air Ministry would ideally like to 
commit ‘a great deal more.’467 Good intentions, however, could not prevent Imperial 
Airways from operating at a loss. Not all critics laid the company’s failure to record a 
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profit at the Government’s door. There were complaints that the company itself misused 
the little money that it had, and that it was unable to think creatively. Imperial Airways, 
Flight commented in August 1925, had ‘not exactly proved itself capable of, or even 
anxious to, strike out along lines calculated to promote real progress.’468 One 
particularly damaging aspect of its management style was a heavy-handed approach to 
personnel matters. At the company’s inception, for example, services were unable to 
begin because the 16 pilots, offered lower salaries than under their old employers, 
staged a month-long strike.469 In addition, employee A.J. Quin-Harkin later recorded 
that during its first year, Imperial Airways suffered many ‘technical vicissitudes during 
its process of welding together the heterogenous flight equipment acquired from the 
vendor companies and standardizing its maintenance and overhaul procedure.’ Such 
were the difficulties that on one day only two aeroplanes were operational.470 The policy 
of continuing to use the old aeroplanes of component companies rather than investing in 
a new fleet held back progress, although the commissioning of aircraft would have 
required investment of capital that the company did not possess. In these circumstances, 
the company’s shortcomings, and the Government’s policy, forced the taxpayer into the 
position of providing subsidisation to a loss-making concern.  
When Imperial Airways was given the responsibility of developing a European 
network, the company entered ‘a sophisticated and complex arena,’471 and by the time 
Britain made its late appearance in 1924, routes and services were already well-
established by foreign aviation concerns: ‘The competition was consolidated and 
technologically superior.’472 So much was expected of Imperial Airways that Frederick 
Sykes believed it was given ‘a task beyond the capacity of any single company,’ and its 
creation had been a ‘mistake.’473 Spurgeon has commented that once Imperial Airways 
was formed, the Government’s financial contributions ‘were provided solely for the 
operation and development of specific services. They did not encourage the 
development of new routes outside those shown in the agreements, nor was there any 
stimulus to expansion.’ Meanwhile, European companies, enjoying ‘liberal’ funding 
from their Governments, were able to develop extensive air networks.474 Lyth, while 
pointing out that making an assessment of Imperial Airways’ financial performance is 
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complicated its ‘secrecy’ and difficulties of interpreting its annual accounts or subsidy 
amounts, 475 concludes that although over the airline’s 15 year history the passenger 
figures for European and Empire routes were at a ratio of 85:15, there was an 
‘increasingly uneven division’ of the subsidy between the two sides.476 Now the 
technological deficiencies of its component aviation companies were exposed, as 
Imperial Airways’ limited funding and out-dated fleet prevented it from contending 
effectively. In Europe, Britain faced competition from Dutch, Belgian, and 
Scandinavian national airlines, but in particular from its main rivals, France and 
Germany.477 These two countries had had a head start, for when Imperial Airways 
commenced operations, the French were already flying scheduled services to twelve 
European countries in addition to Corsica, Morocco, and Algeria, and also from 
Casablanca to Moscow and Constantinople. France, argues Fitzgerald, ‘enjoyed the 
advantage bestowed by geography.’ Able ‘to work down the Mediterranean coast 
towards her African possessions,’ France, unlike Britain, had ‘relatively easy access to 
her imperial skies.’478 Against such competition, Imperial Airways could never make up 
the ground. 
Britain was also reluctant to spend money in Europe on routes and infrastructure 
for which it would not be able to retain sole use. Hoare, casting around for alternatives, 
recognised the difficulties attached to any British attempt to ‘go it alone,’ and saw the 
advantages of collaboration with other European powers wishing to forge air routes to 
their imperial possessions. A group of nations working together was likely to have 
greater powers of persuasion than a single country over common competitors. The 
British thought that the Dutch, who wanted a route to Singapore, ‘might be of great 
value in an Imperial scheme,’ while ‘France would be interested as far east as Syria.’479 
However, collaboration was problematic. In the early post-war years, relationships 
between European nations were still fraught with difficulty. As the question of 
overflight of national territory and borders was a sensitive topic, the development of 
aviation partnerships presented political problems. Britain may also have lacked the 
determination to pursue collaboration; Fitzgerald comments on Britain’s ‘air of 
ineffectiveness’ in diplomatic negotiations with Germany over a route from London to 
Prague via Cologne: ‘Somewhere between the Air Ministry and the Foreign Office a 
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sense of priority and drive was lost.’480 In addition, working with other powers was 
perhaps too humiliating for Britain to contemplate and besides, its credibility was 
already compromised by a history of political problems in post-war Europe, and its lack 
of willingness to facilitate previous overflight requests of other countries. In these 
aspects, Britain’s relationship with Germany was particularly problematic. As will be 
discussed, the Versailles Treaty, although intended, as Fritzsche comments, to ‘cripple’ 
German aviation,481 had failed to hold back the country’s air ambitions. As Germany 
held to its determination to pursue development in any way possible, regardless of 
international restrictions, aviation, Fritzsche comments, became ‘part of the theatrical 
sensibility of state politics in the modern era; power was choreographed for public 
display.’482 This ‘self-congratulation’ resulted in a nationalistic viewpoint, which held 
that aviation would allow Germany to ‘re-emerge as a superpower in the coming air 
age.’483  
After the War, the abrupt revival of Germany’s technological prowess in the air 
accentuated the deterioration in diplomatic relations. Despite the country’s defeat, 
Germany’s achievements were ‘unexpected and unequalled.’484 After regaining 
determination of its airspace on 1 January 1923, Germany had rapidly emerged as a 
challenger to Britain’s eastward-looking ambitions. The Germans, Lyth points out, 
‘concentrated on Europe,’ seeking ‘political rehabilitation’ there by means of the 
Deutsche Aero Lloyd and Junkers companies from 1923.485 On a practical level the 
Germans, Fitzgerald comments, ‘somewhat vindictively, controlled the use of their 
airspace in a very restrictive manner,’ preventing other countries from penetrating east 
of the Rhine by air.486 Clearly, Britain needed access to routes that avoided areas of 
German influence and, with the change of Government in November 1924, Hoare, now 
returning as Secretary of State for Air, began to seek east-bound alternatives. Sefton 
Brancker reported that routes under consideration for an aeroplane through-service from 
Britain to Karachi by way of Cairo were those via Moscow, Galati (in Romania), 
Ankara, and Aleppo.487  
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Germany had been forced to dispose of its military equipment but this, 
ironically, proved a blessing in disguise to the Germans. As British Air Ministry official 
Francis Shelmerdine noted,  
The gentlemen who went to Germany after the war and smashed up all their 
aircraft engines, factories etc. and came away thinking they had disarmed 
Germany had overlooked the fact that they could do nothing to destroy German 
engineering skill. It was a condition that Engineers dream about; that is, all the 
obsolete stuff wiped out and an opportunity to start off with a clean sheet.488  
 
In this way, while Britain began the post-war era shackled with large stocks of surplus 
military aircraft which only glutted the market and deterred technological progress, 
Germany went back to basics and made important advances in aircraft design and 
technology. In addition, without an Air Force to divert resources to military 
development, Germany could concentrate upon civil aviation.489 As has been discussed 
by Fritzsche,490 Germans, prevented from building aircraft with engines, defiantly 
declared that ‘If we can’t fly with motors, we’ll fly without them.’ As a result, gliding 
came to be seen not only as ‘the story of German nationalism in the face of 
Versailles,’491 but also ‘the guardian of aviation and the executor of [Germany’s] 
ambitions.’492  
In the craze that followed, more than 15,000 people gained a gliding 
qualification. Their experience allowed Germany to gain vital information about the 
fundamentals of flight, which would probably not have happened had the German 
Government been allowed a free hand. The Versailles policy, comments Lyth, ‘in 
driving the Germans to concentrate on civil aircraft construction, served only to 
strengthen German aviation overall.493 Glider aerodynamics proved that the future lay 
with monoplanes, and by 1922, 60 percent of German aircraft types were monoplanes, 
whereas in Britain the figure was only six percent and in France nine percent.494 
Fritzsche has discussed the effect of the lifting of the ban on aircraft manufacturing in 
July 1922: ‘German airplanes could still be built only according to onerous restrictions; 
motors could not be more powerful than 60 horsepower; planes could not fly faster than 
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170 kilometers per hour or higher than 4,000 meters, and could carry no more than 600 
kilograms of cargo.’495   
 
Fig. 3.6. An advertisement for 
Imperial Airways’ services to ten 
Continental destinations, 1925.496  
 
After this, so rapid was 
German expansion after 1923 that 
by 1927, 67 flights were going in 
and out of Berlin airport every 
day.497 In that year German 
airlines carried 151,000 
passengers as against Britain’s 
19,000.498 In 1925 the conditions 
were eased further, and lifted 
altogether the following year.499 
Even by 1931, Imperial Airways, 
having started in 1924 with 13 
aircraft, could still only muster 22, 
against the 145 of the German 
national airline, Lufthansa.500 The 
disparity was so great that 
German aviation presented ‘a hindrance of mammoth proportions’ to British aviation 
ambitions in Europe and beyond.501  
Partly owing to Germany’s aviation successes, Britain’s policy of using Imperial 
Airways to develop a European network survived for only two years, before being 
abandoned due to ‘frustrated diplomacy, failure to overcome the realities of geography 
and the technological prowess of its competitors.’502 Leaving European skies to 
foreigners, the British expanded their vision towards the empire, where aviation seemed 
to promise a fresh start and fewer problems. In November 1929 Flight expressed its 
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relief that Britain was taking this step at last. Empire aviation was ‘so obviously our 
only salvation (in more than one sense) that to play with its development as we have 
been doing is not only regrettable but positively dangerous.’ There could be no excuses; 
the difficulties ‘must be overcome, and that very soon.’503 Sefton Brancker, still Director 
of Civil Aviation, considered the options for imperial routes, and explained that to 
advance eastwards towards India was ‘the first obvious step’ for aeroplane operations. 
Canada was ‘too difficult at present, as you have too much sea, whereas in going to 
India one can hop from land to land, and there are not a great many expanses of water to 
be covered.’504 The policy to abandon European operations was also promoted as being 
financially sound, in particular as it would prevent the Government subsidy provided to 
Imperial Airways from being ‘frittered away on uneconomical services,’505 which 
implied that this was the case in Europe.  
Fitzgerald suggests that in pursuing imperial aviation by means of Imperial 
Airways, Britain was placing heavy reliance on a concern which lacked the 
technological capabilities to develop an extensive network. Between 1924 and 1934, he 
argues, the company itself made no major initiatives in route development, ‘even when 
diplomacy was not an obstacle.’506 Indeed, ironically, Britain’s switch to a focus on 
imperial services resulted in little technological advance or innovation in route planning. 
Choosing this strategy enabled the British to indulge in what Fitzgerald describes as 
their ‘penchant for avoidance’ of technological development.507 He argues that by 
removing Imperial Airways services from Europe, the British were able to evade the 
pursuit of the technological advance necessary for successful competition with other 
countries.508 Their departure gave the British an excuse for their failure to compete or to 
develop fast, long-range, aeroplanes. In addition, despite Britain’s lack of experience, it 
made no attempt to learn from the route development techniques being developed, for 
example, by the Dutch airline KLM. While KLM opened an express through-route to 
Indonesia, Imperial Airways adhered instead to what Fitzgerald describes as a ‘short-
hop policy.’ This, he argues, proved ‘a major flaw’ in British thinking, as it gave a 
further excuse not to develop long-range aircraft - these being unnecessary on ‘short 
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hops.’509 In explanation of this strategy, Fitzgerald suggests that the British, ‘obsessed 
with the intricacies of railway timetables and interchanges,’ expanded rail concepts to 
aviation. For example, Cairo, developed as a major air hub for empire routes to Africa 
and the East, was commonly described as the ‘Clapham Junction’ of the empire.510 In 
addition, while it remained the policy to assign long-distance roles to airships, with 
aeroplanes used only for operating feeder services to the main airship trunk routes, the 
development of aeroplanes capable of extended flight was not necessary.  
Adherence to the short-hop system had a number of advantages. For example, it 
allowed Britain to provide air services at many locations along empire routes, and also 
to ‘fly the flag’ in imperial territories. In addition, by removing the focus from 
technological advance, Imperial Airways was able to concentrate on improving the 
reputation of its services. As Fitzgerald comments, the company’s short-hop services 
required ‘large, roomy and slow craft,’ and so these were what the company ordered.511 
In 1931 Imperial Airways unveiled its new Handley Page HP-42 four-engined biplanes, 
or Hannibals as they were known. Dedicated mainly to the Persian Gulf sector of the 
India route, the Hannibals would remain in service until the outbreak of war in 1939. 
Certainly in terms of speed, the Hannibals had little to offer: a pilot would later recall: 
‘I once had Sir Eric Geddes standing beside me in the cockpit saying “You’re supposed 
to be doing 100 mph,” and I said “Well, the aircraft won’t do it!” He was annoyed. The 
aircraft’s performance was disgraceful, really.’512 If the craft failed to provide fast flight, 
they offered other advantages to travellers, gaining a reputation for safety, regularity, 
and comfortable and quiet interiors. As Flight reported, in terms of their ‘ample chintz-
covered seats’ and catering services, the Hannibals could ‘hardly be bettered in any 
respect.’513 The craft increased the popularity of British civil aviation. As they operated 
on the most wild and inhospitable sector of the India route, that from Cairo to Karachi, 
the Hannibals provided an environment which, being redolent of a British domestic 
interior, was reassuring to passengers. While too slow to be of value on the highly 
competitive European routes, in the empire’s periphery514 the HP-42 became, Fitzgerald 
states, ‘at once a symbol of Imperial’s prowess and British aviation’s backwardness.’515 
The ponderous biplanes gained notoriety, and as time went on, Britain’s India route 
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service would become a source of international derision, with the American Time 
magazine jibing in 1938 that 
There was a fanciful yarn about India’s long-delayed independence; the guess 
was that it might be coming via Imperial. Spicier was a tale about a woman who 
gave birth during a flight to India. Politely taxed by a flight clerk for boarding 
the plane in her condition, she became highly indignant. “I’ll have you know,” 
she replied hotly, “that when I got on this ship I was not pregnant.”516  
 
 
Fig. 3.7. The R101 under 
construction at Cardington. A gas 
bag has been inflated inside the 
metal framework (undated, 
1920s).517 
 
If Imperial Airways services 
were slow, those of the Imperial 
Airship Scheme never began. Faced 
with a choice between competing 
but non-comparable technologies, 
the British made the wrong 
decision. The idea of reserving 
long-haul routes for airships 
represented over-optimism in the 
technological and economic 
potential of the craft, and 
capabilities were attributed to them that they could not attain. The effects were severe 
and far-reaching, resulting in the reservation of long-haul passenger routes for airship 
services, while from 1924, lavish Government spending on the R101 scheme consumed 
funds that would have been better spent on the development of aeroplanes. In this way, 
as Higham comments, money was ‘siphoned off’ from ‘a productive program (Imperial 
Airways) for an unproductive one,’ i.e. the Imperial Airship Scheme.518 Therefore, while 
appearing to further the development of the India route, in the longer term, airship 
spending actually restrained the technological development of British aeroplanes 
capable of operating it. The Government-sponsored R101, in particular, swallowed large 
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amounts of public money and by the time of the abandonment of airships in April 1931 
it was revealed that the whole scheme had cost the Government more than £2,350,000. 
This sum, Pirie points out, was ‘twice as much as the capitalization of Imperial 
[Airways], and twice its entire ten-year subsidy.’519  
Initially the Imperial Airship Scheme had been intended to produce its first craft 
after two years. However, although completion was scheduled for 1926, for a number of 
reasons construction did not begin until 1927 and neither craft would fly until 1929. The 
Imperial Airship Scheme had been set up as a symbol of Britain’s power and prestige in 
the world, but its poor performance only served to damage its reputation. Part of the 
problem, as Hoare admitted in his autobiography, was that ‘There were really not 
enough skilled men…to divide between two widely separated efforts of construction’ 
(at Howden and Cardington).520 Airship infrastructure would prove easier to build than 
the craft themselves; facilities for the R100 were rapidly erected in Canada (Fig. 3.8), 
while for the R101 mooring masts and hydrogen plants were installed at Cardington and 
Ismailia. The shed commissioned in 1925 for Karachi became, when completed, the 
world’s largest airship hangar and one of its largest structures.521 As the delay 
lengthened and the R100 and R101 remained in their sheds, a fierce debate developed 
over the wisdom of continuing to commit public money to a technology already proven 
unworthy of support. In one respect the negative criticism backfired, for it served to 
strengthen the resolve of enthusiasts. Officials such as Hoare and Thomson made a 
point of remaining steadfast, and continuing to promote the airship project confidently. 
When the Imperial Airship Scheme was approved in 1924, much was made of its 
employment of the latest scientific methods, and the fact that British designers went 
back to the drawing board to work up new craft free from the faults of the German craft 
on which previous British designs had been based.522 Official publicity repeatedly 
boasted of the advanced technological and scientific methods that were being employed, 
but from 1927 criticism of this aspect became particularly strong, and hence irritating to 
those who backed airship policy. Among the MPs who opposed airships the most 
strident, until his death in July 1928, was Frank Rose, Labour MP for Aberdeen North. 
In March 1928 in the House of Commons, Rose, an engineer, made what was one of the 
most pertinent arguments against the Government’s airship policy: 
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R.33 cost £350,000, and she flew for 800 hours and burst. R.34 cost £350,000 
and burst. R.35 cost £75,000 and burst before she was inflated. R.36 cost 
£350,000, flew for 97 hours, and burst. R.37 cost £350,000 and was never 
completed. R.38 cost £500,000…and she flew for 70 hours and burst. R.39 cost 
£90,000 and was never finished...R.40 cost £275,000, flew for 73 hours and 
burst. The total for eight ships is £2,340,000, and the total flying time 1,540 
hours.523  
 
Critical of all aspects of national airship policy, Rose objected to the ‘idea that 
you are going to link up the Empire with goldbeaters’ skin gas bladders.524 Of all the 
phases of aeronautical dementia, that known to the faculty as gasbagomania is the most 
virulent and the most malignant.’525 In addition, Rose described some experts upon 
whom Hoare relied as ‘charlatans,’ who ‘commenced their technical education by going 
backwards and…they have not got as far back as the ABC. That is where I have got a 
pull on them. I know the rudiments, and they do not.’ Rose’s argument that ‘the stupid 
thing,’526 the R101, was a ‘mass of flimsiness’ which could only come out of its shed in 
fine weather was all too true.527 He urged that the ‘bubbles’ should be ‘pricked’ before 
they incurred the loss of money and human life. The colourful style and fierceness of 
Rose’s attacks opened him to ridicule in the House of Commons, but the records of 
Hansard show that the House was unable to respond convincingly. After the Aberdeen 
MP’s ‘bubbles’ speech, in the same Commons sitting, three other Members made 
unsubstantiated criticism of Rose. Firstly, John Buchan (later Lord Tweedsmuir) 
suggested that Rose had led the House into ‘shady’ and diversionary paths. Rose was 
then subjected to two blatant ad hominem attacks from prominent Naval figures. They 
alleged that he was conservative in his opinion of technological change. Rear Admiral 
Sir Murray Sueter argued that Rose’s ‘damning account’ of airships was ‘all stale’ - 
Sueter had heard the same arguments since 1909. He likened Rose to those whose anti-
airship rhetoric had resulted in the failure of British Naval mine-laying activities during 
the War. In addition, Commander Bellairs, MP for Maidstone, said that Rose’s ‘violent 
condemnation’ of airships reminded him of criticism of steamships a century 
previously, when naysayers had ‘proved to demonstration, mathematically’ that it was 
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impossible for the Great Western to cross the Atlantic, a year before the vessel achieved 
that feat: ‘I think that very much the same thing will occur with regard to airships.’528 
Only three years later, after the R101 disaster had proved Rose right, was the MP for 
Aberdeen justified in the House. Then, in an embarrassing incident, George Hardie, a 
Glasgow Labour MP and fellow engineer, defended Rose’s memory:  
Mr. Rose was a serious Member of this House, but I can remember the right hon. 
Member for Chelsea [Hoare] laughing at him…he was a student and a skilled 
engineer…It is not right to judge a man of that type by saying that he was funny. 
The point is, was he right or wrong? He was right. Circumstances have proved 
that.529 
 
Adding to the pressure created by Rose’s comments were attacks made by E.F. 
Spanner, a Naval engineer who in 1928 published books entitled This Airship Business 
and Gentlemen Prefer Aeroplanes. Echoing Rose, in the former Spanner suggested that 
Hoare’s lack of technical knowledge made him unfit to judge technological matters 
correctly, and in the latter he urged that the airship programme be abandoned because 
‘The enterprise into which we are being rushed by Sir S. Hoare and Lord Thomson is 
destined to involve loss of life...The design of R100 and R101 is faulty.’530 Such attacks 
were not to be tolerated and Spanner was heavily censured by the airship lobby; Flight, 
for example, attacked him for being ‘out of his depth’ and making ‘specious,’ 
‘obviously fallacious,’ and ‘pseudo-scientific’ arguments, as well as concocting 
‘unworthy’ imputations against officials. In fact, retorted Flight, This Airship Business 
should ‘tend to reassure any who were beginning to doubt the future of airships.’531 In 
May, the loss of the Italia airship, in which Italian engineer Umberto Nobile had been 
making surveys near the North Pole, cannot have helped the reputation of the gas craft. 
The news reports were chilling – the disabled Italia had drifted away across the ice with 
six crewmen on board, never to be seen again. The Italia incident did further damage to 
the reputation of aviation when the Norwegian, Roald Amundsen, who had beaten the 
British explorer Robert Falcon Scott to the North Pole in 1911, died in an aeroplane 
crash during the subsequent search for the missing airship in June 1928.  
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Fig. 3.8. The R100 tethered to 
its mooring mast at St. Hubert 
airport, Montreal, Canada, 
August 1930.532 
 
In 1929, with its launch 
now long overdue, the most 
serious and damaging criticism 
of the Imperial Airship Scheme 
was made, coming from an 
unexpected source. In that year 
Dennis Burney published The 
World, the Air, and the Future, 
in which, MP Cecil L’Estrange 
Malone told the House of 
Commons, ‘the man who 
designed the airships and who 
was responsible for energising 
three Governments to spend over £2,000,000…has now turned King’s evidence.’ 
Burney, said L’Estrange Malone, decried the R100 and R101, declaring that ‘the public 
ought to realise that they are failures, and face the fact.’ The MP even suggested that 
there were those in the Air Ministry who agreed. The airships had serious failings; they 
were unable to carry an adequate payload, needed calm conditions for their launch and 
operation, and could land only where mooring masts had been erected. Britain’s craft 
were also ‘very far behind the German Zeppelin airship.’533 L’Estrange Malone declared 
that the only reason for the continuing pursuit of the scheme was political, in that it 
would save the faces of Hoare, Thomson, Burney, and others. Burney, however, was not 
arguing that airship policy should be abandoned, but only that the R100 and R101 were 
unsuccessful. Indeed, he considered that ‘the only possibility of building an airship with 
any chance of success is to build an airship twice the size.’534  
Rose, Spanner, and Burney - three public figures all with engineering experience 
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- had warned of serious technical failings but their evidence was scorned by politicians 
who, although they had faith in airships, lacked technical knowledge and also ignored 
the advice of experts. The reaction to such criticism of Thomson, reinstated as Air 
Minister in June 1929, seems to have been to close his eyes and ears. As Thomson had 
instigated the R101 scheme it would have been difficult for him to disavow it, but in any 
case his belief seems to have been genuine and unreserved. For example, four months 
before his death in the R101, Thomson told the House of Lords that ‘in spite of many 
setbacks and some disappointments, his faith was absolutely undiminished, and he was 
sure the nation would be right in continuing the experiments.’ Britain’s giant airships 
were the ‘strongest in the world’ and ‘almost unbreakable in any foreseeable weather 
conditions, provided they were properly navigated.’535 Thomson would be proved wrong 
on each count. Even in private, speaking to a friend in late 1930, he expressed ‘no 
element of doubt or uncertainty…The possibility of risk or danger did not seem to cross 
his mind.’536 Nevil Shute, who worked on the R100 project, wrote later that as the R101 
was ‘the plaything of a politician’ [Thomson],537 it also became a ‘political problem.’538 
Britain’s policy-makers had pursued an ignis fatuus but once construction started it was 
almost impossible to back out. As Flight commented in 1929, ‘Whatever may be one’s 
personal views of the chances of ultimate success of airships, this country is definitely 
committed to an airship policy, and matters have progressed too far for any radical 
change in policy to be feasible.’539 Thomson was buoyed in his faith, as Henry Cord 
Meyer remarks, by his ‘commitment to scoring successes for socialism.’540 In addition, 
as Higham suggests, a successful voyage to India by the R101 would be ‘a great 
personal triumph’ in ‘the dreary political climate of 1930.’541 Thomson’s desire to arrive 
in India – the land of his birth - in the world’s largest airship probably owed something 
to his forthcoming appointment as Viceroy in March 1931. It appears that a public 
announcement to this effect was scheduled to take place at the Imperial Conference, 
after Thomson’s anticipated triumphant return from India in October 1930.542  
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Fig. 3.9. The LZ127 Graf 
Zeppelin operated 
commercially from 1928 
to 1937 (left and below 
left). Publicity pictures 
for the R101 (below 
right) made the British 
ship seem Spartan and 
flimsy in comparison 
with the German one, 
which was comfortably 
upholstered and 
attractively decorated.543 
During the second half of the 1920s, the 
debate surrounding airships became ever fiercer. 
Personal ambition and political exigency played an unfortunate role, as did the desire to 
outdo Germany, for airships became a status symbol in Anglo-German relations as the 
two imperial powers sought to enhance their prestige. From the mid-1920s German 
progress would become perhaps the most emotive and motivating factor in British 
deliberations over airship policy. Airships were seen in both Britain and Germany as a 
symbol of national advancement, and claims that a strong British airship programme 
would provide a means of countering the rousing effect of airship advances on the 
German national psyche carried weight. From 1924 until 1930, therefore, as Duggan 
and Meyer state, airships played in Britain, as in Germany, a ‘lead role in heroic 
political theatre. Like all theatre, it appealed more to emotion than to reason.’544 Airship 
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policy tended to be pursued because of the seeming potential of the craft to fulfil 
expectations and hopes, rather than on economic grounds. Airships typified the ideals of 
their planners – seeming impressive and powerful, they were in reality insubstantial and 
at the mercy of unpredictable forces and events: ‘Much like their creators, they were 
both political manipulators and victims of politics.’545  
Therefore, part of the incentive to British engineers to produce the R100 and 
R101 rapidly, while at the same time planning bigger and better airships, was the 
national and imperial challenge emanating from Germany’s airship production. While 
Germany forged ahead, Britain remained in a state of indecision, paralysed by 
uncertainty and ignorance concerning almost every aspect related to the craft. It was 
therefore Germany, and not Britain, which dominated the world of airshipping and thus, 
Duggan and Meyer argue, the two countries joined in a ‘feverish and secret two-year 
battle’ in which Britain tried to produce the R100 and R101 before Germany launched 
its 774 foot Graf Zeppelin LZ 127 (Fig. 3.9). The challenge to British prestige was clear, 
and Burney urged that ‘We must be in the air before the Germans…We could not 
contemplate the possibility of being beaten by Germany in civil aviation after having 
beaten her militarily.’ However, Germany won the airship race, with the Graf Zeppelin 
appearing in July 1928 while neither the R100 nor R101 would emerge until the 
following year. In October 1928 the Graf crossed the Atlantic with 20 passengers, and 
in August 1929 made a round-the-world flight, travelling 21,251 miles in less than 13 
days at an average speed of 70 miles per hour. Such news was not given wide publicity 
in Britain, where the press ‘paid scant attention, focusing instead on Britain’s victory 
over Italy for the Schneider Trophy seaplane races.’546 Particularly uncomfortable were 
the Graf’s approaches to areas of British interest, for example Egypt. In 1929, wishing 
to prevent foreigners from viewing its military installations in the Canal Zone, Britain 
refused Germany a permit to overfly the area.547  
As time went on, the deduction that Brancker had made about the relative 
potential of airships and aeroplanes during his 1924 India mission became more widely 
realised. Perhaps the most obvious indication that the future did not lie with airships 
was the speed with which aeroplanes gained the technological advantage in the 
international arena. Even had the R100 and R101 appeared in 1926, as original 
proposed, and even had the Imperial Airship Scheme achieved all that was promised, 
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airship services, as Pirie suggests, ‘would not have lasted for more than a few years 
anyway in view of the rapid progress of heavier-than-air technology.’548 The nub of the 
matter, as C.G. Grey, The Aeroplane editor, identified in 1928, was that ‘Airships breed 
like elephants, and airplanes like rabbits. Consequently, the airship is many generations 
in the process of evolution behind the airplane.’549 Grey was acknowledging that 
whereas each airship took many months to build, an aeroplane could be finished in 
weeks. Aeroplane technology was thus able to go through rapid evolution. The practise 
of trial and error with completed craft allowed changes to be applied immediately to 
craft still on the production line. The design of aeroplanes was therefore dynamic, while 
that of airships was not, meaning that the technological evolution of the aeroplane was 
far more rapid. As Lyth comments, ‘it was only a question of time before…a successful 
intercontinental airliner’ was built.550 In particular, construction work on the R101 was 
held back by a series of innovations and changes made to the original design during its 
construction period. These were alterations to one, still untested, craft and were made 
after theoretical calculation, and not as a result of flight trials.  
In the 1920s, ever-increasing aeroplane capability also whittled away at the load-
carrying advantage of airships, making it inevitable that the argument about the need for 
complementarity in airship and aeroplane services would weaken. For example, in 
October 1929 Flight reported that the Dornier Do.X, a 12-engined German flying boat, 
had flown for 50 minutes carrying 169 people. This, as Flight commented, was ‘far and 
away the greatest number of people every taken into the air in a single aircraft.’ The 
Do.X also had facilities associated with airships rather than with aeroplanes, including a 
dining room and bar. It was, Flight reported, ‘almost inevitable that comparisons should 
be made between the Do.X and the R.101, and it is very natural that the man in the street 
should be asking himself the question, which of the two types will prove the better?’551 
Sophisticated instruments were also becoming available; in 1929 James Doolittle, an 
American aviation pioneer, demonstrated instruments-only flight, ‘flying blind’ for 15 
minutes and landing by means of an altimeter and radio-beacon guidance.552 With 
aeroplanes able to carry large numbers of passengers, able to fly at night and in difficult 
conditions, several vaunted advantages of airships were removed. As the focus shifted 
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towards aeroplanes, the role of Britain’s airships became increasingly unclear, even to 
officials. Perhaps as a tacit acknowledgement of this, in February 1930 Thomson, 
addressing the British Empire League, omitted to mention airships when he told his 
audience that, ‘To Imperial Airways had been entrusted the task of developing the great 
trunk lines linking the Mother Country with India, via Egypt, and then on to Australia 
and through Africa to the Cape.’ Possibly indicating a policy shift, later in his speech 
Thomson stated that the airship was ‘essentially the vehicle for passing over seas.’553 In 
this he was referring to the only advantage that the craft seemed still to retain. Airships 
were therefore now only of value for the Canada route, which required an Atlantic 
crossing, but rapid advance in aeroplane technology already suggested that the day was 
not far distant when airships would become redundant on that route too.  
In the summer of 1930, however, as the British anticipated the launch of the 
airships, and the R100 was prepared for a maiden flight to Canada, confidence ran high. 
Even though there was as yet no proof that the craft would prove a success, Burney’s 
proposal that Britain should build even larger airships won the support of the 
Government. As the R100 and R101 neared completion, it declared itself ready to invest 
far larger sums. Even before the R100 and R101 emerged, so confident were officials at 
Cardington that the Future Projects Office drew up proposals for a four-year 
development programme for the Indian and Canadian routes. This suggests that the 
Government expected Burney’s Howden-built R100 to prove successful, and therefore 
that the ‘Socialist’ and ‘Capitalist’ sides of the scheme would combine under one 
operation at Cardington, sponsored by the Government. In pursuing this development, 
the Government failed to take into account that Britain was not properly equipped to 
pursue a major new scheme, and, as Meyer points out, British airshipmen were less 
experienced than their German counterparts.554 Even so, it was anticipated that the 
enlarged development plans would be presented by Thomson to the Imperial 
Conference after his return from India, with the hope of garnering large-scale financial 
support from empire delegates. The plans involved the building of the R102, R103, and 
R104 as successors to the R100 and R101 – the R103 being a monster of 9.5 million 
cubic feet capacity. Additional mooring masts would be required, including ones at 
Malta and Baghdad for refuelling breaks on the India route, as well as new shed 
accommodation. A four year schedule was worked out; it was projected that the R103 
would operate services to Australia, with stops at Egypt, Karachi, Rangoon, and 
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Singapore, as well as ‘non-stop to Montreal in all weathers.’555 Early in September 1930 
the Air Ministry submitted this plan, costed at £2,750,000, for Treasury approval. The 
success of the R100’s trip to Montreal that summer encouraged the Treasury, and it 
agreed to support the scheme with the proviso of a successful India flight by the R101 
and endorsement by the Imperial Conference.556 However, the disaster of the R101 in 
October ensured that these conditions were never met.  
The R100’s Canada journey, the engineer Nevil Shute (who was on board) wrote 
later, was ‘dictated by political motives alone.’557 By this he implied that it was hurried 
on by Britain’s desire to outdo German airship developments. In its eagerness, the 
Government omitted to adhere to the scientific principles and safety measures which it 
had for years assured the public were rigorously applied to the airship programme. Both 
Hoare and Thomson had, in their turn, spoken on the subject. For example, in 1926 
Hoare had told the Imperial Conference that the dangers inherent in the craft could be 
surmounted by science. He alleged that Britain was making ‘the fullest possible use of 
scientific theory, of full-scale and model experiment, of the testing of materials, 
and…of the study of meteorology.’558 The British failed to recognise that with the 
existing state of technology and materials, the airships of the interwar years were 
unsuitable for commercial purposes. Thomson also attempted to boost public 
confidence by evoking the power of ‘science.’ In June 1930 he informed the House of 
Commons that the Imperial Airship Scheme was ‘one of the most scientific experiments 
man had ever attempted.’559  
In reality, the Scheme failed to follow even basic scientific principles. For 
example, both within and between each construction project there were a large number 
of variables; two craft were built at once under quite different conditions, with each 
being expected to test many new features. Further, as Flight stated in August 1930, ‘In 
no experiment does one desire to make the hardest test first. The ideal is for tests to be 
progressive in difficulty.’560 Thomson’s emphasis on experimental aspects seemed at 
odds with his pronouncements on safety. The Air Minister, The Times reported, insisted 
that there would be ‘no risk while he was in charge. No lives would be sacrificed though 
lack of foresight and skill (Hear, hear)…only the worst of luck could interfere with the 
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experiments.’561 Yet the R100, and later the R101, were required to carry out crucial 
trials on their respective first long-distance flights, to Canada and India. Shute wrote 
that while ‘To the politician it appeared to be a perfectly reasonable proposal,’562 the 
R100’s Canada trip was only the airship’s eighth flight, which from a technical 
viewpoint made a transatlantic attempt ‘not very prudent.’ Given the difficulties the 
R100 experienced, this appeared to be an understatement. For example, heading into a 
storm in the Atlantic, the Captain sent the craft into a steep dive ‘apparently plunging 
straight into the ground, in thick cloud and rain, with the altimeter going madly the 
wrong way, completely out of control.’563 On the return journey an inexperienced crew 
member put in charge of the elevator control wheel almost crashed the R100 into the sea 
off Ireland. Despite these problems, the press adopted a triumphant tone. The Canadian 
flight, declared a Times editorial, was ‘the best possible omen for the future,’ and had 
done much to justify the ‘enthusiastic belief’ of engineers and scientists.564 In reality, the 
R100’s voyage had indicated clearly that the British were not yet ready to chance 
another ambitious airship voyage, yet any such suggestions were ‘brushed aside,’565 and 
a few weeks later the Government sent the R101 off on a pioneering trip to India after 
little testing. Demonstrating the triumph of ideology over reality, the R101’s journey 
was promoted as a high-profile event. Whereas the R100 had carried mainly airship 
workers, several prominent officials travelled as passengers on the R101, and their 
deaths made the airships’ downfall all the more damaging to Britain’s imperial 
reputation.  
 
Conclusion 
After Churchill’s departure as Secretary of State for Air early in 1921, imperial aviation 
policy remained in the doldrums until the advent of the Conservative Government in 
October 1922. During the intervening period, the India route faced continuing problems 
resulting from a lack of strong leadership and cohesion in the pursuit of policy, and 
reticence in addressing the airship quandary left over from Churchill’s Air Ministry. 
National financial retrenchment persisted and, still opposed to subsidisation, the 
Government held off giving strong backing to aviation policy. Churchill’s successor, 
Frederick Guest, failed either to act as an advocate for civil aviation or to grasp the 
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criteria for progress. Any impetus in the Department of Civil Aviation was quenched by 
the apathy, or even hostility, of officials in other departments who had power over it. 
With the arrival of the Conservative Government in October 1922, British dithering 
came to an end. The Air Ministry, now headed by the respected and well-connected 
Samuel Hoare, grew in influence, gaining support from the Cabinet and, to some extent, 
the Treasury. Hoare embraced civil aviation avidly, taking pains to familiarise himself 
with all its aspects and to promote air travel by personal example. His efforts also raised 
the profile of the position of Secretary of State for Air, and under his leadership aviation 
threw off both its gimmicky pre-war image and its wartime reputation as an item of 
weaponry, to emerge as a credible mode of transportation.  
Although after 1922 imperial aviation development owed much to the 
commitment of the Conservatives, it was personal effort rather than political conviction 
that enabled progress. In the world of aviation, still small at this time, for good or ill 
individuals played a key role, and personal inclination, belief, and ability had a 
considerable impact on national aviation policy. In his promotion of civil flying Hoare 
was aided by the energetic Sefton Brancker, Director of Civil Aviation from 1922 to 
1930, whose presence aided continuity of policy across party lines and political 
administrations. Others, such as Eric Geddes and Dennis Burney, helped to drive policy 
forward. After Britain’s adoption of the recommendations of the Hambling Committee, 
international aviation became a matter of national, rather than party, policy. During the 
brief Labour Government of 1924, Lord Thomson to a great extent carried on where the 
Conservatives had left off, and the Government committed itself to aviation via 
financial support of the two great schemes, Imperial Airways and the Imperial Airship 
Scheme.  
The British, prompted by the tantalising vision of imperial communications held 
out by Germany’s airshipping achievements, were won over by the dedication and 
persuasive powers of Dennis Burney. Germany’s airship success in the later 1920s 
suggested that great technological advances were on the horizon, but in seeming to 
prove that it was indeed possible to build a good airship, German achievement taunted 
the British while at the same time encouraging in them an over-optimistic perception of 
the capabilities of their own craft.  As airship policy promised prestige while aeroplanes 
were seen as utilitarian and commonplace, the British pursued airships while leaving 
advances in aeroplane technology to other nations. Britain’s airship programme not only 
swallowed funds that would have been better spent on aeroplane development, but also 
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held back the building of aircraft suitable for long-distance services. While the R100 
and R101 remained under construction they could deviate little from original designs, 
but as aeroplanes could pass rapidly through generations of technological evolution they 
were able to gain ascendancy. Rather than topping German airship achievements, 
Britain’s own project, by its failure to launch on schedule and by its appalling end, 
resulted only in embarrassment. The failure of the Imperial Airship Scheme brought 
British airship spending to an end and also clarified the future role of aeroplanes. By 
1930, aeroplanes had proved their worth and the only question that remained was how 
much backing they should receive, rather than whether they should be backed.  
In the drive of the mid-1920s for the support or revival of the empire spirit, 
aviation was a useful tool. Cross-Channel aeroplane routes formed the necessary first 
stages of international and imperial routes yet despite this, the Government allowed cut-
throat competition to all but strangle the handful of small companies that operated them. 
Forced to accept that civil aviation needed support, the Government instigated a system 
whereby each company operated its own route, and the joint administrative systems that 
were developed heralded the amalgamation of the small companies into Imperial 
Airways in 1924. However, continuing opposition to subsidisation meant that the new 
company was underfunded. Attitudes would relax with time, and by 1931, the 
atmosphere had changed so much that Eric Geddes, Chairman of Imperial Airways, 
could blithely explain that ‘Subsidies are paid to accelerate progress, to bring to pass in 
10 years or so what might otherwise take 100 years or more to develop. Subsidies are a 
medium through which we can buy the future.’566 Meanwhile, the company was under-
resourced and entered the aviation fray in Europe too late to make an impression on 
established markets. The British soon decided that their limited funds would be better 
spent in pursuing empire routes in less-contested areas that were under their own 
control. While in 1924 it had been expected that airships would develop long-haul 
routes, in removing Imperial Airways from the dynamic European environment, the 
British were tacitly acknowledging a change of policy, by which empire routes would 
instead be developed by aeroplanes.  
In addition, when Imperial Airways abandoned the struggle in Europe to 
concentrate on empire routes, the British, to a great extent, relinquished efforts to pursue 
technological advance. As Britain ruled its imperial skies largely unchallenged, local 
inhabitants were not exposed to the systems of rival powers, and hence British 
                                            
566 ‘The Business of Air Transport,’ Flight, 13 February 1931, p. 129. 
116 
deficiencies could pass largely unnoticed. The British seemed satisfied with the 
knowledge that they were spending their resources on infrastructure of which they 
would have sole use, but in switching their focus to the empire they removed 
themselves from a competitive environment. With little incentive to pursue 
technological advance, the British had provided themselves with an excuse for their 
failure to compete in international aviation. Although it seemed that in the Persian Gulf 
environs of their Indian empire, the British would have few problems pursuing their 
aviation policy, the following chapters will demonstrate that optimism was misplaced. 
Instead, the effects of Britain’s long-term policy would cause political and other 
difficulties that would further hamper the progress of the India route.  
 
Chapter Four: ‘His Majesty’s Government have No Levers’: the Air 
Route through Persia, 1924-1932 
 
The British recognized that, ‘under present conditions the only practicable alignment for 
the air route to the East and Australia is via Egypt, Iraq, the Persian Gulf and India,’567 
and in 1924 began to plan the Cairo to Karachi sector of the India route (Map 1). From 
Cairo eastwards to Basra was a distance of 1,000 miles. On the onward route - 1,500 
miles running south-east from Basra to Karachi - 500 miles ran the length of the Persian 
Gulf. Traditionally, the Gulf had been valued little by Britain, with policy-makers 
viewing the waterway as a ‘waste place’ and, even as late as 1928, a ‘cul-de-sac leading 
nowhere beyond itself.’568 Britain’s desire to establish an air route brought new attention 
to the Gulf region and, as Winston Churchill had remarked in the House of Commons in 
1919, such a route would have ‘the effect of buckling the Empire together in a very 
remarkable manner.’569 Britain required a route which was suitable not only 
topographically but also politically. Persia presented the best option in the former 
regard, and at first sight seemed to present no political drawbacks that could not be 
easily overcome. However, in the eight years from 1924 to 1932, the political scene in 
Persia changed to the extent that it would prevent the British from establishing a 
permanent passenger service via Persia. While Imperial Airways did open temporary 
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services along Persia’s Gulf coast in 1929, the company would be ejected in 1932.  
This chapter examines Anglo-Persian relations in relation to the development of 
the air route. Firstly, it provides an account of Britain’s efforts to start a civil air service 
via Persia. In doing so it considers some practical and political problems experienced by 
Britain as it attempted to drive its policy forward. These difficulties resulted both from a 
lack of ‘levers,’ and from obstructive tactics used by Persian elites. Secondly, the 
chapter investigates some key causes of Britain’s failings in the influencing of Persian 
policy prior to the establishment of provisional air services in 1929, and attempts to 
account for the weakness of British influence in Tehran. Thirdly, the chapter discusses 
the period from 1929 to 1932 and the progress of air route negotiations as they were 
subject to the diplomatic relationship of Persian and British elites in the shadowy and 
shifting political environment in Tehran. Ali Ansari’s assumption about Persian 
diplomacy and the ‘weapons of the weak’ is examined via the example of the air 
route.570 Finally, some key geopolitical factors relating to Germany and the Soviet 
Union, both within and outside Persia, are considered. Persia’s position, in that it was 
caught between two ideologically-opposed powers, introduced elements that worked 
against Britain’s aviation progress. Germany was also implicated, for Persia looked to 
the German Junkers company to create and operate its domestic aviation network. 
 
The air route struggle to 1927 
Peter Cain has suggested that Britain enjoyed ‘a greater influence on world events and 
higher prestige after the [First World] war than she had before it.’571 In the interwar 
years Britain remained, relatively, a world economic and political power. It had a major 
role to play in the Middle East in general, and British influence in Persia should not be 
underestimated. A major British focus for eight years from 1924 was the desire to 
establish a permanent sector of the civil Indian air route between Iraq and Karachi via 
Persia. Yet a number of factors combined to bring about a stressed relationship between 
Britain and Persia. To a large extent Britain had brought Persian resistance on itself, for 
negotiations were complicated by old perceptions relating to Britain’s long-term power 
in the Gulf region and its past dealings with Persia in the Qajar era (1794–1921). From 
the mid-1920s the aspiration of Persia after the accession of Reza Shah (Fig. 4.3), a new 
style of ruler, conflicted with British air aims in a tense and changing political 
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environment. Britain’s efforts to implement its aviation policy would prove drawn-out 
and tedious, and would both reveal a change in Anglo-Persian relations and facilitate 
further change.  
Britain’s lack of leverage in the interwar years was particularly galling in view 
of its high levels of influence in Persia as far back as the early seventeenth century. In 
1616 the East India Company began commercial activity in the region, establishing a 
trading agency at Jask on the Persian shore just outside the entrance to the Gulf. 
Subsequently, further agencies were opened inland and at Basra, an important Ottoman 
port at the top of the Gulf, and by mid-century British trading ships were travelling the 
length of the waterway.572 Britain’s first military involvement came in 1622 when the 
Company assisted the Persians (never noted seafarers) against the Portuguese, who were 
obstructing both British and Persian trade. The capture from the Portuguese of Hormuz, 
an island strategically positioned at the Gulf’s entrance, greatly strengthened Britain’s 
position via the resulting Persian grant of a share of customs revenues. During the 
nineteenth century and up to the First World War, British influence in the region grew, 
although this was a slow process. Persia also took on a strategic dimension as a ‘buffer’ 
in the defence of India, while the security of the Gulf waters was necessary to the 
protection of sea routes to India and the East.573  
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Map 2. Modern map of the Middle East. The Persian Gulf route, firstly via Persia (Iran) 
and the Trucial Coast (United Arab Emirates) linked Europe and Britain’s air terminus 
at Karachi British India (now in Pakistan).  
 
The development of Gulf coastal trade, advances in communication after the 
laying of submarine cables, and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, suggest that 
much could have been expected, yet Britain’s commercial aspirations in the Persian 
region proved ‘disappointing.’574 The British were frustrated by a raft of problems, 
which included Persian lassitude, feudalism, failure to reform, unstable government, 
weak infrastructure, and, by the late nineteenth century, fear of Russian expansionism. 
Thus Persia could not be regarded by the City of London as an attractive proposition for 
investment and, Cain and Hopkins argue, British policy ‘wavered’ between support of a 
strong Persian state and a ‘cheap option,’ which was ‘leaving the country to its own 
devices in the hope that its neutrality could be preserved by agile diplomacy.’575 In its 
efforts to shape the affairs of Qajar Persia, Britain possessed a number of advantages. 
Firstly, Mehran Kamrava explains, the ‘avarice’ of the Shahs ensured that they 
borrowed from the British ‘mindlessly…to finance their European journeys and palace 
escapades.’576 The British were eager to provide loans because, as the Minister to Tehran 
wrote of Persia in 1903, ‘The more we get her into our debt, the greater will be our hold 
and our political influence over her government.’577 Secondly, the British were aided by 
the ‘unsuspecting enthusiasm of a few reform-minded Qajar politicians who believed 
that the country’s progress could be expedited through increasing its economic and 
diplomatic ties with Europe.’578 As Cain and Hopkins conclude, such factors were of 
little avail and by the end of the nineteenth century it had become apparent that Persia 
‘offered neither rich pickings nor the conditions to support a sustained development 
drive.’579 After 1907 and the Anglo-Russian Convention, British policy in the region did 
become more proactive, especially in Britain’s Southern sphere of influence. After a 
large oil find in 1908 and the subsequent formation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
(APOC), Persian oil became vital to Britain and it might be fair to conclude that, in the 
oil producing area at least, British influence had by 1914 established a virtual 
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protectorate which was crucial to the defence of India.580  
During the First World War the oil factor and Persia’s importance as a key state 
in the environs of India meant that the country’s economic and strategic value increased. 
Intervention in Persia by Russia, Turkey, and Germany threatened British interests, and 
in drawing up the Anglo-Persian agreement of 1919 the Foreign Office, intending to 
protect India and Persian oil supplies from the Bolshevist threat, attempted to formalise 
Britain’s hold. Under the guidance of Lord Curzon, Foreign Secretary, Britain carried 
out secret unilateral negotiations with the Qajar Government that resulted in an 
agreement whereby Britain loaned Persia £2 million. This gave it a measure of control 
over Persian finances and military forces which, Nikkie Keddie suggests, constituted a 
‘virtual protectorate.’ In brokering this agreement, both Curzon and the Qajar 
Government discounted constitutional factors, notably that the agreement was 
dependent upon the approval of the Majlis - the Persian parliament. As Keddie argues, 
the British, despite being well aware that the opinion of the Majlis was against them, 
were determined to act as if approval was a ‘fait accompli.’ Forging ahead with their 
plans, and without Majlis ratification, they sent forces to Tehran where their officers 
were given charge over the Persian armed forces. This unilateral move only added to the 
list of British acts resented by Persians and, despite countermeasures, ‘nationalist and 
anti-British feeling grew, fed by religious, socialist, and regional forces.’581  
Britain also gave covert support to Reza Khan, the leader of the Persian Cossack 
Brigade, but although at first it appeared that the British had gained a collaborator, 
instead their move marked the beginning of a deterioration of relations that would 
eventually prove fatal to Britain’s air aims in Persia. In February 1921 Reza Khan 
marched his troops into Tehran where he staged an effective coup d’etat. Two years 
later he took formal power after the exile of the last Qajar ruler. Britain’s contemporary 
official line on its complicity in the rise of Reza Khan was denial, but there have since 
been a wide range of opinions expressed on the matter. Clawson and Rubin, for 
example, dismiss the idea of British involvement as a ‘conspiracy theory,’ arguing that 
‘evidence is scant that British diplomats or advisors played much if any role,’582 while 
Michael Axworthy concludes that there is ‘no direct evidence of a plot as such.’583 Other 
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writers disagree. These include Ali Ansari, who suggests that British complicity was 
admitted later by British sources. He cites a British Embassy report of 1932, and the 
memoirs of Anthony Eden.584 In addition, primary source material presented by Cyrus 
Ghani and Mohammad Majd585 also suggests that among contemporary Persians, 
Americans, and even Britons in Tehran, it was believed that the British Government 
was behind the 1921 coup. For example, five days after Reza Khan’s march into the city 
American Minister John Caldwell reported that ‘It is perfectly apparent that the whole 
movement is of British origin and support,’586 and later he gave the opinion that 
‘practically all of the principal figures in the movement were men who had been 
intimately connected with the British.’587 Rabbi Joseph Kornfeld, American Minister to 
Tehran in 1923, wrote later that the British believed they could ‘accomplish their own 
ends far more easily’ through Reza Khan than via the constitutional government.588 
Majd also suggests that General H.R.P. Dickson, serving in Persia at the time, had been 
‘kept in the dark’ but ‘became so outraged by the coup that he began openly criticizing 
British policy.’589 Dickson may have paid for his outspokenness with demotion to 
Lieutenant-Colonel, but his maverick tendencies would serve the British well a decade 
later, for in 1932 he would play a crucial role in the settling of the air route on the 
Trucial Coast, as will be discussed in Chapter Five.  
Britain’s support of Reza Khan in the early 1920s failed to secure his subsequent 
loyalty. In 1925 the Majlis declared him Shah, but after he was crowned the following 
year it soon became clear that, having used the British as a stepping-stone to power, in 
his position of increased security the new ruler would not be their puppet. The advent of 
Reza Shah brought a shift in the balance of power between Persia and Britain. As his 
influence expanded in Persia, Britain’s attempts to establish air transport developed into 
a trial of strength with his regime. Therefore, at the very moment when the British 
required Persian co-operation in order to pursue their aviation ambitions, Persia was 
becoming increasingly opposed to the British. From the mid-1920s Britain faced rising 
Persian nationalist sentiment and resentment of foreign interference. The question of 
Reza Shah’s standing with the British in the interwar years, and the relationship of the 
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two countries under his regime, have been the subject of debate. Interestingly, in the 
1980s a number of writers with a viewpoint oriented in Persia agreed that British 
supremacy prevailed in Persia in the interwar years. For example, Miron Rezun argues 
that even in an environment of heightened nationalism, Reza Shah remained ‘far too 
weak to act alone against the British government or oppose any of its interests,’590 and 
indeed could easily have been toppled by them.591 Majd concurs, asserting that, via their 
indirect influence over the Shah, the British continued to control Persia completely.592 
More recent analysis, however, appears to demonstrate that Britain’s power was on the 
wane, and this is important in the context of Britain’s air route policy in Persia. 
Stephanie Cronin has suggested a fluctuation in relative positions, arguing that Reza 
Khan’s coup of 1921 marked a ‘watershed in British power,’ and that after it his 
increasing strength and resistance to British influence diminished Britain’s ability to 
intervene directly in Persian affairs.593 In this scenario, a culture of national confidence 
emerged, in which the Shah employed variants of traditional Qajar methods of internal 
politics – described by Tim McDaniel as ‘subtle strategies of divide and rule and other 
forms of manipulation’594 - albeit applied with greater resolution and to greater effect 
than in the past.  
The resulting situation, in which policy-making systems were not ‘fixed and 
coherent,’ and in which policy was made on the basis not of ‘shared rules and 
understandings but on the changeable and often shadowy will of the ruler,’595 caused 
difficulties for British officials in carrying out air negotiations. However, British efforts 
to find an alternative to a Persian route failed. This meant that Britain had a pressing 
need to come to terms with the Tehran elites. The British had specific topographical and 
technological requirements for the Persian route, which was also required to serve both 
civil and military aviation. They examined alternative options for reaching Karachi from 
Cairo, and therefore a Red Sea route was re-examined periodically until late 1932, 
although it never held the attention of policy-makers for long. A trunk route through the 
Gulf region remained the paramount option throughout the 1920s as it was considered 
more vital to Britain’s imperial interests. Within the Gulf, as shown on Map 5, there 
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were two possible routes - along the Persian shore to the north, or along the Arabian 
shore on the Gulf’s southern side. The former was generally regarded more favourably, 
mainly because it offered the most direct route to India at a time when distance was a 
crucial factor. Further, the Persian coast was cooler than the Arabian one, and lacked the 
wild ‘tribesmen’ who might menace aviation operations. Flight via Persia also did not 
require the risky sea crossing or passage over the Hajar Mountains which were features 
of the Arabian route. Due to the technical limitations of aircraft such topographical 
factors represented a considerable obstacle, although they became less of a 
consideration as the 1920s progressed. The relative flatness and straightness of the 
Persian shore made it the more attractive option. These characteristics not only 
facilitated the construction and provisioning of aerodromes, but also helped in the 
refuelling and maintenance of aircraft. The need to avoid night flying, and consideration 
of passenger sleeping and mealtime requirements, meant that landing grounds were 
necessary at intervals of about every 200 miles, with emergency sites perhaps every 30 
or 40 miles in between.  
While air services along the Persian shore suited British purposes, they were of 
less value to Persia. In 1931 the Foreign Office would concede that ‘Persia’s objections 
to the sea coast route have more substance than her objections usually have. It is 
economically and administratively useless to her; it is a bit of a nuisance; politically, 
even, somewhat dangerous.’596 Yet in the past Britain had not let any such objections 
obstruct its policy, and did not intend to do so now. Its approach therefore followed the 
established pattern of displaying little regard for Persia sensibilities. As early as 
December 1918 the RAF had pioneered an air route that followed the Persian coastline 
and continuing on to Delhi. At that time, Persia’s Qajar ruling family had been in the 
last years of their rule, and lacked the ability to resist the British. In any case, as a 
Government report stated later, because the Persians also had ‘little control of their 
coast line…the question of obtaining permission…did not arise.’597 Unchecked, 
therefore, the RAF had proceeded to prepare landing grounds and install 
wireless/telegraph facilities. These provided the infrastructure that after the War would 
enable British military aircraft, and British and foreign civilian planes - the latter mainly 
small private craft - to traverse the route on an intermittent basis.  
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Fig. 4.1. Sefton Brancker, March 1921.598 
 
In this way the British had seized the 
initiative, and now anticipated that the 
advantage they had thus gained would help 
drive their policy through. The pursuit of an 
assertive policy had also given them a 
feeling of entitlement, and when the question 
of further developing the route arose in the 
early 1920s there seemed no reason why the 
existing arrangements should not continue. 
Indeed, so confident were the British that 
their early initiative had secured them 
permanent usage of the Persian shore sector, that they paid little more attention to the 
matter until 1924. But Britain’s cavalier attitude had resulted in over-confidence in its 
ability to force through its will on the Persians, and by the time the British came to seek 
air privileges, Persian opinion had hardened against them. That their policy had had a 
negative effect was later acknowledged, for in 1929 F.W. Johnston, Political Resident in 
the Persian Gulf, commented that many of Britain’s difficulties in Persia ‘would have 
been obviated had we taken earlier stock of our position and regularized and 
consolidated it when that position enabled us to do so.’599 As soon as he came into office 
as Secretary of State for Air in 1924, Hoare began to look East. He recognised that the 
problems relating to Persian over-flight permission might become the most serious 
obstacle on the whole India route, and that hence the Persian air sector required careful 
handling. Hoare had both the will and the energy to pursue the matter, observing that a 
rapid breakthrough was crucial in view of Persia’s deal with the German company 
Junkers: ‘Unless a British company got into Persia very shortly, the Germans would 
have a complete monopoly.’600 Hoare took action, announcing in June 1925 that 
Imperial Airways had been given Government approval to operate a weekly service 
between Egypt and India. The Times pitched in, boasting that this was ‘the largest effort 
that has as yet been made in aeroplane development. It is the first opportunity that 
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British air transport has ever had of establishing a remunerative line over an area where 
the existing means of ground transport are not highly developed.’601  
Despite such expressions of optimism, Persian agreement had still not been 
secured. In August 1925 Sefton Brancker, Director of Civil Aviation (Fig. 4.1), departed 
for Tehran for air negotiations. There, with Sir Percy Loraine, British Envoy 
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Persia (Fig. 4.2), he met Reza Khan, at 
that time still Prime Minister. The relationship between Loraine and Reza Khan was 
friendly, and this aided Anglo-Persian diplomacy. Loraine submitted optimistic reports, 
in September 1925 writing to the Foreign Office that ‘the reputation and prestige of 
Great Britain in Persia are steadily increasing.’ The Persian Government’s attitude was 
becoming ‘frank and friendly,’ and the improved feeling was felt throughout all sectors 
of the community.602 Brancker’s character also contributed to the success of his mission. 
With his boyish humour and ready wit, he had ‘the gift of making friends wherever he 
goes,’ and his seniority of rank impressed those he dealt with.603 Although privately 
Hoare thought Brancker enthusiastic but ‘deficient in judgement and application,’604 
others found him energetic, humorous, and endowed with the ability to communicate 
effectively with people at all levels of society. This made him a talented ‘propagandist 
and high-level salesman of air travel.’605 The positive atmosphere allowed an agreement 
to be reached in less than a week. Under its terms, Persia granted Imperial Airways 
permission to establish air services, while Britain agreed to provide the necessary 
ground facilities. It now seemed, as Norman Macmillan comments, that Brancker’s 
‘vision of the air line to India was nearing fruition.’606 The agreement was subject to 
ratification by the Majlis but that seemed only a formality, and the British again went 
ahead with their plans before it was granted. Imperial Airways worked towards starting 
a service in January 1927 and meanwhile, as none of its small stock of ageing craft was 
suitable for the Egypt to Karachi sector, ordered five long-range De Havilland Hercules, 
each with accommodation for seven passengers and freight, and equipped with three 
engines as a safety measure.607 Although it would not become apparent for over a year, 
making the order would prove a rash step. 
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In March 1926, at a dinner held in London to celebrate the delivery of the De 
Havilland aeroplanes, emphasis was placed on the imperial role of the new craft. 
Imperial Airways Chairman Eric Geddes predicted that the Cairo to Karachi route 
would open within twelve months as ‘the first link in the Empire air chain.’ It would, he 
anticipated, swiftly become a weekly service and extend to Australia. Meanwhile 
Samuel Hoare told the audience of his vision of an Empire air route that ‘would carry 
between the Dominions and ourselves a message of business solidarity, of political 
unity, and of family affection’608 The mood at the Imperial Conference in London in 
October 1926 was positive. The idea of a great empire air route to Australia was 
enthusiastically discussed and The Times announced that services on the Cairo to 
Karachi sector would open in December.609 Conference delegates visited Croydon 
aerodrome to view one of the Hercules planes and confidence was boosted further when 
the celebrity pilot, Alan Cobham, made a carefully-staged return from a 28,000 mile 
flight to Australia to be knighted immediately amidst immense publicity.610  
 
Fig. 4.2. Sir Percy Loraine, about 1933.611 
 
The euphoria culminated on 26 December 
when a high-level official party - its most 
prominent members being Samuel Hoare, his 
wife Lady Maud, and Sir Geoffrey Salmond, Air 
Officer Commanding, India – met at Croydon for 
their departure on an arduous week-long journey 
via Basra and Karachi to Delhi by air. The flight 
marked the ‘official inauguration’612 of the Cairo 
to Karachi service, and was the first British 
service outside Europe. That this represented a momentous event in the grand vision of 
a united empire was conveyed by Flight: ‘we hail the flight to India as likely to prove 
one of the most important milestones in the history of British Empire Commercial 
Aviation.’ It was a journey of ‘firsts’ - the first flight made by a commercial aircraft 
between England and India, 
the first time that a Cabinet Minister had arrived by air in India, that a lady had 
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made such a long flight, that a lady had arrived in India by air, that an Officer 
Commanding Air Forces had arrived by air to take charge of his command...It 
was equally the first time that a letter from His Majesty the King was delivered 
by air to the Viceroy of India.613  
 
Hoare’s party reached Baghdad on 2 January 1927, and from there the forward 
route was planned to include three stops on Persian territory – at Bushire, Lingeh, and 
Jask. Although nearly 18 months had passed since the August 1925 Loraine/Brancker 
agreement in Tehran, ratification by the Majlis had still not been granted. Yet Hoare 
acted as if it were a fait accompli. By discounting the ratification requirement he was 
prepared to take the risk of ignoring the sovereign rights of the Persian Government to 
sanction Imperial Airways to begin operations. In this, Hoare underestimated the 
strength of feeling in Tehran, and his risk-taking resulted in humiliation. Britain’s use of 
its traditional and well-tried high-handed tactics indicated a failure to recognise that the 
diplomatic balance of power was shifting away from British policy-makers in a 
changing political game. When it became apparent that Persia had not granted 
permission, Hoare flew defiantly on to Karachi while Sefton Brancker, who had joined 
the official party in Baghdad, immediately departed on a gruelling road trip to Tehran to 
try to restart negotiations. By now Percy Loraine had left Persia, but in the light of 
subsequent events it seems unlikely that even his influence would have achieved the 
desired effect. Although initially it appeared that Brancker’s negotiations would lead to 
another successful outcome, it soon became clear that Persian assurances were again 
empty and that Hoare’s ‘inaugural’ flight had not heralded the start of a regular air 
service. 
Whether the British had been aware before Hoare left Croydon in December 
1926 that they faced a hostile reception in Persia is open to debate, but in any case 
Hoare was clearly prepared to discount Persian opposition. The moment at which the 
British realised that Persia disapproved of Hoare’s flight remains unclear. According to 
Robin Higham, the British were unaware that ‘trouble was brewing until Hoare’s party 
reached Bagdad.’614 Other evidence, however, suggests that the British had known even 
before Hoare embarked. Firstly, a later Air Ministry report stated that in December 
1926, the Persian Government had given ‘orders that work on the ground organisation 
of the route must cease and that the service could not be permitted.’615 Secondly, in his 
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1957 autobiography, Hoare wrote that the Persians had made clear their disapproval 
before his departure from England, and had been ‘particularly unco-operative’ over the 
flight arrangements. In fact, Hoare reflected that they ‘persisted to the end with a blank 
refusal’ of permission to overfly Persian territory, and if the British ‘had not ignored the 
Persian embargo, and landed and left without any official permission, we could never 
have made the flight.’616  
Outwardly, the British brushed aside Persian problems. The difficulties were not 
made public, and at Cabinet level they were suppressed. It was not until 1932 that Flight 
would admit that the episode had left Britain ‘high and dry, and looking considerably 
foolish.’617 Indeed, in January 1927 The Times boasted that the grand imperial design 
had been accomplished: ‘From now onwards the process of covering the face of the 
Empire with a network of British trunk air lines, with India as one of the most important 
junctions of the whole system, can suffer no check.’618 Behind the bravado, however, 
the deterioration in the Anglo-Persian relationship was painfully obvious. In March 
1927 a Foreign Office official wrote to Sir Robert Clive, who in 1926 had succeeded 
Percy Loraine as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Persia, that the 
‘position is almost intolerable and the procrastinating attitude of Persian Government 
who shelter themselves behind Majlis is intolerable.’619 The following month Clive, 
exasperated, replied that ‘I most sincerely hope that Imperial Airways may find it 
possible to leave this fickle and unreliable country entirely outside their calculations and 
establish a line along the Southern coast of the Gulf,’620 on the Arabian shore. The 
Persians had now displayed the taunting and defiant behaviour with which the British 
would become all too familiar in the years that followed. Yet Persia’s new-found 
confidence and independence provided an opportunity for it to re-balance Anglo-Persian 
diplomatic relations, while assuming that it could achieve a greater say in negotiations. 
After Hoare’s flight, Persia increasingly exploited its advantage, employing obstructive 
tactics that included carefully-calculated prevarication, dissimulation, equivocation, 
silences, and the repeated return to an unworkable idea of a route through central Persia 
(to be discussed later), to dog negotiations with the British.  
Upon his return from India in February 1927, Hoare faced the difficult task of 
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explaining and justifying the ‘inaugural’ flight to the Cabinet. Trying to make the best 
of it, in a confidential report he explained his policy in terms of the flight’s ‘propaganda 
effect,’ and, tellingly, suggested that aviation ‘gave Indians, Egyptians and Iraqis to 
think that British influence was not contracting.’ He also stressed the ‘really remarkable 
enthusiasm…among British citizens at every point where we landed.’ Hoare’s arrival 
provided ‘an outward and visible sign of the vigour of British enterprise,’ and he even 
saw himself as an imperial deux-ex-machina: ‘Here was a British minister descending 
from the clouds’ in a British machine with British engines. It was, Hoare reported to the 
Cabinet, ‘a conspicuous example of the mobility upon which our Empire depends for its 
defence and its communications. Here was a new instrument, that, by eliminating time 
and distance, might be of incalculable value to the future of Imperial intercourse.’621 
Despite Hoare’s attempts to save face, he seems to have feared that the India 
route might collapse altogether. Making a tacit acknowledgement that Persian 
negotiations had stalled, he stressed the strategic importance of a Gulf route and urged 
the Cabinet to persist in supporting the Air Ministry’s imperial aviation policy. He even 
argued that it was ‘urgently necessary’ to create an additional route, across the Gulf on 
the Arabian coast, as this would enable the Air Force to avoid Persian territory while en 
route to India.622 The dangers of reliance upon a route via Persia were also 
acknowledged in Tehran. In April, Clive, who as Minister to Persia had first-hand 
experience of Persian methods, wrote to the Foreign Secretary of the Government of 
India that even if a Persian route could be successfully established (which he doubted), 
it would be ‘at the mercy of Persian caprice and foreign intrigue.’ Its administration was 
‘likely to be vexatious and dilatory…while in the event of war our air line might be cut 
off entirely.’623 In July, Clive argued that Persia’s record of behaviour towards Britain 
since 1924 made the arguments against a Persian route ‘overwhelming.’624 
It was particularly galling that while Britain mulled the threats to its civil and 
strategic air policy that Persia presented, the earlier sectors of Britain’s India route were 
prospering. In August 1927 Flight reported that the number of passengers between 
Cairo and Basra had increased to the extent that fares had been lowered and the service 
made weekly rather than fortnightly.625 Making matters worse was implied pressure 
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from the success of foreign aviation projects in the region. For example, it was now 
possible, Flight reported in August 1927, to travel from London to Persia for £50 in five 
days via foreign services. Lufthansa, created in 1926 as the German flag-carrier, 
operated a route from London to Moscow, from where passengers could travel to Baku 
by Deruluft (a joint Soviet-German airline) and from there on to Tehran with Junkers.626 
From 1 May 1926, Deruluft pioneered a night flight service between Berlin and 
Moscow via Konigsberg (Kaliningrad). This provision was costly for Germany, 
however, for the airports and their perimeters needed to be lit. In addition, along the 
route, manned emergency landing strips were provided every 30 to 35 kilometres and 
equipped with large revolving floodlights; smaller lights were erected every four or five 
kilometres in between.627 British aviation could not match this in terms of either 
financial resources or technological night flying ability. 
 
Frustration and hope, 1927 to 1929 
After the failure of Hoare’s ‘inaugural flight,’ there followed a six-year period in which 
Britain’s hopes were alternately raised and dashed as it pursued its air policy in the 
Persian Gulf. During this time the political situation in Persia changed considerably in 
comparison to the war years, with nationalism creating opposition to a British presence. 
Britain’s inability to achieve its air aims revealed that a number of factors, including the 
rise of Reza Shah and the advent of the Soviet state to the north, had by the mid-1920s 
had the effect of reducing British influence. The rise of Reza Shah and his vigorous new 
regime in Tehran gave the Persians a new object of respect and fear, and this weakened 
the effects of Britain’s long-term influence. As the decade progressed, it became 
increasingly clear that British power had declined, even though the reasons remained 
elusive. Even so, Britain’s reputation in Persia lingered on throughout the period of the 
air route negotiations, causing the Persians both to fear and revere the British. As John 
Ferris points out, ‘The prestige of a state is not merely a reflection of its power, but an 
element of it, and derives from many sources, from observation but also from the 
imagination.’628 Persians’ long experience of British exploitation tended to demoralise 
them and make them feel, Sattareh Farman Farmaian records, ‘like nobodies in our own 
country – a small, weak people, eternally pushed around by outside interests that only 
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cared about oil money and power over the Middle East.’ An important factor, as Farman 
Farmaian explains, was that many Persians, particularly among the educated classes, 
had traditionally been keen ‘Anglophiles.’629 As an MP commented in the House of 
Commons in 1922, years previously, in Persia ‘Englishmen stood the highest among all 
nations in Persian opinion, and the respect, and almost reverence, in which the English 
were held, was something of which we might be proud.’630 In a country in which 
fatalism influenced many areas of life, the Persians had ‘a wildly exaggerated belief in 
British cleverness and ingenuity.’631 For example, Farman Farmaian, the daughter of a 
Qajar aristocrat, records that Persians found the British ‘almost supernaturally clever.’ 
Persians 
didn’t exactly hate the British – or rather, we hated and admired them at the 
same time. Actually my father liked them. Unlike the Russians, who were just 
simple brigands and plunderers, the British were very smart. They had made a 
great nation of their little European island, and he had enormous admiration for 
their ability as world leaders, as well as immense respect for their deviousness, 
which was universally acknowledged to be unlimited, surpassing even that of 
Iranians.632  
 
Perceptions of British superiority, even if it was imagined, paralysed Persians to the 
extent that they dared not act overtly against British interests, and thus they endowed 
the British with the power attributed to them.  
British power therefore has a fluid and intangible quality, and it remains difficult 
to determine the extent to which it was illusory on either side. Certainly, the level of 
formality of British influence was difficult to ascertain. The debate on formal and 
informal empire, Cain and Hopkins suggest, ‘has been invaluable in underlining the 
importance of considering shades of influence, degrees of effective control and 
measures of diminished sovereignty.’ These writers discuss Robinson and Gallagher’s 
distinction between ‘the formal empire of legal control and the “informal” empire of 
influence.’633 John Darwin defines imperialism as ‘the sustained effort to assimilate a 
country or region to the political, economic or cultural system of another power. 
“Formal” imperialism aimed to achieve this object by the explicit transfer of 
sovereignty and, usually, the imposition of direct administrative control.’ Informal 
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imperialism, on the other hand, ‘relied upon the links created by trade, investment or 
diplomacy, often supplemented by unequal treaties and periodic armed intervention, to 
draw new regions into the world-system of an imperial power.’ Victorian Britain 
developed the most ‘varied and far-reaching imperial relationships’634 of any power, 
taking a pragmatic approach whereby flexibility of policy allowed regions to be treated 
differently, according to local circumstances.  
Perhaps this flexibility now became a liability, for Cain and Hopkins’ 
examination of Britain’s economic policy during the Qajar era suggests that the British 
had vacillated over the extent to which they embraced, or desired to embrace, Persia in 
their informal empire.635 Persia had remained under Britain’s informal control. In the 
interwar years, Britain continued to employ modes of informal rule by which, 
Alexander Motyl argues, the core influenced the affairs of the periphery by control of 
elites, determination of external policy, and influence upon internal policy.636 By the 
later 1920s, owing to Reza Shah’s efforts to extricate Persia from British influence, this 
policy had become problematic. In the peculiarly fluid and unclear diplomatic and 
political situation in Tehran, the effectiveness of Britain’s attempts to exert informal 
control, as defined by Motyl, was difficult to determine. Persia also remains a test case 
for Robinson and Gallagher’s ideas on informal empire, in the sense that it remained 
under London’s economic and diplomatic dominion, and to a lesser extent under its 
cultural influence.637  
Cain and Hopkins suggest that ‘The relations established by imperialism 
are…based upon inequality and not upon mutual compromises of the kind which 
characterize states of interdependence.’638 While the traditional association between 
Britain and Persia had indeed been founded upon inequality, the tussle of these 
countries over the air route demonstrated that in the 1920s Persia developed both the 
desire and the ability to move towards a more equal negotiating position. Not only did 
Reza Shah and his ministers wish to demonstrate Persia’s independence but were also 
increasingly able to do so, and thus political power became a slippery and 
unquantifiable commodity in Tehran. Persia’s new confidence was fuelled by growing 
nationalism and aspiration for self-determination, which challenged and indeed 
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undermined Britain’s leverage on Persian policy, and hence the air route negotiations. 
Persia’s new assertiveness was largely derived from the Shah’s grand vision for his 
country, which involved the invocation of a revived national spirit. Persia’s pre-Islamic 
history was held up; the lion and sun symbols of the Achaemenid and Sassanid empires 
were reintroduced and Zoroastrianism placed alongside Shi’ite Islam as a state religion. 
In practical terms, the atmosphere of national reinvigoration ushered in a comprehensive 
scheme of reform involving many areas of public and private life, including industry, 
finance, military facilities, the judicial system, public health, religion, and dress codes. 
Priority was placed upon the creation of infrastructure. For example, extensive road-
building schemes were planned, and in 1927 the construction of the Trans-Persian 
Railway began. In addition, Persia collaborated with Germany to allow the aviation 
company Junkers to create a domestic air network (Map 4).  
 
Fig. 4.3. Reza Shah (undated).639  
 
As these developments gave Persians 
‘renewed national consciousness and pride,’ and their 
country became ‘a definable entity once more’ in the 
world,640 the question of Britain’s status in Persia 
became increasingly troublesome. In March 1928, in 
the House of Commons, the Air Ministry was forced 
on to the defensive. Hoare feigned bemusement when 
he informed the House that the obstruction of the air 
route must be due to ‘some misunderstanding’ on the 
part of the Persian Government. There seemed, he said, no rationale behind the Majlis 
reluctance to ratify British plans, for the air route could ‘do nothing but good’ in 
providing ‘a quick and expeditious means of transport in one of the most inaccessible 
parts of the country’ – the coastal region. Hoare’s ingenuousness did not go down well 
with Frederick Guest, former Secretary of State for Air. While acknowledging that the 
cause of Persia’s attitude may have been partly diplomatic, Guest attributed it mainly to 
‘parsimony:’ if the British had been prepared to pay for their ‘way leave or air leave,’ 
they would have achieved it. Paying the Persians for use of the route would have been 
controversial, and Hoare quickly reassured the House that ‘there was no question of 
money in the case at all,’ but the debate nevertheless raised serious questions about the 
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ability of the Government to effect a solution.641 Hoare had not only discounted Persian 
political opinion, but had thought he could get the route on the cheap. In reality, 
officials were by this time despairing. In May 1928, an India Office memorandum 
observed that Persia had succeeded in ‘completely destroying in a few months the 
favoured position on Persian soil enjoyed for centuries’ by Britain. The situation, the 
memorandum concluded, ‘augurs ill for our prospects in the Gulf.’642 The true state of 
affairs could no longer be disguised. In the same month, Philip Sassoon, Under-
Secretary of State for Air, acknowledged in the House that negotiations were at a 
‘deadlock.’643  
 
Fig. 4.4. A cartoon showing Samuel 
Hoare, 1929. The cartoonist reflects 
Hoare’s role as Secretary of State for 
Air both in the representation of an 
aeroplane and in the blue shadow. The 
latter suggests not only Imperial 
Airways’ ‘Speedbird’ logo, but also the 
grainy blue print of an airmail label.644 
 
That British diplomatic policy 
was in tatters was confirmed when, 
during this period, the Foreign Office 
was forced to relinquish sole 
responsibility for negotiations in 
Tehran following the sudden and 
seemingly inexplicable request of the 
Persian Government for direct negotiations with Imperial Airways. This was a clear 
indication that Britain did not ‘call the shots’ in Persia, for the move side-stepped 
British diplomats and allowed Persian officials to deal directly with a commercial 
company. The reasons for the Persian demand are unclear. It may have been because 
Persia had realised that the British were irate, but recognised that a point-blank refusal 
to cooperate would alienate them and hence reduce Persian bargaining power. In this 
case, a more effective policy was to keep the British in the negotiations. Persia also now 
made the air route, with all its imperial and strategic implications, a bargaining counter 
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in wider negotiations, and stated that a resolution to the air question must be ‘dependent 
on a general settlement of Persian Gulf questions.’645 By opening itself to Imperial 
Airways, Persia may also have hoped to push the British to compromise over wider 
questions, such as the ownership of disputed islands in the Gulf. Imperial Airways, as a 
commercial company, albeit one charged with the task of furthering Government policy, 
could have at best only limited influence on such matters. Persian proposals placed 
senior Imperial Airways staff in the position of diplomats and required of them 
expertise and executive powers that they did not possess. The situation also presented 
the British Government with the potential prospect of finding itself committed to 
policies in the making of which it had had no part.  
However, the British did not feel they could afford to reject any sign of 
concession from the Persians, and so in June 1928 George Woods Humphery, Imperial 
Airways’ General Manager, travelled to Tehran. Although he stayed for seven weeks, 
and had presumably been well briefed by Foreign Office diplomats, there would be no 
repeat of the success of the Brancker/Loraine agreement of 1925. Woods Humphery 
was invited by the Persian authorities to only four meetings, all of which proved 
inconclusive. The Persian attitude was unhelpful. In a letter to the Foreign Secretary, R. 
Parr, a British Legation official, gave a taste of the frustrating atmosphere. At one 
meeting, Abdolhossein Teymourtash (1883–1933), the brilliant, cultured, and 
charismatic Minister of Court and right-hand-man of the Shah (Fig. 4.5), insisted that 
the Persian Government would make all the arrangements on the ground. This 
‘necessitated endless discussions as to the exact size of the bungalow required at Jask, 
of the clerks’ office at Bushire, of the wireless huts, &c.’ Nevertheless, at the same time 
the Persians were uninterested, and intended to spend ‘as little as possible’ on aviation 
facilities. Teymourtash’s ‘attitude throughout was one of grudging acquiescence.’646  
It was now clear that there would be no easy solution, and in July 1928 the 
Persian Gulf Sub-Committee was established, drawing together British officials from 
London and India to consider Britain’s position in Persia in depth and to subject British 
policy and attitudes to serious examination. The Committee’s high level of importance 
was reflected by the prominence of its members. Chaired by Austen Chamberlain, 
Foreign Secretary, the Committee also contained the Lord Chancellor, three Secretaries 
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of State (included Samuel Hoare, Air Minister), and the First Lord of Admiralty. While 
the Sub-Committee was therefore dominated by London-based members, India Office 
officials and Robert Clive, Minister to Tehran, also attended meetings. In addition, Sir 
Denys Bray, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, travelled from India to 
represent the Indian Government in the proceedings, but as he had no option but to 
travel by sea, the Sub-Committee’s Interim Report had been published before he arrived 
in London.647  
The Sub-Committee aired and addressed troubling questions. Austen 
Chamberlain argued that Britain was ‘now dealing with a very different Persia, 
and…could no longer claim rights on Persian soil, or in Persian territorial waters, 
without the assent of the Persian Government.’648 Although as a whole the Sub-
Committee acknowledged that geopolitical developments in the region required a 
change of direction in British policy towards Persia, there was significant difference of 
opinion as to the form this change should take. Given the backgrounds of members, the 
disagreement revealed that Government of India officials took a longer-term view and 
had sterner attitudes towards Britain’s imperial subjects, while London-based policy-
makers were more conversant with current policy towards Persia. Empire, David 
Reynolds suggests, ‘rests ultimately on force or the threat of force,’ and it was natural 
that the British should look back to past certainties, which in the nineteenth century had 
relied upon the ‘superiority of British military technology.’649 Now, committee members 
expressed confidence that Britain retained a considerable hold over Persia, and that its 
policy continued to be supported by its position as an imperial power, backed by the 
Navy. Persia, members reported, was relatively weak, and ‘incapable’ of taking over 
‘efficiently’ British functions in the Gulf, for example the maintenance of law and 
order, or indeed of ‘ejecting us by force.’650  
Although the old ways were still potent, the Sub-Committee as a whole 
recognised that the offering of force against Tehran was not now a practical option, and 
was in any case ill-suited to the requirements of international aviation. Imperial air 
transport, as would become increasingly apparent, required consensus and co-operation 
between the parties involved. However, the traditional attitudes of Britain’s Foreign 
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Office diplomats in Tehran militated against the new partnerships that were now 
necessary to achieve air transport services. British contempt for Persian officials was 
expressed in a revealing critique of the situation faced by British diplomats. Tehran 
Legation diplomat Victor Mallet, writing to the Foreign Secretary in London, criticised 
his colleagues but also explained the peculiar difficulties that they met. British 
diplomats, Mallet wrote, were ‘accustomed to treat with officials of foreign 
Governments on terms of at least outwards and nominal equality,’ yet senior Persian 
officials, such as the Minister of Court and the Foreign Minister, were ‘below that level 
of civilisation to which a diplomat is accustomed.’ In Persia, even though ‘The 
diplomatic missions play the game of diplomacy, with its social round and official 
decorum…they are living in a country still barely outside the confines of Barbary.’ 
Despite Mallet’s belief that they lacked ‘civilisation,’ he acknowledged 
condescendingly that Persian elites, having travelled abroad, had become more 
sophisticated and desired to be treated as Europeans. Having been ‘Infected by the 
Turkish bacillus,’ Persians now wished to be ‘treated as an occidental. To treat him as 
an Indian is a deadly insult.’ Mallet suggested that as a result of changes in Persia, 
British diplomatic methods had also subtly changed to the extent that officials presented 
a false face in Tehran: ‘we pretend that the Persian is an occidental, and we try to play 
the game of diplomacy according to the rules of the Congress of Vienna.’651 The Vienna 
Congress (1814-1815) had followed the principles of seeking to achieve containment, 
stability, and ultimately peace, and Mallet’s reference would therefore seem to suggest 
that British diplomats were attempting to achieve their aims while at the same time 
avoiding confrontation. In terms of seeking air route permission, diplomats were 
supplicants of the Persians, but a non-confrontational approach which gave the 
appearance of respecting their claims would in effect only pander to Persian amour 
proper.652  
Pandering to Persians by Foreign Office diplomats irritated Government of India 
officials, and at Sub-Committee meetings an underlying friction in attitudes towards 
how policy should be pursued in Tehran created tension between the London and Indian 
Governments. The Indian Government had for a century controlled the Gulf via the 
Political Residency at the Persian port of Bushire, and naturally felt that its experience 
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of dealing with local people gave its officials superior knowledge and ability (this clash 
between the London and Indian Governments will be explored further in subsequent 
chapters). Tensions were made apparent by the forceful Foreign Secretary to the 
Government of India, Sir Denys Bray. At one session Bray complained that the majority 
of the Sub-Committee ‘appeared to feel that we wanted a great deal out of Persia, and 
that our position was uncomfortably weak.’ Indeed, the committee’s Interim Report, 
produced before Bray had joined the proceedings, had stated that while Britain was in a 
‘strong moral position’ in the Gulf, its ‘legal title is weak.’653 Bray was unimpressed by 
such defeatism. In a bracing speech, he was quick to argue that things were not as black 
as some had painted them: ‘the Government of India felt that Persia wanted much more 
out of us than we wanted out of her, and our position was comfortably strong.’ Bray 
insisted that first and foremost Persia ‘wanted – and needed – the goodwill of Great 
Britain, particularly as a counterpoise to Russia. From time to time Persia had fits of 
pretending that she could do without us. She was suffering from one of those fits at the 
moment; and the view was held in India that it was high time that she was shaken out of 
it.’654 Bray was backed by Robert Clive, who confirmed that the Persians desired good 
terms because they knew that Britain ‘could blockade their coast and antagonize Iraq to 
them.’655  
Although adjacent to India geographically, Persia was not part of the Indian 
periphery in political and diplomatic terms. Even so, Government of India officials were 
discussing Persia as if it was indeed under their purview, and even urging Foreign 
Office officials to adopt the same thinking. Although Bray was of the opinion that 
‘Persia, whatever she might profess to the contrary, was dependent on us,’656 his view 
was becoming increasingly outdated. By 1928 Persia regarded itself as a sovereign 
country which was struggling to gain release from the tentacles of British influence. 
Therefore Bray’s recommendation to deal with Persians in a manner routinely employed 
by Government of India officials in India and its periphery was inappropriate. Bray 
urged the feigning of indifference, but British diplomats could hardly pretend in the case 
of the air route, for which their need was apparent. In addition, attempting ‘frank’ talks 
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with Persian officials had already proved ineffective, and when in 1928 Bray suggested 
that the British minister in Tehran should give Teymourtash a ‘tongue-lashing,’ it was 
clear that this would be counterproductive. Bray even seems to have thought that the 
hard-won three-year concession to fly along the Persian shore, which had just then been 
obtained from Persia, constituted permanent permission, for he declared that Britain had 
‘already got’ the air agreement. Scorning the difficulties experienced by Foreign Office 
officials in Persia, Bray announced that Britain wanted nothing from Persia that it had 
not already got, and ‘very little to which we had not a valid title.’657 But by now the 
struggle against Reza Shah’s administration had taken its toll and Bray found few 
backers.  
Bray’s fighting talk had exerted little influence upon the mood of the London-
based Sub-Committee attendees. Although committee members had also once believed 
that Persia needed Britain, by 1928 bitter experience of Persian methods had deeply 
eroded their convictions. Even the energetic Samuel Hoare appeared defeated by 
Persian intransigence, for he warned the Sub-Committee that the adoption of Bray’s 
approach might make Persia ‘sullen and even more tiresome.’658 The Sub-Committee, 
seeking to salvage Britain’s position, mulled over the few practical bargaining counters 
that the British still held, but these seemed to promise little. Britain held in reserve the 
gift of two unwanted wireless stations, the writing off of certain commercial debts, and 
the relinquishing of British rights to Basidu - a small naval station which had been kept 
on ‘primarily with the object of using it as a pawn in negotiations with Persia.’ 
Seemingly more substantial, and ‘by far the strongest if not the only really big counter,’ 
was the remission of part or the whole of Persia’s War Debt – a sum of £1,510,000 
owed jointly to the Governments of India and Britain. In itself this counter was hollow 
because, the Sub-Committee reported, Britain did not believe that it would be possible 
to extract the whole of this sum from Persia.  
Firstly, Persia resented the debt, claiming that it was incurred more in British 
than in Persian interests. Although Teymourtash, the Minister of Court, had admitted 
Persia’s liability, he argued that obtaining Majlis agreement to pay it off would be 
difficult. Secondly, the Sub-Committee reported, as the British were scaling down War 
debts, enforcement would be problematic. Rather, the debt’s value lay in the fact that, as 
long as it remained unpaid, Britain could claim that it rendered Persia unable to obtain a 
loan from Britain or America for the building of Reza Shah’s pet project, the Trans-
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Persian Railway.659 After extensive deliberations, the Sub-Committee found little cause 
for optimism and produced no substantial recommendations. It could conclude only that 
the maintenance of British authority in the region was, ‘if anything, more essential to 
the security of India and to Imperial interests at the present time than it was in the past,’  
but that Britain’s position in the Gulf was resting on foundations which were probably 
weaker than at any time in the past three centuries.660  
In the later 1920s Persia acted in a particularly provocative and challenging way. 
Its strategy included making claims to certain Gulf islands, sending Persian quarantine 
doctors to replace British ones, and announcing that the people of Kuwait, Muscat, and 
the Trucial Coast were ‘until further notice to be regarded as Persian subjects.’ 
Although these demands were regarded by the British as ‘pinpricks,’661 they amounted 
to a threat of confrontation against British supremacy in the region. As they had the 
potential to unsettle the local inhabitants and thus disturb the political balance in the 
Gulf, they could also have political implications for British air policy. Despite the 
atmosphere of gloom and recrimination at the Sub-Committee meetings, British 
patience now seemed to pay dividends, for at an October meeting Clive reported the 
success of negotiations which would allow Imperial Airways to operate a limited coastal 
service for a period of three years from 1 January 1929 until December 1931.662 This 
would allow the opening of a weekly through-route between London and Karachi via 
Persian territory. The Persians stated categorically that permission would not exceed the 
agreed three year period and added ‘several very undesirable restrictions,’ which 
included retention of control of the ground organisation, petrol installations, and 
wireless service.663 However, time was now so short that the British had little choice but 
to accept. Flight heralded the resulting official announcement as ‘one of the most 
encouraging statements that have been made for a very long time…the definite fixing of 
a date…is proof that at long last we are to get going.’664 Therefore, on 30 March 1929, 
more than two years since the previous attempt to launch the route in 1927, the British 
finally achieved their aim. A group gathered at Croydon airport to see the departure of 
what, for the second time, The Times described as ‘The inaugural flight of the first 
regular air service between England and India.’ Samuel Hoare was again in the party 
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and, making no reference to his earlier ‘inaugural’ flight, told reporters that 
I regard this as the beginning of real British civil aviation. Hitherto we have just 
been making trial runs, flying for short distances about Europe so that people 
could see it was safe to go into the air. This is the real business to-day, taking 
mails, not a few hundred miles, but five or six thousand miles. I am quite sure it 
is the beginning of still longer air lines connecting many parts of our great 
Empire.665  
 
Diplomatic difficulties, 1929 to 1932 
This time Hoare’s confidence was not misplaced, for the ‘real business’ of commercial 
services began immediately. Perhaps reflecting a lack of certainty about the starting of 
the route, the initial arrangements were makeshift. At first the sector beyond Basra 
carried mainly air mail but passengers - male only - would be accepted, The Times 
reported, upon condition that they understood that catering and accommodation 
facilities would be ‘improvised.’666 There were other drawbacks; travel was not entirely 
by aeroplane, for from Basel passengers took a night express train through the Alps, and 
at Alexandria made a connection by car.667 In addition, for a total journey time of seven-
days, which included about 57 hours in the air, the fare was £130, which was £30 more 
than by land.  
With a three year ‘breathing space’ afforded by the Persian permission to 
operate the route until 1931, the British continued to seek a means of obtaining the right 
to use the route on a permanent basis. There seemed little room for manoeuvre, and 
indeed still in 1931 the Cabinet was mulling the possibility of ‘using as a lever the 
possible reopening of the Duzdap Railway,’ which had at one time provided a trading 
link between Persia and India.668 This idea, although promising little by way of leverage 
in Tehran, caused disproportionate disagreement among Government departments. For 
example, an India Office memo of a meeting recorded that ‘Foreign Office in the light 
of discussion with Teheran now strongly favour an immediate approach to the Persians 
on these lines. Air Ministry agree.’ The Admiralty, meanwhile, rejected the Duzdap 
Railway idea, and ‘would still rather prefer that we should try to secure an extension of 
our lease at Henjam [a World War I coaling station], but not I think hold out.’669 So 
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meagre and impotent did Britain’s inducements appear that by June 1931 the Foreign 
Office was persuaded that ‘His Majesty’s Government have no levers which could be 
used in order to induce Persia to meet their legitimate desiderata.’670  
Lacking effective counters, Britain was left only with tactics which, while not 
obviously related to its air aspirations, acted to offset Persian national confidence and 
thus incidentally boost Britain’s position. Without the option of military force, the 
British were reliant upon diplomacy and the exerting of small pressures from London. 
Thus, veiled threats were issued and attempts made to coax Persia into co-operation, but 
these failed to produce the desired effect. Newspaper reports were used as a means of 
intimidation. For example, in April 1927 The Times reported that because ‘Persian 
opinion seems for some reason to be averse to giving anything like an extended “right 
of way” along her southern coast line,’ consideration was being given to an alternative. 
Surveys were already being carried out in Arabia, and The Times sniped that a route 
there would ‘have the advantage of the good will of other Governments, and in that 
sense would be more truly Imperial than the present route.’671 Yet this method of 
exerting pressure presupposed that Persia valued the presence of the British air route. 
This would eventually prove a delusion, but the Air Ministry continued to hope, 
although increasingly faintly, that Britain’s development of an Arabian route would 
goad Persia into changing its mind. Even as late as October 1931, Sir Sigmund 
Dannreuther, Air Ministry Deputy Secretary, wrote to the Treasury that ‘The fact of 
making preparations [in Arabia]…might be expected to bring the Persians to a more 
reasonable frame of mind.’672  
A small additional factor in Britain’s favour in its dealings with Persia was that 
Persian state censorship in part suppressed the burgeoning of national pride. Stephanie 
Cronin suggests that the Persian Government ‘gradually stifled’ intellectual life through 
control of the press, the curbing of political expression, and the reduction of the Majlis 
to ‘futile impotence,’ to the extent that by the late 1920s civil society had been 
‘obliterated.’673 This aided British aims because, although the raising of national 
consciousness worked against Persian notions of inferiority and subjection, the 
suppression of intellectual life and democracy encouraged them. This influenced the 
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perceptions held by Persia and Britain not only about their own levels of power, but also 
about their power in relation to each other. The dampening of the enthusiasm of 
ordinary Persians for the regime in Tehran helped reduce Persian opposition to the 
British, and encouraged Western-minded Persians to co-operate with British aims. The 
British used covert methods. For example, it was commonly believed, Farman Farmaian 
says, that through their spies in Anglo-Persian Oil Company the British ‘manipulated 
our affairs so adroitly that everyone believed that even Reza Shah, who hated them, still 
had to ask their permission for anything he wanted to do.’ The British also maintained 
paid informers and agents ‘at court, the Majlis, the government, the bazaar, the 
mosques, and anywhere else they could find Persians.’674 A more sophisticated method 
was intelligence-gathering by modern technology. For example, in September 1928 an 
American Minister reported that RAF Intelligence Officers in Baghdad  
intercepted and translated all telegrams exchanged between the Shah and 
Teymourtache [the Minister of Court]. No more striking example of the 
efficiency of British espionage can be found. The officers in Baghdad knew 
more of Teymourtache’s movements than did the Shah himself, and proved it to 
me by laughingly informing me from what city the next wire to His Majesty 
could come.675  
 
Counterbalancing these small advantages were a number of factors which 
assisted Persia in baffling and outwitting the British, and worked against the fulfilment 
of Britain’s air ambitions. Britain’s reputation was counteracted by the subtle effects of 
Persia upon some Britons. In his account of ancient invasions, John Standish comments 
that Persia ‘captivated her captors, rendering them susceptible to her own influences so 
that in time they lose their old identity in assuming the new.’676 Remarkably, the same 
could be said for interwar Persia. Many British officials found Persia infuriating, with 
the Political Resident complaining in 1927 that it was ‘so backward and at the same 
time so full of amour propre.’677 Irritation could in time translate into a form of 
acquiescence. For example, Vita Sackville-West, who as wife of the diplomat Harold 
Nicholson attended Reza Shah’s coronation in Tehran in 1926, reported that 
‘Resignation is essential here, if one does not wish to live in a state of perpetual fury.’678 
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Persia also had the power to lull the susceptible into a state of lassitude and torpor, 
which effect could deflect purpose. Despite Reza Shah’s modernisation programmes, 
Persia retained some of its traditional allure - a romantic appeal that was almost 
feminine, and redolent of the stories of the Thousand and One Nights and Edward 
Fitzgerald’s translation of the Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam.679 The very name invoked 
strong associations. For example, Sackville-West found that even the word printed on 
her luggage labels ‘seemed to distil a faint, far aroma in the chill air of Victoria 
Station.’680  Such influences brought about feelings among British diplomats of 
acquiescence and eventual resignation to the intangible power of Persian culture. This 
could only ill-equip them to meet the challenges of negotiation in Tehran.  
On a more palpable level, British diplomats were also affected by a number of 
other factors, which contributed to Britain’s failure to push forward its aviation agenda. 
Firstly, there were Persian techniques which, whether intentional or deliberate, 
obstructed negotiation. Foreign Office officials were also at a disadvantage because they 
were essentially guests in the Persian capital, while the Persians were on home ground. 
The British were at the mercy of the Tehran elites, who determined the tone, content, 
and frequency of meetings. Secondly, there was the dominance and character of 
Teymourtash. While Britain became a victim of its own past policy, underlying these 
factors was the implementation of political tactics by the Persian elites. The use of these 
tactics was highly effective, and permeated all British dealings with Persians. These 
were the ‘weapons of the weak,’ as described by Ali Ansari. Twentieth-century Persian 
politicians, Ansari proposes, were  
excellent practitioners of the weapons of the weak to confound, confuse and 
frustrate the ambitions of greater powers. Acutely aware of their own military 
weakness but driven by ambitions of imperial stature inherited from an earlier 
age, Iranian statesmen have substituted diplomatic for military power and have 
shown a diplomatic sophistication which has often confounded both partners and 
opponents.681  
 
The ‘weapons’ included, for example, the use of cycles of delaying tactics before, 
during, and after negotiations, which often resulted in a need for renegotiation. 
Dissimulation and going back on agreements were common features. While Persian 
elites gave the appearance of conformity and even compliance with the diplomatic 
processes and norms as understood by the British, beneath the surface their intention 
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was often calculated resistance. As the Persians employed these methods singly or in 
any combination, and arbitrarily or concurrently, the air route negotiations were 
surrounded by an atmosphere of perpetual confusion. Therefore, Ansari argues, 
‘Western powers, confident in their own achievements and imperial in their ambitions, 
were consistently out-manoeuvred and frustrated by the activities of their Iranian 
counterparts, a result too often credited to the inadequacies, immorality, dishonesty and 
down-right ineptitude of Iranians.’682 
Ansari suggests that the view of Persians as corrupt and incompetent, while it 
tended to reflect the prejudices of Europeans, nevertheless helped to frustrate their 
ambitions. He also argues that, on the Persian side, there was a deliberate policy of 
frustrating negotiations by failing to communicate effectively with the British. Persian 
politicians, Ansari proposes, used ambiguity as a means of denying foreigners 
knowledge and understanding, and hence power over them. While the British ‘sought 
clear lines of demarcation to facilitate control,’ Persian elites sought to counteract them 
by means of ‘persistent dissimulation.’ Thus, the ‘weapons of the weak’ acted as a 
gauzy veil through which Britain was forced to view, and attempt to interpret, Persian 
behaviour and policy. Persian shades of meaning and obscuration of form denied the 
British clear vision and created uncertainty, thereby preventing effective action.683 For 
the purposes of the air route, these factors ensnared the British in a repeating cycle of 
emotions which ranged from confidence and hope to anxiety, exasperation, anger, and 
resentment. On the British side, Persian tactics resulted in enervation. The constant 
delays and false starts weakened British resolve and sapped the energy of diplomats. 
The end result was that the progress of air route negotiations was faltering, and 
frequently stalled. 
On a more practical level, a serious drawback for Foreign Office officials in 
Tehran was that Persian tactics continually hampered their attempts to gain sufficient 
access to their Persian counterparts to pursue negotiations to the desired extent. The lack 
of structured communication demonstrated the frustrating nature of the diplomatic game 
and meant that British diplomats had insufficient opportunities to pursue the air route 
question. They were forced into negotiating with only one or two officials, and on a 
basis that was often informal. Persian political methods ensured that British diplomats 
were placed at the mercy of powerful individuals. McDaniel has referred to the 
‘pronounced personalism’ and ‘arbitrariness and high-handedness,’ of Persian elites, 
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which ‘served to heighten bureaucratic incoherence.’684 In the early stages of the air 
route negotiations this ‘personalism’ had worked in Britain’s favour, for Reza Shah took 
such an active role in diplomacy that he became, Mehran Kamrava suggests, ‘the whole 
system, personally supervising even the most trivial of the government’s functions.’685 
Therefore Reza Shah’s increasing withdrawal from public life from 1926 caused the 
British major difficulties, and in particular as it coincided with the departure of Percy 
Loraine, Minister to Persia, who had enjoyed a good relationship with the Shah. 
Thereafter, British diplomats were rarely granted an audience. 
 
Fig. 4.5. Teymourtash and his wife, 
Tatyana.686 
 
Perhaps the worst problem faced 
by the British Legation in Tehran was 
owed to the fact that, in the later 1920s, 
its main point of contact with Persian 
elites was Teymourtash. From 1928 air 
route negotiations were conducted 
almost exclusively between 
Teymourtash and the British Minister to 
Persia, Sir Robert Clive. A considerable 
onus was therefore placed on Clive, and 
he was held largely responsible for the 
lack of progress although this was 
hardly fair given the nature of his 
negotiating partner. Teymourtash took a 
leading role in Persian political life. For six years from 1926, he was a key player in a 
small elite which ‘provided the intellectual muscle behind Reza Shah’s brute force’ and 
‘moulded’ Persia into a modern state behind the ‘protective shield’ provided by the 
Shah.687 Although he receives little attention in more recent Western accounts of the 
period, contemporary writers attest to the prominence of Teymourtash. For example, 
Charles C. Hart, American Minister to Persia from November 1929 to 1933, considered 
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the Minister of Court to be Persia’s ‘one true statesman’688 and ‘active head of the 
Persian Government. He took business out of the hands of all the cabinet ministers…as 
if he might have had it solely in his charge.’689  
Whereas Reza Shah had little formal education, Teymourtash came from an 
aristocratic family. He was sophisticated, and having travelled widely in Europe 
possessed a good command of Russian, German, French, and English. In addition, as a 
Foreign Office memorandum reported in 1929, he was ‘a more astute negotiator’ than 
most Persians and was thus better placed to deal with foreign diplomats.690 As a skilled 
wielder of the ‘weapons of the weak’ and master of dissimulation, Teymourtash 
remained largely inscrutable. In this way he was able to obscure Persia’s foreign policy, 
confuse and frustrate the British, and withhold knowledge and therefore power. So 
unfathomable was he that, as Miron Rezun comments, even for Persians it was 
‘exceedingly difficult to ascertain where his political sympathies lay.’691  
A factor which exacerbated the problems of those who had to deal with 
Teymourtash personally was his charm. His ability to disarm foreigners was attested by 
contemporaries. For example, Sir Reginald Hoare, successor to Robert Clive, seems to 
have been lured by the charm of Teymourtash. Bearing in mind the frustrations 
experienced in the past by the Tehran Legation, Hoare demonstrated naivety when he 
wrote of the Persian’s apparently earnest desire to reach an air route settlement, that ‘I 
believe his protestations to be sincere.’692 Even Charles C. Hart, although a former 
newspaperman, fell under the spell of the Persian aristocrat’s Old World charisma. In a 
dispatch of December 1932, after the dismissal of Teymourtash, Hart gave an 
extraordinary eulogy. In meeting the Minister of Court, he wrote, he had felt himself to 
be ‘in the presence of a mighty genius’ who seemed ‘more as a vibrant, captivating 
personality than any other human being I have ever known.’ Able to discuss every 
subject knowledgeably, Teymourtash appeared as one whose ‘gifts were so 
extraordinary as to appear unnatural.’693 Dealing with such a dazzling personality clearly 
defeated British diplomats, and air route negotiations became entangled in a tense 
political relationship, the terms of which were increasingly dictated by Tehran. As 
Robinson and Gallagher argue in their description of late-Victorian policy-makers, 
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which still held true in the interwar years, the British had ‘evolved well-tried techniques 
for dealing with certain situations and swinging the issue in Britain’s favour.694 Yet 
although Foreign Office diplomats thought Persian officials capricious, intransigent, 
and, in the words of Sir Austen Chamberlain, ‘notorious bluffers,’695 they were outwitted 
by them in spite of their long experience of imperial diplomacy. As time went on, 
Teymourtash’s power to obstruct the British grew.696 For example, in October 1930 
Robert Clive wrote to the Foreign Secretary that, had the Anglophile Mohammed Ali 
Feroughi, nominal Minister for Foreign Affairs, been allowed to conduct negotiations, 
‘we should have reached, before now, a satisfactory agreement.’697  
 
Fig. 4.6. The 
topography of the 
Persian Gulf, 
showing the 
mountainous interior 
of Persia on the 
Gulf’s north side and 
the flatter Arabian 
side. The Hajar 
Mountains form a 
rocky projection into 
the Gulf, creating the 
narrow neck of the 
Strait of Hormuz.698 
 
By 1931, the 
British had run out 
of ‘levers’ and of diplomatic options. So weak had British influence become, and so 
entrenched the resistance of the Persian elites, that in June the Foreign Office bitterly 
attributed Britain’s lack of ‘levers’ to the ‘offensively anti-British’699 attitude of Reza 
Shah and Teymourtash. This weakness extended to influence over British air policy. 
Certainly by the spring of 1931 Teymourtash had become such an irritation that even 
Clive was ready to see the back of him. Britain’s position, Clive reported in a telegram, 
had 
now developed into a trial of strength with Minister of Court and so long as he 
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remains in supreme authority I see no prospect of improvement…Minister of 
Court is extremely unpopular and according to my information there would be 
general rejoicing if he fell. He rides rough-shod over the Cabinet, listens to no 
advice and in the general opinion is running the country. Unfortunately we are in 
a very weak position to retaliate.700  
 
Indeed, Britain’s position was constrained and no course of action seemed promising. 
At the Persian Gulf Sub-Committee meetings of 1928, Denys Bray of the Government 
of India had attacked British officials in Tehran for failing to gain control of the Persian 
elites. Priding himself on being an expert on the Asian mentality, Bray set out his 
blunderbuss approach to the problem. He refused to countenance any situation that 
could not be improved by giving Persian officials ‘a cold douche of British 
indifference,’ by a ‘heart-to-heart talk…frank, firm, unmistakeable,’ or by a tongue-
lashing. He reminded his listeners that on an occasion when Clive had given 
Teymourtash ‘a taste of his tongue,’ the effect had been ‘most salutary.’701 Yet as 
Persian confidence grew, this tactic was no longer effective. British diplomats tried a 
number of ploys to dupe and outwit Teymourtash. For example, in April 1932 Reginald 
Hoare telegraphed to the Foreign Office that since November, Teymourtash had ‘been 
allowed to think air ways and general negotiations are definitely linked.’ The British 
hope was that if Teymourtash believed in this link he would be unlikely to halt Imperial 
Airways services because that move would deprive him of a bargaining chip to use in 
other negotiations. The British knew that in giving the Persians a false impression of 
their aims, they were playing a dangerous game. Giving a tacit acknowledgement that 
indeed the British were ‘playing for time,’ Hoare advised that only by careful handling 
could the Persians be prevented from thinking that the British had been ‘disingenuously 
playing for time.’ If, Hoare continued, the Persians perceived this British game, it 
‘would do much harm by awakening or affording pretext for reviving old mistrust of 
His Majesty’s Government now dormant.’702 Although Hoare did not know it at the 
time, there is no evidence that the Persians were fooled by the British, or that Persian 
distrust ever reached a state of dormancy.  
In air negotiations, the Persians repeatedly returned to the subject of a route 
through the centre of the country. Reza Shah, recognising the importance of opening up 
Persia with infrastructure and communications, had proposed in 1927 that Britain forge 
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a central route, on a line which ran from Baghdad to Gwadar via Isfahan, Yedz, and 
Bam. Although the British had no desire to depart from their established coastal route, 
to show willing they had made inland surveys. Surveyors found an extraordinarily 
varied terrain, which featured mountain ranges, gorges, desert, plains, and jungles, all 
without road access (see Fig. 4.6). Aviation was discounted as being impossible both 
practically and financially because of the difficulties and expense in building and 
supplying landing grounds, and the dangers for a plane and passengers making an 
emergency landing. The British were also aware that, as Clive pointed out, such a route, 
running well away from the British sphere of control in the Gulf waterway, would 
‘always be at the mercy of Persian caprice.’ Tehran diplomats speculated that the 
Persian Government knew that the development of a central route was impossible, but 
pursued it as a ploy to divert the British from more practical schemes, and ultimately 
keep them out of Persia.703 There could, however, have been a more prosaic reason. Don 
Peretz suggests that because of his poor education, Reza Shah failed to understand the 
basic requirements and economics of modern infrastructure development.704 Certainly 
this was the opinion of Clive, who commented about the central route scheme that, 
‘There is no reason to believe that the Persian authorities have begun to consider what it 
means.’705 It seems feasible to assume, therefore, that the Persians, wishing to use the 
British to open up and develop the interior, but not understanding all that was involved, 
genuinely believed a central route to be viable. When in 1931 Persia again raised the 
question of a central route, the British reconsidered the matter.706 By appearing to 
entertain the idea, the Tehran Legation was perhaps again playing for time, as the quest 
for a way along the Arabian shore was proving problematic. In addition, the 
abandonment of the airship service on the India route following the crash of the R101 in 
1930 had added urgency to the search for a permanent aeroplane route. The British also 
had internal difficulties, for progress was being held back by disunity among British 
officials. The difficulties were revealed at an Air Ministry meeting held in July 1931 to 
discuss Persia’s attitude to the Gulf air route. It was attended by eight Air Ministry 
officials, a Colonial Office official, two Foreign Office officials, two India Office 
officials, and George Woods Humphery, Imperial Airways’ General Manager. 
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Afterwards, an India Office Political Department Minute reported that the meeting had 
ended in ‘deadlock,’ with the India Office frustrated by ‘the rather defeatist policy of 
the Foreign Office and by the categorical statements of Imperial Airways (which it is 
difficult for us to counter effectively with the information at our disposal).’707 The India 
Office wanted action, but this had been prevented by the inertia and obstruction of the 
other parties involved. Where the Gulf air route was concerned, India Office officials 
were at a disadvantage; as they were forced to take expert advice from Imperial Airways 
officials, they became constrained by commercial concerns.  
The deadlock among officials in London was matched by deadlock between 
British diplomats and Persian officials in Tehran. Later the same month, matters came 
to a head. Baron Amulree, now Secretary of State for Air, penned a panicky 
memorandum to the Cabinet explaining that there was ‘no satisfactory alternative’ to a 
Persian route. Other routes through the region had been explored, but none had proved 
feasible. Matters, he wrote, had become ‘very difficult,’ but although ‘Persian 
intransigence’ jeopardised the air route, there seemed ‘no option but to accept the 
situation.’ The British appeared, ‘in short, to be in a state of complete impotence vis-á-
vis Persia.’708 Such desperation prompted Britain to obtain from the Persians another 
series of extensions – first for three, then for two, and then for a further four months – 
that would allow Imperial Airways to continue in Persia until the end of September 
1932. Although the concessions gave rise to renewed hope of a permanent arrangement, 
this would not be forthcoming. Even as late as March 1932 Philip Sassoon, 
Undersecretary of State for Air, told the House of Commons that after months of 
uncertainty he now hoped for ‘greater security of tenure’ in Persia. However, he 
acknowledged that this hope was slim when he added that because the Air Ministry ‘did 
not know that it would be possible to continue the arrangement’ in Persia, it had ‘had to 
make provision for the possibility of using the Southern coast of the Persian Gulf and 
not being compelled to sever this very important link in the chain of our service from 
Great Britain to India.’709 In this Sassoon appeared to contradict Amulree’s earlier 
assertion that there was no alternative to the Persian route. A few weeks later Persia 
made it clear that Imperial Airways must definitely quit its shoreline in September. In 
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anticipation of this, the British had made ‘a detailed examination of the whole question.’ 
In an admission that Amulree had been mistaken, on 5 July Anthony Eden, 
Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, announced in the House of Commons that 
as it had been found that ‘the Arabian route possesses certain important practical 
advantages,’ a decision had been made to switch the air route to it.710  
These events took place during a period of problematic negotiations between 
Persia and Britain over the APOC oil concession, and also the implications of the 
dismissal of Teymourtash from office which took place towards the end of 1932. In an 
early (1938) biography of Reza Shah, Rezun argues that the Shah was ‘bent upon 
rapprochement with Great Britain,’ which would require a weakening of Persian’s 
relationship with the Soviets. As Rezun suggests, Teymourtash was particularly close to 
the Soviet Union in 1932.711 The implication was that both Reza Shah and the British 
had an interest in the removal of the Minister of Court, and Rezun concluded that it was 
‘plausible’ that ‘British intrigue…represented more than just a contributing factor’ to 
his downfall.712 If Rezun’s supposition is correct, and the British were instrumental in 
the removal of Teymourtash, it suggests that they had resorted to the firm action that 
Bray had urged in 1928. Even so, they were too late to save the air route, for by the time 
of Teymourtash’s fall, Imperial Airways had already abandoned Persia. However, a 
story told by Raymond O’Shea, who served at the Sharjah airbase on the Trucial Coast 
in the early 1940s, although it may have gained something in the telling, suggests that 
by the time of the transfer of Imperial Airways services across the Gulf to the Trucial 
Coast in the first week of October 1932, Britain’s need for independence from Persian 
intransigence over the air facilities may have become more pressing than reported at the 
time. O’Shea relates that when the British abandoned the wireless station at Jask to 
remove across the Gulf waterway to Sharjah, Persian hostility was so great that a 
hurried evacuation was necessary. In the rush, important books and files were 
abandoned, but a native employee of the company volunteered to recover them. 
Requisitioning a boat, he sailed single-handed across the Gulf at night and, once at Jask, 
eluded Persian guards to extract the documents. After setting fire to the wireless huts he 
dodged the guards’ bullets on the beach and returned safely to Sharjah with his spoils.713 
Despite this small victory against the Persians, the fact of the company’s removal 
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proved that Persia had succeeded in frustrating British policy. Britain’s chagrin at being 
seen off was not unalloyed for, as Flight pointed out, although it had failed in Persia, 
and, ‘Despite the nuisance and expense of making the change, there is a general feeling 
of relief that this great British airway will no longer be dependent on the goodwill of the 
Persian Government.’714  
 
The geopolitics of the Great Powers in Persia  
The involvement of the Soviet Union in Persia’s affairs has already been suggested. A 
major cause of problems for the India route was that the British were implicated in a 
four-cornered struggle for influence in Persia, which also involved the Soviet Union and 
Germany. Prior to 1900, Britain’s naval supremacy had enabled it to deter incursion by 
rival powers into the carefully-protected environs of India, and even to dictate the type 
and level of foreign activity in the Gulf region. As the Gulf gained new strategic 
importance in the 1920s, it became clear that the ambitions of the Soviets Union and 
Germany in the area had grown. Therefore a British strategic air route had become a 
necessity, while a civil route was desirable. Concomitantly, the development of 
international aviation increased opportunities for the Germans and Soviets to develop 
new relationships both with each other and with Persia. As these links developed, the 
parties concerned often lacked concrete objectives. Thus the participants became 
ensnared in a nebulous cold war of petty dalliances and intrigues, in which tangible 
achievements were not easy to quantify. The efforts of the countries frequently 
amounted to no more than merely seeking a reduction of influence of another power. 
This struggle would ultimately prove neither satisfying nor productive, and for the 
British had the side-effect of damaging their air ambitions.  
Traditionally, as Robert Clive remarked, Britain and Russia had been ‘The two 
countries that really counted’ in Persia.715 Prior to the Great War they had vied for 
power, with Britain generally retaining the upper hand. The two had collaborated under 
the terms of the 1907 Anglo-Russian Entente, to divide Persia into spheres of influence, 
with the Russians controlling the northern sphere and the British the south and east, 
while the central area remained neutral. Both were concerned to ensure that Persia ‘did 
not fall completely under the control of either power. More often than not the Russians 
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sought to extend their dominance while the British sought to limit it.’716 After the War, 
Britain’s sparring with Russia translated into sparring with the Soviet Union. In the 
post-war period, the ways in which Soviet policy would differ from that of the old 
Tsarist regime, and the strength of influence of the new Soviet state in Persia, were 
difficult for the British to determine. Axworthy has suggested that the British and 
Soviets acted as Persia’s ‘ugly sisters’717 who, true to the fairy tale, were jealous of each 
other and the Persian ‘Cinderella.’ To the British, the Soviet Union had two aims in 
Persia – to increase its own influence while at the same time decreasing that of Britain. 
Rezun concurs, adding that the intention of the Soviet Union was to exacerbate Britain’s 
problems, safeguard its own national security with regards to the British, and draw 
Persia into the Soviet orbit.718 Meanwhile, Persia remained a ‘piggy-in-the-middle,’ 
caught geographically between the two large and ideologically-opposed powers. Persian 
territory adjoined spheres of British influence, and Reza Shah benefited from revenues 
from the British oil fields in the south. However, Persia also shared a long border with 
the Soviet Union to the north and had economic considerations to take into account, for 
its northern areas were economically dependent upon Soviet trade.  
Britain seems to have been no match for the zeal and vigour of Soviet activities 
in Persia. The British position weakened progressively, but no admission that the 
balance of power had shifted in the Soviet favour would be made until April 1931. An 
unattributed Foreign Office document, entitled ‘Note on Possible Reprisals against the 
Persian Government,’ reported that the Soviet position in Persia was ‘much stronger’ 
than that of the British.719 However, Britain had the advantage that, although Persia had 
need of powerful allies, Reza Shah, Legation diplomat Victor Mallet reported, would 
‘never make friends with the Soviet Government,’ and thus had the option of turning to 
Britain. The British had contemptuously thrown away this opportunity. Britain’s 
response, Mallet complained, had been ‘passive rather than active.’ In part, the British 
had brought their problems on themselves. Britain, Mallet continued, had ‘waited to 
have successive concessions wrung from us...we have shown no marked enthusiasm at 
Persia’s military progress, at her attempts to create a navy and an air force. Our gifts 
have been grudgingly given and accepted without gratitude.’ In addition, Britain could 
not fall back on its traditional methods of ‘Teaching the Persians a sharp lesson’ or 
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‘reasserting our authority.’ These tactics, Mallet argued, would only damage British 
interests in Persia, resulting in the disappearance of Persian courtiers friendly to Britain, 
who would be replaced by those ‘sworn to enmity…and therefore ready to play the 
Russian game. It merely means that the next spinning mill will not be ordered in 
England but elsewhere, that the next aeroplanes will not come from British but from 
foreign factories.’720  
 
Fig. 4.7. 
Teymourtash 
arriving at 
Moscow 
Railway 
Station, 
1926.721 
 
The 
breaking off of 
diplomatic 
relations 
between 
Britain and the Soviet Union in 1927 after the Zinoviev letter affair, may have 
contributed to a deterioration in Persia’s relationship with Britain. After 1927, the story 
of the air route suggests that, in their attempts to subvert and damage British interests 
and air ambitions, the Soviets resorted to a number of methods of pressuring Persia. 
Thus, the British air route became a victim of wider power politics, subject to seemingly 
unconnected diplomatic and political vicissitudes. It was perhaps no accident, then, that 
the embarrassing failure of Hoare’s ‘first inaugural flight’ to India in early 1927 had 
coincided with a period in which, in the words of the Persian Gulf Sub-Committee 
report, the Soviet danger in Persia had taken on ‘an aggravated form,’722 which 
represented a low point in Anglo-Soviet relations. The Soviets may also have used 
underhand methods to defeat the British, for Clive reported that the Soviet Embassy in 
Tehran had paid Teymourtash £10,000 to persuade the Majlis not to ratify the air 
agreement. Disgusted, Clive informed the Persian Government that an ‘unchecked 
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campaign of calumny’ was operating against the British, and he proposed to suspend all 
meetings with Persian ministers.723 As The Times reported, the refusal to ratify the air 
route was no surprise, as the Majlis was influenced by Soviet attempts to drive a wedge 
between Britain and Persia. To do this, the Majlis suggested that because Britain’s air 
route ran between Cairo, Iraq, and Karachi – all areas under British control - it was 
‘inevitable’ that Persia would come under British ‘possession or sphere of influence’ if 
aeroplanes were allowed access.724  
As Petro and Rubenstein suggest, Soviet foreign policy ‘presupposed the 
simultaneous pursuit of normal, government-to-government relations – subversion at 
one level; conventional diplomacy at another.’725 In Persia, while on the surface the 
Soviets maintained good relations with Tehran, or extended their influence via such 
means as bribery, on other levels they worked to infiltrate their political doctrine into 
the country. Soviet tactics, Rezun relates, included the interception of correspondence, 
the infiltration of British intelligence, the sponsoring of activist cells, and the 
employment of informers and agents provocateurs.726 The Soviets also attempted to 
create revolutionary fervour among ‘tribespeople,’ and to undermine APOC, Persia’s 
only industrial concern. Soviet tactics had serious implications, because by 1928, so 
important was APOC to the British that Clive thought that about 75% of Britain’s 
interests in Persia were related to it.727 The Soviet press also made efforts to drive a 
wedge between Britain and Persia, attacking the British for some of the very tactics that 
the Soviet Union employed. For example, in 1926 the newspaper Izvestia published a 
number of articles accusing Britain of plotting against the life of Reza Shah, inciting 
rebellion, stirring up insurgents, and raising ‘Fascist plots’ against the Soviet Union. It 
also suggested that in helping Reza Shah to the throne, the British had hoped ‘to attract 
him away from co-operation with the Soviet Union.’728 These reports prompted the 
British Foreign Secretary to draft a letter to the Soviet Government in January 1927, 
complaining of its ‘deplorable attitude’ and hypocrisy. While making professions of 
goodwill, the Soviets allowed ‘public utterances in defamation of Great Britain or in 
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advocacy of a world revolution.’729  
British officials based in Tehran believed that Persia danced to the Soviet tune. 
For example, in 1928 Clive told the Persian Gulf Sub-Committee that during the past 
year the Persians had ‘readily yielded’ to the urging of the Soviet Government that they 
should ‘assert themselves, and reduce British influence in the Gulf.’730 Reza Shah, Clive 
wrote, was well aware of Soviet activities, and that Persia’s ‘thinly veiled autocracy’ 
was ‘anathema to the Bolshevists.’ So great was Persia’s fear of the Soviet Union, 
however, that it could do nothing more than monitor its activity.731 Soviet influence 
seems to have relied upon personal relationships within the Persian Government, and in 
practise equated with influence with Teymourtash. Perhaps not surprisingly given the 
scale of the bribes he reportedly received, the Minister of Court had an attitude of 
‘amenability’ towards the Soviet leaders, with whom he ‘shared a community of 
interests.’732 Certainly he visited Moscow on several occasions. (Fig. 4.7) In an 
acknowledgement that Soviet goodwill was more important to Persia than that of the 
British, Clive wrote that Teymourtash considered it ‘essential for Persia to settle with 
Russia before she settled with us.’733 
Ansari suggests that Persian politicians ‘skilfully played’ the Soviets and British 
off each against the other,734 and this was the view of Lionel Howarth, Political Resident 
in 1927-8. The Resident was based in the Gulf far from Tehran and hence from the 
stronger tentacles of Soviet influence. In contrast to Clive, Haworth seems to have 
perceived Persia as stronger and more independent of Soviet influence. The Resident’s 
view, as he wrote in 1928, was that Persia’s policy towards Britain was ‘a definitely 
antagonistic one no matter what she may say.’ Persia’s object, the Resident believed, 
was to reduce Britain’s power in the Gulf and for this it would ‘use Russia in South, as 
far she may with safety while attempting to use us in North.’735 The British, therefore, 
found Persia’s response to the Soviet Union hard to gauge. Yet whether it was the view 
of Tehran or Bushire that was more correct, the balance of power was delicate and its 
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delineation ambiguous. It continues to be difficult to ascertain the extent to which Persia 
was able to ‘use’ either power, but the example of the Trans-Persian Railway project 
supports the view that the Persians played off the British and Soviets. The British 
regarded increased international access to Persia as a potential threat to their position in 
the Gulf, while the Soviets opposed a railway line by which the British could link Iraq 
and India. Cyrus Ghani suggests that the railway scheme, although viewed with 
suspicion by both Britain and the Soviet Union, demonstrated that Persia did not favour 
the Soviets overtly, for Persia designed it to ‘thwart’ both powers.736 
 
Fig. 4.8. Reza Shah 
checks that his train 
runs on time 
(undated).737 
 
In developing 
railways and roads, the 
Persians were creating 
potential problems for 
the British by giving 
opportunities for a 
Soviet approach to the 
Gulf from the north. 
Road and rail could threaten British shipping and oil interests. Karachi, where the 
British had an RAF base and a strategic railway terminus, would also be within Soviet 
range. Aviation, however, presented a different type of threat, for aeroplanes were fast, 
flexible, and could be used as bombers. By 1928 it was clear that the danger to British 
interests in the Gulf, in the words of the Persian Gulf Sub-Committee report, was 
‘increased rather than otherwise by the advent of air power.’ For this reason, the 
foremost advantage of a Persian air route was strategic, in that it would allow Britain to 
counter Soviet threats. Consequently, in October 1928 Hugh Trenchard, Chief of Air 
Staff, told a Sub-Committee meeting that it was vital that Britain’s ‘great Imperial air 
chain’ from Cairo to Singapore be kept intact: ‘A rupture of the Persian Gulf link would 
be just as grave a disaster to the Air Force as the closing of the Suez Canal would be to 
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the Navy.’738 Civil and strategic aviation were therefore interlinked, but the former was 
subordinate to the latter. In October 1931 the Secretary of State for India noted that it 
was Government policy that strategic air routes be ‘kept open by regular civil air 
lines.’739 It was understood that if necessary, for example in the event of a Soviet 
invasion of northern Persia, civil routes would be given over entirely to military use.740  
In the early 1920s the Soviet Union had lacked the capability to threaten British 
interests from the air, but a new relationship between it and Germany offered that 
potential. Together the two powers forged a physical and political entry into Persia by 
means of aviation. There were precedents for German exploitation of the superiority of 
its technology in an approach to Persia. During the Qajar era, Germany had planned the 
Baghdad Railway, started in 1903, to operate from Berlin to the Persian Gulf via 
Turkey, Baghdad, and Basra. By 1917, the scheme had the potential, as an American 
commented, to create in the Middle East ‘a perfect network of modern methods of 
transportation that would embrace eventually also the projected railways of Persia.’ 
German plans had also included a connection with the Indian railway system via a line 
along the Persian coast to Balochistan. In making the railway ‘a short cut to India - but a 
short cut from Berlin, not from London,’ and one which was in part designed to rival the 
Suez Canal, Germany had challenged Britain’s strategic and imperial interests, and 
threatened its commerce. A particular concern to Britain during the period was that the 
Baghdad Railway demonstrated that Persia viewed Germany with special favour. As 
events turned out, the Railway would reach only as far as Kuwait, for during the War 
the British prevented it from meeting the Gulf and in 1919 the Treaty of Versailles 
ended German ownership of the line.741 
Germany’s wartime Drang Nach Osten (Drive towards the East) had been 
viewed by the British as one of its ‘ulterior objects.’ A Government memorandum of 
February 1917 commented that Germany’s efforts to extend its influence in Turkey, 
Egypt, and Arabia, in addition to inflaming Muslim feeling against British imperialism, 
were intended to help it gain access to the Persian Gulf.742 German occupation of Persia 
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had allowed it a base from which to disrupt oil production (vital to Britain after the 
conversion of warships to oil fuel in 1912), sponsor anti-British activities among local 
tribes, and infiltrate Afghanistan and India. Further, as Sean Kelly argues, Germany 
intended to fill the ‘power vacuum’ left in the region by the fall of the Tsarist regime in 
Russia - a prospect which, as it involved a threat to Britain’s rule in India, was viewed 
with dismay.743 By mid-1918 Lord Curzon, Leader of the House of Lords, had become 
deeply concerned: ‘Germany is out in this war to destroy the British Empire. That is the 
first and foremost of her objects, and one of the methods...is by rendering her position in 
the East insecure.’744 After the War, Persia, in redefining its identity, craved freedom 
from foreign influence. At the same time, as Don Peretz comments, Reza Shah was 
‘infatuated with the material aspects of Western civilization,’745 which were vital to the 
progress that he craved. His regime invited foreigners in to Persia to implement social 
reforms and large-scale educational, industrial, and secularisation projects. In embracing 
Western methods and technology, Reza Shah sought the participation of those countries 
which had been least implicated in past interference in Persia. As Tehran was fearful of 
renewed dependency on foreign powers, a great point in Germany’s favour, as Ansari 
remarks, was that it had no history of imperialism in Persia, and would be ‘only too 
happy to assist’ in driving a wedge between Persia and Britain.746  
 
Fig. 4.9. A Persian Air 
Force pilot, 1930s.747 
 
Britain, to its 
chagrin, did not feature 
largely among the nations 
favoured by Reza Shah, but 
its omission was particularly 
galling in relation to 
aviation. Daniel Headrick 
has argued that, ‘Although 
most technological advances 
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originated in the West…it does not follow that other cultures were passive victims.’ 
Indeed, some societies ‘submitted to Western conquest and domination’ by the 
embracing of technology, while others ‘attempted to emulate’ Western technology.748 In 
the case of Persia, it neither submitted to Western domination nor attempted to emulate 
Western technology. Instead it adopted another model, which involved buying in 
technology, and modifying and adapting it. In 1929 Arnold T. Wilson, manager of 
APOC’s Middle East operations, pointed out that Persians had ‘always been ready to 
adapt to their own peculiar needs any Western invention that seemed to suit them.’ He 
gave the examples of motor cars and railways, and of Persia being the first Eastern 
country to join the Postal Union and introduce telegraph.749 Ironically, as Ansari 
explains, Persians also construed ‘all things “modern”’ as ‘extending the tentacles of 
Western penetration and domination,’ and he attributes this perception to their 
‘persistent dissimulation,’ which often encompassed modernity.750  
In the 1920s, looking to Germany rather than to the Soviets and British allowed 
Persia to build an external relationship with a power that was neither Britain nor the 
Soviet Union. It also gave Persia a strong ally at a time when it was pressured by 
increasing tension in the British/Soviet relationship within Persia. In importing German 
expertise in the interwar years, Persia, Ansari argues, was making the ‘first tentative 
steps towards dismantling British economic dominance’ which had been established 
during the Qajar era.751 For example, Britain had dominated the Persian banking system 
since the mid-nineteenth century, and the Imperial Bank of Persia, founded in 1889 with 
a charter from Queen Victoria, served as Persia’s default state bank until 1928. As 
Germany’s role as Persia’s key partner developed, British concern grew. German firms 
were invited to participate in the building of the Trans-Persian Railway, and then in 
1928 the National Bank of Iran (Bank Melli) was established and given the mandate to 
print banknotes, thus ousting the British Imperial Bank. Predictably, the first director of 
Bank Melli was German. The connection between Persia and Germany was also helped 
by a spiritual aspect; in addition to the shared ideals of nationalism, nation-building, and 
self-sufficiency, Ansari has posited a ‘commonality of interest via the developing myth 
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of Aryanism.’752 With the advent of the Nazi regime the relationship developed further, 
until by 1939 Germany had become Persia’s main trading partner. 
In this new German/Persian alliance, aviation played a key role as an agent of 
the introduction of modernity. Dierikx, in examining the value of aviation in promoting 
national pride and solidarity, comments that in the 1920s the Soviet Union portrayed 
aviation as “‘the great instrument of future” that would liberate Russia from the 
shackles of the past.’753 The aeroplane, Scott Palmer suggests, functioned both as an 
‘agent and symbol of modernization.’ In the post-war years aviation thus ‘served as a 
practical device for states attempting to modernize…while conditioning and 
contributing to perceptions of the modern.’754 The Persians expected great things of 
aviation for, as Clive explained in 1927, they had ‘worked themselves up to thinking 
that a trans-Persian airline would be a capital thing and add to Persia’s international 
importance. They picture great aeroplanes weekly descending in the capital and making 
Tehran a notable centre.’755 Reza Khan had recognized the potential of military aircraft 
as early as 1922, and ordered a feasibility study for a Persian Air Force (see Fig. 4.9). 
Forced to rely on foreign countries for its supply of hardware and the training of 
personnel, Persia approached the United States with a request for aircraft and training 
facilities. Turned down by the Americans, in 1923 Persia made overtures to Germany 
and as a result procured three Junkers F13 craft (the world’s first ‘all-metal’ monoplane 
– see Fig. 4.10). Persia’s military aviation policy contrasted with that adopted for its 
railway, for which foreign personnel were recruited to construct, manage, and operate 
the network (although there was a longer-term objective of replacing them with 
Persians). In 1923 a group of Persian officers was dispatched to France for pilot 
training, and a further ten were sent to Russia in 1924.756 This foreign training indicated 
that Reza Shah envisaged the evolution of a nationalist air force; while this had military 
implications it also indicated a vision of a force equipped with foreign airplanes manned 
by Persian pilots. In 1926 Persia’s small stock of aircraft was supplemented by the 
acquisition of a motley assortment of other types, including a multi-purpose British De 
Havilland Avro and four French-built biplanes.  
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By this time, German aviation had established a track record of providing 
services to foreign countries, and in particular in South America (mainly in Colombia, 
Bolivia, and Brazil).757 According to R.E.G. Davies, Germany had penetrated the South 
American market by 1919. In that year the Colombian-German Air Transport Company 
was founded and subsequently two Junkers F13 aircraft, configured as flying boats, 
were delivered by a Dutch ship. Along with the aircraft, Junkers provided a pilot, a 
technical representative, and a flight engineer.758 Junkers, Fritzsche argues, ‘emerged as 
one of the most successful export-oriented airplane manufacturers between the wars.’ 
Together with Dornier, the company became a major aircraft supplier to a range of 
countries including Sweden, Italy, Russia, and South America, even penetrating ‘sub-
Saharan regions previously dominated by British companies.’ Germany’s civil aviation 
provided it with a reserve of trained aviation personnel and a large number of aircraft 
that had the potential to be converted to military use in the event of another war.’759  
Davies suggests that Germany was able to obtain entry into South America 
because in the early 1920s the United States had ‘shown little interest in developing 
commercial air routes or establishing airlines’ there.760 However, Dienel and 
Schiefelbusch also attribute Germany’s success in helping to found several national air 
carriers in South America to the large numbers of ethnic Germans residing there, in 
addition to the lack of existing train transportation.761 Further, Junkers was able to use 
its existing international sales network, established for its gas appliances, to market 
aeroplanes not only in South America but also in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 
The German Government also subsidised foreign expansion by means of financial 
incentives given to customers.762 In South America, Germany expanded its sales 
throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s. By 1929 Junkers had sold 31 aircraft to 
Colombia, and the country had also purchased a handful of German Dornier craft.763 In 
neighbouring Brazil, German aeroplanes – six Dornier Wal metal flying boats - first 
went into service in 1927. Then in 1928 Junkers entered the Brazilian market, supplying 
twenty-three aircraft by 1933.764 In Bolivia, after a visit by company representatives in 
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1925, the Lloyd Aéreo Boliviano (LAB) airline was formed by German expatriates. By 
1933 LAB had bought in a fleet of about sixteen Junkers craft.765  
From 1926, following the merger of Deutsche Aero Lloyd and Junkers 
companies,766 Deutsche Luft Hansa became the largest aviation company in Europe, 
with 120 aircraft.767 Germany’s international vision, discussed earlier, continued 
throughout the 1920s. German writers, particularly in the 1930s, expounded ‘an 
explicitly geopolitical strategy,’ with one suggesting that ‘German commercial 
aviation…is…an expression of the restless (stürmischer) air-mindedness of a people 
that is waging a struggle for its lebensraum and sees in air transport an important 
instrument of every great power.’768 Although, as Fritzsche points out, Germany lacked 
‘a vast colonial hinterland like those which had nurtured French and British 
aviation…aviation promised to enlarge rather than narrow Germany’s “field of 
existence.”’ Germany possessed certain advantages, not least its location in the centre of 
Europe, which made it a ‘perfect “air terminal” for the continent.’ Fritzsche comments 
on the ‘sense of urgency,’ and the recognition by Germans that they should make every 
effort to obtain control of air routes while this was still possible.769 Outside Europe, 
Germany possessed fewer advantages, but it was determined to develop Atlantic routes 
to ‘make up for the missing necklace of empire’ – those ‘footholds around the world’ 
possessed by other powers. In April 1928, a German Junkers W33 Bremen, a single-
engined monoplane, made the first east-west aeroplane flight across the Atlantic. After 
the pilots were enthusiastically welcomed in New York,770 Germany began Atlantic 
services, which have been discussed by David Thomas Murphy,771 Fritzsche,772 and 
Dienel and Schiefelbusch.773 From 1930 German aviation concerns worked with 
shipping companies to provide cross-Atlantic mail services to Brazil, Argentina and 
Chile. As aircraft range was too short to provide regular services, ships were fitted with 
pneumatic catapults from which flying boats were launched.774 By 1936, Fritzsche 
records, Germany was using three ‘catapult’ ships, the Westfalen, the Schwabenland, 
and the Ostmark, ‘while looking to a future in which large aeroplanes would have a 
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longer reach.’775 Meanwhile the Graf Zeppelin airship was brought into service on the 
South America route from 1932.776 
Persia’s collaboration with Germany also allowed greater Soviet influence, 
providing an indirect way in which the Soviets could insert a wedge between Britain 
and Persia. The Soviet Union benefitted from the German/Persian relationship. 
Although not yet capable of providing efficient domestic air services, the Soviets, 
through their sponsorship of the German company Junkers, prevented the British from 
developing aviation in Persia. Via Junkers, the Germans and Soviets were together able 
to exploit Persia’s desire to modernise through the acquisition of technology from 
foreign countries. Under the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had been 
forbidden to develop military equipment, including aircraft, within its borders. An 
aviation partnership with the Soviets allowed it to subvert this condition. Ironically, in 
view of what followed, Britain had been in part responsible. Lloyd George, in his final 
year as Prime Minister, had organised the Genoa economic conference of April 1922 
and invited the Germans and Soviets to attend. Taking advantage of this, the two 
countries had signed the Treaty of Rapallo, by means of which Germany became the 
first major country to grant the Soviet regime de jure recognition. The relationship 
developed and in February 1923 Flight reported that Junkers had made an agreement 
with the Soviets, which would allow the company to construct aircraft near Moscow and 
to run an air service between Sweden, Russia, and Persia.777 In addition to the aircraft 
production facilities in a Moscow suburb, Germany maintained a ‘secret’ army and air 
force base at Lipetsk, 300 miles south of Moscow.778 In this symbiotic relationship, the 
Junkers’ factory enabled Germany to pursue aviation development, and the Soviets to 
reap the benefits of association with a technologically-advanced nation. The new 
aviation alliance, Flight feared, was ‘fraught with danger to the Allies, and the future 
peace of the world.’779 
Events moved rapidly and by August 1924, having already established passenger 
and cargo services between London and Ankara, and between Marseilles and Vienna, 
Junkers moved into Persia and began the construction of airfields. By August, a Junkers 
representative had visited Persia to discuss the proposed Moscow-Tehran civil air 
service, and the British had received reports that Junkers was to supply 10 more 
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aeroplanes to the Persian Government.780 By its encouragement of Junkers, Persia 
appeared not only to cock a snook at Britain’s air aims, but also indirectly to challenge 
Britain’s position in the environs of India. This raised sobering questions about 
Germany’s military intentions and its potential to damage Britain’s wider strategic 
interests. However, at first the British seem not to have been unduly alarmed by 
Junkers’ activities. Percy Loraine, in Tehran until 1926, maintained what he described 
as a ‘fair and friendly’ attitude towards his German counterpart, Count Schulenburg. In 
March 1925 Loraine reported to the Foreign Office that Schulenburg had told him that 
although the Persians had grand ambitions for their air network, they were not prepared 
to pay Junkers for it. The British had even suggested collaboration, with Loraine 
proposing that a partnership between Junkers and the Air Ministry might be 
‘advantageous.’781 In developing its relationship with Germany, Britain also had a 
vested interest, for by 1930 APOC ‘met 90 per cent of Lufthansa’s requirements in 
Germany and elsewhere’ for aviation fuel.782 
Fig. 4.10. Junkers F13 aeroplanes in Persia (undated).783 
 
Despite harmonious diplomatic relations with British officials, Junkers’ move 
into Persia, Higham argues, was ‘part of a new German Drang Nach Osten designed to 
penetrate as far as China as well as being part of a Wehrmacht plan to enable its officers 
to gain experience.’784 Among its implications were that, in allowing an eastward 
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advance towards the borders of India, Junkers civilian services gave Germany 
knowledge of air routes and flight conditions in the Gulf region, which might be of 
strategic value in the event of another war. In addition, the multi-purpose F13 used to 
operate civilian services could be converted to military use, and indeed Persia was 
already using the craft in its fledgling air force. That Britain was aware of the dangers 
was demonstrated when Loraine warned German representatives in Tehran that, while 
Britain would not wish to interfere or compete with Junkers in Northern Persia, it might 
object if ‘enterprises other than British sought to establish themselves on air routes 
impinging on that to India.’785 Once the Junkers deal was agreed with Persia in July 
1925, Loraine reported that the company had given him ‘positive assurance’ that it did 
not seek monopoly, and would not sign an agreement with Persia until it had ‘seen and 
satisfied’ air officials in London, with whom Junkers ‘wished to work in cordial 
accord.’786 
German ambitions in Persia were boosted by the fact that Teymourtash was ‘at 
least as much Germanophile in outlook as he was Russophile, and his attitude was as 
friendly towards Germany as it was unfriendly towards Britain.’ Admiring German 
discipline and efficiency, the Minister of Court desired to instil these characteristics into 
his countrymen.787 Teymourtash was instrumental in drawing up the agreement with 
Junkers, and in 1927, after three years of preparatory work by the company in Persia, he 
visited Berlin to sign. Despite Loraine’s certainty in 1925 that Junkers did not seek a 
monopoly, the contract for the Junkers Luftverkehr Persien (Junkers Airline Company 
in Persia) granted Junkers a monopoly concession over commercial air operations until 
1932. With nine airfields now ready in Persia, Junkers began passenger and mail 
services on an extensive network of routes, which included to the British base of 
Bushire, located on the Gulf coast (see Map 4). At its height, Junkers would serve about 
ten Persian cities, with regular weekly flights operated by seven aircraft - six Junkers 
F13s (which could carry two pilots and four passengers) and a Junkers W33. In 1928 the 
Political Resident reported of the company that, ‘To their credit, it must be said, they 
have established a great name for regularity, civility and safety in Bushire, and they are 
deservedly popular.’788 Junkers moved to connect Persia to its international services, and 
by 1928 (as shown in Map 4) it was possible to fly from London to Berlin by German 
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airlines although, as it went via Moscow, the service was unavailable in winter.789 These 
rapid developments were both a contrast and a challenge to Imperial Airways. As 
Political Resident F.W. Johnston, who took over from Haworth in November 1928 
commented, if Junkers were to introduce a faster service, Imperial Airways services 
would have a ‘keen competitor’ for the Junkers route would then be the shorter of the 
two.790 Despite the threat of competition, the British collaborated with Junkers. For 
example, when Imperial Airways began airmail services between London and Karachi 
in the Spring of 1929, a connection was arranged at Baghdad to allow Junkers to carry 
mail between there and Tehran.791 
Map 4. Junkers air routes in Persia. From a Junkers brochure (date unknown).792 
 
Ironically, despite Junkers’ promising start, its services would be outlived by 
those of Imperial Airways. By the late 1920s the German company’s Persian enterprise 
was turning sour, and Junkers and Persia entered a game of brinkmanship, in character 
not unlike that which Persia played with the British. Although this would seem to 
suggest a deterioration of Germany’s relationship with Persia, and that Persia wished to 
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be free of Junkers, the causes of Junkers’ difficulties are unclear. Persia’s failure to 
support the Germany company may simply have been another irrational volte-face such 
as the British themselves experienced. In April 1929 Flight reported that although 
Germany had created a ‘wonderful’ civil aviation network in Persia, it now appeared 
that it had been ‘largely illusory…a thing which “looked well on paper,” but which 
was…of no real practical advantage.’793  
By the spring of 1931, Junkers’ services had been reduced or suspended. Rezun 
suggests that the company ‘was believed to have squandered [Persian] state funds,’794 
but in the summer of 1931, the British Legation reported that Herr Kurt Weil, Manager 
of Junkers in Persia, had told British officials that the problems had originated with 
Persia’s ‘heavy increase’ of taxation of airmail letters.795 Suggesting that the Persian 
taxation did indeed price out airmail, in September 1931 Flight reported that the 
contract had been terminated ‘owing to the insignificant amount of mail…that is being 
transmitted by air nowadays.’796 Junkers threatened to send three of its aeroplanes back 
to Germany, which prompted the Persians to withdraw their heavy airmail taxation, but 
it was too late.797 In October 1931, Charles Dodd, a British Legation official, reported 
that although Junkers could win an extension if it ‘gave a bribe of 10-15,000 dollars,’ it 
refused to do so. While bribery ‘might overcome these reluctances and passions,’ it led 
only to ‘increased appetite later on, blackmail and endless trouble. I understand that 
Junkers are tired of bribing.’798 Herr Weil expected the Persians to ‘wait till the last 
minute and then offer some inferior terms’ in the hope that Junkers would accept, but 
Weil would not tolerate this. Tired of Persian tactics, and to demonstrate the seriousness 
of his intent, he began to close down operations.799 At this point, the British seem to 
have considered stepping in to exploit the situation for their own ends. Making an 
awkward combination of questions of imperial policy, diplomacy, and commerce, in 
November Woods Humphery of Imperial Airways suggested to the Minister in Tehran 
that the British could fill the gap left by Junkers. The Minister, Woods Humphery 
suggested, could ‘throw out the hint’ to the Persians that Imperial Airways would be 
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‘only too pleased’ to help develop Persia’s domestic aviation. However, he cautioned 
that Imperial Airways was ‘an ordinary trading concern and rather poor at that.’800 
Imperial Airways was not invited to assist Persia, and by May 1932, in an environment 
in which in other areas, such as trade, Germany’s relationship with Persia was 
flourishing, Junkers Luftverkehr Persien was dissolved and Junkers withdrew from the 
country.801 
The fact that Persia had allowed Junkers’ to withdraw suggests that it considered 
German services a threat to its sovereignty, and prized its independence above the 
advantages that an air network inferred. As Junkers prepared to leave, Charles Dodd of 
the British Legation reported to the Foreign Office that ‘It is the old story of indecision 
bred of ignorance and suspicion. The Persian Government do not recognise a perfect 
service, even when they have it, and are continually suspecting that they are being 
defrauded in ways which they cannot detect.’ The Junkers service, as Dodd commented, 
was ‘more efficient than anything Persian’ and the Persians were ‘jealous on grounds of 
amour-propre, and they feel the savage impulse to destroy.’802 After Imperial Airways 
withdrew in September 1932, four months after Junkers departure, no civil air service 
operated in Persia until the Government formed its own airline in 1938.  
 
Conclusion 
The overall cause of Britain’s failure to establish its air route was Persia’s desire to 
determine its own alliances, rather than act as a puppet of foreign powers as it had done 
in the past. For a century Britain had controlled the Persian Gulf waterway, and its 
power was well established in the environs of India. After the War, Britain retained its 
position as a political and economic power and even had an enlarged role to play in the 
Middle East. Yet British efforts to implement an aviation policy in Persia suggest 
changed circumstances, while aviation in its turn brought further change to regional 
relationships. When during the War the British had begun to fly the Persian Coast route 
without formal approval from Tehran, they had in this way seized the initiative at a time 
when Tehran had a weak grip on the country. In the interwar years, in attempting to 
establish the air route on a formal basis, the British, continuing their traditional 
methods, adopted a manner which was inappropriately high-handed. Britain’s inability 
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to impose a permanent air route demonstrates that its hold on Persia had decreased since 
the War, while the story of aviation in relation to the Soviet Union and Germany in the 
region showed that its regional influence was also under threat.  
Britain’s reputation was tarnished by its long history of interference in Persia, 
but Persia’s desire for national self-determination, in giving it new confidence, created a 
negative atmosphere for British negotiators. The Persians wielded diplomatic power 
through their use of the ‘weapons of the weak,’ using ambiguity and dissimulation to 
deprive the British of a firm basis for negotiation. By holding back knowledge of their 
current thinking and intentions, Persian elites denied the British the means to dominate 
in diplomacy. As air route negotiations were conducted largely through the medium of 
Teymourtash, his personality became a major factor in British difficulties. Despite their 
long experience and careful handling, which involved flattery as well as efforts to dupe 
and outwit him, the Foreign Office diplomats in Tehran were unable to get the better of 
the Minister of Court.  
Persia’s relationships with Germany and the Soviet Union were also ambiguous. 
Persia played a delicate diplomatic game, juggling with three major powers at the same 
time and encouraging or rejecting them seemingly at will. Persia needed to retain an 
outwardly friendly relationship with the Soviets, in part because its northern areas were 
economically dependent on them. At the same time it also feared the Communist 
influence which the Soviets worked insidiously to introduce into Persia. Yet Persia also 
feared British interference, although it needed to maintain a good relationship with 
Britain not only because APOC was a major source of revenue, but also because it 
valued the power of the British to steady Soviet influence. Germany, meanwhile, was 
invited in to create a valuable domestic aviation network. As Persia, Germany, and the 
Soviet Union colluded in a three-cornered relationship, Britain was excluded, and 
struggled to maintain its single air route along the Gulf coast. Even though there was 
generally a cooperative relationship between Germany and Persia, Junkers could not 
survive Persia’s methods for more than eight years. It seems doubtful, therefore, that, 
even had it been allowed to develop wider air transport services in Persia, Britain could 
have escaped a similar fate. For the Persians, suspicion and fear overcame every other 
consideration. By the autumn of 1932 it was clear that Tehran had no intention of 
allowing Imperial Airways to expand its network in Persia, or even to enjoy permanent 
access to the coastal route. The British, despite all efforts, had failed to drive through 
their will. However, as they transferred their services to the Arabian shore they had at 
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least the consolation of knowing that the Germans had also withdrawn from Persia, and 
hence from the environs of India. Importantly, as they moved across the Gulf, the 
British anticipated that they would be free of the diplomatic vagaries that has so 
hampered them Tehran.  
 
Chapter Five: The Struggle for the Arabian Route, 1926-1932 
 
Chapters Five and Six investigate Britain’s efforts to establish an alternative to the 
Persian air route, via the Trucial Coast on the Arabian Peninsula between 1926 and 
1932. Their efforts would be set within the context of continuing political tension in 
Tehran, and the possibility of the breakdown of the Persian option. While an Arabian 
route was desired by some British officials, so grave were the difficulties involved in 
establishing it that throughout the period, a Persian route continued to be favoured. 
Arguments went to and fro, with some officials stressing the need to leave Persia, while 
others insisted that Arabia was more workable. In the former category was Robert 
Clive, Minister to Persia, whose intimate knowledge of Britain’s diplomatic relationship 
with the Persians convinced him as early as 1927 that an alternative - and preferably ‘all 
red’ - route was ‘an immediate and vital necessity,’ even if it possessed some logistical 
disadvantages.803 Although the Persian Legation reported to the Foreign Office in 
London, Clive’s view was challenged by some Indian Government officials, who 
pressed for a settlement with Persia even in the face of continuing difficulties. This 
divergence of opinion reflected differences between policy considerations in Britain and 
India.  
The importance of the Arabian route was heightened by the Soviet threat, and at 
first it had been viewed simply as a strategic alternative to the Persian route, for in 
wartime it would be necessary to transport reinforcements by air from Egypt to India 
through the Gulf ‘without infringing Persian neutrality.’804 The strategic focus meant 
that it took time for the Arabian route’s civil potential to be perceived. Not until July 
1927 did Air Minister Samuel Hoare suggest that a route via Arabia might, ‘in addition 
to its strategic importance, also be the only practicable commercial route for linking 
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England by air with India via Egypt.’805 In October 1928, the Persian Gulf Sub-
Committee stressed the importance of an alternative, reporting that with the 
development of new aerodromes, improvements to roads, and the building of the Trans-
Persian Railway, ‘a rapid movement of Russian aircraft to within striking distance of the 
shores of the Gulf would present no difficulty’ for the Soviets. As this would enable the 
Soviets to threaten British shipping and oil facilities, it constituted ‘the main danger’ in 
the Gulf, and rendered a strategic Arabian route essential for British countermeasures.806  
 
Fig. 5.1. The 
Hajar Mountains, 
United Arab 
Emirates, 2004.807 
 
At the 
same time, it was 
undeniable that a 
route via Arabia, 
as a Times report 
stated in April 
1927, presented 
many practical 
problems.808 The 
most obvious way lay along the Trucial Coast (in the area of today’s United Arab 
Emirates), but this was longer than the Persian route, more expensive to organise, and 
also required a passage over the barren Hajar mountains (Fig. 5.1) plus a sea crossing 
(to Gwadar in British-controlled Balochistan. See Map 5). It also lacked vital facilities 
such as the wireless/telegraph stations that Imperial Airways had installed on the 
Persian side. In addition, the climate was hotter than in Persia, and the sea access less 
convenient. Further, as the area was inhabited by wild tribesmen, it was argued that 
British installations would be unsafe, and in the event of an emergency landing, the fate 
of plane and passengers would be uncertain. Despite these arguments, continuing 
problems in Persia ensured that enthusiasm for the Trucial Coast option gained 
momentum from 1927 as it was increasingly recognised, albeit with reluctance by some, 
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that it offered the only practical solution. Certainly, the Coast appeared to provide the 
advantages inherent in being ‘all red,’ and hence, as The Times pointed out, a route there 
would be ‘more truly Imperial’ than one in Persia.809 From the political viewpoint, there 
seemed little that might obstruct progress. Britain’s long-term relationship with the 
Trucial inhabitants had for a century served British aims so well, that in the interwar 
years the likelihood of indigenous interference seemed less than in Persia. It was 
therefore reasonable to assume that there would be few obstacles to the achievement of 
Britain’s imperial aviation ambitions. However, for reasons which are explored both 
here and in Chapter Six, this assumption would prove too optimistic. 
 
Map 5. Imperial 
Airways routes 
radiating from 
Cairo. Three 
routes through the 
Persian Gulf were 
considered: the 
‘Proposed’ Central 
Persian route, the 
Persian coast 
route, and the 
Arabian shore 
route. While the 
Persian shore 
route was operated 
from 1929, the 
Arabian route 
would be adopted 
in 1932.810 
 
An 
understanding of the problems that the British experienced in their attempts to achieve 
air facilities on the Trucial Coast requires an understanding of Britain’s long-term 
policy, which prescribed Britain’s relationship with the Trucial Coast. Firstly, therefore, 
the research explores some key characteristics of the political and cultural environment 
that Britain’s long-term system of control had created, and which influenced the 
progress of the Gulf air route. The second part of the chapter investigates the impact of 
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aviation on the relationship of the Home and Indian Governments, and on Britain’s 
relationship with the Trucial Arabs, as these pertained to British efforts to introduce 
aviation on the Trucial Coast.  
 
The political and cultural environment of the Trucial Coast 
The British had originally established long-term control of the Trucial Coast in the 
1820s, and in this way had also gained full control of the Persian Gulf waterway. In the 
first two decades of the nineteenth century they had subdued the ‘pirates’ which were 
disrupting trade and sea navigation in the lower part of the Gulf. These ‘pirates’ were 
largely the Qawasim, described as a ‘tribal confederation,’811 which had its base at the 
town of Ras al Khaimah on the Arabian shore (see Map 6). The area was known by the 
British as the ‘Pirate Coast,’ a designation which survived owing to its romanticism, to 
be used by The Times even as late as 1932.812 Prior to British intervention, the Qawasim 
had traded throughout the Gulf, and as far away as India and the east coast of Africa. So 
strong were they that they could muster 63 long-distance trading ships of up to 135 feet 
in length, and 669 smaller ones, as well as the 18,760 men required to crew them.813 The 
British dealt decisively with the Qawasim, burning their fleet in Ras al Khaimah 
harbour, and subsequently preventing rebuilding by blocking the importation of wood. 
After this, Britain sealed its power with a series of treaties, by which the Pirate Coast’s 
ruling sheikhs placed themselves and their territories under the authority of the British. 
The Pirate Coast was renamed the Trucial Coast, and seven Trucial sheikhdoms 
developed - Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras al Khaimah, Sharjah, and Umm 
Al Quwain - defined by an India Office report of 1928 as ‘independently administered 
tribal principalities, governed by independent Arab Sheikhs’814 (as shown in Map 6). 
While across the Gulf, Persia was a recognised national entity with centralised rule and 
a history of parliamentary processes, the Trucial Coast became in part a British 
construct. Its control, as Glen Balfour-Paul suggests, was marked by ‘that scrupulous 
imprecision characteristic of so many of Britain’s imperial contrivances,’ whereby 
Britain ‘made up the rules of the game as she went along, with the result that no one 
really knew what they were.’815 However, it was a construct in which British systems of 
expressing power, although unarticulated, were well understood on both sides. 
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Nicholas Stanley-Price points out that the Trucial Coast was so named in the 
1820s because Britain had drawn up a truce with the local inhabitants.816 A truce has 
been defined as ‘a short interruption in a war or argument, or an agreement to stop 
fighting or arguing for a period of time,’817 but as the truce endured for 150 years, 
ending only with the formation of the United Arab Emirates in 1971, the British can be 
said to have extended it into a fixed state. Robinson and Gallagher argue that after 1815 
‘the British constantly sought the least effortful way of pursuing their interests in every 
part of the world, partly because of their system of government with its inbuilt 
constraint on public expenditure.’818 Certainly this was the case in the Pax Britannica 
that ensued in the Persian Gulf from 1820, as the British allocated no more than the 
minimum of resources necessary to the achievement of their aims. Under this system, 
the Persian Gulf became an ‘English lake,’ and the Trucial Coast settled into a routine 
by which British policy was directed at the maintenance of ‘peaceful supremacy.’ As 
Frauke Heard-Bey has commented, British naval power in the Gulf gave ‘the 
impression that prompt diplomatic and naval action was forthcoming if the treaties were 
violated,’819 and hence the British position depended to a great extent upon bluff. As 
such, the British felt no need to define further the nature of their dominance. As the 
British could achieve their policy aims without formalising their rule, in the interwar 
years, they regarded the Trucial Coast, and indeed most of the Arabian shoreline, as a 
‘sort of’ or ‘veiled’ protectorate.820 821 With the Persian Gulf firmly under control, British 
domination rested on two factors: ‘the exclusion of a foreign naval base from the Gulf 
water’ and ‘the maintenance on the Arab side of the status quo.’822  
The Persian Gulf began to emerge as a waterway of importance in the last years 
of the nineteenth century. This reflected its location in a larger political arena, and its 
peripheral involvement in ‘imperial rivalries, diplomatic flux, and sizable dangers to 
international peace of mind in the cycles of decay and revolutionary activity in the 
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Ottoman and Persian states.’823 Problems developed during the War, when British 
control in the wider Middle East had proved problematic. Clive Leatherdale has 
summarised the regional policy struggles created when the War Office entered Middle 
Eastern affairs, and the Government of India established administrative structures in 
Mesopotamia. Britain’s Arab Bureau, located in Cairo in 1915, operated as ‘a 
hotchpotch of personnel and functions, being technically under the Foreign Office, 
funded by the War Office, yet effectively controlled by the Admiralty.’824 In regard to 
Arabia, in 1916 Mark Sykes, diplomatic adviser on Middle Eastern matters, lamented 
that it would be ‘difficult to find a precedent for so complex or unworkable a political 
arrangement’ as the British had evolved since 1914. Instead of improving, Sykes wrote, 
the ‘mess’ was 
becoming worse: 
‘suggestions are 
fired from all 
quarters of the earth 
– Simla, London, 
Paris, Rome.’825 The 
‘extremely ad hoc 
and uncertain’ 
situation that had 
developed during 
the War, individual 
ministers who 
wished to pursue 
their own agendas 
‘had numerous 
opportunities to 
influence policy-
making.’826  
Map 6. Showing the Trucial Coast area, 1866-1935.  
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After the War, an increased number of officials and departments became 
involved in the Middle East region, resulting in greater tension and complexity of 
administrative arrangements. The Middle East, as Bruce Westrate argues, remained ‘an 
administrative morass that saddled officials with enormous but nebulously defined 
spheres of authority.’ Within these spheres, control ‘was so subdivided as to create 
much departmental duplication, inefficiency, and internecine rivalry’ - a situation which 
‘bred ignorance, intrigue, and practical paralysis.’827 The uncertainty cannot have been 
alleviated by the fact that from 1926 to 1932 Britain had four Governments 
(Conservative, Labour, and the First and Second National Governments). In the 
administration of the Persian Gulf region in particular, Michael Hughes suggests that as 
a result of the War, the Treasury had an increased role in foreign affairs, while the War 
Office, Admiralty, Colonial Office, Dominions Office, and India Office all sought a 
greater say in matters relating to their particular spheres of interest. With authority 
structures thus confused, Uriel Dann concludes that there emerged ‘a damaging 
proliferation of authorities.’828 In particular, the Admiralty - slow-moving, cautious and 
jealous – now feared that aviation - dynamic and modern - presented an alternative 
rather than a complementary element to its traditional system of control, and hence a 
threat to its position. The exploitation of aviation in pursuit of Britain’s foreign policy 
objectives also seemed to imply a reduction of Naval dominance. This coincided with a 
period of particular sensitivity for the Admiralty, which had suffered from the cuts of 
the ‘Geddes Axe’ and the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty. The debate between a 
weakened Admiralty and the RAF over how the defence of the Gulf should be secured 
drew in the Foreign, Colonial, and India Offices, and created disunity among them. 
Each, lacking full responsibility but with its own interests to pursue, felt entitled to 
involvement in Gulf aviation decision-making. In these circumstances, by the 1920s, the 
Gulf’s growing prominence in regional and world affairs meant that it could no longer 
retain its reputation as a ‘cul-de-sac leading nowhere beyond itself.’829 As the Persian 
Gulf Sub-Committee found in 1928, the maintenance of British supremacy was now, ‘if 
anything, more essential to the security of India and to Imperial interests at the present 
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time than it was in the past.’830  
The differing views of policy direction and the concomitant ‘political, 
bureaucratic, and financial implications’ resulted in ‘friction,’831 but it was Delhi that 
‘remained the principal determinant’ in Gulf policy.832 Therefore, Britain’s search for an 
air route solution on the Trucial Coast was to a great extent prescribed by the key 
relationship in regional administration – that between the Home and Indian 
Governments. Between the wars, responsibility for Gulf affairs developed into what 
Robert J. Blyth describes as ‘a compromise accommodating rival views from within 
Whitehall and British India.’833 As a Cabinet report stated in 1921, the Gulf waterway 
was ‘dealt with as a single administrative unit for all purposes.’834 In practice, the rule of 
the British was expressed and executed by the Gulf Residency, defined by James Onley 
as a ‘diplomatic district,’835 with the Political Resident based at Bushire on the Gulf’s 
Persian side (Fig. 5.2). It had been established in 1763, to become responsible for 
‘India’s largest and strategically one of its most important’ regions.836 The Gulf was 
therefore under the control of the Indian Government, and was part of the periphery of 
the ‘Empire of India.’837 The Indian Government formed an imperial core in its own 
right, of which the strength, prestige, and authority was confirmed and enhanced during 
the interwar period by the completion of the impressive capital of New Delhi, which 
included the grandiose 340 room Viceroy’s House.  
 
Fig. 5.2. The Bushire 
Residency (undated).838 
 
In the practical 
administration of the affairs 
of the Gulf, the Political 
Resident acted as the 
virtual ruler, having a great 
deal of autonomy and 
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freedom of action; the Indian Navy patrol boats operated under his instruction. 
Although the Political Resident was primarily an official of the Government of India, 
difficulties arose because he also reported to a number of departments in the Home 
Government. He was directly responsible to the Colonial Office in matters relating to 
Britain’s relationship with Ibn Saud and the political aspects of the Arab littoral. In 
addition, the Resident served the Foreign Office in his capacity as Consul-General at 
Bushire, acting as a liaison with the British Minister to Persia in Tehran. It was also the 
Resident’s responsibility to co-ordinate ‘action in times of stress,’ and in this capacity 
he consulted with the RAF Air Officer Commanding in Iraq, and the Senior Naval 
Officer in the Gulf.839 When the question of civil aviation arose in the 1920s, he was 
required to serve and articulate London’s policy, which included acting on behalf of 
Imperial Airways. In Tehran the air route negotiations had been carried out by Foreign 
Office diplomats. In the Gulf, however, they were the personal responsibility of the 
Political Resident, an Indian Government official. The problems that these arrangements 
caused for the Resident were hinted at by The Times in its obituary of Resident Sir Hugh 
Biscoe in 1932: ‘he showed remarkable skill and address in serving the many masters 
who have to do in one way or another with the Resident in the Persian Gulf – the 
Foreign Office, the Government of India, the Colonial Office, the Navy and the Air 
Ministry.’840  
The tension that resulted from such complexity of responsibility, although not 
usually openly admitted, was suggested in 1933 in a revealing correspondence, in which 
Tehran Legation officials aired their frustrations about the political differences between 
Tehran and the Bushire Residency. From Tehran, Victor Mallet reviewed recent events 
in a letter to Sir John Simon at the Foreign Office. It had been, Mallet wrote, 
‘unfortunately once more shown how wide a divergence of view exists almost 
inevitably’ between officials who ‘watch events in Persia from the different angles of 
Tehran and the Gulf ports. It is useless to ignore the fact that such divergence exists.’ 
Mallet’s opinion demonstrated that while Britain’s status had changed in the Persian 
capital, on the Gulf seaboard, far to the South, it remained largely intact. There would, 
Mallet wrote, always be ‘a time-lag between Tehran and the Gulf.’ While in Tehran, 
Britain’s influence was fading, in the Gulf, on the other hand, British prestige remained 
largely untarnished. In the Gulf, life went on ‘in the old way, far from Tehran and its 
                                            
839 IOR L/P&S/18/B393. ‘Political Control in the Persian Gulf,’ J.G. Laithwaite, India Office, 5 October 
1928.  
840 ‘Sir Hugh Biscoe,’ The Times, 20 July 1932, p. 14. 
181 
new streets and new methods of government, but near the waters in which the British 
navy has held unchallenged supremacy for more than a century.’ While Persian affairs 
came under the aegis of British foreign policy, the Gulf, Mallet stated, remained ‘an 
apanage of our Indian empire, and the Political Resident is the visible sign of that 
Empire’s grip on the Gulf. He still enjoys the halo of prestige which comes of the 
proximity of armed force. The halo has become less conspicuous of late – like a Titian 
halo to that of a Fra Angelico – but it is still rather nebulously there.’841  
Mallet’s letter was followed up by one from the Tehran Charge d’Affaires, who 
also implied disharmony between Legation and Residency. The Charge pointed out that 
the Residency was at fault in showing ‘an insufficient appreciation of the difficulties of 
the position of the Minister at Tehran and the policy which he has to pursue.’ However, 
the official also attacked Legation officials for behaving towards Bushire as if they were 
a superior power. Tehran diplomats, the Charge suggested, did not ‘fully appreciate that 
the Gulf is not merely an appendage of Persia, action in which must be subordinated in 
all circumstances to considerations of Persian policy.’ The Gulf, he pointed out, was 
independent of the Legation, and was of ‘essential importance’ to the British 
Government ‘as the air highway to the East and as commanding one of the flanks of 
India.’842  
 
Fig. 5.3. 
HMS 
Bideford, 
one of the 
British 
sloops that 
patrolled 
the Persian 
Gulf (c. 
1931).843 
 
 
 
Whereas the Tehran diplomats were officials of the Foreign Office in London, in 
the Gulf, the Residency applied the Indian model of administration. However, while the 
control that the Indian Government exercised in its own imperial core was formal, the 
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nature of the power that it exerted on the Trucial Coast was less easily understood. 
Alexander Motyl suggests that empires are ‘structurally centralized political systems’844 
in which the relationship of core and periphery is unequal, being premised on the 
‘dominance’ of the first and the ‘subordination’ of the societies of the second. In 
Motyl’s model, elites in the periphery implement the policies of the core and 
‘administer their [own] peripheral counterparts or extensions.’845 Motyl defines formal 
empire as a situation in which ‘the core elite appoints and dismisses the peripheral 
elites, sets the entire internal policy agenda, and determines all internal policies.’846 In 
the Gulf, the Resident exercised control with the aid of Indian Naval cruisers but, as in 
the 1920s he made tours only once or twice a year, the ships’ commanders, who made 
more regular patrols, acted as a category of Residency deputy. The Resident was also 
represented in key locations by Political Agents, in the 1920s based at Kuwait, Bahrain, 
and Muscat. On the Trucial Coast, as local conditions both political and climatic made it 
impossible for a Briton to reside there, a ‘Residency Agent’ was posted who, although 
an Arab, was not a native of the coast. In practice, on the Trucial Coast in the interwar 
years, whether they exercised it or not, the British had the power to act as a formal core 
elite in one aspect, which was their power to ‘dismiss’ Trucial elites. In informal 
empire, Motyl argues, ‘the core elite influences the appointment and dismissal of 
peripheral elites, sets the external policy agenda, 
influences the internal agenda, and determines 
external policies while only influencing internal 
policies.’ On the Coast, an ‘informal’ pattern of 
control prevailed, reflecting that, while the 
British Raj was operated on a formal system 
within India, in its periphery it employed control 
systems of informal empire. By Motyl’s 
definition, on the Trucial Coast the British 
maintained the ‘influence’ of informal empire 
rather than the ‘control’ of formal empire.847 
 
Fig. 5.4. Old watchtower at Rams, United Arab 
Emirates, 2004.848 
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The influence of the British on the Trucial Coast was limited because they 
exercised control from a distance, but informal rule was best served by giving the 
appearance of formal rule. Therefore the British acted in the manner of rulers of formal 
empire, threatening force, and using it to set internal and external policy agendas. 
During the Pax Britannica, British control had been characterised by fixed resolution; 
British will had been forced through by military means when necessary. Therefore, in 
the interwar years, there was clearly no precedent for consultation. For example, in 1926 
the Resident reported that the Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf had visited Ras 
al Khaimah ‘to communicate to the Shaikhs…the orders of His Majesty’s 
Government.’849 In 1931, a Bushire Residency Minute paper recorded that the Resident 
thought it ‘a mistake to approach the Sheikhs with tentative and contingent schemes, 
and preferable to make up our own minds first as to what we require of them so that we 
can adopt a firm and definite attitude.’850 Britain’s system of control followed what 
Lawrence James has described as a ‘strategic dogma,’ under which challenges to 
imperial authority were met with a response which was ‘aggressive, audacious and 
overwhelming. Compromise or the faintest sign of irresolution would be interpreted as 
weakness and encourage further mischief.’851  
British rule of the Gulf was maintained by means of gunboats and Matthew S. 
Hopper, in discussing the work of Michel Foucault on the history of the penal system, 
characterises Britain’s disciplinary methods on the Trucial Coast in Foucault’s term 
‘disciplinary-blockade,’ or ‘exceptional discipline aimed at negative 
functions…characterized by public spectacle, theatre, and bodily experience.’ Britain’s 
‘gunboat’ methods were intended to have their effect ‘by creating fear of potential 
bodily consequences of the contravention of treaties.’852 As Hopper argues, British 
methods of bombardment were ‘calculated to maximise display, through the destruction 
of a symbolic structure, such as a fort or watchtower…in as dramatic a fashion as 
possible.’853 Denys Bray, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, boasted that 
Indian Naval ships (an example is shown in Fig. 5.3) had ‘relentless patience.’ The 
Navy could ‘take the Resident and lie off some recalcitrant Sheikh for a week or ten 
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days, give the terms, and impose its will without firing a shot. This is the routine when 
we have trouble with a Sheikh.’ Certainly, as Resident Lieutenant-Colonel C.C. Barrett 
commented in 1929, the mere presence of gunboats had ‘a most beneficial and 
tranquilising effect on the more unruly elements on land.’854 If the calming effect failed 
to occur, a sheikh’s fort made ‘a very pretty target which the Navy have not the slightest 
trouble in hitting every time.’855 Thus Navy ships acted as the major agent of British 
power in the Gulf, and their guns exerted the ‘moral influence’ with which the British 
goaded the unwilling into compliance. By the time of the air route negotiations, this 
long-term policy had fixed in the minds of the Trucial Arabs the inevitability that 
transgressions would be liable to punishment by force. Military action took place into 
the interwar years. In 1925, for example, the Resident reported that ‘it was necessary to 
teach a salutary lesson to the Shaikh of Fujairah…for misconduct in regard to slavery. 
His fort was bombarded by two men-of-war and a fine of Rs. 1,500 was recovered from 
him.’856 As late as 1931, the year before the conclusion of the air route negotiations at 
Sharjah, the ruling sheikh there was warned that a watchtower (see Fig. 5.4) would be 
demolished if he failed to comply with British demands.857 
Onley makes a penetrating analysis of the relationship between the British and 
Trucial Arabs, which suggests that during the Pax Britannica era, the Residency system 
had enabled the British to consciously create a style of relationship that served their 
imperial aims. Onley argues that the Coast was drawn into India’s ‘informal empire’ by 
the Resident’s ‘strategy of working within the indigenous political systems,’ and that 
this was the ‘secret’ of the effectiveness of the Residency system.858 Onley explains that 
the role of the Resident was ‘legitimized’ in the eyes of the Arabs because it was akin to 
their traditional ‘tribal’ system of protection – ‘culturally sanctioned protector-protégé 
relationships.’ Therefore the Arabs regarded the Resident as ‘a Gulf ruler himself, 
except that he was the most powerful and influential ruler they had ever known.’ For 
this reason, they ‘tried to impose the role of “protector”…on the Resident and the 
British Government,’ and over time the Resident came to accept this, and ‘to behave, on 
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the whole, as the rulers expected a protector to behave.’859 Having taken on the role, 
Onley argues, the British  
largely conformed to local expectations of a protector’s duties and rights, while 
ensuring that the rulers honored their duties and commitments as protégés. In 
taking on the role, the British embraced in some measure the static and 
unchanging character valued by Trucial inhabitants, and together the two sides 
inhabited a fictional milieu in which the present became a seamless and non-
progressive continuation of the past. This collaborative relationship was the 
reason for the success and longevity of the Pax Britannica in the Gulf.860  
 
Therefore the Trucial pact of the 1820s had allowed the British to claim the right 
to rule, and their claim had been allowed and supported by the response of the Trucial 
Arabs. Cain and Hopkins argue that ‘agents of imperialism normally believe that they 
represent a superior power, ideologically as well as materially, and their actions are 
driven on by a sense of mission which embraces, legitimizes and uplifts their private 
ambitions.’861 British practice in the Gulf conformed to this framework. For example, 
Lord Curzon, as Indian Viceroy, had expressed this combination of characteristics in 
1903 when, during a tour of the Gulf, and regally seated on a golden chair on the deck 
of a large sloop, he had reminded the Trucial elites at his feet that, ‘We were here before 
any other power, in modern times, had shown its face in these waters. We found strife 
and we have created order. It was our commerce as well as your security that was 
threatened and called for protection.’862 However, the changes that took place in the 
subsequent two decades meant that in the interwar years, even had the British had the 
hubris to attempt it in their air route quest, such rhetoric would have appeared 
unhelpfully boastful and hollow. Therefore, although the British were clearly still the 
superior power, their ‘sense of mission’863 had perhaps declined since 1903, while 
Trucial perceptions of British superiority had also declined.  
Events associated with the air route would prove that the British no longer 
possessed the easy superiority that Curzon had expressed in 1903, and to achieve air 
facilities were forced into taking part in discourse and collaboration with the Trucial 
Arabs. The main problem was that by the interwar years, Britain’s long-term policy had 
                                            
859 Ibid, p. 3. 
860 James Onley, ‘Britain and the Gulf Shaikhdoms, 1820–1971: The Politics of Protection,’ Occasional 
Paper 4, Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign 
Service in Qatar (2009), p. 1. 
861 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-2000, p. 54. 
862 Quoted in: Arnold T. Wilson, The Persian Gulf, An Historical Sketch from Earliest Times to the 
Beginning of the Twentieth Century (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1928). 
863 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-2000, p. 54. 
186 
locked both sides into entrenched positions. Each held a fixed, and negative, view of the 
other, which would not easily be translated into a positive partnership. On the Arab side, 
perhaps the main cause of grievance remained Britain’s forceful intervention against the 
Qawasim in the early nineteenth century, and the ensuing effects. As the writer John le 
Carré has observed, ‘in all geopolitical matters…the victims remember, the victors 
never do.’864 On the Trucial Coast, a strong oral tradition kept bitterness smouldering - 
and in particular as it related to the matter of slavery - until in 1932 the British would 
identify it as a key factor in problems over air negotiations. British policy had, however, 
brought some advantages to the Trucial Arabs. As Onley comments, the local rulers 
‘actively sought British intervention and protection,’ which included diplomatic 
involvement in arbitration, guarantees of peace between rulers, and defence against 
attack from land and sea.865 In addition, Balfour-Paul suggests that the Trucial Coast 
benefitted from British control because, without it, the ‘tiny mini-states’ would have 
been ‘absorbed by, or merged into, larger ones of sensible size.’866 The economic effects 
of British policy had been far-reaching, and still in the interwar years the inhabitants 
attributed to it the decline of the economy. Fatima Al Sayegh points out that when the 
British had halted the maritime trading with large boats that had been the economic 
mainstay of the coast, they had ‘overlooked the nature of the land and the conditions 
prevailing. The land provided its people with no other means of living.’ In the 
subsequent economic distress, during the Pax Britannica, ‘by preventing the people 
from adopting alternative economic activities, the British entered into conflict with the 
traditional society, generating much local resentment.’867 Britain’s destruction of the 
large boats had forced the Arabs to switch their dependence to activity with small boats, 
which included pearling and fishing, and small trading, both legal and illegal in British 
terms. By means of fairly low-level policing, the British were able to suppress, but not 
abolish, illegal activities - smuggling, arms trafficking, and slave trading – while 
protecting the legal pearl trade which also benefitted Indian merchants. The pearl 
trade868 grew in importance to become the economic mainstay of the Coast until by the 
turn of the twentieth century, during the pearling seasons, about 22,000 men out of the 
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total Trucial population of 80,000 worked on more than 1,200 boats.869  
Al Sayegh claims that their disregard of the Coast contributed to the problems of 
the British. Trucial society, she argues, was more structured than they perceived, and 
the people had strong rules which were not clearly visible to, or were simply 
disregarded by, British officials. As a result, ‘In their determination to set up the air 
route…the British Government showed no signs of consideration for Arab feelings or 
tribal institutions, a fact that caused a rift between the two sides which was not easily 
healed.’870 Such disdain could only heighten resentment, strengthen Trucial impulses of 
conservatism and independence, and bring forth an obstructive response to aviation 
proposals. British attitudes were drawn from fixed perceptions of the Trucial 
inhabitants, and could not be easily overcome. These included racial and cultural 
attitudes, which have been explained by Robinson and Gallagher in terms of a ‘ladder of 
progress.’ It was a ladder that was peculiarly difficult to climb, for upon it, ‘nations and 
races seemed to stand higher or lower according to the proven capacity of each for 
freedom and enterprise.’ The British occupied the top rung, with Americans and other 
‘striving, go-ahead’ Anglo-Saxons below them. One step up from the bottom stood the 
Orientals of Asia and northern Africa, where progress had been ‘crushed for centuries 
by military despotisms or smothered by passive religions.’ On the bottom rung were the 
‘aborigines’ who, Robinson and Gallagher argue, had ‘never learned enough social 
discipline to pass from the family and tribe to the making of a state.’871 By this 
definition, the Trucial Arabs occupied the two lowest categories from the perspective of 
the British elites at the time. However, once the air facilities were eventually achieved 
in 1932, the Trucial Coast would move away from a ‘tribal’ structure towards one that 
more resembled a modern state by Western perspectives. Therefore interaction with the 
British over aviation would allow the Coast to attain the stability necessary to ‘make a 
state.’  
Britain’s disdain also held back aviation progress in another respect, for it 
helped the British to remain ignorant about the region. During the Pax Britannica, 
administrators had not required familiarity with the Trucial Coast, and Britain’s lack of 
knowledge of many aspects of regional life and culture continued to characterise its 
dealings in the interwar period. Ignorance was also a by-product of the traditional lack 
of perceived value of the region, for traditionally the British had regarded it as 
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inherently of little importance, being only ‘an exceedingly primitive and wild part of the 
world.’872 Partly, the Coast’s isolation was responsible for its ‘primitive and wild’ 
nature, and one Resident, Sir F.W. Johnston, confessed in 1929 that so few were his 
visits that he could ‘only have a very partial knowledge of what is really going on.’873 In 
the 1920s, an unusually high turnover of Residents in contrast to earlier years 
exacerbated the situation. The Resident could request information from the Residency 
Agent at Sharjah, and indeed it was mainly through the lens of the Agent that the British 
viewed Trucial affairs. However, as the Agent was of another race and culture, and had 
to maintain his own position with the Trucial Arabs, his version of events was not 
always regarded in the same way as if he had been British.874 Communication was 
limited, and even in 1929 the Agent still had no wireless link with Bushire,875 while the 
mail steamer called on the Coast only at fortnightly intervals.  
 
The impact of aviation upon Britain’s long-term policy on the Trucial Coast 
Britain’s lack of direct knowledge of the Trucial Coast, and its long-term policy there, 
would have a negative influence on its efforts to introduce aviation. In the stable, and 
indeed static, environment that the British had established on the Coast, aviation was an 
alien intrusion. Aviation implied an alteration of long-term relationships, not only 
between the British and Arabs but also between London officials and the Indian 
Government. In these circumstances, adjustments in well-understood traditional 
practices were required on both sides, but this caused internal and external conflict and 
upset existing systems. A number of writers have discussed the matter of time in the 
relations of West and East. Balfour-Paul argues that the nineteenth century Trucial 
treaties had the effect of ‘legitimizing, perpetuating and indeed fossilizing a fragmented 
political system that just happened to prevail there at the time.’876 Britain’s policy had to 
a great extent preserved the Coast economically and politically in the state in which it 
had been during the 1820s. In 1921, Gulf Resident A.P. Trevor observed that the Pax 
Britannica allowed the ‘extraordinarily ignorant and backward’ Trucial Arabs to retain 
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the conservatism that their culture, religion, and geographical isolation had brought 
about.877 A later Resident, C.C. Barrett, commented in 1928 that the Arabs remained 
‘apparently content to live in the seventh century.’878 The fear of domination also helped 
assure the static character of the Coast, and allowed the British to maintain their long-
term, tried and tested systems of rule. The two sides therefore collaborated in a fiction 
which portrayed the present as an immovable and seamless continuation of the past. As 
a result, British control had deliberately placed and fixed the Trucial inhabitants in a 
past which went on and on, but this did not provide a welcoming environment for 
aviation. The ‘fossilisation’ of the Trucial Coast created what Linda Street, in discussing 
the theories of cultural anthropologist Johannes Fabian, describes as the ‘time warp’ 
experienced by Westerners in Arab environments, whereby ‘centuries were thrown 
about so easily.’879 Here, Street constructs a concept to explain contemporary events. 
Britain’s Trucial policy also conformed to Fabian’s idea that Western imperialists used 
time as a weapon - an ‘ideologically construed instrument of power’ which was put to 
‘political and oppressive uses.’ Fabian argues that Western imperialist expansion 
‘“required Time to accommodate the schemes of one-way history,” a history that charts 
cultures according to select indicators of civilization, development, and modernization.’ 
Under this, ‘relations between the West and the Other...were conceived not only as 
difference, but as distance in space and Time.’880 On the Trucial Coast, the parameters 
of difference, space, and time had become fixed in the minds of both the British and the 
Arabs. Aviation, in shifting the old notions of time and space, presented a sudden shock 
to long-term perceptions on both sides. Britain’s efforts to introduce aviation revealed a 
weakness in the Pax Britannica system, in that Britain’s adoption and exploitation of 
the timewarp effect, and encouragement of fossilisation, although carefully devised and 
maintained over decades to demonstrate tireless, timeless rule, was shown to be a snare. 
The need for aviation facilities required the ‘timewarp’ effect to be overcome, but 
Britain’s efforts to put its air policy into practice showed that it had become a victim of 
its own long-term systems of control. Trapped inside the timewarp it had created, 
Britain’s calculated stance had frozen into an uncomfortable pose which could not be 
dropped without loss of imperial face. Therefore the ‘weapon’ of time was now turned 
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on the British, and worked no longer in their favour, but against them.  
Progress and change were inherent features of aviation. By shrinking journey 
times and bringing a rapid change of environment to travellers, air travel seemed to 
accelerate or disorder chronology, and ‘throw around’ time. Aviation also dislocated the 
rate of technological development as it had previously been understood. As Denison 
Ross, Orientalist and linguist, wrote in 1929, civil aviation, having developed 
‘prematurely’ because of the War, arrived ‘straight away to the Middle East right on top 
of far more primitive means of transport and communication,’881 therefore forcibly 
bypassing advances in land transportation by road and rail. The introduction of aircraft 
represented a great leap forward into modernity, but on the Trucial Coast it brought 
about a ‘leapfrog’ effect in technology. This juxtaposed awkwardly with Britain’s long-
term imperial stance, which relied for its effects upon an appearance of timelessness. 
Therefore, the introduction of aviation, in that it forced the British to abandon their 
long-term appearance of imperial timelessness, would abolish the ‘timewarp’ effect and 
herald the end of the Pax Britannica. 
In the relationship between the London and Indian administrations, Britain’s 
desire for Gulf air transport brought the Gulf, and India’s administration of it, into 
clearer focus in London. At the same time, with the Air Ministry and Imperial Airways 
playing an increasingly important role in the Gulf in the 1920s, the London Government 
made a new type of intrusion into geographical and political territory which had 
traditionally been the preserve of the Government of India. The complex status of 
Imperial Airways as both an agent of the core’s imperialist impulses and as a 
commercial concern contributed to the difficulties. These factors created tension 
between the metropole government in London and the colonial government in India. 
While London officials seem to have expected Delhi to support and facilitate their aims, 
this was by no means inevitable. The introduction of aviation made new demands on the 
Government of India, and had unwelcome implications. Traditionally, Britain’s 
supremacy in the Gulf had been effected by Naval force, with the Indian Navy 
responsible for both policing the Gulf and providing sea transportation for officials. In 
the interwar years, the provision of resources in the pursuit of London’s air agenda was 
a new function for the Indian Navy. While the Indian Government was unenthusiastic 
about fulfilling this role, it could not overtly avoid the facilitation of aviation. Robin 
Higham argues that the inability of the two governments to achieve a ‘far-sighted and 
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statesmanlike view’ of the potential role of aviation in imperial affairs rendered the 
story of the India route a ‘tragedy.’882 Seeing aviation as a threat rather than an 
opportunity, India resisted air development in territory under its purview, proved 
unreceptive to suggestions from London, and produced arguments to cover for its own 
grudging and desultory response. In employing tactics that included delaying, stalling, 
and raising objections to Britain’s proposals, the Indian Government displayed 
resistance that, although largely passive, discouraged the impulses driving civil aviation 
from the core. In return, the British Government’s half-heartedness in its efforts to 
pursue the Gulf air sector allowed the Indian Government to obstruct the 
implementation of aviation policy, and thereby undermine the objective of the 
metropole.  
Therefore, although the Gulf air route had been instigated by the London 
Government, its development was to some extent reliant upon the Indian Government. 
Delhi effectively determined aviation policy within India unilaterally, while in the 
environs of India it had the power to exert influence over London’s pursuit of its air 
policy. The smooth operation of the route in India and its environs required a 
harmonious relationship, but in reality there was divergence in the aims of the two 
administrations. On a practical level, India did not possess the capability to create air 
routes, produce aircraft, or run international services unaided. However, despite this, 
between 1920 and 1927 in particular, the British failed to ensure the transfer of 
responsibility, knowledge, and expertise that would support India and help galvanise it 
into the action which would promote the development of the India route. In addition, as 
the route continued eastwards from Karachi, India’s stalling meant that the slow 
development of the trans-India sector became a major cause of delay in the onward 
route to Australia.  
In 1926 the disharmony both within India’s administration and between officials 
of the metropole and periphery, were indicated in an exchange of correspondence. This 
highlighted the extent of the pressure that the India Office came under from the Home 
Government, while also demonstrating the ability of peripheral elites to influence core 
elites. Problems began when an article written by an observer in India was published in 
Britain by the Daily Telegraph. The writer not only complained that the Indian 
Government had side-lined civil aviation, but also criticised facilities at the Calcutta 
landing ground used by the RAF. The article constituted censure of both Britain and 
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India, and its publication demonstrated that aviation proponents in India were able to 
use the news media to gain a voice in the core, and by this means utilise an effective, if 
roundabout, method of exerting pressure on the Indian Government. Lord Birkenhead, 
Secretary of State for India, picked up on the criticisms and on 16 August 1926 wrote to 
the newly-appointed Viceroy, Lord Irwin, in support of the claims and adding his voice 
to the complaints of negligence and neglect. As political head of the India Office, 
Birkenhead was the Viceroy’s superior and his tone was both offhand and patronising: 
‘Civil aviation may subserve many commercial and economic purposes in India. These 
should be carefully and constantly borne in mind; but at the same time it must always be 
remembered that civil aviation is the nursery of warfare in the Air.’883 Irwin was under 
pressure and his response was abrasive: the Daily Telegraph was ‘ill-informed.’ The 
Calcutta landing ground was not waterlogged, as the article stated, but the RAF reported that 
instead it was ‘perfectly good,’ even if a little swampy during the monsoon season, as 
was only to be expected. Further, the newspaper’s allegation that India took no interest 
in civil aviation was untrue, and the criticism that the Indian Assembly was unwilling to 
vote money for aviation was also ‘quite wrong…They have never refused a request, and 
have voted increasing sums annually.’884 
Despite Irwin’s retort, the matter did not rest there, for the Viceroy had also 
communicated Birkenhead’s complaints to the Indian Department of Industries and 
Labour in the Public Works Branch - the Government of India body responsible for civil 
aviation. In September, A.G. Clow of the Public Works Department hit back in a letter 
to the Under-Secretary of State of its London counterpart, the India Office Public Works 
Department. Despite Irwin’s assurances that all was well, Clow tacitly acknowledged 
that the Indian Government’s commitment was open to question. Taking attack as the 
best form of defence, Clow complained of ‘confusion and delay’885 in relations between 
the Indian Department of Industries and Labour and the Air Ministry in London. 
Although, Clow wrote, the Government of India was ‘anxious to do all in their power to 
co-operate with the Air Ministry in making the new services a success…the present 
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arrangements make co-operation difficult.’886  
Pirie suggests that aviation ‘Interventions, designs and procedures formulated in 
the capital did not always take overseas conditions into account.’887 Clow’s letter 
indicates shortcomings in communication between Britain and India, but his appeal to 
the India Office to liaise with the Ministry on behalf of the Public Works Department 
identified the Air Ministry as being responsible for many difficulties. Clow complained 
that instructions from London had sometimes been ‘not only belated but altogether 
unsuitable for execution in the local conditions obtaining.’888 For example, although it 
had been proposed that air services to Karachi should begin in four months’ time, no 
plans had been received showing the location of buildings. As a result, although the site 
had been cleared, construction had not yet started. Further, Clow observed, in August 
1926 the Air Ministry had signed a contract for an airship hangar without consulting the 
Indian authorities, but the building was ‘quite unsuitable for erection in Karachi, with its 
known liability to occasional winds of extreme violence.’889 In fact, added Clow, 
meteorological conditions might even mean that Karachi could not be used as an ‘air-
harbour’ at all. Clow pleaded for autonomy, arguing that policy should be the sole 
responsibility of Indian authorities, with the Air Ministry having only a minor role.890 
The time had come, he argued, for an Indian Directorate of Civil Aviation to be 
established, to be on a par with its London counterpart. Even though Clow’s suggestion 
would rapidly be put into action, the Indian Government continued for some years to 
prevaricate in its dealings with civil aviation. Indeed, honesty would not prevail until 
1931 when, in a letter to Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State for India, Lord Willingdon, 
the Viceroy, would write that: ‘I agree fully that in the past the India authorities have 
not handled the question with much energy or imagination.’891  
Although the establishment of the Indian Directorate in 1927 eased problems 
with regards to certain aspects of aviation policy, the stand-off between the Home and 
Indian Governments at a higher level continued to affect the development of the Gulf air 
route. For example, in 1931 Resident Hugh Biscoe became awkwardly caught between 
the two governments in an incident which suggested that London officials, unfamiliar 
with both local conditions and the requirements of aviation, had an inordinate amount of 
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power in the Gulf. Biscoe did not enjoy their full confidence, and his experience serves 
to highlight the contrast between his approach as Resident, and that of distant 
administrators. Biscoe proposed that he should offer an annual subsidy of £3,000 of 
British Government money to a Trucial sheikh to offset the costs of hosting Imperial 
Airways facilities. However, the Treasury raised objections, misinterpreting Biscoe’s 
payment as a bribe. In this way a department of State, the Treasury, prevented a Gulf 
official from pursuing a pragmatic policy which would have furthered aviation policy.892 
To complicate Biscoe’s situation further, the Government of India seems to have backed 
the Treasury. For example, an attempt to justify his position to the Indian Foreign 
Secretary, Biscoe, as the man on the spot, demonstrated an attitude towards the Trucial 
Coast that was fairly sympathetic. In his attempts to persuade the Indian Government to 
support his subsidy scheme, he felt it necessary to appeal for appreciation of Sheikh 
Saqar of Sharjah as a man whose concerns and rights were worthy of regard, Biscoe 
explained that the subsidy scheme was not designed to obtain the Sheikh’s ‘good-will or 
tolerance’ – in other words it was not a bribe to procure permission for an air base.893 
Instead, it would compensate the Sheikh for the ‘very definite and heavy responsibility’ 
of providing an armed guard to protect installations, staff, and passengers:  
the Sheikhs themselves are small men and are not supported by tribesmen who 
give them unswerving loyalty and obedience. The Bedouin in the interior levy 
constant blackmail upon them and they are compelled either to buy them off or 
resist them by force, and few things would be easier for these gentry, or indeed 
anyone who wishes to get the Shaikh into trouble, to fire shots at the Imperial 
Airways’ craft.894 
 
The Indian Government continued to try to intrude in policy-making. For 
example, in 1932 it sent a ‘Secret’ telegram to the Secretary of State for India in 
London, explaining that when offering money to Trucial Sheikhs in air route 
negotiations, Biscoe should ‘endeavour in each instance to secure something definite 
and tangible, and not merely good will, as quid pro quo,’ because ‘undisguised 
blackmail always spells trouble later.’895 Indeed, Indian Government officials seem to 
themselves have adhered to a policy of not supporting the Trucial Sheikhs financially, 
as attested to by Mohammed Al-Fahim. He asserts that although local people assumed 
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that the Sheikhs were paid for their compliance, in fact ‘The British never paid any 
money or gave anything to the rulers.’896  
In April 1932 Biscoe again came under attack from London, this time from 
George W. Rendel, head of the Foreign Office’s Eastern Department. After an incident 
in the Gulf, Rendel became frustrated by Biscoe’s slow progress over the air route, and 
from his desk in Whitehall penned a strong Minute, in which he demonstrated his lack 
of understanding of the conditions endured by Gulf officials:  
That the Resident should have left negotiations in suspense and given the Sheikh 
time to consult his relatives, owing to the difficulty in altering the movements of 
one of His Majesty’s sloops and the necessity of catching the return mail to 
Bushire suggests that Colonel Biscoe can have no conception of the importance 
of the issues at stake. I feel that the case is one where a letter in strong terms 
should be written to the India Office without delay. I understand that the 
Treasury and the Air Ministry feel equally strongly on the subject.897  
 
Four days later, to defend himself against this accusation of failure to support London’s 
air route planning, Biscoe wrote an express air mail letter to the Indian Foreign 
Secretary at Simla. He explained his delay, reporting that the weather, he reported, had 
been so ‘exceedingly bad’ that his ship had been forced to shelter overnight behind an 
island.898  
There were a number of compelling reasons for the Indian Government’s 
reticence to support London’s air aims. The main reason, although this would not be 
admitted by the Indian Government until 1931, was that, as Lord Willingdon, the 
Viceroy, stated in a private letter to Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State for India, officials 
‘were fearful of the political consequences.’ Willingdon admitted India’s failure to 
expedite Britain’s aviation policy: ‘I agree fully that in the past the India authorities 
have not handled the question with much energy or imagination.’899 Civil aviation 
development had important implications for the British Raj in that, set against the 
backdrop of growing Indian nationalist sentiment, it had the power to raise the hackles 
of local Indian politicians, and hence rouse negative public opinion. For example, in 
October 1929 William Wedgwood Benn, Secretary of State for India, suggested to Lord 
Thomson, Secretary of State for Air, that because the Indian Government was ‘entirely 
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in the hands of the Assembly’ – this being the lower house of the Indian Parliament, of 
which the majority of members were elected - the development of a civil through-route 
might cause political difficulties. Wedgwood Benn argued that the Assembly might 
‘regard the development of internal services as more important than the Imperial 
route,’900 and pressure the Indian Government to concentrate on domestic aviation, 
rather than serving Britain’s aim of making India a sector of the Australian route.  
The core of the matter was that the Indian Government feared the political 
consequences of spending Indian taxpayers’ money on London’s aviation project. In a 
discussion of expatriate administrators, Bernard Porter points out that if Britain wished 
to increase resources supplied to India this would have to be paid for by taxation in 
India, but that this might provoke rebellion.901 The view of Wedgwood Benn, as E.J. 
Turner of the India Office Revenue and Statistics Department wrote in 1929, was 
founded on sympathy with the Indian Government in its desire to reduce expenditure 
‘because of the poverty of the bulk of the taxpayers.’902 As British rule was supported by 
land tax and other tax revenues from Indian subjects, the spending of money on items 
such as imperial aviation, which would appear to ordinary Indians to benefit only the 
British, would add to the taxation burden and hence be a politically inflammatory move.  
Another serious political issue, which emerged after 1927 and would continue 
into the 1930s, involved the employment of native Indians in the operation of civil air 
services, and in particular as pilots and maintenance workers. The root of the problem, 
although largely unspoken, was that there was a perception in Western and Dominion 
countries that Indian employees, owing to the nature of their background and culture, 
could not be trusted to work to the same standards of reliability and safety as Western 
personnel. The problem was a thorny one, and presented two major difficulties. On the 
one hand, Imperial Airways passengers might object to flying in aircraft piloted and 
maintained by Indians, but on the other hand, the failure to employ Indians would cause 
political problems for the Indian Government. The concern over Indian pilots was 
articulated in November 1932, when former Australian Prime Minister S.M. Bruce 
wrote confidentially to J.M. Thomas, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, about this 
‘somewhat delicate’ matter: ‘I am absolutely certain that any arrangement for a through 
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air service from Britain to Australia which contemplated any part of the route being 
flown with Indian pilots would be totally unacceptable to Australia.’903  
There were also disquieting implications for Delhi in the development of the 
trans-India air route, in that once it opened, India, as a signatory of the International Air 
Convention, could not deny aircraft of other contracting states the right to cross it by 
air.904 Therefore, while trans-India air transport served Britain’s imperial purposes, it 
also allowed foreigners easy access into India. The introduction of aviation in Indian 
territory was without precedent, and the implications for India’s cherished territorial 
integrity of questions relating to the use of airspace and ground facilities by foreigners 
were unclear. Foreign requests were also seen as potentially damaging to commercial 
interests. As the Indian Air Board, a department within the Government of India, 
pointed out in 1927, if India did not embrace aviation rapidly there was a ‘real danger’ 
that foreign companies could gain early control of Indian aviation. As an Air Board 
official warned, ‘Unless India to some extent pays the piper she will not be able to call 
even part of the tune; and unless she is willing to participate in the experimental stage it 
will be practically impossible for her to gain a footing later.’  
As trans-India routes neared completion, applications to use both them and the 
Gulf sector were made by France and the Netherlands, which wished to connect to their 
eastern territories. The problem of the intrusion of foreign services now had to be 
addressed, but this was done with reluctance,905 and India’s lack of enthusiasm cannot 
have expedited Britain’s own commercial ventures. Ironically, there was one point of 
agreement. French and Dutch requests were also not welcomed in London, where 
imperial loss of face was anticipated. For example, an India Office report of c. 1928 
concluded that, in relation to the Dutch, ‘His Majesty’s Government and the 
Government of India alike view with disfavour on grounds of prestige the establishment 
of a foreign air service across India before an Indian one is in operation.’906 In regards to 
the Dutch, as their requests could hardly be denied outright, after discussions between 
unspecified departments, the India Office reached only the problematic, and perhaps 
even unworkable, conclusion that attempts should be made to stall the Dutch but 
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‘without in any way impairing our good relations with them.’907  
In July 1929, India Office official E.J. Turner proposed a means of ending the 
deadlock. Anticipating future diplomatic issues over Britain’s forthcoming need to ask 
the Dutch for permission to fly across the Dutch East Indies, he noted that this would 
force the British to accede to Dutch appeals in India. Therefore, Britain’s early 
agreement to Dutch requests would expedite British policy in the future.908 This hint was 
not heeded and a year later matters were unchanged, with Lieut.-Commander 
Kenworthy pointing out in the House of Commons that a ‘dog-in-the-manger policy’ 
would result in ‘reprisals’ against the British.909 Both Home and Indian Governments 
colluded in the stalling policy, finding pretexts to allow the Dutch permission only for 
trial flights rather than full passenger services. Not until early 1930 did they run out of 
excuses,910 and thereafter an agreement was drawn up with the Dutch that allowed them 
to begin trans-India services immediately. Britain was perhaps influenced by the 
commercial advantages inherent in capitulation to Dutch requests for, by 1930, APOC 
was supplying aviation fuel to the Dutch airline, KLM.911 By early 1930 the French had 
submitted similar requests, and their trans-India service began in January 1931.912  
However, once the Indian Government had capitulated to the French and Dutch, 
it developed another compelling argument as to why it should not support the further 
development of the trans-India route. Citing an increased need for economy, the Indian 
Government replaced delaying and defensive tactics with comments about finance and 
responsible government. In June 1931, in the House of Commons, Wedgwood Benn, 
Secretary of State for India, read out a telegram from the Indian Government. It 
informed the House that, owing to the present state of its finances, India could manage 
only the minimum of expenditure on civil aviation, and was even considering cutting 
spending on ground organisation, which would mean the closure of wireless and 
meteorological stations. Wedgwood Benn’s announcement met a critical response. One 
MP retorted that the actions of the Indian Government would have ‘a deplorable effect 
on Imperial air communications,’ while Samuel Hoare, who two months later would 
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succeed Wedgwood Benn as Secretary of State for India, reminded the House that the 
Government of India had an obligation under the International Convention for Aerial 
Navigation ‘to provide air ports and certain facilities, if not for themselves, at any rate 
for other countries.’ There was a ‘grave risk,’ Hoare warned, that India’s threatened 
actions would compromise its obligations.913  India did not, however, go so far as to 
prevent foreign services, which forged ahead in India. Meanwhile, British foot-dragging 
over the next stages of the onward route to Australia continued. As late as March 1932 
Captain Knatchbull, MP for Ashford, urged the Government to ‘get busy’ on the 
eastbound route or ‘the Dutch will very likely start that service for us.’ It would be both 
calamity and disgrace, Knatchbull continued, ‘if the main trunk lines of the British 
Empire air services were not entirely flown under the British flag.’914  
The tension between the two Governments was heightened by Hugh Trenchard, 
Chief of Air Staff. Trenchard realised that the relative roles of civil and strategic 
aviation in the Gulf was unclear but that, as the capabilities of aircraft grew, military 
aviation was likely to play an increasing role in Britain’s imperial policy. In 1928 
Trenchard complained that in its surveying and organisation operations in the Gulf, the 
RAF was greatly hampered by requirements to obtain the consent of departments of 
both the British and Indian Governments.915 In a move that cannot have enhanced his 
popularity in some quarters, Trenchard asked whether the India Office and Government 
of India might not ‘consider relieving themselves of their direct political and 
administrative responsibilities connected with Arabia?’916 Calling for a simpler system 
of control, Trenchard argued that executive responsibility for Arabia should fall under 
one department, to be advised by the Air Ministry. It was perhaps partly in response to 
Trenchard’s concerns that the Persian Gulf Sub-Committee was appointed in 1928 to 
review policy. It reported itself ‘much struck by the importance of the Air factor’917 and 
recommended methods by which the machinery of political control could be ‘simplified 
and speeded up’ in view of the implications of aviation on the Arabian coast.918  
Trenchard kept up his offensive, and by May 1929 there had developed what 
Dann has described as an ‘unbridgeable’ gap between the Air Ministry and other 
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departments, in particular some in the Government of India.919 Despite this, Trenchard’s 
call for unified control gathered support. For example, in 1929 the Sub-Committee on 
Political Control reported that the advent of air power, and its projected use on the 
Arabian coast, necessitated ‘simplifying and speeding up the existing machinery for 
political control in Arabia.’ In December (only days before Trenchard’s retirement as 
Chief of Air Staff) the Sub-Committee agreed that the Air Ministry was ‘placed at a 
disadvantage in carrying out this work in that, on its political side, it does not as a whole 
concern any one Department in particular.’920 However, the divergence of opinion of 
Government departments on matters relating to the Gulf ensured that the question of 
responsibility would remain unresolved until its administration was passed to the India 
Office in 1933. 
While these internecine struggles had been going on, aviation had also been 
causing the British considerable difficulties on the Trucial Coast. With the power of the 
British well-established in the region, there had originally seemed no reason to suspect 
that the influence they had exerted for a century would not suffice for forcing through 
their will in the matter of aviation. Therefore, when in the mid-1920s the British began 
to explore the Trucial Coast with a view to establishing aviation infrastructure, they 
acted with confidence. In April 1927 the RAF, facilitated by an Indian Naval vessel, 
carried out reconnaissance for a civil flying boat harbour. From on board HMS Triad, 
RAF officers surveyed the Coast, with its sandy shores and settlements of palm-branch, 
mud brick, and coral stone dwellings, and for good measure sailed on round the rocky 
Musandam Peninsula to Muscat in Oman. As Squadron Leader G.W. Bentley would 
later recall, the area was tantalizingly suitable for flying boats, having ‘endless stretches 
of sheltered water caused by inlets, projecting islands, sandbanks, and shoals.’921 During 
the 1920s the Schneider Trophy air race event had publicised the capability of flying 
boats to the extent that for a number of years they were expected to be widely used in 
the development of commercial and passenger services across the empire. As most 
cities had access to a stretch of water – whether river, lake, or seacoast – they would be 
suitable for flying boat services, and an aerodrome would not be necessary. For this 
reason, the craft seemed to offer a more cost-effective solution than land craft. In the 
Gulf they seemed the best prospect for civil services, in particular as they were already 
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being used in the region by the RAF. However, the RAF surveyors also kept one eye 
open for suitable landing grounds for aeroplanes, a number of which were used by the 
air force. For aeroplanes and flying boats, it was calculated that refuelling sites would 
be needed at intervals of about 200 miles, with emergency landing grounds at every 30 
to 50 miles in between.  
While on board the Triad the British were in their traditional position - 
physically distanced from, and hence largely invisible to, the Trucial Arabs on the 
shore. As a result, their intentions were not necessarily revealed. Matters took a less 
promising turn later in 1927, when British officials attempted a survey on land, for an 
inland route between Abu Dhabi on the Persian Gulf and Muscat on the Gulf of Oman. 
They were able to carry out the task only partially, due to local opposition which denied 
them access to the whole length of their proposed route. Although this first close 
aviation-related encounter with the Arabs had prevented the British from completing 
their work, they still saw no long-term difficulty. For example, that summer R.S. 
Thomas, a British official in Muscat, predicted that ‘The coastal tribes’ opposition will 
in the face of our sea power break down the moment that it is decided (i) that the Air 
Route must happen, (ii) that cooperation to this end will materially benefit them and that 
obstruction will materially harm them.’ To Thomas, Trucial opposition was merely a 
ploy to encourage the British to abandon their aviation project, this being ‘the only card 
they [the Arabs] have to play. If and when they see that they have to concede they will 
concede gratefully.’922 At the end of the year, the Political Resident, making his annual 
report, also suggested that ‘the Arab route has been shown to be perfectly feasible and 
only requires developing.’923 Matters would not prove so easy, however.  
Under the terms of their century-old agreements, the Trucial Arabs valued 
Britain’s protection from hostile elements in the Gulf, and in particular from the 
Persians, who from time to time made claims to the Gulf waterway. As regards their 
own economic activities they desired independence from British control, and hence 
regarded Western presence in their territory as a threat. Until the building of Imperial 
Airways’ Rest House at Sharjah in 1932, the Arabs were indeed able to dictate that only 
in exceptional circumstances was a Western visitor allowed to sleep on land. In the mid-
1920s this concession was made only for the staff of the Kuwait-based Arabian Mission, 
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an American Christian organisation which provided infrequent peripatetic medical 
services to the Coast. This was because the 30,000 inhabitants otherwise had ‘access to 
no medical help whatever.’ Even so, when Mission doctor Paul Harrison, an American, 
asked why he could not establish a hospital, he was answered ‘with some asperity’ by a 
prominent merchant: ‘Because if we do just behind you will come the English with a 
consulate and a telegraph office and we after that, nothing but slaves.’924 In that it 
involved permanent installations and the presence of staff, an air base would present 
similar threats to those of a hospital. This view was confirmed in 1929, when the Senior 
Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf reported that the Trucial Arabs were ‘definitely 
suspicious of anything which to them appears as the thin end of the European wedge 
poking its nose into their territories…Whether they are truly independent or not, they 
have a sturdy spirit of independence as regards determination to control their own 
affairs.’925  
This fear of domination had kept out the trappings of Western civilisation and, 
with it, technological development. During the Pax Britannica the British had aligned 
themselves with the innate conservatism of the local people, and in this way abetted 
their dislike of change. Therefore, Britain had brought about, and become complicit in, 
the Coast’s resistance to Western ideals of progress. While the outside world developed 
technologically, the Trucial Coast remained static, and this contributed to Trucial 
opposition of Britain’s aviation proposals. A report by Dr. Paul Harrison explains the 
reasons behind Trucial wariness about aviation, but also indicates the level of 
opposition that British proposals were likely to face. Trucial inhabitants, Harrison 
claimed, had,  
fought desperately to keep western civilisation at bay…An Indian Moslem…was 
anxious to bring in a motor boat. Permission was emphatically refused. The real 
reason was their fear that even a motor boat might serve as the thin end of the 
wedge and through it in some way western political power gain an entrance. So 
the man was informed that such a noisy affair would frighten away the fish.926 
 
In pushing for air facilities, therefore, the British were proposing the sudden and 
unprecedented imposition of aspects of Western culture on people to whom it had 
traditionally been alien. Aviation acted as an agent of cultural imperialism. Barbara 
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Bush posits that ‘Cultural imperialism involves a dominant power imposing aspects of 
its culture on a society which is “weaker” or “backward” in some military, economic or 
technological sense.’ Certainly on the Trucial Coast Britain as a dominant power was 
attempting to impose its aviation policy on a technologically less-developed society. 
However, Bush also suggests that the concept of cultural imperialism implies a 
‘conscious process of suppression of inferior cultures. Cultural strategies were more 
subtle than other forms of colonial control, such as policing and the law.’ On the Coast, 
the cultural imperialism imposed by the air facilities was inadvertent, for the location 
was incidental and determined only by the requirements of aircraft and passengers to 
land. The Coast was seen as nothing more than a necessary halt for civil and military 
aircraft on the India route, and Britain’s economic interests there, and its desire to ‘fly 
the flag,’ were not so great as to merit a stop for its own sake. Had aircraft capability 
been more developed, Britain would not have needed to impose aviation on the Trucial 
Coast. Britain’s intention was therefore not to implement a ‘conscious process of 
suppression’ of a ‘backward’ culture927 but only to harness and use those aspects which 
would serve its practical imperial purposes. 
 
Fig. 5.5. Supermarine Napier 
Southampton flying boat, 
1930.928 
 
As aircraft appeared 
particularly wonderful in a 
technologically underdeveloped 
and deeply conservative 
environment such as the Trucial 
Coast, they could help to boost British influence there. Being faster than any form of 
transportation ever seen on the Coast, aircraft were also more disturbing and 
disorienting. By moving through the air, a heavy machine was bound to inspire greater 
awe than would one moving on land. By its seemingly supernatural qualities, aviation 
allowed the British to participate in what Ziauddin Sardar describes as ‘the white man as 
god syndrome.’ By this, the ‘white man’ is seen as ‘the god of scientific wonder and 
superior technology. The bearers of such advancement must be a thing of wonder for 
the unsophisticated Other incapable of conceiving such refined marvels for 
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themselves.’929 Among the Trucial inhabitants, aviation had implications which brought 
forth both positive and negative responses to Britain’s demands for cooperation. In the 
Trucial experience, British Naval vessels had always doubled as weapons, and the 
potential of civil aircraft to perform such a dual role – but one that was potentially far 
more intrusive – raised disturbing questions regarding sovereignty and security. Naval 
force had limitations of reach, which meant, as Hopper comments, that ‘the shelling of 
forts and the levelling of watchtowers had limited impact on groups with no attachment 
to fixed structures near the shore.’930 Aircraft, however, were able to fly inland, and 
hence had far greater ability to encroach than ships. The creation of ground 
infrastructure required a direct and interventionist approach because, in terms of a 
concept discussed by Edward Said, it involved the encroachment of the British ‘ours’ 
upon the Arab ‘theirs.’ Said suggests that attitudes such as those displayed by the 
British in the Gulf were the result of perceptions of anthropology, linguistics, history, 
Social Darwinism, and ‘the rhetoric of high cultural humanism.’ They contributed to the 
categorisation of ‘reality’ ‘into various collectives: languages, races, types, colors, 
mentalities.’ Each category became ‘an evaluative interpretation’ underpinned by ‘the 
rigidly binomial opposition of “ours” and “theirs,” with the former always encroaching 
upon the latter.’931  
Once the British began to implement their plans to establish ‘our’ facilities upon 
‘their’ ground, they received confirmation of the negative effects of their long-term 
policy. When in 1929 they tried to impose their will over usage of the creek at Ras al 
Khaimah, it became apparent that Trucial negotiations would be ‘of a long and tedious 
character.’932 With flying boats favoured over landcraft, by November 1928 attention 
had reverted to a coastal option, and flying boat landing had the advantage of promising 
less involvement with local Arabs than land craft. In March 1929, No. 203 Squadron at 
the RAF HQ in Iraq was supplied with three additional Southampton flying boats (Fig. 
5.5), and given the task of setting up landing bases on the Trucial Coast. This work 
included surveying for landing sites for aeroplanes and anchorages for flying boats, 
marking out landing-grounds, laying moorings, and installing refuelling facilities. Ras al 
Khaimah’s large and sheltered creek was identified as the best location; it had the added 
advantage that the Residency Agent’s house overlooked it. Unfortunately for British 
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ambitions, the Trucial Arabs valued the waterway for their marine activities, and the site 
was additionally sensitive because it was here that the British had outraged local 
opinion a century before by torching the Qawasim fleet. Despite opposition from the 
ruler, Sheikh Sultan, preparations were made and the RAF began to land its flying 
boats. However, when in May 1930 the Navy tried to tow into the creek an iron barge 
designed to hold aviation fuel, Sultan resented this further intrusion and, supported by a 
group of Bedouin, denied the barge entry. The British now resorted to time-honoured 
tactics, setting up a blockade, capturing eight pearling dhows, and cutting off food 
supplies to the town.933 Although after two weeks Sultan was forced to accept the barge, 
thus allowing RAF flying boats to use the creek more regularly, his opposition 
remained. The episode demonstrated that the British were not averse to using traditional 
methods to enforce their authority, but this small victory could only provide a short-
term solution. The fuel barge episode furthered Britain’s strategic, but not civil, air 
ambitions. In the longer-term, a forced and grudging acceptance of British terms was 
insufficient, for the operation of civil air services required the willingness and co-
operation of local elites.  
By 1931, continuing difficulties in Persia and the problem of obtaining 
permission for the necessary night-stop on the Trucial Coast, threatened to halt Imperial 
Airways’ services through the Persian Gulf, and humiliate Britain as a result. As the 
situation deteriorated, concern was felt in London by both Government and Imperial 
Airways officials, and efforts were made to seek a solution. In January, therefore, reliant 
upon the RAF, the company made a further survey of the Coast with the aim of locating 
a suitable site for the overnight facilities. By November the subject had also become an 
irritation to the RAF, for John Salmond, Chief of Air Staff, deplored the fact that the 
India route might be ‘abandoned merely because of the intransigence of a Trucial 
Sheikh.’934 As matters worsened, it was recognised that problems in responsibility had 
become an obstacle to progress. The variance of opinion between those departments 
which felt entitled to have their say in Trucial aviation policy-making was revealed in 
November 1931 at meetings of the Sub-Committee for Questions Concerning the 
Middle East. Its report demonstrated that the Sub-Committee studied the question in 
some detail. The India Office and Air Ministry, the Sub-Committee stated, were united 
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in the belief that the best hope for the Arabian air sector lay in offering a subsidy to the 
Sheikh of Ras al Khaimah, while the Admiralty thought that this scheme involved 
‘considerable risks,’ and would lead to greater commitment than anticipated. The 
Admiralty proposed the abandonment of aviation plans for the Coast and advocated the 
use of an island instead. Meanwhile the War Office – ‘generally interested, but…not 
directly concerned’ with the air route – tended to support the Admiralty’s view. The 
Treasury was also cautious. Treasury officials had not received full financial projections 
and were still uneasy about commitment to any scheme, but would nevertheless not 
object to negotiations at Ras al Khaimah.935 Not only was there no cohesive air policy in 
London, but that there was also inconsistency in relations between officials of the 
British and Indian Governments over the Trucial Coast and aviation policy. Events at 
Ras al Khaimah gave a practical example of the tension between them. With the creek 
there still being eyed for the night-stop, in July 1931 the Government of India expressed 
its concern about the escalation of problems. The Indian Government, an official 
warned, had both ‘military and constitutional objections,’ in addition to concerns over 
internal stability, as the use of Indian forces ‘would provoke reaction among Indian 
Muslims which at present juncture we are not prepared to face.’936 In this way the Indian 
Government openly opposed the policy of the British Government, which was tending 
to view Ras al Khaimah favourably. The religious implications were certainly a cause of 
concern in the early 1930s. As a Tehran Legation official would write in 1933, ‘The 
prestige of West over East, on which Britain’s strength in Oriental countries so largely 
rested,’ had been ‘rudely shaken in the Islamic world when the Christian nations 
embarked in the World War with all its barbarous consequence.’937  
The Indian Government’s opposition was also a warning to London officials 
about meddling in a region in which they had previously had little engagement, but 
India also baulked at facilitating London’s own involvement. India’s naval efforts at 
Ras Al Khaimah, as an official of the Indian Foreign and Political Department wrote, 
had ‘not been encouraging hitherto.’ Therefore, if authorities in Britain continued to 
pressure Sheikh Sultan, they could achieve success only by ‘recourse to force both for 
inception and maintenance.’ In this event, the official stated bluntly, India would neither 
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co-operate nor allow Indian forces to protect Imperial Airways installations on the 
Trucial Coast.938 Reservations about the night-stop scheme were also expressed by the 
Foreign Office, Admiralty, War Office, and Treasury. For example, in November 1931 
Lancelot Oliphant of the Foreign Office warned the Air Ministry that a night-stop was 
unsafe because it put Britons ‘at the mercy of the Trucial Sheikhs.’ He anticipated the 
risk of ‘a complete closing down of the service to India’ when Persian permission 
expired in March 1932. He also complained of the danger to imperial bullion shipments 
for, if the Trucial Arabs were to gain advance knowledge of ‘an important air load’ 
passing through their territories, they might launch an attack which would be both costly 
and ‘impossible to deal with at the time.’939  
Ironically, as the squabbles about points of detail on the Trucial Coast became 
more bitter, and Persia continued its requests for rapid British withdrawal, the likelihood 
of the Persian option succeeding dwindled. Increasingly, there seemed no option other 
than for Imperial Airways to transfer its operations to the Trucial Coast in March 1932. 
Sidestepping the objections of officials such as Oliphant, the Air Ministry made 
progress on the Trucial Coast. As no landing site had yet been found on the Coast, the 
RAF was asked to carry out further reconnaissance as a matter of urgency. The creek at 
Ras al Khaimah still appeared to offer the best solution, but local objections continued. 
One suggestion was that passengers could be accommodated in a ‘rest vessel’ anchored 
offshore, which aspect would, it was hoped, mitigate Arab resentment. However, 
disagreement still remained between the Air Ministry and Imperial airways. At a 
meeting in November 1931, Imperial Airways Managing Director George Woods 
Humphery proposed the use of a steamer, the Imperia, but it was soon pointed out that 
while the vessel drew 10 feet of water, the depth over the bar at Ras al Khaimah, even at 
high tide, was only seven feet. The Air Ministry, meanwhile, favoured an onshore ‘rest 
house’ as being ‘far preferable…on grounds of practicability, comfort of passengers, 
cheapness and security.’940 It could be equipped with ‘machine guns which could, if and 
when necessary, be manned by Imperial Airways’ staff.’ As it was thought ‘undesirable’ 
for ‘white people’ to be stationed on the Trucial Coast, Woods Humphery proposed the 
use of ‘Eurasian’ and ‘Anglo-Indian’ ground staff. Several other night stop suggestions 
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were put forward, but perhaps the most drastic was made at a meeting of Air Ministry, 
Treasury, and Imperial Airways officials on 1 December 1931. It was suggested that the 
air route between Bahrain and Gwadar should be replaced by a British India Steam 
Navigation steamer, but to this the Marquess of Londonderry, Secretary of State for Air, 
had strong objections:941 
this is the key trunk air route of the Empire…How damaging a blow would be 
struck at British prestige in the Middle East if we were forced to resort to sea 
carriage in the Gulf by Persian intransigence coupled with fears as to the attitude 
of an isolated petty Sheikh on the Arabian coast. Local native opinion would be 
under no illusion as to the motive causes.942  
 
On the same day, Air Vice Marshall Ludlow-Hewitt telegraphed Salmond from 
the RAF’s Iraq HQ to suggest that a base at Dubai would be ‘more settled and safer’ 
than one at Ras al Khaimah.943 The 203 Squadron immediately surveyed Dubai and 
reported that it was suitable and by 8 December the Political Resident, Sir Hugh Biscoe, 
had held talks with the Dubai sheikh. The sheikh had ‘no objection’ but asked for time 
to ‘square his relations.’944 At this point Sheikh Sultan of Ras al Khaimah, under 
pressure from his people, gave a final refusal of civil air facilities, with the result that 
the British pinned great hopes on Dubai. However, when Biscoe again hastened to 
Dubai, he was told that as the Sheikh had been unable to get the support of his relatives, 
he could not accommodate British requests. The India route was at another stalemate. 
The British had intended it as their first imperial route, but their disappointments at Ras 
al Khaimah and Dubai were compounded by the news that the air route to Cape Town 
had opened. The first scheduled Imperial Airways service departed from Croydon for 
Africa on 20 January 1932, but prospects for the India route continued to look bleak.  
The following month, Persia issued a reprieve that allowed Imperial Airways to 
continue its operations until 31 May. This move precipitated the British into feverish 
consideration of a plethora of fresh but unworkable ideas for forcing through a route on 
the Arabian side of the Gulf. Among the suggestions was one by Imperial Airways, 
which suggested a site at Malcolm Inlet on the Musandam Peninsula, but air and sea 
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currents made this problematic for flying boat operations945 and the idea was not 
followed up. At an Air Ministry meeting on 5 February, Imperial Airways made another 
suggestion when Colonel Harold Burchall, Assistant General Manager, proposed that a 
night-stop be provided by means of ‘a temporary camp with tentage accommodation’ at 
Gwadar. The Director of Civil Aviation exposed Burchall’s lack of local knowledge 
when he pointed out that, owing to the climate, it was ‘unthinkable to expect passengers 
to stay there in tents between April and October.’946 Then on 15 February Ludlow-
Hewitt revived an old idea, telegraphing to Salmond that the leg from Bahrein to 
Gwadar ‘could be done in one day, as aircraft could leave Bahrein in darkness.’947 On 
the 25th Samuel Hoare, now Secretary of State to the Government of India, pitched in, 
suggesting that a ‘depot ship’ could provide overnight accommodation on Yas Island.948 
As one by one these ideas were rejected as impracticable, prospects for the India route 
grew bleaker. Such was the despondency of decision-makers over the practical 
implementation of the Gulf sector that the Air Ministry continued to grasp at hopes for 
the success of the Persian option. The Ministry, perhaps not fully understanding 
Britain’s situation in Tehran, even suggested that the Arabian option might be only 
temporary. As late as 24 March 1932, an Air Ministry telegram to the Government of 
India stressed that the transfer from the Persian to the Arab route could be ‘made at 
short notice, and vice versa if Persia subsequently granted a definitive permit for South 
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Persian route.’949 With Persia showing no sign of concession, and permission for the 
Persian shore route due to expire in weeks, the British position was becoming ever 
graver.  
Fig. 5.6. One of the Handley-Page HP-42 craft that operated the Persian Gulf air sector 
from 1931 (shown at Gaza - undated).950 
 
As the expiry of Persia’s authorisation to fly along its Gulf shoreline loomed, the 
future of Imperial Airways’ India route service became increasingly uncertain. Events at 
Ras al Khaimah had shown that although the Trucial inhabitants tolerated occasional 
military landings, the introduction of civil facilities was a different matter. The Gulf 
sector was now being operated by Handley-Page HP-42 aircraft (Fig. 5.6) which carried 
up to eighteen passengers. The main Trucial objection was to the overnight presence of 
civilian foreigners, and in particular Western ones. Even with flying boat services 
landing on water, provision would have to be made for passengers and staff to 
disembark and sleep on land. To this, as the India Office noted in October 1931, it 
would take ‘a great deal’ to overcome the ‘general and strong objection.’951 It was this 
question that would occupy the British for the succeeding year, and which will form that 
subject of the final chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
With their long history of control of the Trucial Coast, the British appeared to possess a 
number of advantages to aid them in establishing a sector of the India route there. They 
had in place an administrative arrangement executed by the Government of India. Under 
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this, the Resident exercised political control with the backing of Naval forces, and this 
had traditionally served British purposes effectively. A ‘culturally sanctioned protector-
protégé relationship’952 had operated since the nineteenth century, whereby the British 
enjoyed a degree of allegiance from the Trucial Arabs. The status of the Coast was 
ambiguous, being described as a ‘sort of protectorate,’ but Britain’s informal control 
was exercised through methods that more resembled those of formal imperialism. Given 
these circumstances, it seemed that Britain’s grip would allow it to pursue its air policy 
with little obstruction, and for a long time the British persisted in adhering to the 
traditional attitudes and methods. Unfortunately for British air ambitions, these only 
perpetuated the alienation of local opinion, whereas it would ultimately be proven that 
the achievement of the air route was dependent upon the abolition of old barriers in the 
relationship between Britons and Arabs. 
For a century, therefore, the British had done little more than to insist upon the 
Coast’s outward appearance of peace and compliance with regulations. However, the 
effects of its traditional ‘hands-off’ methods of dealing with the Trucial Coast hampered 
the British in the pursuit of their air aims. The Gulf administration was also complicated 
by the involvement of the Government of India in a region which was part of the 
periphery of the Indian core. While the Political Resident was ostensibly a 
representative of the Indian Viceroy, in Britain’s pared-down economic system of 
empire administration, he also doubled as the representative of the London authorities in 
the matter of aviation. The Indian Government’s reservation about many aspects of 
aviation, and in particular those related to its political effects on the Raj, obstructed the 
aviation ambitions of London. Officials in London and India lacked intimate knowledge 
of the situation on the ground, and this prevented them from giving sympathetic 
consideration to the interests of the Trucial sheikhs. The Arabs’ natural fear and 
suspicion of outside influence, exacerbated by their long-term experience of the British, 
made them wary of requests for aviation facilities, and created resistance to intervention 
in the form of Western technology. Meanwhile, although in the Gulf the British 
cultivated a serene, timeless and united face, behind the scenes, confusion in 
administrative arrangements held them back from developing a clear forward policy. 
The diffusion of thinking about the various questions involved – Persia versus Arabia, 
flying boats versus landplanes, force versus negotiation, and strategic versus civil 
aviation needs - dissipated effort and prevented a whole-hearted and focussed approach 
                                            
952 Onley, The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj, p. 3. 
212 
to the Arabian problem. On the Trucial Coast, as in Persia, British methods resulted in a 
deadlock.  
 
Chapter Six: Force Majeure: the Sharjah Solution, 1932 
 
Britain’s efforts to establish air facilities on the Trucial Coast had shown that its long-
term policy during the Pax Britannica had created an environment that was hostile to 
the introduction of civil aviation. At the beginning of March 1932, with permission for 
use of the Persian route soon to expire, the British still faced major challenges but, 
without a solution, the India through-route would break down, and imperial humiliation 
result. The problems were formidable. No suitable landing site for Imperial Airways 
services had been found, and the Trucial Arabs were proving so truculent that the 
chances of a successful outcome to negotiations seemed slim. This chapter examines the 
means by which the British were able to overcome these factors. The process took effect 
via a synthesis of three major elements drawn from both the British and Arab sides. 
Firstly, the chapter examines the factors which allowed London officials to lay aside 
their differences; this cleared the way for them to exploit two key practical 
breakthroughs which took place in March 1932. Secondly, the chapter discusses the 
entry of Sheikh Saqar of Sharjah into negotiations in the role of native mediator. 
Thirdly, the chapter explores how the British changed their approach by means of which 
Harold Dickson, who was able to break across the cultural divide between the British 
and Trucial Coast to finally achieve the air agreement at Sharjah.  
 
British obstacles to progress are overcome 
Early in 1932, Persia’s ultimata for Imperial Airways to quit its shoreline, and the 
prospect of the consequent failure of Britain’s through-route to Karachi, brought new 
pragmatism to British officials in relation to the Trucial Coast. Britain’s traditional 
methods of control would no longer suffice, and its need for aviation facilities forced it 
to embrace change. John Darwin argues that imperial advance was ‘driven not by 
official designs but by the chaotic pluralism of British interests at home and of their 
agents and allies abroad.’ The ‘chaotic expansion’ that resulted meant that by the mid-
nineteenth century, the empire consisted of an eclectic selection of ‘half-conquered 
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tracts, half-settled interiors…whaling-stations, barracks and cantonments.’953 In a 
number of respects, the Trucial Coast resembled a ‘half-conquered tract. Meanwhile the 
Trucial air sector there would prove to involve a ‘pluralism’ of interests, requiring the 
guidance and impetus of officials of the London and Indian governments, the 
involvement of Imperial Airways, and the approval of Sharjah elites who favoured 
British air proposals.As discussed in the previous chapter, already in 1931 there had 
been a certain amount of collusion between departments involved in Trucial air policy. 
The Foreign Office, Air Ministry, and Government of India had sidestepped obstruction 
from the Admiralty and also from Imperial Airways itself, in an effort to smooth the 
way for a forward policy. The new unity of official mind had been illustrated further in 
October 1931, when the India Office, Foreign Office, and Air Ministry colluded to 
present a united front against the objections of the Treasury. The three departments 
agreed that Biscoe, the Political Resident, should be allowed a ‘free hand to negotiate 
with Shaikhs as soon as possible…with a view to 
securing requisite facilities,’ and that he should offer 
Sheikh Saqar ‘allowances on fairly generous scale so 
as to overcome opposition of Shaikh’s retainers.’954 
This new environment also allowed officials to be 
more receptive to two practical breakthroughs which 
would occur in March 1932, and mark the beginning 
of moves leading to the implementation of the 
Trucial air route.  
 
Fig. 6.1. Francis Shelmerdine (undated).955 
 
The first occurred when Sheikh Saqar, ruler of Sharjah, made the British an 
offer. This was communicated to the Foreign Secretary of the Government of India in a 
telegram from Biscoe on 3 March: ‘Sheikh of Sharjake [sic] has written to Residency 
Agent offering to grant facilities for aircraft, either flying boats or land machines.’956 
Biscoe requested an immediate and detailed survey of Sharjah’s creek (Fig. 6.2) to 
assess its suitability for flying boats, and its shore for an aerodrome. The Sharjah 
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proposal was discussed on 21 March at a bad-tempered meeting at the Air Ministry in 
London. During it, a second breakthrough was made when Imperial Airways proposed 
that passenger services on the Trucial Coast need not be dependent upon flying boats, 
but could employ landcraft instead. What followed demonstrated the indecisiveness of 
Britain’s aviation policy-makers. Even though Imperial Airways had been operating the 
Persian route with landplanes since June 1931, the mental leap from flying boats to 
landplanes for Trucial Coast services was a difficult one for some officials to make. The 
focus on Ras Al Khaimah, and the hopes of the creek at Dubai, had kept attention 
focussed on the idea of flying boats, but landplanes had the advantage of increasing the 
number of potential landing locations. The landplane suggestion was posited, perhaps 
with some trepidation, by George Woods Humphery, Managing Director of Imperial 
Airways. He announced that the company ‘would prefer to operate the service 
throughout with land planes,’ which incidentally, he said, had always been its 
preference. Woods Humphery favoured four-engined aeroplanes, rather than the three-
engined Calcutta flying boats previously proposed for the Trucial sector. This meant 
that in practice the adoption of a landplane scheme would mean simply the transfer 
across the Gulf of the Handley-Page HP-42 Hannibals.957 (Fig. 5.6). 
Reflecting a general feeling of jadedness with the whole subject, Woods 
Humphery’s landplane suggestion drew a sour reaction from Air Ministry officials. 
Francis Shelmerdine, Director of Civil Aviation (Fig. 6.1), pointed out that the 
landplane idea ‘had already been negatived and…it seemed to him rather late in the day 
to bring in still another fresh proposal.’ He implied that this was just another in a long 
line of ill-thought-out Imperial Airways schemes. Air Vice-Marshal Charles Burnett, 
Deputy Chief of Air Staff and Director of Operations and Intelligence, added that 
landplanes had been objected to not only by the Air Ministry but also by the Foreign 
Office, Admiralty, and the Political Resident in the Gulf. Furthermore, as Burnett still 
had objections to the use of the Trucial Coast per se, he did not view the Sharjah offer 
with enthusiasm. Not only did he fear that the Coast was unsafe for both practical and 
political reasons, but that if the British opened landing grounds there, then ‘foreigners’ 
(the French and Dutch) would request to use them. This would have a number of 
negative implications for the British, for example by giving them responsibility for 
rescue services. Faced with this onslaught from the gentlemen of the Air Ministry, given 
Woods Humphery’s background (he was the son of a tank maker’s storekeeper and had 
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in his youth been apprenticed at a shipbuilder’s yard), it is perhaps not surprising that he 
beat a retreat. While he ‘admitted that operation with landplanes was contingent upon 
the finding of a suitable spot for an Aerodrome,’ as a parting shot he pointed out that 
‘the actuarial risk attendant on the operation with landplanes was less than with flying 
boats.’958  
Despite the cold reception of Woods Humphery’s proposal, Imperial Airways 
pursued the landplane idea. After the meeting, Colonel Harold Burchall, Assistant 
General Manager, attempted to clarify the situation in a conciliatory letter to Lord 
Londonderry, Secretary of State for Air: ‘aviation is such a new and rapidly changing 
art that it is essential to review fairly frequently problems which may have been 
considered finally disposed of, in order that the latest knowledge and experience can be 
focused on them.’ The fact was, Burchall explained, that because it had been only in 
recent months that the ‘greatly improved performance of our latest types of planes, viz: 
the Hannibal type’ had become apparent, it would now be wise to reconsider their value. 
Tactfully, given the Air Ministry’s opposition, he agreed that while flying boats had 
advantages – they were safer in the event of an emergency landing at sea, and raised 
fewer objections from the Trucial sheikhs - the Handley-Page Hannibals gave a superior 
performance, having ‘a ceiling of 8,000 to 10,000 ft. under any weather conditions with 
one engine out of action as against the flying boats ceiling of 2,000 ft. under favourable 
conditions with one engine stopped.’959 Indeed, Burchall’s argument about increased 
aircraft capability was valid, and Imperial Airways had already benefitted from 
technological developments. For example, night flight was now practical, and when in 
April 1931 the company had adopted it on the Baghdad to Basra section a day had been 
cut from the London to Karachi time.960 Aeroplane range was also increasing, and the 
HP-42 craft operating the Persian route were specially equipped with four engines, and 
their large fuel capacity made long distance flights and sea crossings less risky. Aircraft 
manufacturers were also making great advances in airspeed. For example, when Britain 
had first won the Schneider Trophy flying boat speed competition in 1914, the average 
speed of its Sopwith craft was 86 mph, but in 1931 the average speed of Britain’s 
winning Supermarine S.6B was 340 mph.  
For all its perceived drawbacks, the landplane scheme now seemed to offer a 
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concrete solution, and Imperial Airways won the day. The objections of Shelmerdine 
and Burnett discarded, the Air Ministry immediately endorsed the new plan, as did the 
Treasury, the latter persuaded by the financial economies that the use of aeroplanes 
promised.961 Rapid action was necessary, and on 24 March the Ministry informed the 
Government of India that the ‘State of Persia negotiations make it essential to arrange 
for opening of Arab route by end of May if necessary.’962 But now, with the Air 
Ministry having given the green light to an alternative scheme, Persia suddenly granted 
a further extension of permission. The British briefly reviewed the Persian route, but as 
the Tehran administration made it clear that this was the final concession, it now 
seemed certain that Imperial Airways must quit Persia at the end of September. There 
remained only six months in which to transfer services to the Arabian side. The RAF 
surveyed Sharjah while at the same time, for good measure, reconnoitring Dibba on the 
Gulf of Oman for a landing site, rest house, and rest vessel. For a short period Imperial 
Airways had great hopes of Dibba, but the survey report proved inconclusive. Sharjah, 
however, was found to have two potential aerodrome sites, on level sabkha (salt flats) 
which had suitably dry and crusted surfaces, and the advantage of good air approaches. 
Sharjah also offered sea access, relatively good supplies of drinking water (from a well 
near the Sheikh’s fort), and the availability of building material (coral-stone rock mined 
in or near the sea). In other respects, it did not present an auspicious prospect for air 
services. The best site for the aerodrome lay two miles across empty sand from the main 
town, where conditions were primitive. Although in 1930 Air Vice-Marshall Sir Robert 
Brooke-Popham had reported that the people were friendly, he observed that, ‘The place 
stinks of bad fish.’963 Officially, pearling and trading comprised the main source of 
income, but the Arabs also had a ‘black economy’ which involved economic activities 
deemed illegal by the British, and which they therefore desired to keep hidden. Food 
supplies for passengers would be limited; most food was imported by the 40 to 60 
resident Hindu merchants who brought in ‘rice from Calcutta, flour, wheat, sugar and 
tea from Karachi…and dates from Basrah, Minab and the Batinah coast.’964 There 
would, in addition, be a good supply of fish, which was obtained locally.  
Although the input of Imperial Airways had cleared the way for progress, the 
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company continued to cause irritation, for in April 1932 a number of Government 
departments, including the Air Ministry, collaborated to isolate it and limit its role in 
future negotiations. In this way they manoeuvred together against a private company. 
With only five months remaining before the expiry of Persian permission, it was 
perhaps felt better to deny Imperial Airways the opportunity of delaying a diplomatic 
solution on the Trucial Coast. As a result, the official resolution to go ahead with air 
facilities in Sharjah was not discussed in advance with Imperial Airways. The 
Government departments may have feared the objections of Burchall, whose 
contributions to discussions had not always been helpful. It had been he who in 
February had suggested that passengers could sleep in tents, and had been put down by 
the Director of Civil Aviation.965 This factor may have discouraged Government 
officials from involving him any further in consultations. The situation may have been 
embarrassing, for he was clearly an influential figure in Imperial Airways, and would be 
promoted to General Manager by the end of 1934.  
When Burchall realised that an official decision had been made without 
informing the company, on 30 April he wrote to Frank Bertram, Deputy Director of 
Civil Aviation. Burchall suggested that, whilst not wishing to appear ‘merely capricious 
in raising difficulties,’ he believed that Sharjah did not ‘provide an altogether 
satisfactory solution,’ and he was ‘sorry we did not have earlier information that it was 
being considered as an alternative to Dibah [Dibba].’ He pointed out a number of 
disadvantages to Sharjah. It was 60 miles further from Gwadar than Dibba, meaning 
that as another 100 gallons of petrol would be required, the payload would be smaller. 
Burchall also had many quibbles relating to mountains, headwinds, delays, and 
passenger objections owing to various timing considerations. While Imperial Airways 
did ‘not want to be awkward,’ Burchall regretted that ‘all efforts in connection with the 
Arabian route should have produced a solution so near, but yet so far from, being an 
entirely satisfactory solution.’966 Burchall’s comment that, despite all efforts, the 
solution reached was unsatisfactory, implied criticism of the Government departments 
involved. In addition, his complaints seemed particularly inappropriate at a time when 
the Government had finally settled the question after years of struggle, and when the 
breakdown of the Persian route necessitated speedy change and action. In any case, by 
this time, the Political Resident had already been despatched to Sharjah to commence 
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negotiations, and Burchall’s letter was not acted upon. Indeed, his fears would prove to 
have been unfounded for, once established later that year, Imperial Airways services 
would operate along the Trucial Coast with few problems.  
 
Sheikh Saqar of Sharjah becomes native mediator 
With the way now clear as far as London officials were concerned, and permission 
obtained from Sheikh Saqar (Fig. 6.3), progress seemed possible. However, there 
remained the problem of drawing up the terms of an agreement with Saqar, and 
obtaining his signature. This would require negotiation and collaboration but, as events 
unfolded, it became clear that without a change in long-term policy and practice on both 
sides this would be no easy matter. Darwin suggests that ‘The hallmark of British 
imperialism was its extraordinary versatility in method, outlook and object…the British 
imagined different kinds of empire, sought different kinds of relations with client 
peoples and subjects.’967 The desire for the air route forced the British to break with 
traditional protocol to adopt a new and less combative policy, which would allow 
collaboration with the indigenous Trucial population. In doing so, they demonstrated the 
resilience and adaptability of their imperial administration. Even so, they would not find 
deviation from traditional methods and outlook easy and did not demonstrate a 
willingness to ‘imagine’ a new relationship with the Trucial Arabs. The one that 
emerged came only out of sheer necessity, and at the last minute. The achievement of 
the air facilities would be hard-won. 
Darwin has argued that imperialism was driven by ‘chaotic pluralism’ of 
interests,968 and Cain and Hopkins have similarly described imperialism as ‘never 
simply the imposition of the progressive on the static and unchanging; it was an 
interactive, collaborative process.’969 Ronald Robinson’s excentric theory of imperialism 
incorporates a discussion of ‘imperialism’s involuntary partners,’970 who mediated with 
foreigners on behalf of their own side. Robinson and Gallagher suggest that as the 
British needed collaboration in order ‘to avert resistance or hold it down,’ the empire 
was thus dependent upon it:  
The financial sinew, the military and administrative muscle of imperialism was 
drawn though the mediation of indigenous elites from the invaded countries 
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themselves. The iron of collaborative systems lay in the fact that although the 
white invaders could exert leverage on ruling elites they could not do without 
their mediation...When mediators were not given enough cards to play, their 
authority with their own people waned, crisis followed, and the expanding 
powers had to choose between scrapping their interests or intervening to 
promote them directly.971  
 
The air negotiations on the Trucial Coast exemplify Robinson and Gallagher’s theory. 
The requirements of aviation meant that for the first time the British sought financial 
and administrative ‘muscle’ on the Coast, and they could obtain this only through the 
agreement of local elites. For the British, neither of Robinson and Gallagher’s 
alternative scenarios – of either ‘scrapping their interests or intervening to promote them 
directly’ – was possible. The Trucial Coast was the last resort for the Gulf air route; 
abandonment was ruled out, and Britain’s long-term policy had created circumstances 
whereby ‘direct intervention’ would be counter-productive. In this situation, Saqar’s 
offer of facilities, his influence over Trucial politics, and his willingness, albeit 
wavering, to negotiate, made him a prize that had to be grasped. As the Trucial air 
sector depended upon the Saqar’s agreement, by mid-1932 the Sheikh held the key to 
the India air route. The British had left themselves no choice but to give Saqar ‘enough 
cards to play,’ but, as will be shown, they would hand these out only grudgingly.  
 
Fig. 6.2. Boy with toy boat, 
Sharjah Creek, 1926.972 
 
Sheikh Sultan II bin 
Saqar al-Qasimi (r. 1924-
1951), a descendant of the 
Qawasim tribal group 
suppressed by the British in the 
1820s, was the paramount 
leader among the rulers of 
neighbouring Ras al Khaimah and Ajman, to whom he was related. He supported four 
of his brothers financially and of two (one being Mohamed), Biscoe reported, he ‘stands 
in some fear.’973 In Persia, Britain had found no mediator between themselves and the 
local elites, and hence its efforts to collaborate had met with frustration and ultimately 
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failure. By offering to facilitate Britain’s air requests, Saqar had stepped forward to take 
on the role of native mediator, but on both sides the implementation was difficult. 
Saqar’s offer placed considerable power in his hands in his dealings with the British, but 
in many ways he seemed an unlikely partner. The prospect of dealing with the Sheikh, 
of whom the British had a low opinion, appeared uninviting. An Air Ministry thumbnail 
sketch described him as ‘fat and obviously a “Bon Viveur.” Is very much influenced by 
a group of hangers on, whom hold themselves representatives of the people, but are 
actually merely seeking their own ends.’974 Worse, however, was Saqar’s history of 
obstruction of the air route for, Biscoe reported, he had ‘certainly encouraged’ the 
Sheikh of Ras al Khaimah in opposing the fuel barge that the British wished to anchor 
in the creek.975  
 
Fig. 6.3. Sheikh Saqar in 
Sharjah Rest House, early 
1940s. The Residency 
Agent is on the right.976 
 
Saqar and other 
Trucial inhabitants were 
far from fulfilling the 
idealised portrayal of 
Arabs in Western popular 
culture during the interwar 
period. It was a view that 
reflected a contemporary 
interest in the Arab world 
and, in Britain at least, 
owed much to the media exposure of T.E. Lawrence, British First World War hero of 
the Arab Revolt. The Western idea, Linda Street comments, was often characterised by 
‘predictable markers of Orientalism,’ which included ‘harems, angry men, dancers, dirt, 
jewelry, veils, and daggers.’977 In 1919, The Sheik, a novel by British writer Edith M. 
Hull became an international best-seller and began the ‘desert-romance genre’ of 
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fiction. Arab culture also entered the popular mind through the medium of the ‘Oriental 
spectacular’ genre of feature films,978 perhaps the best known being the film of Hull’s 
book, starring Rudolf Valentino, and released in 1921. The Trucial inhabitants bore 
little resemblance to the Arabs of Western imagination; by the interwar years they were 
impoverished, and remained under the deeply conservative influence of the Wahabi 
branch of Islam. While their culture featured Street’s ‘dirt,’ ‘angry men,’ and daggers, 
the harems, dancers, and jewelry were less visible.  
However, they did to an extent conform to a second aspect of the Western 
portrayal. David Cannadine, in his discussion of British attitudes to Arabs in the mid-
nineteenth century, argues that owing in part to the influence of writers such as Sir 
Richard Burton, a ‘romantic image’ was projected, which depicted Arabs as ‘English 
gentlemen “translated into another idiom.”’ Britain’s ruling classes, Cannadine argues, 
both admired and envied ‘the magnificent Bedouin chiefs and their remote, unspoilt 
deserts…where there was “a feeling of escape from the furies of modern life – 
disillusion, doubt, democracy.”’ As a result British gentlemen viewed Arab elites as 
‘noble and superior leaders, the patrons and protectors of a traditional, ordered world, 
which had once existed in Britain.’979 While in one sense the Trucial sheikhs, as Biscoe 
commented, were ‘small men’ who did not have the unswerving support of their 
tribes,980 their tribal culture conformed to Cannadine’s point regarding ‘the patrons and 
protectors of a traditional, ordered world.’981 For example, when in 1927 the RAF had 
attempted its overland survey between Abu Dhabi and Muscat, Saqar had written a 
letter to the tribal elites along the route, asking them not to become involved with the 
British.982 The British obtained and translated a copy. Saqar’s text suggests a social 
structure and standards which the British, in their contempt for the local people and 
owing to the effects of their long-term policy of non-involvement, failed to appreciate. 
Saqar’s invocation of unity, loyalty, and moral values was not dissimilar to the culture 
of the British ‘official mind.’ Saqar’s main purpose983 was to plead with the Sheikhs not 
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to co-operate with, or take bribes from, the British: ‘do not be deceived by worldly 
gains’ for ‘Fire is better than disgrace.’ The Sheikh’s letter revealed an unexpectedly 
high level of social organisation, integrity, and cultural cohesion. He reminded the 
Sheikhs that he was their leader and ‘sincere friend’ and advisor. He called the Arabs to 
unity, calling for responsibility towards Muslims, Arabs, and the ‘people.’ He also 
encouraged adherence to moral values, including Muslim values, and the ‘honour and 
respect’ of Arabs. However, although the values expressed by Saqar were akin to those 
of British elites, the British cut themselves off from an understanding of Trucial culture, 
and in this way damaged their air negotiation efforts. The challenge the British faced 
was to find common ground, and this would require collaboration and mediation.  
Saqar’s burgeoning relationship with the British made him the object of 
attention and pressure on his own side. Britain’s requests on the Trucial Coast coincided 
with a period of flux in the relationship of the two sides, and the negotiations were set 
against a backdrop of changing views about Britain’s political position in the Gulf 
which had been developing since the end of the War. In the Trucial view, Britain’s 
reputation was deteriorating, and this perception brought about a change in the balance 
of power on the Trucial Coast. Cain and Hopkins suggest that imperialism establishes 
relationships that are unequal, rather than the more cooperative ones that are a feature of 
interdependent states.984 In the interwar years, the relationship of the British with the 
Gulf inhabitants was becoming more equal, as these factors added new strain and 
uncertainty to the existing relationship between the two sides. Britain’s vulnerability in 
the Gulf had begun to be revealed after the War, and the Trucial inhabitants, schooled in 
British omnipotence by centuries of subjection, perceived cracks in the façade of power. 
Britain was the ‘Great government,’985 but by the 1920s the Arabs were losing 
confidence in its historical style of governance and diplomacy. One indication of this 
was the reaction to the revival of Persian territorial claims from 1926. Burgeoning 
nationalism increased Persian self-confidence so much that Captain H. Boyes, Senior 
Naval Officer, reported in August 1928, these claims had grown to encompass the 
whole Gulf, including Bahrain and several islands which were also claimed by the 
sheikhs of Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah. To indicate the Trucial antagonism towards the 
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British that this matter raised, Boyes sent his superiors a transcript of a complaint made 
by the Sheikh of Dubai:  
if we were not bound by the treaties we should send armed parties and deal with 
them properly, as our fathers did; but we have the treaties and we may not deal 
with another nation except through the Great Government…If you give way 
before the Persians it means you are becoming a weak Power, and for a weak 
Power we have no use…So far we have had only promises from you – promises 
– promises – promises. When are we going to see some actions.986 
 
Further, the encroachment of Persian customs vessels into Gulf waters presented, Boyes 
reported, 
a novel situation in the Gulf. Hitherto His Majesty’s navy has largely been 
employed keeping the peace amongst the Arabs and preventing them from 
preying upon other peoples. Now, on the other hand, the Arabs, appealing to the 
reciprocal clauses of the Trucial treaties, demand that His Majesty’s navy shall 
protect them and their shipping from the Persians.987  
 
There was some danger that the Arabs would discover the extent to which their rule was 
bluff. It was implicit that if the British failed to keep their side of the long-enforced 
agreements, the Arabs would consider it broken and act accordingly. Clearly, imperial 
prestige was at stake.  
Another aspect of the changing vision of Gulf politics which affected Britain’s 
traditional control on the Trucial Coast and thus, indirectly, the future of the air route 
was the rise to power in the Arabian Peninsula of Ibn Saud. In some respects, in 
particular in its effects on local perceptions of relative power, this mirrored that of Reza 
Shah in Persia. Ibn Saud was the name given in the West to Abdul Aziz Al-Saud (1876–
1953) who, in the interwar years strengthened his position by means of taking over 
territory. Ibn Saud belonged to the conservative reformist Wahabi branch of Sunni 
Islam, the followers of which advocated a return to the strict practices of early Islamic 
history. In 1925 Ibn Saud had captured the ‘holy city’ of Mecca, and the following year 
signed the Treaty of Jeddah, by which the British acknowledged his independence. In 
1932 he would rename his territory Saudi Arabia and proclaim himself king. The advent 
of Ibn Saud was troubling to British aviation plans owing to his potential influence on 
the Trucial Coast. While the Arabs were pressed from the north by the Persians, they 
were pressed from the land side by Ibn Saud. In October 1929 the Persian Gulf Sub-
Committee concluded that Ibn Saud desired ‘hegemony over the greater part of the 
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Arabian Peninsula.’ Although he had shown a ‘correct attitude,’ and appeared to accept 
that the Trucial Sheikhs were under British protection, still ‘the future is not devoid of 
anxiety.’988 The British recognised that, but for their presence, Ibn Saud’s takeover of 
the Trucial Coast would be ‘a natural process.’989 In their long-term policy of non-
intervention on the Coast they had adopted a ‘divide and rule’ strategy, deliberately 
encouraging the independence of individual sheikhs. As the ruler of Bahrain explained 
to them, Ibn Saud was ‘the one big Arab ruler, and it is natural for all the smaller Arab 
Sheikhs…to look up to him and try to please him.’990 The British were well aware that, 
as the Viceroy warned in 1928, Trucial disillusionment with the ‘Great Government’ 
could result in the transfer of tribal allegiance, long given to the British, to Ibn Saud for 
help against Persian claims.  
A further factor, external to the Gulf, which weakened Britain’s pursuit of its 
policy in the Gulf region was pressure resulting from the new international atmosphere 
after the Armistice, and the formation of the League of Nations. The effects of this 
threatened to dent Britain’s image in the Gulf and hence deny it its traditional free hand. 
Persia in particular had been a keen early participant in the League, joining, as had 
Britain, in the first round of membership in January 1920 and gaining new confidence 
from its partnership with other members. This, the Persian Gulf Sub-Committee 
reported in 1928, combined with the ‘weakness of our legal status’ in Persia, created for 
the British ‘a position of some difficulty.’991 The British seem to have viewed the 
League as a kind of watchdog for imperial abuse. As Political Resident Lieutenant-
Colonel C.C. Barrett commented in 1928, the League of Nations introduced new factors 
into international relations: ‘by proceeding to extremes [i.e. the use of force] we 
certainly run a risk of antagonizing world opinion, which appears to be on the look out 
for any stick which offers for beating the British Empire.’992 These pressures were 
indirect, but Saqar was subject to more direct influences from his own people which 
acted both in Britain’s favour, and against it.  
Saqar had a number of motivations in pursuing negotiations with the British. 
Robinson and Gallagher argue, Darwin suggests, that local elites entered into 
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collaboration because they calculated that it ‘would limit the scale of intrusion, preserve 
the substance of power and might even yield benefits.’993 This was the case at Sharjah, 
where the Trucial elites may have assumed, although probably erroneously, that 
compliance with Britain’s air proposals would ‘limit the scale of intrusion’ because it 
would prevent the intervention of a gunboat. Sheikh Saqar was driven by personal 
financial impoverishment, and the dangers from disgruntled local people to which it 
exposed him. By the early 1930s, Saqar’s financial problems had become so pressing 
that he saw the air route, and the security that collaboration with the British offered, as 
an opportunity to ensure his political and personal survival. Therefore, in providing 
money to Saqar for the hosting of aviation facilities, the British were deliberately 
exploiting his financial need to gain the ‘leverage’ they needed. The cause of Saqar’s 
impecuniosity was mainly the decline of the Trucial pearl trade. Britain’s intervention in 
the nineteenth century had resulted in the growth of the trade, which had become the 
economic mainstay of the Coast. However, by the 1920s, a fall in international demand, 
coupled with the arrival on the world market of cheaper Japanese cultivated pearls, had 
put the Gulf pearl trade into serious decline. In Sharjah, between the turn of the century 
and 1927, the number of pearling boats declined from 2,000 to about 45, which 
employed only 2,000 crew. As the Trucial sheikhs received income from the tax levied 
on boats leaving their shores, its loss weakened their power. Another reason for Saqar’s 
poverty was that from the middle of the nineteenth century Sharjah had progressively 
lost its political power to Abu Dhabi and its commerce to Dubai, and Saqar was under 
pressure to revive its fortunes.994  
As Fatima Al Sayegh has explained, a sheikh going against the traditions and 
customs of his people was seen as threatening the very fabric of society.995 Therefore, in 
demanding co-operation, the British asked a great deal of the Sheikh, for, if he agreed, 
he was putting his life at risk from those of his people who opposed collaboration. 
Saqar’s financial problems, as Clive Leatherdale argues, were exacerbated by the social 
structure operating in Bedouin society. Bedouin organisation, Leatherdale explains, was 
‘inter-woven’ and ‘segmentary;’ economic alliances and military units were formed 
with other Arab groups or sub-groups, but loyalties could shift as and when expedient. 
On the Trucial Coast, where there was no centralised state, the development of 
‘protector-client political, economic and social relationships’ was normal, and tribes 
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were rewarded for providing military forces to tribal leaders.996 Therefore, Saqar’s lack 
of money implied an inability to maintain such relationships with groups of relatives, 
traders, Bedu from the hinterland, or neighbouring sheikhs. His failure to pay them off 
threatened his rule, and even his life. In a land in which fratricide and regicide were 
commonplace, no reliance could be placed on family loyalties, and if a sheikh was 
unable to satisfy a hostile individual or group, or in other ways gain the leverage that the 
possession of money provided, he would be exposed to attack.  
Saqar also faced pressures from competing economic interests, both legal and 
illegal, on the Trucial Coast. Among the most prominent aerodrome supporters were a 
group of influential Sharjah merchants. They backed British demands on two grounds. 
Firstly, they recognised that Britain’s obvious desire for the landing site offered the 
potential for cutting deals which would benefit the coast economically, but in particular 
over a steamer stop. The switch from Sharjah in the 1890s of the regular port-of-call of 
the British India Steam Navigation steamer service to Dubai was still a sore point forty 
years later. The pro-aerodrome group therefore urged Saqar to deal with the British 
because the negotiations would allow him a platform from which to request a steamer 
stop as a condition of his agreement over land infrastructure. Secondly, having 
recognised, like Clement M. Keys (1876-1952), American head of the Curtiss 
Aeroplane and Motor Company, that ‘ten percent of aviation is in the air, and ninety 
percent is on the ground,’997 the merchants pressured Saqar to accede to British wishes 
because, as an RAF telegram of May 1932 stated, they believed that the aerodrome 
would bring about a much-needed revival of trade.998 However, this group was opposed 
by a larger Sharjah lobby, the interests of which lay in maintaining illegal trading and 
smuggling. They pressed Saqar to block Britain’s aviation plans, reasoning that the 
increased British presence which the aerodrome would bring would bring exposure to 
their activities.  
In neighbouring emirates, too, it was recognised that an improvement in 
Sharjah’s economy might mean a decline in their own. Growing discontent of the ruling 
classes of its neighbours - Dubai, Ajman, and Ras al Khaimah added to the pressure 
from within Sharjah. Dubai, the Resident explained in June 1932, owed its superior size 
and wealth ‘simply and solely...to the fact that the mail steamer calls there and it has 
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become the emporium of the Trucial Coast.’ Influential Dubai merchants, Biscoe 
reported, feared that if the aerodrome negotiations resulted in the transfer of the steamer 
stop to Sharjah, Dubai’s trade would be damaged. In this event, Dubai merchants and 
elites would decamp to Sharjah and the Dubai ruling family would lose income. Dubai 
merchants, Biscoe warned, put ‘Very great pressure’ upon the Sharjah elites to put a 
stop to Britain’s aerodrome plans: ‘the Residency Agent tells me that they receive daily 
4 or 5 letters from Debai [Dubai], urging them not to yield in this matter.’ Under such 
pressures as these, it was a measure of Saqar’s desperation that he was prepared to 
suppress his own fears, face down opposition, and effectively trust the British for the 
sake of the concession income which would, he hoped, ensure his political and probably 
personal survival. 999 Biscoe, in his account of the lengthy negotiations with Saqar over 
the steamer stop in the Spring of 1932, reported that ‘the Sheikh burst into tears and said 
he was pleading for his life and that if he signed without getting this undertaking he 
would certainly be murdered when he got ashore.’ Biscoe did not know whether Saqar’s 
fears were justified.1000 Although Saqar’s emotional outburst was clearly a haggling 
ploy, it also indicated extreme humiliation – far more so for Sheikh Saqar even than for 
a British man of Biscoe’s class in that period1001 - and thus can be taken to indicate a 
strong desire to obtain from the British an agreement that would appease powerful 
figures among the Sharjah elites. 
Another factor which aided the British was a move towards a change in attitude 
towards technology on the Trucial Coast. While, as has been discussed, the Trucial 
inhabitants had traditionally been opposed to technology, fearing it as the ‘thin end of 
the wedge’ of Western domination, some among them felt a propensity to try it out. 
Darwin has written that in Britain’s imperial advance, there were ‘very many in every 
colonial society to whom the new cultural forms were deeply attractive. They offered a 
new individualism.’1002 In accord with this, by the early 1930s, exposure to the 
technological trappings of Western civilisation had begun to erode resistance to aviation 
in the region. Shortly after Dr. Paul Harrison wrote in 1925 of the closed nature of the 
Trucial Coast,1003 enthusiasm for Western technology began to spread in the Gulf, and 
by the late 1920s had gone some way towards eliminating Arab opposition. For 
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example, in January 1928 The Times had reported that a number of special flights in the 
region had indicated ‘the readiness of native princes and their advisers to use the most 
up-to-date Western methods of travel.’ Members of the Iraqi royal family had already 
travelled by Imperial Airways, as had an adviser of Ibn Saud.1004 In 1929 the Resident 
reported that on the Trucial Coast only two years previously, ‘the entry of modern 
invention was prohibited, but now the Shaikh of Ras al Khaimah is inquiring about a 
Ford car, and has been for a flight in a flying boat; the Shaikh of Dubai has purchased a 
motor launch for himself; the richest and most influential merchant of Abu Dhabi has 
also purchased a launch.’1005 By 1932, this factor had provided a more favourable 
environment for the British pursuit of aviation facilities. 
Clearly, for the British and Saqar together to find a way through these 
difficulties would require considerable skill, and in placing the negotiations in the hands 
of Biscoe, the British also were also putting him forward as their mediator and imperial 
champion. Biscoe had the confidence of the Air Ministry. In October 1931, for example, 
C.L.L. Bullock, Air Ministry Permanent Under-Secretary, had written to the India 
Office that ‘we can confidently leave it to him [Biscoe] to strike the best bargain he can 
for us.’1006 However, in trusting the fate of the India route to Biscoe, his superiors were 
placing their reliance on a sick man. Biscoe, perhaps even inspired by rivalry between 
the Bushire and Tehran administrations, and wishing to succeed where the Foreign 
Office diplomats had failed, had returned for a tour of duty in the Gulf against the 
advice of his doctors. By mid-April 1932, with official attention firmly fixed on 
Sharjah, Biscoe had visited Sheikh Saqar, well aware that the matter had ‘now become 
one of extreme urgency.’1007 Determined to drive through to a speedy conclusion, on this 
first visit Biscoe seized the initiative and forged a preliminary agreement with Saqar. In 
his official report to Simla he emphasised several positive aspects. Firstly, Saqar was 
keen to accommodate British requests because he was ‘exceedingly hard up 
and…anxious to obtain the subsidy,’ by which Biscoe meant the fee that the British 
would pay for Saqar’s support of the aviation facilities. Secondly, the Residency Agent, 
being based at Sharjah, would be on hand to oversee security arrangements. Knowing 
that the Sheikh would be subjected to local pressure, Biscoe, he assured his superiors, 
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had adopted a high-handed stance, informing Saqar that the British would proceed 
‘irrespective’ of hostility from members of his family. Biscoe was of the opinion that 
the Sheikh would ‘personally welcome having to yield to force majeure,’ and would 
thus take the necessary steps to overcome any opposition by his people to the aviation 
arrangements, a factor which would save the British trouble.1008  
Diplomatic factors may have pressured Biscoe to express more optimism than he 
felt in his report to his superiors, for in memoirs written a quarter century later, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Harold R.P. Dickson, the Residency Agent in Kuwait, recorded that 
on his first visit, Biscoe had ‘found the ruler so intractable, raising difficulty after 
difficulty, that he had come away empty-handed.’1009 Indeed, on 29 April, in a ‘Secret’ 
telegram to the Government of India, Biscoe reported that the Sharjah Residency Agent 
had informed him that the Sheikh had gone back on his offer, and ‘does not agree to 
afford facilities.’1010 Such contradiction did not deter Biscoe from making a second visit, 
in May. The outcome of this was less positive, but still Biscoe urged his superiors to 
hold firm, warning of the dangers to Britain’s imperial authority if they abandoned the 
Sharjah aviation project. Biscoe suggested that if the British were to back out now, they 
would damage their imperial standing on the Trucial Coast, for the Trucial Sheikhs 
would ‘consider that the opposition they have shown during the last five months has 
been entirely successful, and can always be repeated.’1011 In recommending firm 
resolution, however, Biscoe was also acting as an advocate of both the Air Ministry and 
Imperial Airways to the Government of India.  
In involving themselves with the Sheikh, the British were entering into the 
politics of the region. Lacking knowledge of the internal affairs of the Trucial Coast, 
Biscoe miscalculated the extent to which Britain’s aviation proposals were seen as a 
threat by the Arabs. He failed either to comprehend the political weakness of Saqar, or 
the depth of the Sheikh’s fears about his survival if he were to comply with British 
requests. In particular, it appeared that the Sheikh was suspicious of the intentions of the 
British, and feared that they would fail to support him against local opposition. Biscoe 
reported that after his first meeting with Saqar, political intrigue entered the equation, 
for Saqar’s brothers appeared ‘to have been got at by interested persons in Dibai 
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[Dubai] and to have organized opposition.’ Therefore, although the Sheikh himself was 
still ‘anxious’ to cooperate, he could not withstand such pressure. Now Britain’s long-
term policy of relying on a non-Western Residency Agent revealed a negative effect, 
for, Biscoe wrote, the air route affair had the effect of putting matters ‘entirely in Isa’s 
hand.’ Isa, the Agent, ostensibly served the British but naturally had his own interests, 
relationships, and loyalties with Trucial elites. Knowing this, Biscoe did not entirely 
trust him.1012 
 
Fig. 6.4. RAF Westland 
Wapiti aircraft in 
formation over Iraq, 
1930s.1013 
 
In his efforts to 
force British policy 
through, Biscoe, resolved 
to discount local 
opposition, took several 
determined steps. He 
attempted to intimidate the Sheikh by telling him that his formal letter making the offer 
of air facilities allowed the British a free hand to go ahead not only without his further 
consent, but also without paying him a subsidy, if they so pleased.1014 Biscoe also 
requested that RAF Wapiti planes land at Sharjah, and asked the Residency Agent to 
mark out a landing circle with broken chalk. Isa, Biscoe suggested, should also enlist 30 
or 40 aerodrome guards as a precaution against ‘isolated marauders.’1015 The Wapitis 
arrived on 20 May ‘to call the Shaikh of Sharjah’s bluff,’1016 as an Air Ministry official 
put it, and to act as a litmus test of Trucial attitudes towards Britain’s air policy. In these 
moves, Britain was taking a proactive stance in the style of its long-term methods of 
gunboat diplomacy, but this brought forth a backlash from Sharjah’s neighbours, and 
caused an internecine tribal conflict that only added to Biscoe’s problems. The chalk 
circle was tampered with and Saqar’s life threatened, and upon investigation the British 
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found the chief instigator to be their old opponent, Sheikh Sultan of Ras al Khaimah, 
but supported by the Sheikh of Ajman. Having long held out against British plans for 
Ras al Khaimah creek, Sultan, as Captain E.C. Denison, Commanding Officer of the 
sloop HMS Bideford (Fig. 5.3) reported on 10 June 1932, now complained of ill 
treatment by the British, and was ‘furious’ that Sharjah had made an agreement with 
them. Denison thought all this ‘sour grapes.’ Sultan, although accusing Saqar of ‘selling 
his country to the British,’ knew full well that hosting the aerodrome would bring 
financial advantages.1017  
In addition to these feuds between Bedouin groups, Britain’s policy had also set 
Saqar’s brother Mohamed against the Sheikh. While the chalk circle was remade - with 
Saqar himself helping in the work - it was soon damaged again, but this time by 
Mohamed. While Mohamed’s actions were initially interpreted as ‘an anti-British 
gesture,’ it emerged that his true motive was to force Saqar to pay him a share of the 
subsidy money.1018 Irritated, Biscoe considered resorting to strong tactics against 
Mohamed: ‘We cannot,’ he wrote, ‘allow one man to obstruct the air route and overawe 
the inhabitants and to be a constant focus of unrest in Sharjah and should he persist in 
this attitude I think it will be necessary to deport him or order him to reside outside 
Sharjah.’1019 Biscoe made a further visit to Sharjah in June, but the situation deteriorated 
further. Afterwards he wrote privately to Dickson that he had had ‘five days of 
interminable discussions with the Shaikh and even now he had not finally signed the 
agreement.’ Biscoe had felt ‘very much handicapped at the time by the fact that I did 
not take with me an Arab munshi as the Shaikh produced a most villainously worded 
letter which he asked me to sign.’ As a result, Biscoe asked Dickson, who spoke ‘Arabic 
as an Arab does,’ to accompany him on his next visit to Sharjah.1020  
Faced with the fluid political situation, both Biscoe and the Air Ministry 
remained determined to push ahead with their plans. In early June an RAF telegram 
from the Gulf informed the Air Ministry that, ‘All possible speed is being applied to the 
construction of the permanent rest house at Sharjah.’1021 Yet ploughing ahead with the 
building of facilities could not disguise the fact that no formal agreement had been 
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reached with Saqar, and by July this became a matter of greater urgency as Persia’s 
ultimatum to quit its territory neared. With just a few weeks remaining, Biscoe again 
boarded the Bideford (ship’s motto: ‘Bide Your Time’) and departed for Sharjah, 
collecting Dickson en route. Thus far Biscoe had been the man on the spot in the 
Trucial negotiations, but he was not to see the end of the political game. On the night of 
18th/19th July, Dickson and Biscoe slept on deck owing to the fierce summer heat. In the 
small hours Biscoe awoke complaining of chest pains, and later, Dickson wrote, ‘He 
practically died in my arms after a whole night’s struggle.’1022 A prompt sea burial 
ceremony took place and subsequently Dickson, now ‘the Senior Political Officer left in 
the Gulf,’ felt that ‘it was up to me to take some action.’1023 The scene was set for the 
final act of the air route negotiations.  
 
The British position shifts 
The meticulous preservation of status throughout the Pax Britannica years had involved 
the British in the careful construction of stances and modes of behaviour which 
produced a consciously-maintained representation of rule. They had developed an 
imperial personality – one which they projected to the Trucial Arabs, but also held up as 
a standard for themselves. While during the Pax Britannica, Britain’s systems of control 
had sufficed for the achievement of its aims, in the interwar years they increasingly 
appeared to be out-dated. Britain’s long-term policy had prejudiced the Trucial Arabs 
against both the idea of aviation and its implementation in their territories. Attempts to 
introduce aviation turned the previous hands-off policy on its head as it became clear 
that many aspects of the old-style imperial rule, for example, that using force, prevented 
the development of the collaborative relationship that aviation necessitated. Therefore, 
as in the 1920s British policy-makers found their capacity for exerting influence 
weakened, they were forced to break with traditional protocol and adopt conciliatory 
tactics.  
In making requests for air facilities, the British were in a sense acknowledging 
some level of autonomy and sovereignty on the Trucial Coast, and acting as supplicants 
of the Trucial elites. This was an unprecedented alteration to the long-term 
protector/protégé relationship. The state of truce that ostensibly existed had been 
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expected to imply a balance of power of sorts, but the air negotiations revealed that the 
balance was less in Britain’s favour than might have been supposed. To achieve the air 
agreement, therefore, Britain was forced to make compromises. This exposed the 
weakness in the British position, and suggested a degree of interdependence which had 
previously been neither intended nor desired by either side. Robinson and Gallagher 
make an interesting observation about the role of imperial negotiators,  
Collaborators had to perform one set of functions in the external or “modern 
sector” yet square them with another and more crucial set in the indigenous 
society. The kind of arrangement possible in the one thus determined the kind of 
arrangement possible in the other. When collaborators succeeded in solving 
these complex politico-economic equations…progress was almost 
miraculous.1024 
 
Air negotiations required a mediator on each side. Each had to represent his own side to 
the other, and the other to his own people, and liaise between the two. In addition to 
being placed diplomatically between two groups, the British and Trucial mediators also 
liaised between the old world of tradition and the new world of aviation technology.  
Sheikh Saqar had emerged as mediator on the Trucial side while on behalf of the 
British, Biscoe had initially adopted the role but had been removed from the field at a 
crucial junction. Biscoe had perhaps recognised his lack of success at Sharjah, and his 
engagement of Harold Dickson (Fig. 6.5) for the visit of July 1932 was a shrewd act. 
The early phase of the Sharjah negotiations had been placed solely in the hands of one 
man – Biscoe - who was in any case sick. The lack of forethought in administrative 
provision that this spartan and risky policy represented suggests a lack of concern for 
the outcome of the negotiations. Biscoe’s untimely death left Dickson to assume charge 
of the Sharjah mission. Although unplanned, this event was fortuitous for British air 
ambitions, for Dickson was more evenly matched with Saqar as a mediator than had 
been Biscoe. Able to solve the ‘politico-equations’ at Sharjah, Dickson enabled progress 
in the negotiations and would become the linchpin in Britain’s collaborative relations on 
the Trucial Coast. He represented the external sector and was uniquely able to ‘square’ 
this role within the culture of indigenous Trucial society. Although Dickson had a 
reputation among the British of being, at best, a maverick, he was a man who could get 
things done.  
As a Gulf official, Dickson worked under the Government of India and was 
therefore, as suggested in the previous chapter, of a different background and quality 
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than the Foreign Office diplomats based in Tehran. Whereas Tehran staff were trained 
in the ‘administration of oriental peoples,’ officers of the Indian Diplomatic Service, as 
Victor Mallet of the Tehran Legation argued, usually had no such experience.1025 
Mallet’s belief in the necessity of ‘oriental’ experience would be vindicated by the 
outcome at Sharjah.1026 Events would prove Dickson to be the greatest asset that the 
British possessed in their attempts to achieve air facilities in the Gulf. Where Biscoe had 
lacked important local knowledge, Dickson’s intimate acquaintance with Arab culture 
allowed him to bring unprecedented methods to bear on the negotiations. Through the 
agency of the Kuwait official, the British were able to overcome the entrenched racial 
and imperial attitudes and behaviours that their self-conscious maintenance of a 
Westernised perspective had brought forth.  
The success that Dickson would achieve at Sharjah can be attributed to his 
cultural ambiguity. Although the son of British parents, Dickson had native-speaker 
Arabic as a result of having been brought up in the Middle East, where his father was a 
diplomat. Dickson’s language skills, Charles Dalrymple-Belgrave, British Advisor to 
the ruler of Bahrain (Fig. 6.6) wrote in his personal diary in 1929, were enviable; he 
spoke it with a ‘wonderfully good accent…his English has a trace of an accent.’1027 
While his race, nationality, and official position gave Dickson the outward appearance 
of a middle-class Englishman, several contemporary accounts express the unease his 
peers felt about Dickson’s cultural orientation. Darlow and Bray may write in their 
history of Ibn Saud that ‘Dickson was through-and-through a British imperial diplomat 
in the finest tradition,’1028 but every other account differs. Dickson failed to conform to 
what Edward Said has described as the ‘communal idea’ of a ‘White Man.’ Said has 
examined the state of ‘Being a White Man’ in an imperial environment; it was, he 
suggests, both an idea and a reality: ‘It involved a reasoned position towards both the 
white and the non-white worlds,’ which involved adopting certain modes of speech and 
behaviour ‘and even feeling certain things and not others. It meant specific judgements, 
evaluations, gestures.’1029 In its institutional forms, Said argues, the idea was ‘an agency 
for expression, diffusion, and implementation of policy towards the world…although a 
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certain personal latitude was allowed, the impersonal communal idea of being a White 
Man ruled.’1030 British officials thus followed a pre-ordained way of dealing with 
imperial subjects:  
for the Britisher who circulated amongst Indians, Africans, or Arabs there 
was…the certain knowledge that he belonged to, and could draw upon the 
empirical and spiritual reserves of, a long tradition of executive responsibility 
towards the colored races.1031  
 
As being ‘white’ therefore implied ‘a form of authority before which nonwhites, and 
even whites themselves, were expected to bend,’1032 Dickson’s refusal to do so 
demonstrated that he was not wholly a ‘White Man.’  
 
Fig. 6.5. Harold Dickson after a game of polo 
(undated).1033 
 
Dickson’s peers and contemporaries 
perceived that Dickson did not think or act in a 
‘White’ way, and that his ‘personal latitude’ 
had a far wider range than did theirs. His 
reputation as the ‘other’ - a separate, slippery, 
and undefinable character, and hence not 
solidly ‘British’ is well-attested. For example, 
the British writer Compton Mackenzie thought 
that there was ‘always…something queer’ 
about Dickson, ‘something missing.’1034 
Dalrymple-Belgrave recorded that ‘Dickson is 
very capable…but is too Arab in his way of 
thinking. He was born in the Levant and is said to have a touch of the Levantine about 
him…I don’t quite trust him.’1035 St. John Philby, the Arabist and British Intelligence 
officer, admired Dickson’s ‘unstudied ease [in] an Arab setting,’ and said that his 
‘peculiar’ understanding of Arab culture enabled Dickson to ‘walk blindfold without 
faltering’ in the confines of the Arab world.1036 Dickson also played Arabs at what he 
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considered to be their own game, writing to his mother that ‘I meet cunning with 
cunning.’1037 He also took care to enhance his own reputation by recounting that because 
how as a small child in Damascus he had had a Bedouin wet-nurse, her tribal family 
regarded him as having a blood tie with them. These ploys aided Dickson in his dealings 
with Arab tribesmen,1038 although Priya Satia suggests that the wet-nurse story was an 
embellishment of the truth.1039  
 
Fig. 6.6. Charles Dalrymple-Belgrave (undated).1040 
 
Darwin has attributed the success of Britain’s 
imperial advance to its ability to appeal to ‘the self-
interest or sympathy’ of allies and collaborators. He 
suggests that the British exhibited chameleon-like 
qualities, which meant that ‘Those who disliked one face 
of British imperialism could usually find an alternative, 
more liberal, human or respectful. This was no 
accident.’1041 The Sharjah negotiations certainly lend 
weight to Darwin’s generalisation. Biscoe’s sudden demise left not only the question of 
the continuance of the through India route, but with it British imperial prestige, to 
Dickson, who would prove a ‘chameleon,’ able to switch roles as the occasion 
demanded. In that Dickson did not conform to the traditional standards of the Gulf 
official, his was perhaps the first ‘alternative’ face that the British had presented to the 
Trucial Arabs. His knowledge and understanding of Arab culture were to prove 
invaluable to Britain’s aims. According to Fatima Al Sayegh, the Sharjah Residency 
Agent ‘later admitted there was much more chance of the matter being settled under 
Dickson’s auspices than there would be if the matter was delayed…Dickson’s 
personality and his fluent Arabic were largely responsible for the successful conclusion 
of the agreement.’1042 The fact that Dickson was a friend of Ibn Saud also gave him 
credibility in the eyes of the more conservative elements on the Trucial Coast.  
At Sharjah, Dickson did not, in Said’s terms, express, diffuse, or implement1043 
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British policy to the extent that he destroyed the trust of the Arabs. Less tainted by the 
contempt which had erected barriers in the past, he ‘spoke the same language’ as the 
Arabs not only culturally but technically. Language, Barbara Bush argues, has been ‘a 
powerful tool of cultural assimilation and coercion’ for imperialism, and the language of 
imperialists was ‘imposed as the official language and subordinated local languages 
were ignored.’1044 At Sharjah, however, the British had not imposed the use of English, 
but had traditionally communicated through a translator. Now, Dickson did away with 
the English language and conducted negotiations entirely in Arabic. By this means, he 
could ‘assimilate’ the circumstances and subtleties of the negotiations, and ‘coerce’ the 
Arabs into an alliance. His skill also enabled him to engage effectively with convoluted 
Arab methods such as haggling and cutting deals. David Commins comments that the 
British ‘bargained with Arab sheikhs for landing rights,’1045 but in this way they entered 
into the Arab culture. This represented a change, and perhaps even a compromise, 
because in the past they had simply stated their terms and expected compliance. In 
addition, largely unfettered by considerations of diplomatic protocol, Dickson possessed 
an attitude of Eastern pragmatism towards red tape; his driving force was expediency. 
These characteristics, as will be shown, would enable him to discern the true concerns 
which lay at the root of Trucial recalcitrance in the air route negotiations – those related 
to slavery and the treatment of women. 
Dickson’s experiences at Sharjah can be pieced together by the amalgamation of 
two separate accounts, the first being the official report that he compiled at the time, and 
the second a chapter of his memoirs of 1956.1046 These records do not always accord. In 
the report, Dickson appears to play up the expectations of his audience of superiors, but 
in his memoirs, written twenty year after his retirement from British service, he tells his 
story more freely. In the nineteenth century, Clive Leatherdale argues, imperial officials 
in the field were ‘endowed with much greater responsibility for decision-making’ than 
later became the norm. The Government was ‘chiefly concerned with “picking up the 
pieces”’ afterwards.1047 Officials on the ground were also subject to pressures to appear 
competent and effective. For example, a Trucial source reported that in the nineteenth 
century, at Ras al Khaimah, British actions had raised opposition which resulted in a 
six-day war in which the local people ‘suffered 1,000 casualties.’ The British, 
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meanwhile, had become so ‘scared’ that they ‘moved their base to Al Qashm Island.’ 
However, in their official report, the British stated that when their troops occupied Ras 
Al Khaimah, the local people surrendered immediately.1048 In the more static 
environment of the Gulf, such old imperial standards of behaviour lingered. In the 
interwar years, many nineteenth century procedures were still in operation. After the 
death of Biscoe, Dickson took full advantage of this latitude. Free of restraint, Dickson 
and the other officials on board HMS Bideford – Lieutenant Frederick C.L. Chauncy, 
Biscoe’s young Under Secretary who had been in the Gulf for only five months,1049 and 
Captain Denison - entered into a sort of conspiracy, thereby becoming a law unto 
themselves. Dickson, as the senior officer, added his personal latitude to imperial 
latitude, drawing the group outside the unwritten ‘communal idea’ of the ‘White Man.’ 
Dickson managed to coax even Captain Denison to transgress the boundaries of official 
behaviour and accepted protocol.  
The news of Biscoe’s death had been immediately telegraphed to the 
Government of India. It must have been on 19 July, the day of the sea burial, that, from 
the cool of Simla the Foreign Secretary replied to the Bideford instructing Dickson to 
take no further action over the air route until the arrival of a new Resident. This 
telegram, Dickson wrote in 1956, ‘concluded with the advice that it was considered 
unpropitious to continue with negotiations so soon after Sir Hugh Biscoe’s death, and 
that the Sheikh of Sharjah would be the first to think so too.’ Yet in his 1956 account, 
Dickson wrote that Denison chose to withhold the message, releasing it only later, when 
the Sharjah negotiations had been brought to a successful conclusion. Denison would 
then justify his action, explaining to Dickson that he had retained the telegram because 
he had judged that immediate action was necessary, or ‘the air agreement would never 
have been put through now, or ever more.’ Chauncy, Dickson wrote, had been ‘in on the 
plot,’ but Dickson himself had been ignorant of the official will. With Biscoe gone, and 
knowing that ‘Sir Hugh [Biscoe] would have wished it so,’ Dickson gave the order to 
proceed to Sharjah with all speed.1050 Having bypassed orders from Simla, Dickson 
needed to justify his actions to his superiors. Therefore, his report would stress that an 
immediate departure for Sharjah had been necessary, because ‘the news of the Political 
Resident’s death would certainly reach the Trucial Coast by Arab sailing dhows in the 
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shortest of time, and would result in the wildest of rumours getting about.’1051  
The Bideford arrived at Sharjah early on 20 July. In his official report, again 
attempting to justify his actions and perhaps also to give a sop to his Indian Government 
superiors who had recommended delay, Dickson recorded that once at Sharjah, he 
thought it ‘prudent, knowing the peculiar mentality of the Trucial Coast Arab, and his 
highly superstitious nature,’ to suggest that negotiations be delayed. He feared, he 
wrote, that hostile elements would ‘seize upon the Political Resident’s death, as a 
Heaven sent Sign, and might have it in their power to spoil all the good spade work 
already done.’ Instead, Dickson was ‘very agreeably surprised’ to find that the Sheikh 
still wished to proceed: ‘The feeling seemed to be abroad that the Political Resident’s 
death was in part due to the worry and trouble that the chiefs of the Trucial Coast has 
caused him, and they wished to make amends, by hastening the conclusion of the 
business.’1052 On 21 July Dickson presented his superiors with a fait accompli, 
telegraphing the Secretary of State for India to request permission to proceed with 
negotiations. There was, he reported, a ‘favourable atmosphere, which may not last…I 
think the opportunity too good to miss and recommend that I now be permitted to 
proceed with the negotiations. I feel that I may achieve (?final settlement)[sic] and such 
opportunity may not occur (?again)[sic].’1053  
Negotiations began immediately, but conditions were difficult. Dickson wrote in 
1956 that ‘For three days and three nights, in desperate heat and living ashore, we 
[Dickson was accompanied by Chauncy] laboured at the treaty documents, deleting here 
and adding there, but in the main following the Political Resident’s draft.’1054 Dickson 
later wrote to a friend that ‘Entre nous, I do not think I have ever had such a hard 3 days 
fight as I had with the Shaikh of Sharjah. The heat was terrific, one’s temper was 
ragged, and I had scarcely recovered from Biscoe’s tragic end.’ The fact that Dickson 
and Chauncy were able to sleep ashore, in the house of the Residency Agent, may have 
been a tacit recognition of Dickson’s status as an honorary Arab, but in any case 
suggests a new attitude of co-operation on the Coast. Even so, as Molly Izzard has 
commented, Saqar’s methods were ‘captious and prevaricating.’1055 Biscoe had earlier 
commented, sharing his own racial views, on the almost unbearable frustration he had 
experienced in meetings at Sharjah: ‘The Shaikhly families of the Trucial Coast 
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are…quite the stupidest people with whom it has ever been my misfortune to deal – a 
country yokel from a remote village in England or Scotland is a highly intelligent 
individual compared with a Trucial Sheikh.’1056  
Such was the nature of the Residency system that in the past, the Trucial attitude 
seems to have been accepted by the British as an innate characteristic of the Arabs, and 
their motivation was not investigated. However, Dickson’s knowledge of Arabic 
exposed him to every detail of what passed. Given the tactics of delay, prevarication and 
haggling, this must have been irritating, but it also allowed Dickson to discern a key 
cause of the Arab desire to obstruct the air route. Even Biscoe, who via the air route 
negotiations become more closely involved with the Coast than some of his 
predecessors, and who felt a certain sympathy towards the Trucial Sheikhs, had failed to 
discern that the single biggest factor working against Britain’s air aims was the fear of 
interference in the slave trade, and the associated question of the treatment of women. 
Even though the pearl trade was in decline, the Trucial economy remained dependent 
upon slave labour (Fig. 6.7). Dickson would later report that Trucial hostility was 
‘bound up almost entirely with this “slave” business.’ The slave question, as Dickson 
discerned during the course of the negotiations, was Saqar’s ‘chief dread.’ It formed the 
core of his ‘suspicious fear’ of the British that, with the arrival of air facilities, they 
would turn their attention to it and ‘start interfering in what he believes to be his 
immemorial rights.’1057 This came to light only as a result of Dickson’s superior insight, 
and his ability to grasp that the issue was crucial to the air route negotiations became 
key to the achievement of a settlement. 
 
Fig. 6.7. African slave 
workers on a Persian Gulf 
pearling boat (undated).1058 
 
The Gulf slave 
trade had existed for 
centuries, and remained 
extensive and entrenched. 
Slaves, brought mainly from Zanzibar and Balochistan by sea, were traded with 
impunity across the Arabian peninsula. In 1925 the Trucial Coast was described by 
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missionary Paul Harrison as ‘The one remaining nest of slavery in Arabia.’ Harrison 
had found that ‘Night visits by desperate slaves begging for assistance in running away 
are harrowing affairs...Slave women are the plaything of their owners...There is no 
section in all Arabia where immorality is so flagrant and open as in this district.’1059 In 
1929 the Senior Naval Officer confirmed that the Coast was the trade’s ‘magnet and 
mainspring,’ and added that ‘To attempt to compel Arabia, in its present state of 
development, to give up slavery could perhaps be compared with attempting to compel 
Glasgow to give up the use of mechanical apparatus and whisky.’1060 Matthew S. 
Hopper has examined Britain’s ‘dilemma’ over the Gulf slave trade. He suggests that 
the main reason for the continuing prevalence of slavery on the Trucial Coast in the 
interwar years was the weakening of British antislavery measures after 1890. Hopper 
suggests that from the late nineteenth century the British ‘drifted towards tolerance’1061 
because clamping down on slavery would have such severe economic and therefore 
political effects as to make their rule ‘untenable.’1062 He also suggests political 
motivation in Britain, in that the trade created 
a conflict between the objectives of liberal politics and liberal economics. On the 
one hand, the administration was committed by treaty and popular sentiment at 
home to the suppression of the slave trade. On the other hand it was committed 
to the maintenance of free trade and tranquillity in Gulf waters. These goals 
conflicted because the Gulf’s two largest export products – pearls and dates – 
relied heavily on slave labour.1063 
 
To the Trucial Arabs, British intervention in Trucial slave concerns was 
incomprehensible. Frauke Heard-Bey explains that slavery ‘is treated as a fact of life in 
the Koran,’1064 and even the Senior Naval Officer thought the system not wholly bad: 
‘While the lot of a slave employed in Pearl Diving is cruel and that of a slave working 
in the date gardens is probably harder that of the domestic slave is on the whole good 
and may be even better than that of many free men.’1065 By 1929 another factor had 
come into play. International attention, Hopper claims, was becoming focussed on Gulf 
slavery, and pressured the British to maintain a strong policy over slavery. The Senior 
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Naval Officer expressed the fear that the Persian Government could refer the matter to 
the League of Nations and thereby expose Britain’s failure to deal with the problem.1066 
In these circumstances, Saqar’s fears were justified. The presence of aviation 
infrastructure might not only allow the British to discover the extent of the slaving 
activities, but also provide an additional opportunity for slaves and women to seek 
manumission. The Trucial view has been confirmed by two local, although secondary 
sources. Fatima Al Sayegh states that opposition to a Rest House was due to local fear 
that it would provide another location at which ‘women, whether slaves or free,’ could 
seek refuge, which, Al Sayegh argues, ‘might cause great social distress.’1067 In addition, 
Alexander Frater, retracing the Imperial Airways route in 1984, at Sharjah met Nasser 
Abdul Latif, the son of the Residency Agent involved in the 1932 aviation negotiations. 
Latif (who told Frater that he had personally translated the 1932 agreement into Arabic) 
explained that ‘The British met stiff local resistance because the sheikhs believed that, if 
the company came, their women and slaves would slip away to the Imperial manager’s 
office and ask for asylum.’1068 From time to time, as under British rules they were 
entitled to do, dissatisfied slaves and women sought refuge and a certificate of 
manumission at the house of the Residency Agent. In 1929, for example, Al Sayegh 
states that 47 slaves had taken this course.1069 One such event took place in December 
that year, when a woman entered the Agent’s house but was injured in the resulting 
recovery attempt by her brother and three other armed men. As the ‘prestige of the 
British agent’ was involved, HMS Crocus was despatched and the culprits apprehended 
and flogged.1070 However, according to Hopper, the Agent’s protection of slaves seeking 
manumission was the exception rather than the rule. As the Agent had to ‘maintain his 
position’ in Sharjah, among the slaves he was ‘notorious for accepting bribes from slave 
owners and returning slaves to their masters.’1071 The implication was that although the 
Trucial Arabs had found ways of circumventing the Agent or gaining his co-operation, a 
British official based at the aerodrome would be less tractable. That Trucial fears over 
this matter were eventually calmed probably owed a great deal to Dickson’s presence, 
but Frater adds that the worldly Wazir, Humaid bin Ali, assured Saqar that an Imperial 
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Airways’ manager, ‘having no diplomatic status, couldn’t give asylum to anyone.’1072  
The situation of both Dickson and the Sheikh was difficult and unprecedented. 
Each was caught between their own world and that of the other. In Dickson’s official 
report, whether deliberately or not, he distanced himself from the Arab environment and 
hence confirmed his solidarity with his superiors. In setting out his sufferings at Sharjah 
and explaining how his special knowledge had helped him, Dickson was perhaps 
intending to mitigate any subsequent censure. His account implied that he was the only 
man who could have succeeded under the circumstances. The negotiating environment 
was unpleasant in many respects. Dickson found the proceedings ‘exasperating to a 
degree.’ Dickson had had to contend with ‘a host of intriguers all determined to prevent 
the Shaikh, a most weak, obstinate and frightfully suspicious person, from signing the 
agreement.’1073 Saqar, Dickson wrote, ‘insisted on having present in the room, to give 
him moral support one presumes, his Wazir, one Humaid bin Ali, a cunning and 
argumentative pearl merchant who had visited Paris, a couple of wild Bedouin Shaikhs, 
and several Negro slaves.’ Thus supported, Saqar now began to make ‘all kinds of fresh 
and impossible demands, and for a time appeared bent on going back on everything that 
he had agreed to on Sir Hugh Biscoe’s previous visit.’ Progress was painfully slow, as 
‘time after time he [Saqar] would appeal to one or both of the Bedouin Shaikhs or to a 
black slave, for advice and sympathy.’ At last, ‘With the wet and dry bulb standing in 
the vicinity of 100ºF,’ Dickson reached the limit of his endurance. His account suggests 
that he was able to get away with insulting and threatening the Trucial Sheikhs, 
behaviour which would not have been tolerated from any other British official. He now 
had to threaten to break off the negotiations, return to the ship, and sail away. I 
told the Shaikh quite openly that it was impossible for me to continue business 
in an atmosphere which resembled that of chattering women, rather than the 
deliberations of serious men. It was necessary to be rude at this stage and I think 
that these remarks as well as other equally caustic expressions which I used had 
good effect.1074  
 
By 3.30p.m. on the penultimate day of negotiations, the details of the agreement 
had been settled. But now the discussion took ‘an even more puerile and acrimonious 
turn’ over the wording of a letter which Dickson was to give the Sheikh. Saqar ‘seemed 
genuinely to believe’ that an agreement with the British threatened his independence, 
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his authority, and his land holdings. By 8p.m., ‘the Sheikh appeared finally satisfied 
with Dickson’s assurances.’ He then promised to board HMS Bideford early the next 
day to sign the agreement, and Dickson and Chauncy returned to the ship. Nevertheless, 
the following morning, Saqar did not arrive, and his subsequent behaviour would drive 
the Britons beyond the bounds of accepted protocol. Putting Dickson’s two accounts 
together, it seems that overnight Saqar had a change of heart. The Wazir went out to the 
Bideford to report that the negotiations had been ‘too much for the Sheikh and that he 
had retired to bed sick.’ Dickson ‘at once suspected evasion,’ and Denison set in motion 
a stratagem which demonstrates the pragmatism of the British in their efforts to achieve 
their aims. The Sheikh’s liking for food was well known, and Denison now issued an 
invitation to a ‘formal tea-party.’ The ruse worked, for in the afternoon Saqar came out 
to the Bideford, where ‘a grand display of foodstuffs, chocolates, biscuits, cakes etc., 
was temptingly laid out’1075 in the Captain’s cabin. The gastronomic delights did not, 
however, immediately have the desired effect, for Saqar, perhaps interpreting the tea 
party as a sign of desperation on the British side, now sought to extract further 
concessions: ‘We enjoyed our tea,’ wrote Dickson in 1956, but then Saqar ‘began to be 
awkward.’ Denison refused the Sheikh’s request for the gifts of a signed photograph of 
King George V, a silver-framed photograph of Mrs. Denison, and a silver cigarette-box, 
presented to Denison by Queen Mary. Denison was now exasperated, and promised the 
Sheikh, Dickson wrote,  
anything in the cabin except those three things, so Shaikh Sultan at once 
pocketed two silver cigarette-lighters, a photograph of the Bideford, another 
silver cigarette-box, half a dozen teaspoons, and told his black slave in 
attendance to carry off a large tin of fancy biscuits and a cake that had not been 
cut. Thinking all the time of the agreement and the shaikh’s signature, which we 
still had to get, I kept on whispering to Captain Denison such words as: “Let him 
have it. Keep him happy – that’s the main thing.”1076 
 
In this, Dickson was encouraging Denison to break with Britain’s long-term protocol by 
which the Trucial elites were not rewarded for their compliance. His tacit agreement to 
‘play along’ with the Sheikh, and ultimately allow him to plunder the Captain’s cabin, 
also went against Britain’s traditional demonstration of imperial resolution. The clash 
between the two officials broke Britain’s long-term policy. In it, Denison represented 
the old ways of the Pax Britannica, while Dickson’s methods demonstrated the painful 
wrench that was now necessary to realign Britain’s hundred-year rule with the post-war 
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world and the requirements of aviation.  
With the sheikh loaded with spoils, Dickson seized the hour: ‘I got out the air 
agreement, had the table cleared, and ink, pen and blotting pad placed in position.’ At 
this point, Saqar announced that he must wait for the sun to go down and say his 
prayers. Until sunset, therefore, the Sheikh sat on a carpet ‘spread on deck by his 
servants, drinking coffee and talking volubly to his wazir.’ The prayers which followed 
occupied an additional fifteen minutes. The British officials, Dickson reported, had a 
long and wearisome wait. In an informal letter of 26 July to the Senior Naval Officer, 
Denison paid tribute to Dickson’s ‘amazing patience (tried like I have never seen 
patience tried before).’1077 The delay gave Saqar time for further reflection, and after his 
prayer time he came up with a new demand. He announced that he would sign the 
agreement only upon condition that he would be given a one gun salute, not only as he 
left the Bideford that evening but subsequently by ‘every warship that came to port and 
was boarded by him.’ This was a mark of honour not afforded previously to a Sharjah 
sheikh. For Denison (who had particularly resented the loss of the teaspoons and had 
been placated only by Dickson offering to buy him a new set) this was too much: ‘Not if 
King George himself asked for such a favour would I grant it! Does not the sheikh know 
that Admiralty regulations forbid all salutes after the sun goes down?’ In Dickson’s 
informal account to an acquaintance, this request set the two officials against each other, 
and the ensuing argument was ‘fast and furious.’  
 
Fig. 6.8. The Sheikh of Abu 
Dhabi goes out to a British ship, 
1937.1078 
 
This disagreement 
demonstrated the tensions 
between the old and new 
relationships on the Trucial 
Coast, and also had cultural 
implications. In opposing 
Denison, Dickson was pleading on behalf of Saqar, and thus mediating between the 
rigid protocol of British officialdom and the more fluid and accommodating methods of 
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the Arab world. It had been, Dickson wrote, ‘a regular “tug of war” between the Shaikh 
and myself lasting on the second day from 8 am to 9 pm (all alone on shore in smelly 
and hot surroundings), and the third day from 10 am till 7.30pm on HMS Bideford. I 
wore him out in the end and won. It was a stiff fight.’1079 However, the stiff fight had 
also been between Denison and Dickson, representing old and new worlds respectively. 
Dickson won the argument, and at about 7.30p.m., the ‘delighted’ Sheikh signed the 
agreement. Afterwards, as Saqar left the Bideford, Denison, in irritation, fired the 
agreed gun salute by means of a live round from a four inch gun which, Dickson 
recorded, ‘went off with a deafening roar that nearly blew us off the quarter-deck and as 
nearly sank the [Sheikh’s] launch…What an experience! We thanked God and entered 
the cabin again, where we gulped down a strong whisky and soda apiece.’1080 The gun 
salute not only signified to the Trucial Arabs ashore that the Sheikh was honoured by 
the British, but it also signalled the end of the Pax Britannica on the Trucial Coast. 
Fig. 6.9. The Sharjah ‘Rest House’ and landing ground, 1933.1081 
 
With the air agreement achieved, Dickson and Denison could once more unite 
on common ground. At this juncture Denison, his temper now restored, ‘with a grin’ 
produced the Simla telegram. Dickson was ‘dumbfounded, but not ill-pleased,’ 
calculating that he could hardly be sacked after obtaining the air concession for the 
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British. Denison’s withholding of the telegram reveals how he too, away from the 
strictures of British protocol, had, like Dickson, mediated between the two worlds. 
Together the officials now ‘concocted a tactful radiogram to Simla, explaining our 
success.’ Dickson and Denison connived to explain ‘how great a storm had raged whilst 
I was for three days ashore, making communication between the ship and myself quite 
impossible – a necessary lie.’1082 In another communication, to the Senior Naval Officer, 
Denison also did his best to smooth over the episode and show Dickson in the best light, 
pronouncing that ‘In my opinion I think that the Government was more than fortunate in 
having Colonel Dickson on the spot.’1083 Perhaps it was this recommendation that 
helped Dickson avoid disciplinary action over the promise of the gun salute, which, he 
admitted, did ‘scare’ him. The official reaction to Dickson’s achievement is hard to 
gauge. On 30 July 1932 Biscoe’s successor, Trenchard Fowle, who had by that time 
arrived at Bushire, wrote to Dickson: ‘Many congratulations on your Shargah [sic] 
coup. Official pats on the back from His Majesty’s Government and the Government of 
India are in this mail.’1084 However, once the dust had settled, there may have been some 
official disapproval of Dickson’s actions, for in his annual report, written at the end of 
the year, Fowle complained that Dickson’s agreement ‘offered very favourable terms to 
the Shaikh.’1085 Even so, there seems to have been no long term ill-effect, for by 
September 1934 Saqar was being accorded a three-gun salute, while Dickson retained 
his Kuwait posting until his retirement in 1936.  
With the signing of the Sharjah air concession agreement, the two parties, 
British and Arab, entered into a pact which was mutually beneficial, and which also 
established a state of interdependency. As the introduction of air facilities meant that 
Britain imposed a greater degree of formal control on the Trucial Coast, so the British 
now relied upon the support and involvement of Saqar and the Trucial Arabs. For 
example, local people were employed as guards for the landing ground, and co-
operation was required for obtaining water and food supplies. In this way, the Trucial 
Arabs facilitated Britain’s air services, and so indirectly helped to maintain Britain’s 
imperial prestige. Trucial cooperation also implicated the British in a new and 
unprecedented form of intervention, by which they supported and protected an 
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individual sheikh. This had not previously been necessary on the Coast, but the 
requirements of aviation caused the British to change their methods. As Saqar was 
responsible for guarding the aerodrome, and also owned the Rest House (Figs. 6.9 and 
6.10), his deposition by forces hostile to the British could have serious consequences for 
the air route. To prevent such a crisis it was in Britain’s interests to protect him. Saqar 
had feared that collaboration with the British would lead to his assassination, but over 
time his fears were assuaged, and indeed, his status as protégé and agent of the British 
ensured that he grew in power and stature. The money he received rendered him 
dependent upon the British, but it also removed him from reliance upon local support 
and funding, for example from the pearling industry. Although, Obaid A. Butti states, 
after the drawing up of the agreement some merchants ‘denounced’ Saqar’s ‘unilateral’ 
aerodrome agreement, they were ‘ignored.’ A number were so infuriated by Saqar’s 
disregard of their views that they decamped to Ras al Khaimah ‘as a form of protest,’ 
but this had little effect, for the Sheikh was now ‘economically independent,’ and 
therefore to some extent politically independent.1086  
Fig. 6.10. Imperial Airways’ HP42 Hadrian under maintenance at Sharjah, 1930s.1087 
 
Conclusion 
At the beginning of 1932, prospects for the continuation of the Gulf air sector looked 
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grim. Early efforts to achieve the route via the Trucial Coast had shown the extent to 
which aviation caused dissent, not only between the British and Trucial sides, but also 
among the elites of each. Britain’s long-term system of rule had allowed, and even 
encouraged, Trucial independence. This had predisposed the people to fear intrusion in 
the life of the Coast, and therefore they rebuffed British efforts to achieve aviation 
facilities by tried and tested methods. Although the two breakthroughs of March 1932 - 
Britain’s decision to employ landplanes and Sharjah’s offer of assistance – would 
eventually synthesise in the aerodrome agreement, the effects of Britain’s long-term 
methods had first to be overcome.  
 
Fig. 6.11. Today 
Sharjah Rest 
House is a 
museum (Al 
Mahatta 
Museum). The 
doors (blue) of the 
former bedrooms 
can be seen under 
the covered 
walkway.1088 
 
The 
British had bound 
themselves with 
the Trucial Arabs 
into a relationship which had become fossilised. Britain’s air demands required this to 
be broken - and involved collaboration initially and partnership thereafter. Therefore 
any solution required changes to the nature of existing relationships, and implied the 
destruction of the century-old Pax Britannica system. The transition would be painful 
on both sides. Stepping out of the artificial timewarp required each side to enter the 
world of the other. The British had to change their style and systems of long-term 
control and engage with the despised local inhabitants in a new way. As the British 
sought permission for the landing ground, they proposed not only to enter physically 
into the Trucial Coast, but also to play a role in its internal life and politics. To the 
Arabs, the acceptance of air services represented the loss of independence, for they had 
to accept a permanent foreign presence for the first time, with all that that entailed.  
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The British also had to overcome problems in their administrative arrangements 
that conspired to create delay. The insistence of Imperial Airways in March 1932 
regarding the use of landplanes allowed some differences to be laid aside, but tension 
remained between Imperial Airways and the Air Ministry, and only by means of behind-
the-scenes manoeuvring could progress be made. Meanwhile the Trucial Arabs had to 
weigh up their options. Like the Persians they did not desire British aviation services 
per se, but recognised the aviation issue as part of a larger diplomatic game in which 
Britain’s need for air facilities provided a bargaining chip. They had a number of 
powerful incentives for coming to terms with the British, all of which had their roots in 
the Coast’s economic decline. The main impetus came from Sheikh Saqar, who was 
motivated by the financial benefit and associated increase in security that the aerodrome 
deal offered him personally. Even though Britain’s imperial reputation and strength in 
the Gulf had been weakened by factors such as the rise of Ibn Saud and Reza Shah on 
either side of the Gulf, and nationalism in India, the Sharjah elites calculated that the 
British were still the paramount power in the region. In addition, in adopting a pro-
British stance, they also acknowledged that there was more to be gained from 
cooperation with the British than from existing trading – whether smuggling or the 
declining pearl trade. The British made the better ally, and therefore the Trucial 
inhabitants were prepared to put their lot in with them.  
Dickson and Saqar became the native mediators on their respective sides. In 
many respects Dickson embodied the antidote to the negative effects of Britain’s long-
term policy. He was unlike other British officials with whom the Trucial Arabs 
normally dealt, representing a break from the tired protocol of the Pax Britannica era. 
His language skills and cultural orientation allowed perfect communication in 
negotiations, and his friendship with Ibn Saud must have helped appease the more 
conservative elements on the Coast. These characteristics enabled him to act as a 
catalyst, bridging the gap between the two sides. Even so, the fact that the negotiations 
drove Dickson to the limits of his tolerance demonstrated the scope of the intrusion that 
aviation implied into both the Coast and the long-term relationship between Arabs and 
British. The achievement of the aviation partnership had required a retreat from 
traditional protocol that was both protracted and painful. Nevertheless, it constituted the 
lesser of two evils, having saved the British from the imperial humiliation that would 
have resulted had the route failed.  
As the air lobby had foreseen two decades earlier, when the Second World War 
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broke out in 1939, civil infrastructure on imperial air routes was turned over to become 
a military resource. As soon as war was declared, civil services on the India route 
ceased and Imperial Airways began to operate in conjunction with British Airways. By 
the following April the two concerns had merged to create a new national airline, 
British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC). The India route would prove vital to 
British war interests. After the RAF took over the Sharjah landing ground in 1940 it was 
extended, and subsequently became a key regional air base.  
 
Chapter Seven: Retrospect and Conclusion 
 
The research set out to discover the causes of British slowness in developing the civil 
air route to India. Although a route had been pioneered before the end of the War, 
eleven years would pass before passenger through-services began, and a further three 
before the location of the route was established on a permanent basis. In the thesis, 
explanations have been sought through an examination of the development of British 
imperial aviation policy between 1918 and 1932. A number of concepts have been 
investigated in relation to aviation applied to Britain’s imperial purposes, and to the 
history of aviation as a new technology. The overall finding is that the progress of the 
India route was held back by a combination of interconnected factors operating in both 
Britain and the Persian Gulf region. The conclusions, which are discussed below, may 
be grouped in three categories. The first category relates to the imperial and economic 
value of imperial aviation, perceptions of Britain’s imperial potency, and the character 
of the ‘official’ and imperial mind responsible for civil aviation policy. The second 
category relates to the technological choices made by the British, and the third category 
to the effects of Britain’s long-term policy and administrative arrangements in London, 
Delhi, Persia, and on the Trucial Coast, and changed circumstances in the last two areas.  
In the first category, relating to imperial and economic value the research has 
shown that, in accordance with the theory of Cain and Hopkins,1089 the impetus of 
imperialism originates in the empire’s core. Therefore, as aviation was driven from 
London out towards empire territories, the delay of the India route originated in causes 
located within the core. The primary reason for the slowness of the route’s development 
was that - with the exception of the false start of the Imperial Airship Scheme between 
1924 and 1930 - the British were reluctant to provide financial support for imperial 
aviation. Cain argues that in the interwar period, leading gentlemanly capitalists ‘strove 
mightily to preserve and extend’ the empire.1090 However, the Government’s 
unwillingness to back imperial aviation suggests that officials regarded it as being of 
limited value either in preserving or extending the empire. In terms of traditional 
imperial development, transportation had generally been funded by private investors, 
and there seemed to be no precedent and little incentive for funding in cases where 
profit seemed uncertain. For example, in the nineteenth century, capital backing had 
been forthcoming only where financial return seemed guaranteed, an example being 
railway development. The expansion of rail traffic had been identified as an effect, or 
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result, of economic development1091 between the metropole and empire territories, rather 
than the cause, and investment could therefore be seen as a safe prospect. Investors also 
anticipated that their backing would facilitate further economic development. Such 
calculations could not be made in the case of imperial aviation in the interwar years. Its 
economic justification was unclear, and it deviated from the earlier land-based and 
maritime transportation development models in being neither the product, nor the 
obvious promoter, of economic advancement. In any case, by the 1920s, the progress 
made in the nineteenth century had provided Britain and the empire with land and sea 
transport that was adequate to fulfil existing needs.  
Therefore, at the Armistice, the development of imperial aviation and hence of 
the India route depended upon that of civil aviation. Generally, although wartime 
spending had ensured that Britain possessed the elements necessary for the pursuit of a 
forward policy – for example, trained personnel and infrastructure - the role of civil 
aviation in the post-war world was unclear. Advocates put forward arguments about the 
benefits that commercial aviation offered in speeding up the transportation of 
passengers, mail, and freight, but the private sector was unwilling or unable to risk 
capital for uncertain returns. With private capital not forthcoming, it was left to the 
Government to fund imperial aviation. However, in a difficult period of post-war 
overstretch and re-adjustment, aviation development was given low priority. The need for 
financial constraint also strengthened Britain’s natural distaste for subsidisation, and 
this, together with the Treasury’s reluctance to assist, ensured that commitment of 
public funds was limited. Even though the Government would later decide to subsidise 
passenger transportation, and as a consequence Imperial Airways was started in 1924, 
into the 1930s officials tended to favour Churchill’s dictum that aviation must ‘fly by 
itself.’ Any deviation from this policy, for aeroplane if not airship services, was made 
only grudgingly, but the Government’s limited provision for commercial aviation meant 
that development could be neither rapid nor extensive.  
Attitudes to aviation were different in other European countries; for example, the 
French and German Governments readily provided ample financial support, anticipating 
that aviation had a key role to play in future communications and commerce. Robin 
Higham suggests that in the interwar years, ‘aerial might was rapidly becoming the 
potential measure of power.’1092 Aviation appeared to offer military and economic 
advantages to European powers, and also provided opportunities for them to try 
themselves against their peers, and demonstrate superiority over less-developed nations. 
As it was the German challenge that became a key factor motivating Britain to pursue 
aviation, to an extent, Britain’s incentive to invest in imperial aviation derived from 
calculations of the value of prestige. The Germans gave aeroplanes and airships a 
central role as a tool of empire, but their initiative threatened Britain in a number of 
ways. In airshipping, the British were provoked by the success of the Zeppelins, which 
boosted Germany’s national and imperial prestige. For a few years the British 
responded by commitment to airships, and by competition with Germany via the 
Imperial Airship Scheme but, with hindsight, it appears that imperial romanticism and 
inflated ideas about the value of airships to imperial prestige dominated more hard-
headed business calculations. Meanwhile, in aeroplane aviation, the British never 
engaged whole-heartedly with international competition, and this had both military and 
civil implications in Persia and the Indian periphery. There, Junkers’ domestic network 
allowed the Germans direct access into the Indian periphery and up to the borders of 
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India. The strength of the German alliance with Persia and the Soviet Union pushed 
Britain out of the imperial air race in Persia, and also reduced British chances of 
becoming providers of Persia’s domestic aviation services. German aircraft construction 
and route agreements with the Soviet Union also had the potential to allow the Soviets 
entry into the Gulf region by air. Thus sidelined, the British were forced to retreat to the 
Gulf’s Arabian side, where there was no contest.  
While it has been argued, for example by Cain and Hopkins, that after the First 
World War the empire was robust in relative economic terms, the story of the India 
route demonstrates that, in relation to aviation at least, imperial policy-making was 
neither confident nor proactive. The thesis inclines towards the view of Gordon Pirie, 
who argues that British imperial aviation ‘tells about the problematic implementation of 
imperialism.’ Imperial Airways’ lacklustre performance, Pirie continues, was ‘a window 
onto late imperial desire, delusion and dismay.’1093 Jeremy Paxman has proposed that 
‘The British empire had begun with a series of pounces. Then it marched. Next it 
swaggered. Finally, after wandering aimlessly for a while, it slunk away.’1094 The 
evidence presented here suggests that during the 1920s at least, Britain was indeed 
‘wandering aimlessly.’ While the theory of Cain and Hopkins posits economic strength 
as proof of British potency,1095 the faltering progress of the India route offers a different 
perspective. It suggests a failure of management, and of vitality, imagination, and 
cohesion in wider imperial policy. Therefore aviation policy reveals an essential 
weakness in Britain’s imperial administration, in that the British were neither able to 
make up their mind, nor to impose their will sufficiently strongly to drive through the 
India route rapidly or effectively. This was demonstrated, for example, by Imperial 
Airways withdrawal from Europe to seek the less challenging skies of the empire, and 
by the defeat of British diplomacy in Persia.  
For a technology that was intended to facilitate communications, aviation proved 
peculiarly divisive. Attempts at policy-making highlighted, created, or exacerbated 
tensions in imperial administration both within and between London departments, and 
between the governments of Britain and India. Robinson and Gallagher’s theory of the 
‘official mind’1096 has been a useful concept in the examination of the India route. 
Whereas these writers seem to regard the ‘official mind’ as a coherent unit, imperial 
aviation, by its nature, touched upon a wide range of Governmental affairs and the lack 
of a united viewpoint among the multiplicity of officials involved became a force 
working against coherence. The competition of views and attitudes jostling for influence 
resulted in a fragmentation of the ‘official mind,’ and hence of responsibility for 
imperial aviation, and the splitting and grouping of officials in temporary alliances, as 
and when expedient, brought about a lack of definition in policy-making. The unity of 
the ‘official mind’ was also undermined by the power of individual officials. While 
there was a lack of coherence in the thinking of elites, there was also a remarkable level 
of coherence. The individualism of officials operated within the confines of a shared 
mind brought about by upbringing and background. As the sphere of the official mind 
was bounded to a great extent by the culture and background of its members, there was 
both latitude and flexibility.  
While on the one hand, therefore, many officials were implicated in the ‘official 
mind,’ on the other hand individuals could have considerable influence. This resulted in 
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a vacuum which, for good or ill, allowed a small number of strong personalities an 
inordinate amount of power and the ability to exert undue influence. They were able, 
directly and indirectly, to sway, or even commandeer, the ‘official mind’ responsible for 
aviation policy at the national level. Therefore the progress of aviation was driven by, 
and often depended upon, the personal conviction and ability of officials such as 
Churchill, Burney, Hoare, Thomson, and ultimately Dickson. As a result, British 
imperial air policy was as varied as the personalities of the officials responsible. While 
Churchill had an understanding of the potential of technology, he did not find it 
expedient to further civil aviation policy. Hoare, on the other hand, had been educated 
in ‘cricket and the classics,’1097 but in his role as Secretary of State for Air he applied 
himself avidly to the study of aviation and then dedicated himself to its development. 
Thomson sought to make his own mark by identifying closely with airships, bringing to 
fruition Hoare’s policy while adding his own ‘Socialist’ element. Direct and unmediated 
influence on policy was perhaps most obvious in the case of Dickson, whose personal 
intervention enabled the British to secure the final victory at Sharjah. Indeed, without 
the contribution of Dickson, the India through-route route might well have lapsed, for a 
time at least. Clearly, these individuals were united by an enthusiasm for aviation that 
transcended political boundaries. Edgerton claims that aviation was the preserve of the 
‘Right,’1098 and certainly there was no clear direction in civil air policy until the 
formation of the Conservative Government in October 1922. The mission to further 
imperial aviation was taken up with as much fervour by the Socialist Thomson as it had 
been by the Conservative Hoare. In addition, in the House of Commons in 1922, 
L’Estrange Malone, Communist MP and experienced aviator, clear-sightedly 
championed aeroplanes as opposed to airships.  
The second category of conclusion concerns the relationship between 
technological development and aviation policy. The power of individuals over the India 
route meant that Britain’s efforts to develop aviation technology were circumscribed by 
the experience of its gentlemanly elites, the members of which, by background and 
education, tended to place little emphasis upon technology. The findings of the thesis to 
some extent agree with Edgerton that Britain did not experience a ‘failure’ of 
technology.1099 The research has found that, as Edgerton asserts, technology, commerce, 
and economics were important factors in British policy-making and that officials did 
indeed support aviation and aircraft manufacturing industries throughout the period. The 
research also suggests that the level and strength of this support was limited and 
vacillating, and not as forceful and coherent as Edgerton proposes. Edgerton opposes 
the idea that gentlemen avoided technological issues, and indeed, Hoare, Thomson and 
others dedicated themselves to the study of aviation with impressive dedication. The 
research offers less support for Edgerton’s denial that gentlemen were ill-prepared by 
the nature of their education system and by their inclination to pursue an effective 
aviation policy. Edgerton attacks what he describes as a view long-held by historians 
that British interwar elites were ‘pathetically idealistic about the world…antiscientific, 
anti-technological and anti-industrial.’1100 However, in the case of Lord Thomson, while 
he personally made every effort to embrace and promote airship science and 
technology, he certainly remained ‘pathetically idealistic’ about the romance of 
Britain’s airships and their potential to fulfil an imperial role.  
Personally ill-equipped to decide upon technical issues, Air Ministry officials 
had to rely upon experts who knew the field, but in the case of airships, the extent to 
                                            
1097 Ibid, p. 268. 
1098 Edgerton, England and the Aeroplane, p. 47. 
1099 Edgerton, The Shock of the Old, p. xv. 
1100 Ibid, p. xiii. 
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which, behind the scenes, the opinions of these experts were heeded is open to question. 
The reception of the technological arguments put forward by Frank Rose, the engineer 
turned MP who spoke against airship technology in the House of Commons, suggests 
that views that had the potential to impede Government policy may have been side-
lined. With hindsight, the outcome of the Imperial Airship Scheme demonstrated clearly 
that the airship experts to whom the Air Ministry turned for advice were unreliable; the 
Government was badly advised regarding its decision to support airships rather than 
aeroplanes, and the Cardington effort resulted in a craft that was technologically 
inadequate for the task given to it. Contributing to this error was confusion among 
officials about the relative technological capabilities of the two forms of aircraft. British 
officials were both seduced and challenged by the success of Germany’s Zeppelin 
programme. This led them to believe that airships were able to provide a ‘quick fix’ to 
the problems of distance between empire territories, provided the economic advantages 
of a superior payload, and could into the bargain also give Britain imperial prestige. The 
truth that the future of long-distance air transport lay instead with aeroplanes was 
obscured by a number of factors. Therefore, officials inverted the value of the two types 
of craft, and were taken in by the size of airships, rather as they hoped their imperial 
subjects would be. Resorting to the use of airships as the chosen instrument for the 
provision of imperial aviation suggests that still in the interwar years the ‘official mind’ 
valued the power of bluff and imperial prestige in its dealings with imperial territories.  
As aeroplane services did not promise to promote these, they failed to capture 
the collective imagination of empire administrators. The potential of aeroplanes was 
hidden by their state of technological development. In following the airshipping lead of 
the Germans, the British took a gamble but made the wrong technological choice, and 
over-resourced an inappropriate technology. A negative implication of this was that 
well-founded fears about the viability and safety of airships were transferred to 
aeroplanes, and thus the reputation of a valid form of aviation was damaged by its 
association with an invalid one. Worse, public money spent on airships diverted funds 
from aeroplane development, and in particular from that of aircraft capable of flying 
long-distance routes. Such was the state of aeroplane technology that these craft seem to 
have had less credibility as a tool of empire. Relatively small and cramped, aeroplanes 
offered transportation that was far more noisy, cramped, and dangerous than other 
modes of international travel. They could not appeal to elites whose ideals of long-
distance travel were based upon the comforts of ocean liners and first-class train travel. 
The underfunding of Imperial Airways also left Britain unable to compete with the 
technological challenges presented by its Continental peers. Imperial Airways’ retreat 
from Europe in 1926 provided less tangible benefits. It allowed the British to switch to a 
concentration on the development of imperial routes and hence retain resources for 
facilities intended for their own sole use. In addition, it enabled them to evade scrutiny 
of their aviation progress, but also allowed them to withdraw from a competitive 
commercial and technological environment. In these circumstances, the incentive to 
pursue technological advance was partly removed. As a result, the Gulf sector continued 
to be operated by the comfortable but ponderous HP-42 Hannibals, but over time they 
became the subject of international derision.  
The third category of conclusion concerns Britain’s pursuit of aviation policy in 
Persia and on the Trucial Coast, and the extent to which it required the British to accept 
new imperial realities. The story of the Indian air route has suggested a degree of 
decentralisation of power from the British metropole. In relation to aviation, the Indian 
administration operated as a separate economic core, equipped with its own systems and 
structures. While India therefore enjoyed a degree of autonomy from London, the 
separation brought about fracture in administrative arrangements. The India Office – 
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located in London but under the Government of India – was caught uncomfortably 
between two masters, while in the Gulf region, air route progress suffered from 
diffusion of responsibility. In Tehran, negotiations were the responsibility of Foreign 
Office diplomats, but on the Trucial Coast they came under the jurisdiction of the 
Political Resident, who reported to the Government of India. The lack of clarity 
between London and India over the question of authority for imperial aviation both 
exposed and widened gaps in interest and purpose between London and Delhi. The 
research has shown that in these circumstances, London’s lack of administrative grip 
allowed the Indian Government to evade responsibility for imperial aviation policy, and 
even to place obstacles in the path of the London authorities. India responded to London 
not in the manner of a subordinate entity but by resistance to its authority and will, 
causing practical problems in the determination of a coherent aviation policy both 
within India itself and in the Gulf region, part of the Indian periphery.  
In Persia and on the Trucial Coast, Britain’s long-term policy proved a 
stumbling block to the early formation of the collaboration and co-operation without 
which, as the British found to their cost, air facilities could not easily be achieved. The 
actions and attitudes of imperial administrators, continuing to function in the traditional 
manner, worked against the new style of relationships with local elites that were now 
necessary. The severity of the responses of the Persians and Trucial Arabs demonstrated 
that aviation involved an incursion into sovereignty in a way that was unprecedented in 
the history of British control. Furthermore, British demands came during a period in 
which elites desired to expel, rather than embrace, foreign influence. In Persia, although 
Britain’s long-term patronage of the elites seemed to promise diplomatic advantages, 
the rise of Reza Shah had strengthened nationalism and given Persians the confidence to 
defy the British. On the Trucial Coast the Pax Britannica, which had for a century 
proved an effective method of sustaining British power, was expected to facilitate 
negotiations. However, via aviation Britain now proposed the abandonment of their 
long-term policy of non-involvement. The Trucial Arabs not only positively resented 
foreign intrusion but were also uncertain and sensitive about the level of the Persian 
threat, while at the same time they entertained new suspicions about the power of the 
British to protect them.  
In earlier years the British had been able to bribe the Persians and bully the 
Trucial Arabs, but in the interwar period these tactics no longer worked. That the British 
resorted to bargaining revealed a fact that had hitherto not been apparent: rather than the 
state of dominance that the British had initially presumed, there existed a situation that 
more resembled a balance of power. In both Persia and on the Trucial Coast, local 
opposition rendered the British peculiarly powerless, and their long-term power, when 
put to the test in a new way by aviation, proved to be largely illusory. In Tehran, British 
diplomats found no method of reconciling their air aspirations with Persian desire for 
sovereignty. The systems and style of imperial control which the British had developed 
over centuries had now lost their potency. Persia’s ‘weapons of the weak’ proved so 
powerful that ultimately they defeated the British. The British had recognised that in 
Persia their air ambitions were obstructed by a lack of ‘levers,’ but they faced the same 
problem on the Trucial Coast. On the Trucial Coast, in attempting to drive through their 
will, they could no longer resort to the use of force. There, the Political Resident 
exercised power that was devolved directly from the Indian Viceroy, and hence, free 
from the restraints placed on the diplomats in Tehran, enjoyed the freedom of action 
allowed by the more pragmatic systems practised by the Government of India. Even so, 
the British experienced great difficulty in gaining local approval.  
Overall, the thesis has demonstrated the extent to which aviation forced change 
and new imperial realities upon the British. Their efforts to achieve the air route resulted 
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in several major departures from traditional policy. Firstly, to subsidise Imperial 
Airways the British abandoned their long-term refusal to provide public money for 
commercial transportation projects. Secondly, in adopting the Imperial Airship Scheme 
and agreeing to fund the R101 project wholly and to purchase the R100, they embraced 
responsibility for civil aviation manufacturing and services. Thirdly, on the Trucial 
Coast, the British undertook new ways of dealing with local elites. Forced to adopt a 
conciliatory policy, they abandoned the traditional ‘gunboat diplomacy’ for more 
collaborative diplomacy. However, although the imperial climb-down made at Sharjah 
to accommodate the Trucial Arabs brought a successful outcome, it was achieved only 
by means of Dickson, whose presence was little more than an accident.  
Ultimately, although the abandonment of subsidisation ideology and the 
manoeuvring at Sharjah were painful and the funding of airships proved disastrous, the 
British eventually achieved the completion of the India route. This demonstrated that, 
when expedient, the ‘official mind’ could be flexible, and that the British were capable 
of departing from their long-term policy and adapting to changed circumstances and 
conditions.  
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